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Abstract
ROMAN TRAGEDY AND MEDICINE:
LANGUAGE AND IMAGERY OF ILLNESS IN SENECA AND CELSUS

by
MICHAEL P. GOYETTE

Adviser: Professor Craig A. Williams
This dissertation analyzes the language and imagery of illness in selected tragedies and, to a
lesser extent, the philosophical prose of the first-century CE Roman tragic poet and philosopher
Seneca, reading these works with and against De Medicina, a nearly contemporary
encyclopedic Latin prose text on medical theory and practice by the Roman encyclopediast
Celsus. Inspired by previous studies of classical Greek tragedy together with the largely
contemporary body of Greek prose writings on medicine known as the Hippocratic Corpus, my
dissertation moves the discussion to Latin literature and is the first extended study to do so. I
aim not only to provide insight into Seneca’s and Celsus’ writings, with particular attention to
the question of vocabulary usage, but also to show how a shared language of human illness can
inform a range of textual genres in Greco-Roman antiquity, from the prose literature of
knowledge to philosophy to mythological poetry. I demonstrate that reading Senecan tragedy
in tandem with Celsus’ prose encyclopedia on medicine can shed light upon how illness
functions as a prominent although previously overlooked theme in Seneca’s plays. At the same
time, my comparisons provide insight into vocabulary usage and rhetorical strategies in Celsus’
De Medicina. My project examines both “physical” and “mental” forms of illness, calling into
question the linguistic and conceptual boundaries between such categories as they are
explored in the works of Seneca and Celsus, and as they relate to Roman medicine more
generally. My readings are sensitive to cultural and historical differences, encouraging reexamination of modern ideas and assumptions about illness, health, and other aspects of
medicine; my project thus makes a key contribution to the developing field of medical
humanities.
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Chapter I
Introduction
Illness is a major theme in both Greek and Roman tragedy. One particularly well-known
example from Greek tragedy is Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannos, which opens with a plague
ravaging the city of Thebes1 due to the presence of Oedipus, the incestuous patricide, who is
himself characterized as suffering in a state of illness. Another example is Euripides’ Medea,
whose title character is described by her nurse as “sick with love” for her treacherous
husband2, and whose own speech illustrates that she is losing her mental balance3 as she plots
her revenge. Scholars have recognized the centrality of the theme of illness in these and other
Greek tragedies, and have given much consideration to how such works portray the human
experience of illness, both physical and mental.4 Analyses have often focused upon the use of
language, looking to the terminology for symptoms, diseases, and etiologies in Hippocratic
writings as a point of comparison. This method of investigation has proven to be illuminating
and thought-provoking not only because both sets of texts are rich in language and thought
pertinent to illness, but also because the Greek tragedies (5th century BCE) were written around
roughly the same time period as many influential works from the Hippocratic Corpus (5th
century BCE and later).

1

See esp. Oedipus Tyrannos 22-30.
e.g. ἔρωτι θυμὸν ἐκπλαγεῖσ’ ᾿Ιάσονος (8); νῦν δ’ ἐχθρὰ πάντα, καὶ νοσεῖ τα φίλτατα (Medea 16)
3
See esp. Medea 1040-1080.
4
Here, I use the categories “physical” and “mental” illness in keeping with popular usage, but my analysis
(especially in Chapter 4) will show that this mental/physical dichotomy often fits poorly with conceptualizations of
illness in Greek and Latin literature.
2

1

Despite this recent scholarly interest in comparing the terminology of illness in Greek
tragedy and the Hippocratics, significantly less research has been conducted on the relationship
between Roman tragedy and medical prose, whether in Latin or Greek. This lacuna in
scholarship is surprising, as many Roman tragedies were deeply inspired and influenced by the
earlier Greek tragedies, and the themes of illness so prevalent in the Greek plays are distinctly
present in many of the surviving Latin tragedies. Although the mid-first-century CE tragedies of
Seneca—the only Latin author from whom entire tragedies survive intact—provide fruitful
opportunities for analyzing representations of illness, this matter has been given little scholarly
attention. Nor, to my knowledge, has there been any work done on the language and imagery
of illness in the other (fragmentarily surviving) Latin tragedians besides Seneca, such as
Naevius, Ennius, Pacuvius, and Accius. This dissertation, then, performs the first extended
study of language and imagery of illness in Roman tragedy in general and in Senecan tragedy
specifically, reading five of Seneca’s tragedies in particular, as well as key passages from his
prose works, alongside Aulus Cornelius Celsus’ De Medicina (On Medicine), a nearly
contemporary encyclopedic prose text on medical theory and practice. In short, my
dissertation draws inspiration from previous studies comparing works of Greek tragedy and
contemporaneous medical writings, moving the discussion to Latin literature and providing new
perspectives on the works of both Seneca and Celsus.
There are several reasons that may explain the dearth of scholarship on the relationship
between Seneca and Celsus, and on the relationship between Roman tragedy and medical
writing more generally. First, it can be observed that Roman tragedy lacks certain direct
connections to illness, healing, and medicine intrinsic to the historical and performative
2

contexts of Greek tragedy. In fifth century Athens, for instance, tragedies were performed in a
theatre immediately adjacent to the temple of Asclepius, the Greek medical deity, which has
led some scholars to suggest that the phenomenon of Athenian tragedy bore connections with
the cult of Asclepius and thus the spheres of medicine and healing.5 When it comes to Senecan
drama, matters of performance are still much debated6, but there is no evidence of a theatrical
setting connected with the sphere of medicine or with Asclepius specifically. Also unlike
Seneca’s tragedies, some of the extant Greek tragedies were composed and/or performed
during periods of devastating plague, which has led some scholars to identify themes of illness
in Greek tragedies more readily and even to suggest that certain Greek tragedies were
informed by historical occurrences of illness. Mitchell-Boyask, for one, draws a strong link
between the great plagues that ravaged Athens in the second half of the fifth-century BCE and
Athenian tragedy’s increasing interest in themes of illness, as reflected in plays performed after
the outbreak of the plague, such as Sophocles’ Oedipus, Trachiniae and Philoctetes, and
Euripides’ Hippolytus.7 Seneca’s tragedies, on the other hand, do not appear to resonate with
any particular historical phenomenon of illness. Neither of these reasons, however, precludes
or detracts from the present study, which will in fact show that Seneca’s tragedies reveal a
strong interest in illness and other medically-related issues by pointing out resonances between
5

See Mitchell-Boyask 2008: 105-109; Wiles 1997: 43-44. Wickkiser discusses claims made by Plutarch (1st to 2nd
century CE) that Sophocles himself was involved in the introduction of the Asclepius cult in Athens. (Wickisser
2008: 66-67; see also Wilson 1947: 290; Clinton 1994) In addition, testimonia from the Etymologicum Magnum, a
twelfth century CE lexicon, state that Sophocles established an altar to Asclepius. (see Wickisser 2008: 66) While
Wickkiser and other scholars have expressed some skepticism about the reliability of these testimonies, they show
that connections were at least thought to exist between Athenian tragedy and medicine in antiquity and during
the medieval period.
6
Whether Seneca’s plays were performed, intended for performance, or even performable is not a central concern
for the purposes of this study, and it is not my aim to shed new light upon these issues. For a synopsis of the
various perspectives on these thorny and unresolved questions, see Erasmo 2004: 136-137; Pratt 1983: 16-21.
7
Mitchell-Boyask 2008: see esp. 105; see also Craik 2001: 87.

3

language and imagery in Seneca’s tragedies and in Celsus’ De Medicina. My comparisons will
also identify instances in which Seneca’s representations of illness and language usage diverge
from descriptions of illness and language usage in Celsus, thus supplying a multi-faceted
perspective on contemporary discourse concerning illness.
Seneca and Celsus
Before commenting further on my methodology and scholarship that has influenced it, some
background information about Seneca and Celsus is in order. Lucius Annaeus Seneca, also
known as Seneca the Younger, served as a tutor and adviser to the emperor Nero. Seneca was
born sometime between 8 BCE and 1 BCE, and he lived until 65 CE, when he was forced to
commit suicide after being accused of involvement in the Pisonian conspiracy against Nero. 8
Seneca produced a varied assortment of writings, including philosophical essays, letters
(Epistulae) often concerned with issues in the realm of moral philosophy, a satiric prosimetric
text on the death of the emperor Claudius, three essays written in the form of letters which
make up a body of texts known as the Consolations, and tragedies, which may or may not have
been intended for performance. Of the ten tragedies traditionally grouped in the Senecan
corpus, two—Octavia and Hercules Oetaeus—are generally considered the work of an unknown
author who was strongly influenced by the works of Seneca.9 My study does not delve into
Octavia, but takes some brief glances at Hercules Oetaeus, setting aside questions of authorship

8

As Miriam Griffin notes in her biography on Seneca, there is scant evidence concerning Seneca’s life before 41.
Based upon ancient sources, Griffin infers that Seneca could have been born in 8, 4, or 1 BCE, but she thinks that
he was most likely born between 4 and 1 BCE. (Griffin 1976: 34)
9
Octavia is typically rejected because it refers to historical events which occurred after Seneca’s death, while
Hercules Oetaeus is often considered spurious because of its “excessive length”. (see Pratt 1983: 12)

4

in the interest of comparing language usage.10 It is not a goal of this study to attempt to resolve
these questions.
Many of Seneca’s philosophical works espouse ideas associated with Stoic philosophy and,
like other works influenced by Stoicism, often reflect an “obsession with…sickness”.11
Commenting on Seneca’s writings more generally, Busch has observed that “Seneca’s prose
teems with characters oppressed by serious illness” 12, including psychological forms of illness.
While the relationship between Seneca’s prose writings and tragedies is highly complex13 and
has been the subject of much debate14, the obsession with illness which is so pronounced in
works of Senecan prose is, as I will show, strikingly present in Seneca’s tragedies, although, to
date, this matter has been given only limited attention. Some scholars have even suggested
that this interest in illness which pervades so many of Seneca’s works can be traced to Seneca’s
own personal experiences with illness.15 While enticing, the idea that Seneca’s own personal
experience influenced him to write about the subject of illness is impossible to confirm or

10

Zanobi similarly admits Hercules Oetaeus into her analysis of Senecan tragedy on the basis that it is “much
indebted in phrasing and tone to the [other] Senecan [tragedies]”. (Zanobi 2014: 239 n. 75)
11
Rosenmeyer 1989: 136.
12
Busch cites Epistula 77 and Epistula 78 (6-10) as examples. (Busch 2009: 255) Nutton also comments that
Seneca is, in comparison with Cicero, “at ease with medical theories and terminologies.” (Nutton 2013: 161)
13
As Boyle aptly observes, “Seneca’s tragedies, textured though they are with Stoic ideas, exhibit a series of worldviews which are neither simply Stoic, nor simple.” (Boyle 2006: 198; see also 201) Hesk discerns a distinct
difference between Seneca’s philosophical prose and poetic tragedies: “Seneca expresses revulsion for…violent
entertainment in his philosophical writing and yet we see that the baroque descriptions of human suffering and
bloody violence in his tragedies are meant to be enjoyably disgusting.” (Hesk 2007: 88) On the complex role of
Stoic philosophy in the corpus of Senecan literature, see also Volk and Williams 2006: esp. 19-41; 43-55; 57-74.
14
Recent scholarship has tended to embrace the possibility of considering Senecan tragedy alongside Seneca’s
Stoic philosophical writings. Nussbaum, for instance, has argued that certain Senecan tragedies aim to develop
and test Stoic ideas about the passions (see Nussbaum 1994: 448-453). In past decades, it was less uncommon to
find scholarship which maintained that that the two genres should be read completely separately. (e.g. Dingel
1974)
15
Busch, for instance, suggests that Seneca’s interest in illness could be related to his own “personal struggle with
asthma, which left him feeling his own hold on life was tenuous.” (Busch 2009: 255; see also Edwards 1999: 253;
Noyes Jr. 1973: 224) Seneca discusses his personal experience with asthma in Epistula 54.

5

refute. Furthermore, while the impact of biographical realities of author on text can be
important, this is by no means the beginning or end of interpretation; such concerns are (at
best) ancillary to the present study’s close analysis of language and imagery.
Compared with Seneca, there is much less certainty concerning the details of the life,
educational background, and literary career of Aulus Cornelius Celsus.16 It is generally accepted
that Celsus was born around 25 BCE and that he lived until about 50 CE17, although these dates
are very much based upon conjecture. It is also unclear where Celsus was born and where he
lived18, although his use of the first person when discussing the medicinal hot springs at Baiae, a
city in the bay of Naples, might suggest possible residence in the area.19 The first century Latin
rhetorician Quintilian attests that Celsus wrote not only on medicine, but also works on
agriculture, military arts, rhetoric, philosophy, and jurisprudence, which together comprised a
vast cultural encyclopedia called the Artes.20 Of these works, only Celsus’ work on medicine, De
Medicina, survives in any substantial form21, and fortunately enough it survives almost
completely intact. Based upon certain known physicians and medical writers who are
mentioned in this work22, and the apparent lack of reference to any physicians or medical

16

For a more in depth examination of the life and career of Celsus, see Contino 1988: 13-50.
Allbutt 1921: 203-204; Mazzini 1999: 14.
18
It has been suggested that Celsus lived in either Italy or Gallia Narbonensis, but there is not strong evidence for
either suggestion, as Langslow notes (Langslow 2000: 43 and n. 123)
19
See De Medicina 2.17.1.2-5; 3.21.6.1-5. In each of these passages, Celsus uses the phrase super Baias in murtetis
habemus (as we have in the myrtle groves above Baiae), possibly indicating some personal familiarity with the
area. I would like to thank Philip Thibodeau for bringing these passages to my attention. To my knowledge, no
other scholar has commented on these possible clues as to where Celsus lived.
20
Institutio Oratoria 12.11.24.
21
Only fragments of other parts of Celsus’ Artes remain, surviving as quotations by later Latin authors. (see
Langslow 2000: 41)
22
e.g. Meges of Sidon, a surgeon who lived a little before the time of Celsus.
17
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writers known to lived after 50 CE, De Medicina is often dated to the reign of Tiberius23 and
sometimes to the reign of Nero24, making Celsus roughly contemporaneous with Seneca.25
Also rather uncertain is the role Celsus played within the world of medicine.26 His
compendia on various subjects demonstrate that Celsus had an array of interests outside of the
medical sphere. He is, for instance, frequently cited as an agricultural authority by the first
century CE author Columella.27 At the same time, we must be cautious about assuming that
Celsus was a practicing farmer, philosopher, jurist, or doctor simply because he wrote texts on
those subjects. While it is certainly possible that Celsus could have had expertise in these
various areas of knowledge and still belong to the ranks of the medical profession, it is perhaps
more likely, as scholars such as Scarborough have suggested, that Celsus was “not a ‘physician’
who practiced medicine, [but] merely a Roman compiler of a Hellenistic medical handbook”.28
It is also possible, as Scarborough acknowledges, that Celsus could have been both a
“physician” and a “compiler”29, but even ancient sources such as Pliny the Elder associate
Celsus more with the auctores than with the medici.30 There have long been attempts to place
Celsus into one box or another31, but as I discuss later in this introductory chapter, it is not so
simple to make firm distinctions between such groups in the historical context of the first
23

Contino 1988: 16-19; Mazzini 1999: 13-14; Meißner 1999: 201.
Nutton 2013: 376 n. 63; 382 n. 16; see also Allbutt 1921: 203-204.
25
Langslow discusses the issue of dating Celsus in more depth, and suggests, with some reservation, that Celsus
most likely wrote De Medicina sometime between 14 and 39 CE (Langslow 2000: 43-44). This is very close to the
time when Seneca’s tragedies and prose works were written.
26
See Meißner 1999: 201-202.
27
See De Re Rustica 1.1.14, 1.8.4, 2.2.15, 2.2.24-25. See also Scarborough 1969: 60.
28
Scarborough 1969: 59.
29
Scarborough 1969: 59.
30
As Scarborough points out, in Book 1 of Naturalis Historia Pliny lists his sources for the following books, and
Celsus is repeatedly cited as a source of information about medicine; meanwhile, nowhere in Pliny’s work is Celsus
ever described as a medicus himself. (see Scarborough 1969: 196; Spencer 1935: viii)
31
For a list of citations of modern scholars who have arguments about these issues, see Langslow 2000: 46 n. 130.
24
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century Roman Empire. In addition, it is rather puzzling that the scholarly tradition begins with
the assumption that we should pose the question whether Celsus was a practicing physician,
but not whether he was a practicing farmer, orator, jurist, philosopher, etc. The fact that
Celsus’ works on these subjects do not survive should not keep us from questioning his
relationship to these spheres of inquiry in the same way that scholars have questioned Celsus’
relationship to the world of medicine.
Equally unclear is Celsus’ intended audience, namely the question of whether his work was
meant for “laymen” or “professionals”. Although these categories were not definitively
differentiated in Celsus’ time period, Gourevitch maintains that Celsus must have written “for
the interested general public” because he decided to write about medical subjects in Latin,
instead of Greek, the traditional language of medical learning.32 While Celsus’ choice to write in
Latin may indeed have helped expand his potential audience to some degree, it must also be
borne in mind that only a small minority of people during Celsus’ time period would have
actually been able to read Celsus’ text. Indeed, Celsus’ audience still would have been limited
by the number of people who had the ability to read Latin at the level of his prose and who
were also interested in learning about medicine (as well as agriculture, jurisprudence,
philosophy, etc.), and by the number of people who actually had access to his text. While the
present study is not directly concerned with the issue of Celsus’ audience, the fact that Celsus’
work often includes pieces of common, “non-specialized” vocabulary (as this study will show)

32

Gourevtich refers to this choice as “an absolutely unprecedented undertaking” (Gourevtich 1998: 122), although
it should be noted that in the last decade of his lifetime Varro (116-27 BCE) wrote a book on medicine in his
Disciplinae, a lost encyclopedic work (see Conte 1994: 210-211; 218). On technical/scientific writers’ use of Latin
(as opposed to Greek) as a means of appealing to a broader readership specifically in late antiquity, see Formisano
2004: 129.
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lends some support to the idea that Celsus may have writing with a broader audience in mind,
or at least that his work may have been geared in some ways to “non-specialists”.33 This
possibility is also bolstered by Celsus’ style, which is famously lucid, such that Renaissance
scholars hailed him as the “Cicero of the medical writers.”34 Nonetheless, Celsus’ work offers
little direct evidence pointing toward or even implying a desired readership.
As for Celsus’ literary influences, there are numerous passages in De Medicina that echo
passages from the various Hippocratic texts so closely that they might be regarded as
“translations” of the Greek35, although Celsus himself never claims to be translating
Hippocrates directly. It has also been argued that De Medicina is largely based upon the work
of Asclepiades of Bithynia, a Greek physician and philosopher who came to Rome in the first
century BCE.36 In addition, Celsus makes frequent reference to various other Hellenistic writers
on medicine who appear to have heavily influenced his work. According to Flemming, Celsus
refashioned “parts of the Hellenistic tradition in a recognizably Roman idiom”37, suggesting that
his role was very much akin to that of a translator. This role is apparent in a great many
passages in which Celsus offers a Latin term along with the corresponding Greek term when

33

Concerning such questions of intended/implied readership and the status of the author with regard to their
subject matter, some potential parallels could be drawn with Vitruvius and his first century BCE work De
Architectura. (on Vitruvius, see Gros 1997)
34
Peltier 1990: 21; Spencer 1935: x.
35
The third volume of Spencer’s Loeb edition of De Medicina provides an extensive concordance of such passages.
(Spencer 1938b)
36
On this matter, see Mudry 1994: 800-802; 811-815; Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl 1964: 45; Toohey 2004: 300 n.
39.
37
Flemming 2000: 130; see also Spencer 1935: ix.
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giving the names of illnesses, symptoms, body parts, plant remedies, etc.38 But as for the
question of Celsus’ sources, this problem remains largely elusive given the current evidence.39
One of the few pieces of scholarship to examine the relationship between Seneca and Celsus
is Stok’s short article “Celso in Seneca?”, which raises the possibility that Seneca may have been
familiar with the writings of Celsus. This article does not explore Seneca’s tragedies, but it
notes several passages from Seneca’s Epistulae that bear similarities to passages from Celsus,
particularly in regard to vocabulary usage.40 Stok even suggests that Seneca probably had
knowledge of Celsus’ medical writings, an idea he supports by pointing to an extensive passage
from Seneca’s Epistula 95 (13-15) which bears a close resemblance to the opening passage of
the Proemium to Book 1 of De Medicina (1.Pr.1.1-5) in both its ideas and use of language.41
Fernandez, on the other hand, in his overview of Seneca’s literary influences, asserts quite
forcefully: “no podemos establicer ninguna relación, ninguna paralelismo entre [Celsus] y
Séneca...”42 Fernandez gives short shrift to this issue, however, spending only three short
paragraphs comparing Seneca and Celsus, and ruling out any possible resonances between the
two authors without providing any textual examples. Both Stok and Fernandez leave room for
futher analysis, especially with regard to close readings, textual comparisons, and language
usage, all of which—to use a medical metaphor—the present study seeks to remedy.

38

e.g. …tabes, quam Graeci ΦΘΙΣΙΝ, urinae difficultas, quam ΣΤΡΑΝΓΟΥΙΑΝ appellant… (2.1.8.2-4); …infra
transversum septum, quod ΔΙΑΦΡΑΓΜΑ Graeci vocant…(2.7.32.5-6)
39
On the intractability of this matter, see von Staden 1999: 252.
40
Stok 1985: 420.
41
Stok 1985: 418. On the possibility that Seneca was familiar with the writings of Celsus, see also Lana 1955: 73;
Migliorini 1988: 52.
42
Fernandez 1976: 15. In this article it is not clear whether Fernandez’ assertion is based upon analysis of Senecan
tragedy, Senecan prose, or the entire Senecan corpus. In an earlier article, however, Fernandez examines medical
language in both Senecan tragedy and prose, though without making any mention of Celsus. (Fernandez 1973)
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Methodology
Although the works of Seneca and Celsus both take a significant interest in matters of illness,
and although they were written around the same period of time, I am not seeking to show that
Seneca may have been directly influenced by the writings of Celsus (or vice versa). Nor am I
attempting to argue that the two authors may have had any personal acquaintance or
interaction (I do not aim to refute this point, either). To be sure, the near-contemporaneity of
these authors is one reason that they are intriguing to compare (as is the case with the Greek
tragedies and certain Hippocratic texts), but this dissertation focuses on terminological and
thematic points of comparison between Seneca and Celsus, without arguing for direct influence
or exchange of ideas. Indeed, my study takes a largely philological approach, centering on close
readings of passages from Seneca’s tragedies which contain language or imagery evocative of
illness (in both its “physical” and “mental” manifestations). In performing these close readings,
I often suggest fruitful comparisons with relevant passages from Celsus’ De Medicina.
Throughout, my interpretation is driven by close attention to language use as a way into larger
questions of the representation of human illness in the language, literature, and culture of
ancient Rome. In keeping with my emphasis on close reading, all passages of text that are given
close consideration are provided in the original language43 along with my own translations
(unless otherwise indicated), which tend toward the literal but always aim to demonstrate

43

Unless otherwise indicated, I follow the textual editions published in the Oxford Classical Texts (OCTs) when
quoting passages of Seneca’s tragedies (Zwierlein 1986), letters (Reynolds 1965), and philosophical treatises
(Reynolds 1977). When quoting passages from Celsus, I follow the Teubner text established by Marx (1915), which
is reproduced in Spencer’s Loeb editions (1935-1938) and is generally still regarded as the most definitive edition
of Celsus’ De Medicina. When quoting other ancient sources, I follow the OCT editions unless otherwise noted.
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clarity and an understanding of idiomatic expression. In the Latin passages that are quoted, key
phrases and pieces of vocabulary are underlined.
I focus on Seneca’s plays Oedipus, Thyestes, Phaedra, Hercules Furens, and Medea—all works
in which the theme of illness (physical, mental, or both) plays a prominent role. For clarity of
focus (or for reasons of space), I discuss each play in connection with a specific theme/topic (i.e.
Chapters 2, 3, 4) which it particularly well illustrates. Here is a brief overview of each chapter:
I. Introduction — This chapter provides background information about Seneca and Celsus,
explanation of my methodology, a review of scholarship that has influenced my methodology,
and theory-driven comments on “technical” writing and vocabulary.
II. Vocabulary of Illness — This chapter builds upon my theoretical observations in Chapter 1,
first commenting on vocabulary associated with “illness” in the English language (e.g.
“sickness”, “disease”, etc.) to draw attention to methodological issues. Then, I analyze Latin
vocabulary having the sense of “illness”, focusing on Seneca’s Oedipus and various sections of
Celsus, with attention to some of the ways in which illness is described and categorized in Latin
literature, but also to issues of characterization and theme (such as paradox and selfawareness) specific to Seneca's Oedipus and his tragedies more generally.
III. Illness Unveiled: Language of Concealment and Revelation — This chapter analyzes
language associated with the manifestation and concealment of illness, focusing especially on
the Proemium to Book 1 of De Medicina and Seneca’s Thyestes and Phaedra. In this chapter I
give close attention to the emergence and detection of illness, which often becomes apparent
12

via what might be called “symptoms”, as well as situations in which illness is present but
remains undetected. This chapter thus sheds light upon how the perception of illness is
depicted in different genres of Latin literature, as well as perceptions of the body and the
body’s role in the concealment and revelation of various forms of illness. In the Proemium44,
Celsus provides an overview of the history of medicine up to his own time, and this section of
De Medicina is of special interest here because it discusses both “obvious” as well as “hidden”
causes of illness, and because of its vocabulary usage, which often resonates with language in
Seneca’s tragedies. Through close readings of various textual passages, this chapter connects
observations about language usage with themes and issues of characterization specific to
Thyestes and Phaedra.
IV. The Language of Madness — This chapter examines language associated with “mental
illness”, with a focus on Celsus, various Senecan philosophical works, and Seneca’s Hercules
Furens and Medea. Since my project seeks to analyze both physical and mental manifestations
of illness, this chapter broadens out my study in an important way, providing opportunities to
look closely at Seneca’s discussions of madness in his philosophical prose, including passages
from De Ira (On Anger), Naturales Quaestiones (Natural Questions), De Tranquillitate Animi (On
Peace of Mind), and De Vita Beata (On the Happy Life), and his Epistulae Morales. Here, I am
careful about assuming that there should be any kind of congruity between a statement in a
philosophical essay and a passage in a poetic tragedy; instead of looking for a consistent,
44

While there are also Proemia preceding Books 2 and 7 of De Medicina, scholars generally refer to the Proemium
to Book 1 as the Proemium because it is serves as an introduction to the entire work (and probably also because it
is significantly longer than these other Proemia). I follow this convention, always meaning the Proemium to Book 1
when using the phrase “the Proemium”. I specifically indicate if I am referring to the Proemium to Book 2 or the
Proemium to Book 7.
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unified theory of diseases and symptoms across all of Seneca’s texts, I generally find it more
productive to note and interpret the differences between these works, and to consider how
these differences relate to each work’s literary aims and approach to “madness”. To be clear, I
am not calling into question whether these prose works and tragedies can be confidently
attributed to the same author.45 Indeed, the present study operates with the view that all of
the “Senecan” works—with the exception of the spurious tragedies Hercules Oetaeus and
Octavia—were written by a single author named Seneca. In fact, while I point out many
differences between Senecan prose and tragedy, I also identify some striking similarities in
language usage across these genres.
Another recurring theme of my project builds on the observation that Seneca and Celsus are
typical of ancient Greek and Latin authors in frequently not making a sharp distinction between
what we today call “physical” and “mental” illness. This point, which is emphasized in Chapter
4 as well as other parts of my dissertation, in turn brings my work into the area of translation
studies, since the question of whether and how various languages, such as Latin and English,
make that very distinction is an open one, and the English vocabulary associated with mental
illnesses is continually evolving. In this way, my study urges sensitivity to processes of
translation and to how they can influence perceptions of other cultures’ understandings.
45

Most present-day Senecan scholars accept that both the philosophical works and tragedies in the Senecan
corpus can be confidently attributed to a single author by the name of Seneca. There are, however, a small
number of scholars who still question whether the prose works and tragedies in the Senecan corpus were written
by the same individual (for a review of some of these scholars and their arguments, see Kohn 2003: 271-280; Pratt
1983: 12). Prior to the Renaissance, on the other hand, it was generally held that the tragedies and prose treatises
were written by two different individuals, “Seneca tragicus” and “Seneca philosophus”. (see Schubert 2014: 74;
Fischer 2014: 745-746) Even today, the dichotomy long-drawn between Seneca’s works of poetry and prose is still
reflected in that fact that, although there are many existing editions of Seneca’s works, it remains almost unheard
of to find an anthology that, as Romm puts it, “dares to package tragedies and prose works together.” (Romm
2014: 76, see also 234)
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With these things in mind, throughout my study I do not try to identify the conditions
described in the works of Seneca or Celsus with conditions or diagnoses recognized by the
modern medical establishment—an approach which is problematic for numerous reasons, as
has been pointed out by scholars such as Biggs, Nutton, and Pigeaud.46 Such problems include
the scantiness and partiality of ancient data pertaining to symptoms and diagnosis, as well as
the not infrequent dubiousness of what is reported (e.g. the Hippocratic notion of “tertian” and
“quartan” fevers, believed to recur every three or four days, respectively, and the emphasis on
“critical days” which were believed to be particularly important during the course of an
illness47). But above all, from a linguistic standpoint there is the real potential that modern
conceptual clusters resulting in the identification of specific syndromes or diseases are
susceptible to shifting, changing, adapting, coming into being and disappearing (e.g. “hysteria”,
“nervous breakdown”, “neurasthenia”, “idiocy”). This phenomenon, as I discuss in Chapter 4,
is particularly evident with the ever-evolving terminology associated with mental illness.
Sometimes inexact correspondences in terminology can be seen across even modern languages
contemporary with each other: the English word “flu” is not quite coextensive with the Italian
“influenza” or the German “Grippe” (i.e. “flu” can refer to “stomach flu”, which is not called
“influenza” or "Grippe" in those languages); the German “Kreislaufbeschwerden” has no direct
equivalent in other languages.

46

See Biggs 1966: 223; Nutton 2013: 22-23; Pigeaud 1981: 413.
For instance, the author of Book I of the Hippocratic Epidemics asserts that certain types of fevers may
potentially reach their “crisis” on day 4, 6, 8, 10, 14, 20, 24, 30, 40, 60, 80, or 120 after their onset. (Epidemics 1.26)
47
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V. Conclusions — Here, I briefly restate some of the major issues and questions explored in
the dissertation, as well as some of the major points made in each chapter. Reflecting on my
study as a whole, I highlight its most significant findings and interesting observations. I also
point toward some related areas of inquiry where there remains room for further research, and
I comment on my study’s relevance to the budding field known as the medical humanities.
In short, this study fills a gap in English-language scholarship on the use of medical language
in the works of Seneca48, and on connections between the writings of Seneca and Celsus (a
matter which has been hardly explored in any language49). It demonstrates that works of
Roman tragedy and medical literature can be productively read alongside each other, much in
the way that other scholars have done with comparative readings of Greek tragedy and the
Hippocratic Corpus. In doing so, this study points out specific ways in which Seneca’s tragedies
both reflect and depart from terminology associated with illness and perceptions of illness
evident in a near-contemporary prose text on medicine.
Discussion of Scholarship
This study is strongly influenced by works of scholarship that examine illness and medicine in
Greek and Latin literature from cross-generic perspectives. One notable example of this kind of
scholarship is Alessia Guardasole’s Tragedia e medicina nell'Atene del V secolo a.C.50, which
surveys representations of illness in Greek tragedy and works in the Hippocratic Corpus.

48

As the next section of my Introduction indicates, a significant amount of the most relevant scholarship is written
in Italian (e.g. Guardasole 2000; Mazzini 1991; Migliorini 1997), and even this scholarship gives little attention to
Senecan tragedy.
49
e.g. Fernández 1976: 15; Stok 1985. But these studies only scratch the surface.
50
Guardasole 2000.
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Guardasole’s methodology serves as an important model for this study, even though Roman
tragedies and Roman medical texts are outside of her book’s scope.51
Other studies of Greek literature that have influenced my approach are Brooke Holmes’ The
Symptom and the Subject: The Emergence of the Physical Body in Ancient Greece52 and Jennifer
Clarke Kosak’s Heroic Measures: Hippocratic Medicine in the Making of Euripidean Tragedy.53
Holmes’ book explores conceptualizations of the human body and discourses about health,
illness, and medicine across various genres of ancient Greek literature, including epic, lyric
poetry, history, philosophy, tragedy, and medical writing. Covering a wide arc of literary
history, Holmes identifies some concepts of health, illness, and the human body as unique to
the Hippocratic Corpus or tragedy, while pointing out other ideas that transcend genres of
Greek literature. For instance, Holmes observes that, in writers as disparate as Hippocrates,
Hesiod, Plutarch, symptoms repeatedly “demand interpretation”54, while she also maintains
that tragedy, more than any other genre she discusses, “realizes the potential of the symptom
to generate meaning, rather than simply revealing ‘facts’.”55 Like Holmes, Kosak looks across
genres, examining “medical” language and imagery in works of Greek tragedy (with a particular
focus on the plays of Euripides) and Hippocratic texts. Without arguing for direct influence or
exchange, Kosak observes that the corpus of Greek tragedies contains both echoes and

51

Guardasole makes very brief mention of Seneca, noting that details in Seneca’s description of Oedipus’ selfblinding (Oedipus 978-979) are “certainly Sophoclean” (sicuramente sofoclei, see Guardasole 2000: 66 n. 102).
Guardasole does not elaborate further and otherwise leaves Roman tragedy out of her analysis.
52
Holmes 2010. Commenting in reference to Greek literature, Holmes suggests that “medicine was particularly
relevant to tragedy because it was developing conceptual and imaginative resources to describe struggles for
power in the inner recesses of a human being.” (Holmes 2010: 230)
53
Kosak 2004.
54
Holmes 2010: 2, see also 1.
55
Holmes 2010: 229.
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divergences from concepts found in contemporary medical writings. On the one hand, she
notes that both Hippocratic treatises and Athenian tragedies are motivated to “discuss, probe,
observe, diagnose, and predict the outcome of their particular situations”.56 On the other
hand, tragedy, more than the Hippocratic texts, incorporates divine elements in explicating the
causality of illness, and also uses illness as metaphor for “the breakdown of political unity, the
corruption of leaders, and the rule of passion over reason”.57 My work expands upon the work
of Holmes and Kosak by taking the discussion into the realm of Latin literature, while also
focusing more specifically on language usage.
Other cross-generic studies of medical issues in Greek literature serve as a precedent for the
present study. These include Rosalind Thomas’ book Herodotus in Context: Ethnography,
Science, and the Art of Persuasion, which features one chapter, “Medicine and the Ethnography
of Health”, in which Thomas compares ideas and language in Herodotus’ Histories with
Hippocratic texts.58 In a similarly-themed article, entitled “Herodotus as a Medical Writer”,
Warren R. Dawson and F.D. Harvey observe that there is much “of medical interest to be found
in purely literary works, and…[that] collections from the Greek anthology, Lucian, Chaucer and
others have justly aroused and stimulated the interest of those who have hitherto only sought
res medica in locis medicis.”59 Dawson and Harvey make the important point that authors not
traditionally included in the canon of “medical writers” can serve as rich sources for medical
thought and language, but I would still question their use of the phrase “purely literary works”,
56

Kosak 2004: 2.
Kosak 2004: 3.
58
Thomas 2000: 28-74.
59
Dawson and Harvey 1986: 87. Stok also demonstrates some of the potential for studying “medical language” in
authors not traditionally considered “medical writers”, including Seneca (see “Celso in Seneca?” 1985) and Virgil
(see “Celso e Vergilio” 1994b).
57

18

which suggests that some works are more “literary” than others, without providing any
definition for this problematic descriptor. Inherent in this phrase lies the implication that
“medical writings” are not “purely literary”, which Dawson and Harvey perpetuate further in
the next sentence when mentioning that the reliability of “non-medical writers” (by whom they
mean “purely literary” writers) are not a subject of concern in their article.60 By using phrases
such as “non-medical writers” and “purely literary works” in such ways, Dawson and Harvey
undercut the larger point which they are trying to make, namely that one can find subjects of
medical interest in various genres of Greek and Latin literature.61 As the next section of this
Introduction will emphasize, in a world where scholars have begun to take more and more of
an interest in studying “medical” or “technical” subjects in works of poetry and artistic prose,
the labels “medical writing” and “technical writing” are less and less informative.
In the realm of Latin literature, Sari Kivistö has explored the usage of medical vocabulary in
works of satire. Kivistö recognizes that “it is important to observe the use of medical discourse
in different kinds of contexts. The goals of healing have traditionally been associated with all
kinds of writings…”62 Similarly, in one chapter of his book on technical and scientific writing in
late antiquity, Marco Formisano discusses the use of medical terminology in various genres of
60

Dawson and Harvey 1986: 87.
In her recent book, Baker discusses various methodologies available to students of ancient medicine: She
observes: “besides the erudite medical and philosophical texts of authors such as Galen, Rufus of Ephesus, and the
Hippocratic writers, medical historians are fortunate to have many other types of textual remains at their disposal
that survive from thr Greco-Roman period: papyri fragments, lead curse tablets, wax and wood tablets,
inscriptions, coins, and collyrium stamps.” (Baker 2013: 36) Even though she takes a broad view of the study of
ancient medicine, pointing out that this study need not be restricted to the traditional works of medical prose,
Baker nevertheless does not mention the possibility of looking at poetic texts concerned with medical matters. For
sure, this comment is influenced by Baker’s archaeological approach to the subject of ancient medicine, but it is
still somewhat surprising that she does not acknowledge the value of poetic texts, since, for example, she later
remarks that “seemingly minor texts [e.g. papyri fragments] tell us something about medical practices in the past.”
(Baker 2013: 40)
62
Kivistö 2009: 4.
61
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literature63, including the anonymously authored fourth century prose work De Rebus Bellicis,
which proposes various innovations in military technology and contains a series of observations
about the economy and politics of the Roman Empire.64 Formisano compares language in this
work with language in Theodorus Priscianus’ roughly contemporaneous work on medicine
Rerum Medicarum Libri Quattuor, thereby offering a precedent for this study’s comparison of
medical language and imagery in Celsus’ De Medicina and Seneca’s nearly-contemporaneous
works of prose and poetry. Indeed, Formisano urges for a reading of all such texts as “literary”,
and as belonging to one and the same “literary space” as each other, regardless of differences
in genre, style, and subject matter.
Other scholars, such as Paola Migliorini, have investigated medical vocabulary and themes in
the works of Seneca specifically. In Scienza e terminologia medica nella letteratura latina di età
neroniana: Seneca, Lucano, Persio, Petronio, she observes that the writings of Seneca (and
other Latin authors who are not traditionally considered “medical writers”, namely Lucan,
Persius, and Petronius) abound in language and themes dealing with medical issues65, and she
provides many citations of medical vocabulary in Seneca’s writings, but almost exclusively from
the prose works. Migliorini’s study offers many useful lists and citations of relevant vocabulary
items, whereas my dissertation performs close readings of specific passages containing such
vocabulary. Another difference relates to scope: Migliorini’s study is quite broad, aiming to

63

Describing the methodology of his study, Formisano observes: “Dal punto di vista linguistico e stilistico i testi che
prenderemo in esame appaiono eterogenei.” (Formisano 2001: 63-64)
64
Formisano 2001: 71-76. Formisano focuses primarily on late antique authors, but he does make several brief
references to usage in Celsus to point out Celsus’ influence on later authors. (see Formisano 2001: 80, 84)
65
Commenting on Seneca, Migliorini states: “l’interesse per la medicina appare più relevante, sia per la quantità
dei temi affrontati sia, come vedremo, per il livello delle conoscenze mediche che questi revelano…” (Migliorini
1997: 21)
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shed light on the role of science and medicine in the age of Nero, while my study is centered
more specifically upon Seneca and Celsus. Like Migliorini, Innocenzo Mazzini offers some
analysis of medically-oriented vocabulary used in Seneca’s philosophical works in his article
entitled “Il lessico medico latino antico: Caratteri e strumenti della sua differenziazione”.66
Here, Mazzini, too, touches only briefly upon the use of such vocabulary in Seneca’s tragedies.
For perspectives on what might be called “mental illness” in classical literature more
generally, the recent collection of essays entitled Mental Disorders in the Classical World,
edited by William V. Harris, has proven to be a very important source, in particularly Harris’
own introductory chapter entitled “Thinking about Mental Disorders in Classical Antiquity”.67
Although this collection engages only briefly with Seneca’s philosophical works, and makes only
passing references to Seneca’s tragedies and Celsus’ De Medicina, it makes important
theoretical distinctions between ancient and modern views on mental illness, a question upon
which my own study expands in Chapter 4.
As for scholarship on the cultural and theatrical contexts of Seneca’s plays, Anthony J.
Boyle’s book Roman Tragedy68 has been a valuable source for contextualizing my own analysis.
Boyle discusses connections between Roman tragedy and other genres of literature, observing
that Seneca’s tragedies interweave a rich array of literary influences and thus operate in a
“palimpsestic mode”.69 Although he acknowledges this plethora of influences on Seneca’s
tragedies, Boyle does not delve into connections with medical literature. Similarly, James Ker
66

Mazzini 1991. In the first footnote of this article, Mazzini notes that there are “lacune della ricerca…per cogliere
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has examined the multiplicity of influences on Seneca’s tragedies in “Seneca, Man of Many
Genres”.70 Ker, too, affirms the value of examining Seneca’s work “as part of a larger
polygeneric project”71, often drawing connections that transcend genre, but his study does not
take medical writing into consideration. Two new pieces of scholarship that may prove useful
to this study’s exploration of Seneca, but were in fact published too recently to be taken into
account at the time of writing, are The Cambridge Companion to Seneca edited by Shadi Bartsch
and Alessandro Schiesaro72 and Sénèque, un philosophe homme de théâtre? edited by JeanPierre Aygon.73
“Medical Writing” and “Technical Writing”
Since my dissertation interprets both poetic texts on mythological themes and an
encyclopedic prose text on medical knowledge, questions of genre and of definition are key,
above all the commonly invoked categories of “literary” texts and “technical writing,” which are
frequently contrasted with each other or implicitly understood as hermetically distinct
categories. My study questions this dichotomy, building upon the work of various scholars,
including Markus Asper, Marco Formisano74, and in particular David R. Langslow, who has
written extensively on these issues.75 By drawing attention to specific pieces of vocabulary and
concepts of illness common to both works of tragedy and medical texts, my study erodes
70
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distinctions sometimes drawn between so-called literary and technical forms of writing. The
comments below are intended to elucidate my own theoretical perspective, which I apply in the
ensuing chapters.
Greek and Roman tragedies are often labeled “literary” works; Greek and Roman treatises
on medicine, on the other hand, are frequently referred to as examples of “technical writing”,
often with the implication that they are not “literary”. These ostensible boundaries reflect the
canonization of certain Greek and Latin texts, a phenomenon which has caused works of
“technical” writing to be largely overlooked by literary critics, both ancient and modern.76
Scholars in the field of Classics have only recently begin to take a broader view of “literature”
and recognize that works of “medical writing” are ripe with potential for literary analysis, which
Asper calls attention to in asking, “these people [i.e. scientific/“technical” writers] are, to us,
mainly writers, so why do we hesitate to apply to them the instruments we are accustomed to
bring to reading Herodotus or Apollonius (of Rhodes)?”77 This question points toward the fact
that it is challenging to produce reliable criteria by which “literary” and “technical” or
“scientific” modes of writing can be distinguished from one another. It is also difficult to pin
down a firm definition for “medical writing”, a prominent type of what is often called technical
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writing.78 Langslow, for one, has astutely observed that scholars have historically used the term
“medical Latin” loosely and “without much discussion of the meaning of the phrase.”79 In the
opening chapter of Medical Latin in the Roman Empire, Langslow discusses some of the
problems inherent to distinguishing between “medical” and “non-medical” vocabulary and
modes of writing, as well as “technical” and “non-technical” vocabulary and modes of writing,
and he examines some of the possible criteria by which these terms might be defined.
To deal first with the term “medical Latin”, this phrase, according to Langslow, can be used in
either a “strong” or “weak” sense. Under this framework, the “strong view” describes medical
Latin as a variety of Latin which is distinct both in vocabulary and grammar when compared
with the “common language”, and used by writers with “special medical knowledge”.80
Langslow points out one major problem with this view in noting that “words like caput and
manus may not be excluded as [medical] terms simply because all Latin speakers use and
understand them, in part like the specialist.”81 Kallet reaches a similar conclusion in her
examination of medical language in a passage from the Greek historian Thucydides, stating that
“it must be acknowledged at the outset that much vocabulary found in the medical corpora is
of course also used by other writers in nonmedical contexts, without necessarily any exclusively
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medical connotation.”82 In addition, it can be observed that similar grammatical constructions
can be used in both “medical” and “nonmedical” contexts, thus further blurring the lines
between medical and non-medical forms of discourse. While these points may seem rather
obvious, it is important to emphasize their fundamental importance to the methodology of this
study. Like Langslow, I reject the strong definition of “medical Latin”, as I note that many
pieces of vocabulary without any intrinsic medical relevance frequently appear in Celsus, and
conversely, that many pieces of medically-charged vocabulary can be found in Seneca’s
tragedies.
According to the “weak view” identified by Langslow, “medical Latin” constitutes the corpus
of “Latin texts devoted to medicine.”83 While this view is much more open to discerning
medical language and themes in various genres of literature, the phrase “Latin texts devoted to
medicine” creates some ambiguity. One might question what it means, exactly, for a text to be
“devoted to medicine”. To take matters to an absurd extreme, does it imply that a text must be
concerned only with medical issues (to the point of excluding “non-medical” issues), in order to
be considered “devoted to medicine”? Such an interpretation of that phrase would disqualify
seemingly all texts from consideration. Indeed, few, if any, Greek or Latin texts can be said to
be “devoted” to medical issues alone, since so many texts that deal with medicine also have
relevance to various aspects of culture, history, and the like. Surely, Langslow is not narrowly
suggesting that Latin texts can only be considered to be “devoted to medicine” if they only
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discuss matters which are directly relevant to medicine. But this raises the question of just how
much of a text must deal with medicine for that text to be considered “devoted” to medicine
(as if this were quantifiable in some way). Furthermore, one can ask how “medicine” is to be
understood in this phrase. If a text is primarily interested in exploring issues such as weather
and the environment, but also acknowledges that these factors can influence health (as in the
Hippocratic treatise Airs, Waters, Places), can such a text be said to be concerned with (or even
“devoted to”) “medicine”? Similarly, should we say that a text that is primarily concerned
about weather, but does not explicitly discuss how weather affects health, is still “devoted to
medicine” merely through the text’s ability to call to mind ideas relevant to the sphere of
medicine? As this questions demonstrate, the phrase “devoted to medicine” does not do
much to narrow down a definition of “medical Latin”. By phrasing his “weak” definition of the
term “medical Latin” in this way, Langslow leaves opens the door for all manner of Latin texts,
regardless of form, to be included in the corpus of “medical Latin”.
Concerning the question of whether a specific word should be considered “medical”, Holmes
has observed that “words are usually called medical if they appear in the [medical] corpus.”84
Holmes goes on to question this definition of medical vocabulary, observing that it is difficult to
know how “technical” a word used in an ancient Greek tragedy would have seemed to
contemporary audiences, and thus how specialized any given word might be to a certain
discipline, such as medicine.85 Holmes’ critique focuses on vocabulary in Greek tragedy, and
the same can be observed of vocabulary occurring in Senecan tragedy. I would also draw
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attention to the circular quality of the practice which is critiqued by Holmes, and which occurs
in many definitions of “medical writing” and “medical vocabulary”: words are considered
“medical” if they occur in “medical” texts, and texts are described as “medical” if they contain
“medical” vocabulary. This does not take into account the fact that the vast majority of words
(in both Greek and Latin) which appear in medical contexts also appear in non-medical contexts
and in various genres of literature.86 As Langslow observes, “technical languages are, of course,
based on and derived from general language”87, and this dynamic, ongoing process
problematizes attempts to distinguish between such modes of discourse.
In addition to discussing “medical” vocabulary, Langslow explores how “technical
terminology” might be defined. He highlights various problems associated with distinguishing
between technical and non-technical terminology by reviewing three influential criteria which
have been proposed by Klaus Heller88:
(1). a technical term is “not generally understood in the linguistic community as a whole” or
(2). a technical term is “proper to a given specialist or technical discipline” or
(3). a technical term is “normalized or standardized in its usage in a discipline”
According to Heller’s theory, which is intended to be applicable to technical terminology in any
language, a term needs to satisfy only one of the above criteria in order to be considered
“technical”. Langslow carefully scrutinizes each of Heller’s criteria, rejecting (1), but largely
accepting (2) and (3). I agree with Langslow’s objection to (1), but would like to raise some
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questions about (2) and (3), as well. Langslow dismisses (1) by observing that certain words in
English (e.g. abscess, recovery, tongue, and even eat) are employed by medical practitioners
working in specialized settings, as well as by “non-specialists” in common, everyday
situations.89 Langslow goes on to observe that technical terminologies—both ancient and
modern—“merge gradually with the generally known, everyday vocabulary of the language”90,
making it even more difficult to draw the distinction posited by (1). This phenomenon speaks
against Isidore Pinchuck’s assertion that “the most significant linguistic feature of the technical
text is its vocabulary, the specialized terminology of the specialized discipline.”91 I find this
emphasis on vocabulary to be overstated, especially in light of the fact that one can find in the
works of Seneca (an author who is not usually considered either a “medical” writer or
“technical writer”) words which are pertinent to the world of medicine, and which also appear
in Celsus (an author who is sometimes labeled a “technical writer”).92 Identifying and analyzing
such instances of overlapping usage is, of course, a major focus of this dissertation. The fact
that one can find such similarities in usage gives all the more reason to question the usefulness
and descriptiveness of distinctions between what are often called “literary” texts (e.g. Seneca)
and “technical” texts (e.g. Celsus), along with “literary” vocabulary and “technical” vocabulary.
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Because of the problematic nature of these terms, I try to avoid using them whenever possible,
except when responding to points made by other scholars.
Langslow, on the other hand, does not go so far as to eliminate such phrases from his own
writing; he refers, for instance, to the “letters and tragedies of the hypochondriac Younger
Seneca” as a unique opportunity “to identify and evaluate the use of technical terms in nontechnical writings.”93 While it is encouraging for the present study that Langslow singles out
Seneca as an author whose works might be analyzed with such questions in mind, his use of the
phrase “technical terms in non-technical writings” perpetuates a dichotomy which my study is
calling into question (not to mention his questionable pseudo-diagnosis of Seneca as
“hypochondriac” solely on the basis of some of his writings). Langslow does offer some
compelling ideas in this article about how “technical terms” might be defined on the basis on
certain morphological properties94, the question remains: if a piece of writing contains some
technical terms, how can it be determined that that piece of writing is not a piece of “technical
writing”? Exactly how many “technical terms” must appear in a work for it to be considered a
piece of “technical writing”, or what percentage of words in a work must be “technical terms”
for that work to be considered a piece of “technical writing”? These questions are not raised by
Langslow, but they are important ones to ask especially because they do not have
straightforward answers, and thus further problematize the criteria by which a piece of writing
might be labeled as “technical”.
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Langslow somewhat reluctantly accepts the second and third criteria proposed by Heller,
conceding that “words are considered to belong to the Latin medical terminology simply if they
name (or relate closely to) objects or ideas of ancient medicine”.95 Here, Langslow identifies
“medical terminology” as an example of a kind of technical terminology. He acknowledges that
this is a rather broad and loose way of defining technical terminology, but he suggests that it is
probably impossible to arrive at a narrower definition. I also find this definition imprecise, but,
unlike Langslow, I am not willing to accept it despite its imprecision. I question Langslow’s
concession for reasons similar to the objections Langslow himself makes in response to Heller’s
first criterion: the assertion that a word “belongs” to medical terminology if it names or relates
to “objects or ideas of ancient medicine” does not seem to take into account the fact that
certain words (for instance, the examples identified by Langslow above: recovery, tongue, eat)
may also be used in various contexts, medical and otherwise.96 Indeed, it means little to say
that a word “belongs” to medical (or technical) terminology if it can also be used in non-medical
contexts (and thus “belong” to other, nonmedical forms of discourse). Such an assertion can
flatten out important and real variations in usage and lead to overgeneralizations about
“readers” or “speakers” or a “linguistic community”—groups which are not, and cannot be,
uniform and monolithic. In my study, I identify many pieces of vocabulary which occur both in
works traditionally considered “medical”/“technical” literature (e.g. Celsus), as well as in works
not traditionally included in the corpus of medical literature (e.g. Seneca’s tragedies). Such
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pieces of vocabulary cannot be said to belong strictly to medical forms of discourse, and in
keeping with these observations I also refrain whenever possible from using the phrase
“medical vocabulary” and similar expressions.
Langslow has also suggested, in apparent agreement with (2) and (3), that the terminology
of a given field, or tekhnē (or—to use a Latin term with a similar semantic range—ars), is set by
specialists in that field.97 When we look at Celsus’ writings, we obviously find a great deal of
vocabulary pertinent to the sphere of medicine, but most scholars do not regard Celsus as a
professional “doctor” or a “specialist” in medicine. Despite the fact that Celsus coins new
pieces of vocabulary and phrases that appear in subsequent works concerned with medicine,
he is generally regarded as a knowledgeable “amateur”.98 Langslow, for one, states that Celsus
was “no medicus proper” because there is no evidence that he practiced medicine outside of
his own familia99, and von Staden observes that, despite the fact that Celsus frequently inserts
his own comments and observations into De Medicina, he “never once projects himself as a
member of this professio or as one of its professores or as a medicus.100 Langslow does not,
however, directly address the question of whether Celsus could be considered a “medical
writer”, even though he himself was supposedly not a medicus. While this is an important
question in and of itself, the larger point here is that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to
differentiate between “professional” and “amateur” status within the historical context of
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ancient medicine (as is also the case with other tekhnai in Greek and Roman antiquity).101 One
problem is that the modern construct of a “professional doctor” cannot be applied to a medicus
in the context of ancient medicine, which Langslow himself acknowledges was “very
heterogeneous [in] nature”102 and “lack[ing in] a sharp divide between professional and
amateur.”103 In regard to matters of terminology, it is quite possible that a “lay person” (i.e. a
person without any formal training in the tekhnē of medicine) would have knowledge of much
of the vocabulary used in the field of medicine.104 Such an individual might be mistaken
(possibly in his own time, and/or by later readers) for a “specialist” on the basis of language
usage. Moreover, it is not safe to assume that Celsus had any actual medical experience,
whether as a doctor or observer, simply because he sometimes uses the first person when
describing certain treatments.105 This use of the first person may, as von Staden has suggested,
be more of an “epistemological posture” intended to cultivate an air of medical authority.106
It is also likely that even some writers who did possess some formal medical training
(“specialists”) would “[make] concession to their lay readers by sparing them some technical
terms and using paraphrases instead”.107 This sort of concession could problematize the
perception of the “specialist” even further, making it difficult to identify a specialist on the basis
on their language usage. While this is an important observation, Langslow’s phrasing suggests
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that a piece of vocabulary should not be considered “technical” in nature if it can be
understood by an “untrained” or “amateur” audience. With Celsus, we have the reverse of the
situation described above: he is generally considered an “amateur” despite the fact that he
frequently uses words associated with the tekhnē of medicine. At the same time, Gourevitch
has suggested that Celsus actually “fell short” in developing a “technical language” in Latin
because he “quite often…gives the names of diseases in a transliterated version of the
Greek.”108 For such reasons, it is overly facile to describe Celsus’ writing with labels such as
“technical”/ “non-technical” or “professional”/ “amateur”. These categories become even
more blurry and destabilized when one observes that both Celsus and Seneca use pieces of
vocabulary (and in some cases the same pieces of vocabulary) which are pertinent to the world
of medicine, but which would have been generally comprehensible to audiences lacking
specialized medical training or knowledge. This speaks further to the ambiguity of the phrase
“technical writing”, since the epithet “technical” could apply either to a style of writing, or to
the nature of the content (i.e. texts that deal with tekhnai or artes); both of these senses, I
would argue, are imprecise and not particularly elucidatory. My study, then, draws upon
Langslow’s discussion of “technical writing” in Latin literature, but goes even further in
questioning what this phrase denotes by pointing out the flimsiness of criteria (2) and (3).
In further response to (3), it also bears mentioning that Celsus (like Seneca) is not always
consistent in his usage of terminology. In his comments on insania, for instance, Celsus
sometimes breaks with other writers’ use of this term, and he sometimes lacks consistency with
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even his own use of the term.109 These inconsistencies suggest that the word insania is not
completely “normalized or standardized in its usage in a discipline” (to return to Heller’s third
criterion), but this is nonetheless a word which Celsus uses to categorize and diagnose various
forms of mental illness. Insania is thus a word strongly associated with the tekhnē of medicine.
While I am calling into question the usefulness of the phrase “technical terminology”, the fact
that the uses of insania are not completely “normalized or standardized” would not seem to be
a solid reason to dismiss it from being considered an example of “technical terminology”.
Innocenzo Mazzini is another scholar who notes the presence of “medico Latino” 110 in
various authors who are not traditionally included in the Latin medical corpus, including
Seneca. Mazzini complicates some of the boundaries between so-called medical and nonmedical writers, observing, for instance, that a word such as caligo111 can have the sense of
“blindness” in both “medici” (physicians) and “profani” (laymen).112 Mazzini does not provide a
clear basis for distinguishing between “medici” and “profani”, but he does state that a firm
distinction cannot be made between these groups on the basis of language usage.113 Although
Mazzini is not responding to Heller here, his observation about caligo would call (2) into
question. Moreover, Mazzini observes in a later piece of scholarship that “tematiche
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mediche”114 can be found in many Latin poets, including Seneca, further eroding distinctions
between medical “specialists” and “non-specialists”. For this reason, it is a little surprising that
Mazzini’s analyses only briefly examine Seneca’s tragedies.
While Mazzini problematizes some of the distinctions between medical “professionals” and
“laymen”, he does attempt to contrast “lessico medico latino” with non-medical Latin
discourse, proposing three criteria of his own115:
(1) medical Latin lacks variatio, whereas “non-medical” Latin tends to have more variety in
vocabulary usage
(2) medical Latin tends to employ vocabulary which is emotionally neutral (“emotivamente
neutro”)
(3) medical Latin is characterized by the use terminology which is concise and technical
(“concisa e tecnica”)
Mazzini does not elaborate much upon these criteria, but they all appear to rest on shaky
ground. Concerning (1), it is clear that Celsus’ medical prose is not averse to variatio; for
instance, he uses various terms in reference to “illness”, as Chapter 2 will make quite apparent.
In fact, Jocelyn has convincingly argued for the “literariness” of Celsus’ work on the basis of its
lexical and syntactical variatio.116 Regarding (2), Mazzini does not explain what he means by
“un vocabulario emotivamente neutro”, but it is difficult to categorize a piece of Latin
vocabulary as totally “emotionally neutral”, given that almost any Latin word could elicit an
emotional response—either through the word’s sense in a specific context, or through the
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connotations it may evoke via usage in other emotionally-charged contexts. Indeed, this study
will point out many instances in which Seneca and Celsus use vocabulary in contexts that are
quite obviously not “emotionally neutral”. As for (3), it is difficult to say much because the
phrase “concisa e tecnica” is rather vague in its formulation, but it can again be pointed out
that Celsus and Seneca use many of the same pieces of vocabulary in their reflections on illness
(e.g. morbus, insania, causa), so this also seems to be an overgeneralization. The close readings
performed in this study will further demonstrate the flimsiness of these criteria.
One scholar who has observed that Seneca makes use of vocabulary from both “specialized
and generalized discourses” is Thomas Habinek.117 According to Habinek, Seneca’s works are
for this reason particularly difficult to classify according to traditional distinctions such as
“literary” vs. “non-literary” and “technical” vs. “non-technical”. Habinek’s views are very much
informed by the work of Mikhail Bakhtin, a twentieth-century linguist and literary theorist who
questions the criteria by which “literary” language can be distinguished from “non-literary”
language.118 Bakhtin identifies “primary genres” of speech and language usage, which consist
of expressions commonly used in daily life, as well as “secondary genres”, which include
specialized technical vocabulary. Concerning the phenomenon of language usage, Bakhtin
notes that, in practice, one often finds frequent shifts between primary and second speech
genres. This supports Bakhtin’s larger point that classifying vocabulary into rigid spheres of
human activity is often difficult and ultimately misguided.119 Bakhtin goes on to conclude that
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typical classifications of technical language are “completely random”, neglecting the “generic
nature of linguistic styles”.120 As Bakhtin explains, seemingly straightforward divisions of
speech such as “bookish speech, popular speech, abstract-scientific, scientific-technical,
journalistic-commentarial, office-business, and familiar everyday speech” cannot be decisively
distinguished from each other because any one of these styles of speech may make use of
elements found in one of the other styles.121 By pointing out the complexity of the relationship
between “technical language” and other genres of language and speech, Bakhtin’s analysis
presents further challenges to Heller’s second criterion, thus lending further support to the
methodology of this study.
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Chapter II
Vocabulary of Illness
No single Latin word has precisely the same sense and connotations as the English word
“illness”. Indeed, while it could be said that there is no Latin word whose semantic range—with
all of its senses and connotations—has an exact one-to-one correspondence with any English
word1, translating words in the general semantic category of “illness” is especially fraught with
complexity because of differences in relevant conceptualizations across cultures and time
periods. Further complication results from the existence of various English words such as
“sickness”, “disease”, and ”disorder”, which partially overlap with, but do not completely
replicate the various senses and connotations of the English word “illness”.2
The issue becomes even thornier when considering these pieces of English vocabulary from a
diachronic perspective. Indeed, the nuances of these words have changed in subtle but
significant ways over time, as Jackson discerns: “Although there has been a useful trend in
modern times toward giving different definition to illness and disease, it should be noted that
historically these terms were essentially synonymous.”3 Jackson quite rightly observes that

1

This is a general principle of lexical semantics—true between and across any and all languages. See Lyons 1977:
236-238; Murphy and Koskela 2010: 180-181, 207-208; Davidson 1973; Quine 1960, 1968.
2
The glosses of these words provided in the Oxford English Dictionary reflect a circularity in definition: “illness”
and “sickness” are listed under the entry for “disease”;“disease” and “sickness” are listed under the entry for
“illness”; and “illness” and disease” are listed under the entry for “sickness”. (see OED Online: s.v. disease (n.);
illness (n.); sickness (n.). Other English words in this semantic sphere include “ailment”, “disorder”, “malady”, and
“malaise”.
3
Jackson 1986: 12. Jackson elaborates: “the growing strength of pathology and the emergence of bacteriology and
laboratory medicine [in the nineteenth century] began to provide the basis for the modern differentiation of illness
as the combination of the symptoms testified to by the sick person and the signs observed by others, and disease
as a combination of anatomical, physiological, and even psychological deviations from the norm that could be the
basis for a complex of symptoms and signs.” (Jackson 1986: 12-13) Other scholars have attempted to draw
distinctions between these terms; Eisenberg, for one, asserts that “patients suffer ‘illnesses’: physicians diagnose
and treat ‘diseases’.” (Eisenberg 1977: 9, see also 11) This delineation makes a sharp distinction between the
personal experience of the patient on the one hand, and the physician’s observations of the patient and
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these words’ senses have changed along with developments in modern science, but we should
be cautious about accepting his claim that these words were once “essentially synonymous”.
Linguists such as Cruse consider the phenomenon of absolute synonymy, or the mutual
substitutability of two or more words in all contexts without any change in sense or
connotation, to be a rare, and perhaps even non-existent phenomenon.4 Thus, even if the
senses of “illness” and “disease” were formerly less differentiated in the past, as Jackson
suggests, even then there still would have been differences in the kinds of things these words
could suggest to speakers of English. Furthermore, Jackson’s qualification that words such as
“illness” and “disease” used to be “essentially synonymous” diminishes the important fact that
now, as in the past, one can find differences in the usage of these words. We find, for instance,
that in certain expressions only one of these words tends to be employed idiomatically (e.g. we
are accustomed to the phrase “mental illness”, but not “mental disease”). Then there’s also the
question of register: how the “technical vocabulary” of medicine uses these two words is one
thing, and how they are used in broadly attested everyday speech may be another. All of this
serves to remind us not only of the danger of labeling two English words as “synonymous”, but
also of the fact that considering any two Latin words to be simply “synonymous” (even if the
same English word can be used to translate those Latin words) is to diminish differences in
semantic range and in nuances of usage.
subsequent responses on the other hand. But this formulation seems to overlook circumstances in which patients
are able to self-diagnose and/or treat themselves, while also suggesting that physicians are not sensitive to their
patients’ suffering. Despite drawing these distinctions, Eisenberg nevertheless goes on to state that “illness and
disease are synonymous in contemporary English usage.” (Eisenberg 1977: 11) Other attempts to differentiate
between “illness” and “disease” have been discussed by King. (King 1985: 5; 1999: 282 n. 7)
4
Cruse has remarked that “languages abhor absolute synonyms just as nature abhors a vacuum.” (Cruse 1986:
270; see also Cruse 2011: 142-143). Murphy similarly observes that “very few words are absolute synonyms”, as it
is “rare for two words to have exactly the same meaning/use.” (Murphy 2010: 110, see also 111-112; Murphy
2003)
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This important point does not always receive the emphasis it deserves. Meyer’s recent book
Latin Synonyms for Language Lovers (2013), for instance, lists semantically-similar words
together in broad categories, for example “verbs of arriving”, under which are listed verbs such
as attingere; advenire; devenire; pervenire; and adipisci). While these categories are useful,
Meyer does not issue the caveat that there will inevitably be semantic and pragmatic
differences between the various words listed under a single category. In fact, Meyer’s book
does not at any point explain its understanding of synonymy. This is worthy of some discussion,
especially since the book is avowedly geared toward an audience that includes not only
students and “armchair Latinists”, but also teachers5, who ought to be able to help their
students become more sensitive to semantic nuances and nuances of usage.
Another problem associated with the usage of these terms in English has been noted by
Grmek, who observes that there is “a subtle and fundamental distinction between ‘being sick’
and ‘having a sickness’”6; this points to the ability that language has to refer to actions (using
verbs), as opposed to its ability to assert identity (using nouns and adjectives). By the same
token, one often finds differences in semantic range when comparing a Latin verb and related
nouns or adjectives. The complexities mount further when we examine Latin terminology, as
there are numerous pieces of vocabulary having the sense of “illness”, “sickness”, or “disease”,
including the nouns pestis, pestilentia, morbus, infirmitas, aegritudo, lues, macies, tabes, vitium,
and malum. When we examine specific instances of usage in Latin texts, we see that there are
5

Meyer 2013: xi.
Grmek 1998: 123. It can also be pointed out that the English adjective “sick” can, in colloquial parlance, be used
in the senses of “excellent”, “impressive” and “risky”, and that “ill” can similarly be used in the senses of
“excellent”, “attractive” and “fashionable”. (see OED Online: s.v. sick (adj.); ill (n.)) These senses—which take on
an element of irony in light of traditional uses of these words—are not apparent in the usage patterns of the
related nouns. It would be rather unusual for a person to use the nouns “sickness” or “illness” in the respective
senses of “excellence” or “fashionableness”.
6

40

no absolute synonyms among these words; there are subtle differentiations in sense and
connotations between each word, which in turn reflect or emphasize different aspects of the
broad phenomenon of “illness”. At the same time, throughout this chapter I generally translate
or gloss these words with the English “illness” deliberately and consistently, as both a reminder
and tool to draw attention to the prevalence of this theme, while allowing the Latin words to
speak for themselves.
In this chapter, my analysis will focus on the varied and complex language of illness in
Seneca’s Oedipus, a play which offers fruitful opportunity for analysis due to its richness in
relevant themes and language use. In this play, Seneca presents a city beleaguered with a
plague which encompasses various forms of suffering and illness; this multiplicity is in turn
reflected in the array of vocabulary used throughout the play.7 I will analyze words in the
semantic sphere of illness by performing close readings of passages from Oedipus, with
occasional reference to vocabulary usage in other Senecan plays. My analysis is organized by
semantic types, first focusing on nouns and related adjectives and verbs whose semantic core is
specifically linked to illness (e.g. pestis, pestilentia, morbus, aegritudo), then turning to words
whose semantic core is more general, or at least not always specific to illness (e.g. lues, macies,
tabes, virus), and finally turning to words whose semantic core is even more broad (e.g. malum,
vitium). To use a linguistic term which has been employed by Cruse, it could be said that these
various words constitute a “lexical cluster”, or an informal grouping of “near-synonyms”.8
Throughout this analysis, I will draw comparisons with the various pieces of vocabulary

7

As Mastronarde observes, when one focuses on the play’s use of language, “the play emerges more and more as
a study of a sick situation which centers around and derives from a sick individual.” (Mastronarde 1970: 301)
8
See Cruse 2000: 193-194.
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employed by Celsus9, thus providing a fuller understanding of the semantic range and
connotations of such words and offering insight into the conceptualization of illness in different
genres of Latin literature. By looking closely at specific instances of usage in both Seneca and
Celsus, we can become more sensitive to the subtleties of the Latin vocabulary of illness, and
thus arrive at a more nuanced understanding of these authors’ ways of describing illness that
are characteristic of these different kinds of texts, and the literary, linguistic, and cultural
traditions in which they arose and circulated.
Pestis and Pestilentia
I begin with words that are often translated as “plague”, since that is such a prominent
theme in Oedipus. The English word “plague” can signify “a particular affliction, calamity, or
evil”, “a wound, a sore; a boil”, “a smiting, slaughter”, “an infectious disease which spreads
rapidly and has a high mortality rate”, or “a person, animal, or plant whose presence, behavior,
or activities are damaging, troublesome, or merely irritating”, etc.10 Two Latin words
commonly translated as plague are pestis and pestilentia.11 Bodson observes that these are the
Latin words most commonly used to refer to “maladies epidemiques”.12 Aside from “plague”,
possible translations for pestis include “physical destruction”, “death”, “an instrument of death

9

Commenting on the lexical variatio in Celsus’ work, Jocelyn observes that Celsus uses “three words for πάθος
(malum, morbus, vitium).” (Jocelyn 1985: 315) Jocelyn points out a few of the different words in Celsus’ rich
vocabulary of illness, but we should question his suggestion that these Latin words are synonymous with each
other, and that they are all synonymous with a Greek word.
10
see OED Online: s.v. plague (n.).
11
According to Ernout and Meillet, the etymology of pestis is unclear. (Ernout and Meillet 1951: s.v. pestis) Lewis
and Short suggest a possible connection with the verb perdere (to destroy, to waste). (Lewis and Short 1879: s.v.
pestis)
12
Bodson 1991: 220.
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or destruction”, “disaster”, “curse”13, and, according to Lewis and Short, “noxious atmosphere”
and “unhealthy weather”14—all senses that resonate with the plot and themes of Oedipus.
Both the Oxford Latin Dictionary and Lewis and Short observe that pestis can refer to either a
destructive thing or a destructive person—an ambiguity which, as I will argue, has great
significance to the situation in Oedipus. Possible translations for pestilentia include “an
outbreak of epidemic disease”, “pestilence”, “unhealthy quality of atmosphere”, and
“insalubrity”.15 While pestilentia does not appear in Oedipus or any other Senecan play16, pestis
plays an important role in Oedipus, possessing a broad range of connotations. At the opening
of the play, Oedipus describes some of the elements of the pestis that is besieging his city17:
Iam nocte Titan dubius expulsa redit
et nube maestum squalida exoritur iubar,
lumenque flamma triste luctifica gerens
prospiciet avida peste solatas domos,
stragemque quam nox fecit ostendet dies.
Now, with the night driven off, Titan hesitantly returns
and his radiance appears gloomy due to a dirty cloud,
his woeful flame carrying a sad light
that will look upon homes abandoned because of the greedy plague,
and day will reveal the confusion which night has made. (1-5)

13

Glare 2012: s.v. pestis.
Lewis and Short 1879: s.v. pestis.
15
Glare 2012: s.v. pestilentia.
16
In the corpus of Senecan tragedy, the adjective pestilens appears twice, (Hercules Furens 32; Phaedra 489), and
the adjective pestifer appears four times (Hercules Furens 562, 976; Phoenissae 38, 220). For a discussion of the
representation of pestis and pestilentia in Senecan prose, see Pisi 1989: 73-79.
17
This opening speech, which continues until Jocasta’s speech at line 82, appears to be a soliloquy which,
according to Boyle, performs a “prologic” function. Boyle convincingly argues that Oedipus “enters alone” and
that he is not speaking to another character. (Boyle 2011: 102)
14
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Oedipus describes this pestis as an all-consuming manifestation of illness: it is shown to affect
not only the people of Thebes, but also the surrounding environment and the cosmos.18 As
Boyle has commented, “the land, animals, citizens of Thebes, even and especially the air are
infected with Oedipus’ contagion.”19 This is a clear illustration of how pestis can have the sense
of a “noxious atmosphere”. As we will see, Oedipus provides more detail about the effects of
the pestis on the surrounding atmosphere and environment later in his opening speech. Here,
Oedipus’ reference to the plague as “greedy” (avida, 4) points toward these pervasive effects,
while also giving the pestis a human characteristic. The adjective avida is also used to describe
the pestis at 589, where the plague is said to be hungry for the Ogygian people (avidumque
populi Pestis Ogygii malum, 589)20, which again underscores the ravenous, consumptive nature
of the plague.21 In that particular passage, Pestis is mentioned at the end of a long, asyndetic
list22 containing various words with connotations of illness and infirmity (Furor, Horror, Luctus,
Morbus, Metus, Senectus, Pestis, 589-59423). The fact that this list culminates with Pestis
suggests that it is the ultimate form of illness, encompassing all other forms of illness, suffering,
and infirmity, and this is in keeping with the representation of the plague as all-consuming. The

18

Duncan has remarked upon the tendency of Senecan tragedy to “describe the entire universe, not simply the
particular Greek polis of the play’s setting, as falling into chaos as a result of human crimes.” Duncan also suggests
that this tendency is in keeping with Seneca’s Stoic cosmological beliefs. (Duncan 2006: 198; see also D. Henry and
E.W. Henry 1985: 40-54)
19
Boyle 1997: 97. D. Henry and E.W. Henry also note that emphasis is placed upon the ill condition of the air. (D.
Henry and E.W. Henry 1985: 147)
20
Ogygos was an early, legendary ruler of Thebes from whom the populus Ogygius of Oedipus’ time were
supposedly descended.
21
As Boyle notes, in this play avida is also used in connection with words denoting death (164), fate (411), and
Oedipus’ self-blinding (965). (Boyle 2011: 106). Mastronarde has also observed that the adjective avidus is used to
create connections between Oedipus and “the horribly insistent grabbing of death and of its agent, the plague.”
(Mastronarde 1970: 295)
22
On the frequent use of asyndetic lists of nouns and adjectives in Senecan tragedy, see Boyle 2011: 112, 263.
23
Most critical editions, including those of Boyle and Fitch, transpose the line labeled 589 after line 594. (see Boyle
2011: 249-250; Fitch 68-69)
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words in this list, including Pestis, are usually capitalized in critical editions24, reflecting how
they are used as personified abstractions. Seneca includes lists of personified entities in other
tragedies (e.g. Hercules Furens 95-99; 1059-1060); in this practice, Seneca appears to have been
influenced by Virgil and Ovid, as well as earlier Roman tragedians, such as Accius and
Pacuvius.25 In this particular passage, the use of the adjective avida contributes to the sense of
personification, as if to endow Pestis with a sense of agency. Later in this chapter, I discuss
other lists in Oedipus which feature language personifying illness (652, 1059-1060).
In the opening lines of the play, pestis is also associated with paradoxical changes in nature:
the sun (Titan) is returning, yet it possesses a “gloomy radiance” (maestum iubar, 2); day and
night are thus confounded, as is highlighted by stragem (5). Later in the opening scene, we see
that this confusion extends to the realm of human society when Oedipus observes that the
pestis brings death indiscriminately, showing no regard for age, sex, or the natural sequence of
generations:
Nec ulla pars immunis exitio vacat,
sed omnis aetas pariter et sexus ruit,
iuvenesque senibus iungit et gnatis patres
funesta pestis…
No area is unaffected or free from destruction,
but every age and sex perishes equally;
the deadly plague joins the young to the old,
fathers to sons… (52-55)
In noting that the plague muddles up the typical cycles and patterns of life, death, illness, and
health, Oedipus also reminds us of the confused lineage of the Theban royal family (even if
Oedipus himself is still unaware about this confusion at this point), and the confused nature of
24
25

Boyle 2011: 250; cf. Fitch 2004: 68.
See Boyle 2011: 250.
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Oedipus himself.26 All this confusion is connected with Oedipus’ unwitting marriage to his
mother, which makes Oedipus paradoxically both a father and a brother to his children, and is
here highlighted by the suggestive juxtaposition of gnatis and patres. Littlewood and Bettini
also observe that the plague’s confusion of natural order mirrors, and perhaps stems from, the
confused nature of Oedipus’ identity.27 Tiresias makes this quite explicit later in the play, when
he asserts that the cause of the plague does not have to do with luctificus Auster (the baleful
South Wind, 632) or the fact that the land is afflicted by dry fumes (halitu sicco, 633), but the
rex cruentus (bloody king, 634) himself, and herein lies another paradox: the plague is a form of
illness experienced by an entire community, but its cause (and potential healer) is closely linked
with a single individual.28 It also paradoxical that the plague does not directly harm Oedipus,
despite his assertion that nothing is free from its wrath. A little earlier in his opening speech,
Oedipus wonders why the plague spares him alone (…mihi parcit uni? 31); this formulation
draws attention to the paradox that he alone is (or could be said to be) the cause of the pestis.
Oedipus’ opening speech thus emphasizes that the pestis is confounding and paradoxical, and
this theme is explored further as the play progresses.
While the nature of the plague remains perplexing to Oedipus, he is fully aware of the havoc
that it wreaks on the land of Thebes. Oedipus uses language of health and illness to comment
upon the condition of his realm, noting that one would not find bodies piled up in a “healthy

26

Busch and Frank make similar points about this specific passage. (Busch 2007: 258; Frank 1995: 124)
Littlewood 2004: 23-24; Bettini 1983: 148-149.
28
As Pisi observes, “la ‘peste’ ed Edipo sono irrimediabilmente legati: Edipo è la peste, perche è la colpa.” (Pisi
1989: 68-69) Sontag also discusses interconnections between individual and communal experiences of illness in
antiquity, and she includes the Oedipus myth in her comments. (Sontag 1990: 133)
27
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kingdom” (regnum salubre, 36). Expanding upon these remarks, Oedipus describes the
conditions of the environment, using a number of words evocative of medical symptoms:29
Non aura gelido lenis afflatu fovet
anhela flammis corda, non Zephyri leves
spirant, sed ignes auget aestiferi canis
Titan, leonis terga Nemeaei premens.
Deseruit amnes umor atque herbas color
aretque Dirce, tenuis Ismenos fluit
et tinguit inopi nuda vix unda vada.
Obscura caelo labitur Phoebi soror,
tristisque mundus nubilo pallet die.
Nullum serenis noctibus sidus micat,
sed gravis et ater incubat terris vapor:
obtexit arces caelitum ac summas domos
inferna facies. Denegat fructum Ceres
adulta, et altis flava cum spicis tremat,
arente culmo sterilis emoritur seges.
No mild breeze with its cold breath
soothes our hearts that gasp with heat, no mild west winds
breathe, but the Titan, pressing down upon the back of the Nemean lion,
increases the fires of the heat-bringing dog star.
Moisture departs from rivers and color from grasses;
Dirce is parched; Ismenos flows scantily
and hardly moistens the bare shallows with its slight waves.
Phoebus’ sister glides through the sky concealed,
and the sad universe grows pale with the overcast day.
There is no star shining in the clear night,
But a heavy black vapor broods upon the earth.
An infernal appearance spreads over the fortresses of the heavens,
the highest palaces. The mature grain denies harvest,
and although the golden field shakes with its tall shoots,
the crop is fruitless, and dies away on dry stalks. (37-51)
Although the term pestis does not appear in this passage, it is used by Oedipus shortly
thereafter (55), suggesting that this passage is a description of the pestis. This section of

29

Boyle states that this passage is “self-consciously allusive” to descriptions of plague in Thucydides, Lucretius,
Virgil, and Ovid, but he does not examine the passage in relation to Celsus. (Boyle 2011: 122) Pisi also notes the
passage’s connections with descriptions of plague in Thucydides. (Pisi 1989: 63)
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Oedipus’ soliloquy first informs us that there is no mild breeze to provide relief from the
plague’s oppressive heat. This is expressed using language associated with medical treatment,
since the verb fovere (37) can be translated “to relieve”, “to massage”, “to treat (parts of the
body, wounds, etc.)” “to tend (the sick, infirm, etc.), etc.30 This is in fact a word that Celsus uses
(whether as a finite verb or as a participle) more than seventy times, often when describing the
application of various kinds of liquids (often water) or unguents in order to remedy an
assortment of conditions.31 In the above passage, relief is needed because there are no breezes
bringing “cold breath” (gelido…afflatu), and because no west winds “breathe” (non Zephyri
leves / spirant) upon the land of Thebes. These west winds are described as leves—a word I
translate above as “mild”, but which also suggests medical relief, especially through its
etymological connection with the verb levare (“to lift or raise up”, “to relieve”, “to lessen (pain
toil, loss, grief, etc.”).32 Celsus frequently uses this verb in the sense of “treating” or “relieving”
various conditions33, and Oedipus uses it in this sense later in this speech (non ars ulla corruptos
levant, 69).34 Lacking such relief, the people of Thebes suffer from “hearts that gasp with
flames” (anhela flammis corda, 38). The connection between the condition of the land and the
condition of the Theban people is made very clear: because the winds do not “breathe”, the
people themselves cannot breathe.35 We are presented with an image of asphyxiation, which is

30

Glare 2012: s.v. fovere.
e.g. 1.2.4.3-5.2; 2.17.7.1-8; 4.12.4.3-10; 7.3.3.5-8.
32
Glare 2012: s.v. levare.
33
e.g. Super tabem si mulieri suppressa quoque menstrua fuerunt, et circa pectus atque scapulas dolor mansit
subitoque sanguis erupit, levari morbus solet… (2.8.7.1-4)
34
This verse is examined more in depth in this chapter’s forthcoming discussion of morbus.
35
Aygon makes a similar connection between the plague’s effects on nature and its effects on the people of
Thebes, stating that “les hommes pâtissent directement des maux mêmes qui frappent la nature.”
31
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reminiscent of Celsus’ description of an illness in the region of the throat (circa fauces malum,
4.8.1.1) which produces various kinds of breathing problems:
Omne in difficultate spirandi consistit; sed haec dum modica est neque ex toto
strangulat δύσπνοια appellatur; cum vehementior est, ut spirare aeger sine
sono et anhelatione non possit, ἆσθμα: at cum accessit id quoque, quod aegre
nisi recta cervice spiritus trahitur, ὀρθόπνοια. (4.8.1.3-9)
It consists of a difficulty in breathing; when it is moderate and does not produce
any choking, it is called dyspnoea; when it is more severe, with the result that
the ill person is not able to breathe without noise and gasping, it is called
asthma; but when in addition the patient is barely able to draw in breath unless
his neck is positioned upright, it is called orthopnoea.
In the above description from Celsus, we find language also used by Oedipus in his description
of the condition of Thebes: both writers use the verb spirare in reference to breathing, and the
stem anhel- (the adjective anhelus in Seneca, the noun anhelatio in Celsus) in reference to
“gasping”. These resonances further accentuate the medicalized nature of Oedipus’ description
of the Theban pestis.
Interestingly, Oedipus states that the hearts (corda, 38) themselves are gasping (anhela), in
effect attributing the process of breathing to those organs, rather than to the Theban people
who are suffering as a result of the gasping. While this might be considered an example of a
transferred epithet, there is also a subtle element of personification with these gasping organs,
similar to how the plague itself is given human characteristics. This instance illustrates what
one can miss in calling something a transferred epithet and simply leaving it at that. Another
noteworthy aspect of usage in this phrase is that the heart is associated with breathing, rather
than another organ that we may expect, such as the lungs. Celsus provides a description of the
relationship between the heart and lungs; he states that these organs are directly attached to
49

each other, but he associates breathing with the lungs, noting that their spongy nature
facilitates taking in breath.36 In his reference to “hearts that gasp” (anhela flammis corda),
Oedipus also suggests a close relationship between the heart and the lungs, as if their functions
are so interconnected as to be indistinguishable from each other. In other Senecan tragedies,
one can also find instances where a bodily function or perception is surprisingly attributed to an
unexpected organ; in Thyestes, for instance, Atreus states that he saw the entrails of Thystes’
sons groan (mugire fibras vidi, 1064). This particular phrase is discussed in Chapter 3, but here
we note that in this example and in the above passage from Oedipus the normal functioning of
the body is thrown into disturbance by the intermixing of bodily processes.
Due to the excessive heat brought on by Titan, the rivers Dirce and Ismenos become devoid
of umor (41). The word umor appears quite frequently in Celsus, often serving as an important
indicator of health. Celsus uses umor in various ways: it may refer to one of the four humours
familiar from the Hippocratic Corpus37, but it can also refer to any kind of moisture, fluid, or
discharge, and it can be applied to bodies of water.38 Like earlier Hippocratic writers, Celsus
places importance on the proper flow, proportion, and balance of bodily fluids, and considers
abnormal discharges or excessive accumulations of umor to be signs of illness.39 As
Rosenmeyer has noted, Seneca states in Naturales Quaestiones that the earth itself, as well as

36

Is spongiosus, ideoque spiritus capax, et a tergo spinae ibi iunctus, in duas fibras ungulae bubulae modo dividitur.
Huic cor adnexum est, natura musculosum, in pectore sub sinistriore mamma situm; duosque quasi ventriculos
habet. (4.1.4.1-5)
37
Celsus refers to bilis atra (black bile), along with various other bodily fluids, as umor (2.1.6.1-7). Bilis atra is
discussed more in depth in Chapter 4.
38
Glare 2012: s.v. umor. Thomas’ discussion of medical language in Herodotus observes that certain pieces of
Greek humoral vocabulary, such as ἰκμάς (“moisture”) have a similarly broad semantic range and that they are
capable of referring to fluids inside human beings as well as fluids in the earth. (Thomas 2000: 49-52; cf. Lonie
1981: 269)
39
e.g. Vere tamen maxime, quae cum umoris motu novantur, in metu esse consuerunt. (2.1.6.1-2)
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human bodies, contain different types of humor.40 This idea is reflected in Oedipus, where the
rivers’ deficiency of umor is a sign of the Theban plague. A little later in the play, the chorus
relates that the river Dirce is clouded with blood (turbatam sanguine Dircen, 177), suggesting
another kind of humoral abnormality.
The Theban environment’s poor state of health is also conveyed by the grasses’ loss of color
(41), another indicator of various forms of illness in Celsus and works by other authors.41 Celsus
notes, for instance, that when the heart is punctured, a person assumes a color pallidissimus
(most pallid color, 5.26.8.2) before dying shortly thereafter. In another passage, Celsus states
that it is a particularly bad sign when a person loses their usual color (colorem…amisit, 2.2.2.23). In addition, Goldman has observed that Celsus uses the verb decolorare in relation to
various parts of the body, “which have changed color in a significantly negative fashion”.42
Celsus also asserts that administering proper treatment to a wounded body part requires
knowledge of the color that body part displays in a state of health (1.Pr.25.5-26.2). A change in
color is also indicative of illness in other Senecan tragedies. In Seneca’s Thyestes, Atreus
anticipates that a change in Thyestes’ colores (904) will come about when Thyestes realizes that
he has consumed the flesh of his sons.43 In Medea, Medea’s mental distress is manifested in

40

Rosenmeyer 1989: 131; cf. Naturales Quaestiones 3.15.2.2. Note that humor is a variant spelling of umor (Glare
2012: s.v. humor). In Hine’s edition of Naturales Quaestiones, this phrase is printed as multa genera umoris.
41
As Bradley notes, the quality of color is an important aspect in diagnosing and classifying forms of illness in
medical texts from the Hippocratic Corpus through to Galen. (Bradley 2013: 133; see also Villard 2002; Nutton
2013: 339 n. 82)
42
Goldman cites two particular passages from Celsus: a description of a skin condition in which the eyelids become
pale (2.6.4.2), and a description of abscesses that form under the skin, causing a discoloration of the overlying skin
(2.8.23.2). (Goldman 2013: 143; see also 144 concerning the use of decolorare and the noun decolor by authors
such as Pliny, Prudentius, and Cicero in passages that describe the worsening condition of body parts)
43
This passage is discussed more in depth in Chapter 3.
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the ever-changing color of her face.44 As for the grasses’ loss of color in the above passage, one
finds an interesting parallel in a passage from Lucan’s De Bello Civili that describes how war
brings devastation and deterioration to every aspect of the universe. As in Oedipus, the sense
of illness and despair is manifested in even the humble blades of grass: quae seges infecta
surget non decolor herba? (What crop of grass will not rise up discolored and with tainted
blades? 7.851).
In the passage above, Oedipus’ use of the verb pallet (45) also suggests that the natural
environment has undergone a change in color. The verb pallere, which can have the sense of
“to be pale or bloodless (from illness, strong emotion, etc.)”45 or “to lose [one’s] natural
color”46, appears frequently in Celsus, along with the noun pallor and the adjective pallidus.47
These words are often indicators of various kinds of illness, and they are closely associated with
changes in color, as in the passage discussed above (5.26.8.2). In another passage, Celsus notes
that changes in color (color) and pallor (paleness) are both signs of fever (febris, 3.6.7.11-12).
While the above passage does not feature the word febris, it does contain language and
imagery associated with heat (e.g. flammis, ignes, aestiferi canis, Titan), as if to suggest that the
entire universe is in a feverish state. Celsus also relates that pallor deprives body parts of color
(eademque palpebrae pallent, et idem pallor labra et nares decolorant, 2.6.4.1-2), and he
asserts that this is a sign of imminent death (mortis index est, 2.6.3.1; eadem mors denuntiatur,
2.6.5.1).
44

Flagrant genae rubentes / pallor fugat ruborem. / Nullum vagante forma / servat diu colorem. (Medea 858-861)
Commenting on this passage, Boyle observes that changes in color are “a standard index of high emotionality”.
(Boyle 2014: 341; see also 340)
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Glare 2012: s.v. pallere.
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Lewis and Short 1879: s.v. pallere.
47
Pisi and Stok note that Celsus associates pallor with stomachus infirmus. (e.g. 1.8.2.1-2; see Pisi 1989: 76 n. 16;
Stok 1985: 420)
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Oedipus observes that his city is oppressed by a heavy, black vapor (47), suggesting an image
of polluted air. As Boyle notes, vapor is often used to express “exhalations arising from heat”48
and it can even be translated as just “heat”, reinforcing the sense that the environment is in a
feverish state. Boyle notes that this word also appears in the description of symptoms
experienced by the people of Thebes which is provided by the chorus after the first act of the
play (tum vapor ipsam corporis arcem flammeus urit, 185).49 Here, vapor is modified by
flammeus (185)50 and it is said to burn (urit) the surface of the human body—language evoking
fever.51 Vapor is thus presented as a symptom experienced by both the people of Thebes and
the Theban environment itself.52 These widespread effects recall ideas propounded in the
Hippocratic treatise Breaths, which traces the origin of all diseases to air and emphasizes the
effects that air has on both individuals and the universe in general.53 In Oedipus, however, the
noxious condition of the air around Thebes is presented not as a cause of illness, but rather as a
symptom of an illness brought about by an individual—a point which is made quite forcefully by
Tiresias.54
Vapor is also a term with medical significance in Celsus, where it appears thirteen times, but
with rather different connotations. But in each of Celsus’ mentions of vapor, it is used in
reference to treatments of illness, rather than symptoms. In one instance, Celsus discusses
48

Boyle 2011: 124; cf. Glare 2012: s.v. vapor.
Boyle 2011: 124.
50
Rosenmeyer remarks that vapor is also linked with flammae Hercules Oetaeus (1613) and with pestis in Thyestes
(87-89). (Rosemeyer 1989: 130)
51
Mastronarde observes that vapor contributes to the sense of heat and dryness which is repeatedly evoked in
this passage (cf. 37-40; 41-43; 49-51), and he associates this collective imagery with “the fever of disease”.
(Mastronarde 1970: 296)
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Boyle observes that “heat” is traditionally identified as a symptom of plague, citing descriptions by Thucydides,
Lucretius, and Ovid. (Boyle 2011: 158)
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On these theories put forth in Breaths, see Nutton 2013: 74.
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See 631-634 (discussed above)
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treatments that require perspiration to be induced, and he notes that these treatments can be
conveniently carried out in locations where vapor naturally rises out of the ground (2.17.1.1-5).
In several other instances, Celsus mentions the ingestion of vapor aquae (water vapor)55 as a
way to treat various kinds of illness. In none of these instances is vapor associated with pestis
or other language suggestive of mass illness/plague. Celsus does, however, often associate
vapor with heat, describing it as calidus or associating it with substances that are calidus56,
which recalls the connotations of heat that vapor carries in Oedipus (cf. 185).
The effects of the pestis are so extensive that even the farmland of Thebes is depicted in a
state of illness. Oedipus observes that even though the land shakes with tall shoots
(altis…spicis tremat, 50), it produces a barren crop which cannot be harvested. The verb
tremere, which can be translated “to tremble” or “to quiver”57, and the related noun tremor,
evoke symptoms of human illness. Near the end of the play, for instance, Oedipus speaks of
Morbi tremor (the shaking of Illness, 105958), and Oedipus also experiences a cold tremor run
through his body (Et ossa et artus gelidus invasit tremor, 659) after Creon accuses him of
bringing illness upon Thebes through his unwitting acts of incest and patricide. Seneca’s
Hercules Furens also contains repeated uses of tremere and tremor59, referring to either
physical symptoms of Hercules’ madness, or indicators that the natural environment is in a
tumultuous state, recalling the use of these words in Oedipus. Moreover, the connotations of
shaking in lines 50-51 of Oedipus are particularly dire, as it is also stated that the crop is dying
55

e.g. 6.8.1a.1; 6.8.1c.2; 6.9.1.5; 7.7.10.9; 7.7.11.10; 7.9.5.8; 8.4.11.1; 8.7.4.5
e.g. 2.7.1.3; 4.9.1.3; 6.8.1a.1; 6.8.1c.2; 6.9.1.5; 6.10.1.2; 6.10.3.6; 6.13.3.4; 7.7.10.9; 7.7.11.10; 7.9.5.8; 8.4.11.1;
8.7.4.5.
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Glare 2012: s.v. tremere.
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Cf. Morbus tremens (Hercules Furens, 694).
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Hercules Furens 61, 81, 158, 259, 269, 414, 418, 517, 694, 979, 1044. The language and imagery associated with
Hercules’ madness are discussed more in depth in Chapter 4.
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away (emoritur, 51). The grim connotations of shaking are also apparent when the chorus,
describing the afflictions of the environment, states that the Cadmean woodland shook twice
(bis Cadmeum / … tremuisse nemus, 175-176). The verb tremere does not appear in Celsus, but
the noun tremor (shaking) appears six times, in connection with various conditions. This
includes some rather severe conditions, such as delirium (2.8.16.6-7)60 and ardentes febres
(burning fevers, 7.23.1.5); in the latter case, the onset of a tremor is said to indicate that death
is imminent.
The wide-ranging effects that the plague has upon both mankind and nature reflect two
fundamental components (as Migliorini notes) of a pestis or pestilentia: it is both contagious
and deadly.61 Oedipus’ description of the plague culminates in language of death (emoritur),
suggesting that death is the ultimate outcome to be expected based upon the symptoms that
are identified. This constellation of symptoms allows Oedipus to conclude that his kingdom is
mired in a funesta pestis (55). The large-scale devastation of nature wrought by the pestis is
presented as a macrocosm of a human body afflicted with illness. The process by which
Oedipus describes aspects of the condition of the environment, and concludes that it is
suffering from a deadly pestis, resembles the processes of medical diagnosis, whereby one
observes a set of symptoms then attempts to draw a conclusion about a person’s condition.
This process operates similarly in Celsus, who emphasizes at the opening of the Proemium of
Book 2 that various forms of adverse health can be detected by observing signa conplura
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The term delirium is discussed further in Chapter 4.
“...quello che conta è solo l’allusione ad un tipo di malattia “contagiosa”, letale, che semina sofferenza e morte e
da cui non mettono al riparo neppure un fisico robusto ed una cura attenta della propria salute.” (Migliorini 1997:
74)
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(various signs, 2.Pr.1.1-262). Celsus then goes on throughout the rest of Book 2 to provide a
multitude of examples in which specific illnesses are identified through the observation of
signa63, and he recommends treatments based upon these identifications. Celsus’ diagnoses
are also sometimes informed by causes (weather, seasons, age, etc.) which can precipitate
symptoms associated with certain forms of illness64; Oedipus, on the other hand, remains
ignorant of the causes of the pestis, and treatment thus remains elusive despite his diagnosis.
In Migliorini’s discussion of the opening passage of Oedipus, she argues that Seneca’s
portrayal of the funesta pestis is merely following “tradizione letteraria”, and that it is thus
difficult to identify a “particolare competenza ‘clinica’ senecana’.”65 My analysis, however,
demonstrates that this passage can be considered both “letteraria” and “clinica” in nature, and
that these categories are not mutually exclusive. Migliorini also states that representations of
illness in Seneca’s tragedies are primarily derived from Stoic thought, and that they thus do not
demonstrate “conoscenze mediche”.66 Migliorini, however, does not explain what constitutes
“conoscenze mediche”, nor does she explain how this epistemological paradigm is distinct from
other epistemological paradigms. Oedipus’ description of the pestis features numerous
examples of language also used by Celsus, which calls into question the suggestion that the
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Later in Book 2, Celsus similarly remarks: Ante adversam autem valetudinem, ut supra dixi [cf. 2.Pr.1], quaedam
notae oriuntur, quarum omnium commune est aliter se corpus habere atque consuevit, neque in peius tantum sed
etiam in melius. (2.2.1.1-5)
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On the process of diagnosis in other Roman authors of prose texts on medicine (esp. Galen), see Nutton 2013:
228, 244.
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e.g. Frigus modo nervorum distentionem, modo rigorem infert; illud spasmos, hoc tetanos Graece nominatur;
nigritiem in ulceribus, horrores in febribus excitat. (2.1.12.1-4)
65
Migliorini 1997: 75.
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Migliorini 1997: 83. Despite this assertion, Migliorini also claims that Seneca’s descriptions of the conditions of
Phaedra (in Phaedra) and Heracles (in Hercules Furens and Hercules Oetaeus) possess a greater sense of medical
precision, and she compares these descriptions to passages in Caelius Aurelianus’ De Morbis Acutis (1.38.2; 62-63)
(Migliorini 1997: 85, nn. 427, 428).
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passage is devoid of medical knowledge. Similar distinctions between the “literary” and
“medical” spheres are made by Pisi, who draws a contrast between the usage of the words
pestis and pestilentia, asserting that the former word “conosce l’uso metaforico”, while the
latter “è ristretto al campo specifico (nosologico) e all’uso proprio”.67 But as my analysis has
shown, pestis carries “metaphorical” as well as “nosological” or medical connotations in
Oedipus’ opening speech.68 All this illustrates a point emphasized in my introduction’s
discussion of “technical vocabulary”: dichotomies such as “literary”/ “clinical” (or “medical”),
and “technical”/ “non-technical” often break down when one looks closely at the specific
instances of vocabulary use.
Following Oedipus’ speech, the chorus goes on to describe other physical and medical
elements of the mass illness: the animals in and around the city become weak and unable to
perform their typical behavior (132-153), plant life dies off (154-159), the rivers of the
underworld change their course, and even the ferryman who famously serves the underworld
becomes exhausted from the constant influx of the dead (166-170). While these elements of
the mass illness are not directly associated with the word pestis, this word is used when the
chorus describes effects which the plague has upon one specific animal:
…perdidit pestem latebrosa serpens:
aret et sicco moritur veneno.
…the lurking snake has lost its means of destruction:
he is parched, and dies with poison dried up. (152-153)

67

Pisi 1989: 72; see also 73-74.
Pisi also maintains that “pestis è riservato alla sfera morale”, but my analysis illustrates that a pestis does not
necessarily possess only moral connotations.
68
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Here, the Theban plague actually deprives the snake of its ability to inflict “plague” or
“destruction” (pestem) upon other animals through the use of its poison69; the snake thus loses
the means by which it sustains its own life. The statement borders on the paradoxical: it is
implied that the pestis of Thebes is so destructive and all-consuming that it prevails over other,
weaker pestes that exist in nature.70 In this particular instance, pestis refers to a specific means
by which a snake can kill prey; this is in contrasts with other passages where the use of pestis is
more generalized. Pestis is also connected with the sudden attack of an animal in Hercules
Oetaeus. Setting aside the question of whether this play should be attributed to Seneca, we
find a similar use of pestis in this play. After Hercules puts on a shirt poisoned with the blood of
the Lernaean hydra and his flesh begins to melt away, Hercules refers to this sudden attack as a
pestis (1225, 1230, 1260). Before dying from this attack, Hercules also associates his condition
with the strike of a scorpion (scorpios, 1218) or crab (cancer, 1219), which further emphasizes
the quick and sudden action of pestes.71 Similar connotations are also apparent when Hercules
refers to the Nemean lion as a pestis (1193) in a passage that will be discussed in further detail
later in this chapter. In Celsus, the word cancer is used to in reference to various conditions,
including ulcerations, erysipelas, and gangrene; each of these conditions is associated with its
own specific symptoms, but they are all characterized by disfigurement of the skin, including
discoloration, putrefaction, mortification of external tissue, and quickly spreading swollen veins
which were thought to resemble the limbs of a crab. The cancer which subdues Hercules also
69

In Fitch’s translation, pestem is translated as “poison”, apparently through analogy with veneno, which Fitch
translates as “venom”. (Fitch 2004: 29)
70
A similar sense of paradox is again apparent later in this chorus, where we see reference to a “form of death that
is more severe than death” (facies leti / gravior leto, 180-181).
71
Budelmann also discusses how these references to scorpions and crabs contribute to the representation of
Hercules’ experience of illness and pain. (Budelmann 2007: 448-449).
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spreads quickly over his body, but the fact that it results in his death represents a departure
from Celsus’ usage, as Celsus never applies cancer to malignant conditions.72
The word pestis makes one final appearance near the ending of the play, after Oedipus has
come to understand his identity as an incestuous patricide, and how these aspects of his
identity are connected with Theban plague. Oedipus then prepares to leave Thebes and go into
exile, believing that the pestis and other manifestations of illness will leave with him:
Quicumque fessi pectore et morbo graves
semianima trahitis corpora73, en fugio, exeo:
relevate colla. Mitior caeli status
post terga sequitur: quisquis exilem iacens
animam retentat, vividos haustus levis
concipiat. Ite, ferte depositis opem:
mortifera mecum vitia terrarum extraho.
Violenta Fata et horridus Morbi tremor,
Maciesque et atra Pestis et rabidus Dolor,
mecum ite, mecum. Ducibus his uti libet.
Whoever are weary at heart and heavy with illness
dragging along half-dead bodies, behold, I am fleeing, I depart:
lift up your heads. A milder condition of the sky
will come in behind me: whoever, lying prostrate, retains
scant breath of life, may easily take in life-giving draughts.
Go, bring help to those put down:
I am drawing away the deadly illnesses of the lands.
Violent Fates and terrible shaking of Disease,
Wasting and black Plague and raving Pain,
come with me, with me. I delight in having guides such as these. (1052-1061)
The present discussion of this passage will remain focused on the usage of pestis, while the
other words in this passage that can have the sense of “illness” (morbus, macies, vitium) will be
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Spencer devotes an entire section of his Appendix to Celsus’ usage of the word cancer. According to Spencer,
Celsus’s use of cancer always denotes superficial, non-malignant conditions, which do not include the condition
known as “cancer” today. In reference to superficial conditions that are malignant, Celsus uses the words
carcinoma or carcinodes. (see Spencer 1938: 589-592)
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Here, my quotation of the Latin (corpora) departs from the Oxford Classical text (corpore), following a reading
which Boyle and other scholars have persuasively argued for. (see Boyle 2011: 358).
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discussed later in this chapter. The mention of pestis in 1060 provides a matching bookend for
the initial reference to pestis which occurs near the very beginning of the play (4)—an example
of ring composition that underscores how the entire play is encompassed by this particular
manifestation of illness. This passage also contains another list of words that personify forms of
illness and suffering (1059-1060, cf. 589-594), building up to the ultimate form of illness, Pestis.
The fact that the list concludes with Dolor74 suggests that this quality subsumes and unites
Morbus, Macies, and Pestis, while it is also most strongly associated with Pestis through their
close juxtaposition. Oedipus himself is also closely identified with this Pestis, and with the
other manifestations of illness in the list; he addresses them all in an apostrophe, asking them
to become his companions in exile. As previously noted, pestis can be used in reference to a
“destructive thing or person”, and both of these senses are evident at the closing of the play,
when the pestis and Oedipus—the destructive cause of the pestis and the curse of Thebes—
merge into a single entity.75 By removing himself from Thebes, Oedipus believes that he will
cease to be a source of pestis for the city, finally bringing relief to its people and environment.76
While the play initially presents Oedipus as an agent of disease, in the end he becomes a source
of healing for his city.
The representation of Oedipus as a “healer” of Thebes has some precedent in Sophocles’
Oedipus Tyrannos. As Knox has shown, certain sections of the play depict Oedipus as a
74

The word dolor, which can be used to denote both physical and psychological pain (Glare 2012: s.v. dolor),
appears very frequently in Senecan tragedy, and in Oedipus it appears in two lists of various personified
manifestations of illness (652, 1060). For some remarks on the challenge of translating this particular word into
English, see Nussbaum 1984: 451-452 with nn. 16 and 17; King 1999: 269-282.
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Boyle takes a similar view, stating that “the ending of Seneca’s Oedipus plays out externally the moral situation
internally experienced by its protagonist in the drama’s opening lines.” (Boyle 1997:92)
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This builds upon Boyle’s suggestion that this passage represents Oedipus as a “self-conscious scapegoat for the
Theban community.” (Boyle 2011: 359) Earlier in the play, Creon also asserts that Oedipus’ exile from Thebes will
rid the city of illness (647-653).
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“physician” figure in part by using medical language and imagery, some of which can be found
in Hippocratic medical treatises.77 Yet the ending of Sophocles’ play, I would argue, does not
characterize Oedipus as a healer of others in the same way that we see in Seneca’s play. Knox
convincingly observes that Sophocles’ ending showcases the recovery and resurgence of
Oedipus, both through his reassertion of decisive, autonomous action, as seen in his act of selfblinding (a choice, Knox reminds us, not mandated by the gods, cf. 1330-1331), and in his
willing departure from Thebes.78 But to this I would add that Oedipus’ rehabilitation is very
much a personal one, not bringing the same relief to the rest of the Thebans. Indeed, near the
end of the play Oedipus states “neither disease nor anything else will destroy me” (μήτε μ' ἂν
νοσον / μήτ' ἄλλο πέρσαι μηδέν, 1455-1456), but he laments the future of his own
children: “oh children, it is clear that you are destined to waste away, unmarried” (ὦ τέκν',
ἀλλὰ δηλαδὴ / χέρσους φθαρῆναι κἀγάμους ὑμᾶς χρεών, 1501-1502; see also 14861500). Furthermore, in the final three lines of the play, the chorus proclaims the sententia that
no one can ever be certain to be free from pain until death79, with their final two words placing
extra emphasis upon the idea of pain (ἀλγεινὸν παθών, 1529-1520). The final words of
Seneca’s play, on the other hand, conclude matters with Oedipus rejoicing (Ducibus his uti libet,
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For example, Knox cites Oedipus’ use of the word ἀνακούφισις (relief, 218; cf. ἀνακουφίσαι, 23), a word
which he says “is used almost as a technical term in medical language to describe ‘improvement’ on the part of the
patient”. (Knox 1957: 140-141; see also 139, 142-147)
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See Knox 1957: 185-196.
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This sententia is familiar from Herodotus’ narrative of Croesus and Solon (Ἱστορίαι 1.32), and it has been
suggested that Sophocles may have had this narrative in mind when writing the final lines of the play. (see Earle
1901: 300) It should be noted, however, that some commentators, including Dawe, consider lines 1524-1530 to be
spurious, and that Pearson’s Oxford Classical text places these lines in brackets. (Dawe 1982: 247; Pearson 1971)
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1061)80, not necessarily on his own behalf, but on the behalf of the rest of his city as it will now
have relief from the “guides” that are to accompany him in exile, Macies and Pestis and Dolor.
Oedipus directly states that his departure will help others heal a few lines earlier: “whoever,
lying prostrate, retains scant breath of life, may easily take in life-giving draughts” (quisquis
exilem iacens / animam retentat, vividos haustus levis / concipiat, 1055-1057). Even though he
is ultimately still associated with pestis and with various other manifestations of illness,
Oedipus is able to alleviate the suffering of others—a paradox which is not explored as fully by
Sophocles. I hope to investigate comparisons between the language of illness in Seneca’s
Oedipus and Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannos (and other Greek tragedies representing Oedipus)
more in depth in future studies.
In Seneca’s Oedipus, then, pestis signifies a particularly virulent form of illness which
encompasses other forms of illness and affects massive numbers of people, as well as animals
and the natural environment.81 It has confounding and paradoxical effects, and at times is
personified and given a sense of agency. All this is enabled by the word’s broad semantic
range, which Seneca exploits in a manner that recalls the parallel semantics of word νόσος and
its usage in Greek tragedy. As Mitchell-Boyask notes, this is the word used most often by the
Greek tragedians in reference to “mass illness” or “plague”82, but it has various other senses,
including “sickness”, “distress”, “disease of mind”, “bane”, “mischief”83, making it a rather
ambiguous word with a high degree of metaphorical potential. This is in contrast with the word
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Boyle observes that libet (1061) is an “extraordinary final word, matching the opening word of the act [bene,
998]” and that it “strikes a note quite alien to Greek tragedy”. (Boyle 2011: 361)
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As Pratt states, “the whole environment and social structure of Thebes are being destroyed.” (Pratt 1983: 97)
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Mitchell-Boyask 2008: 27.
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Liddell, Scott, Jones, and McKenzie 1996: s.v. νόσος.
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λοιμός, which occurs very rarely in Greek tragedy.84 This word has a narrower semantic range
(“plague”, “pest”)85, lacking the connotations of “madness” and “mischief” which are possessed
by νόσος.
In Celsus, the words pestis, pestilentia, and the related adjectives pestifer, and pestiferus are
altogether used a total of twenty one times, sometimes with connotations that recall Seneca’s
representation of the pestis in Oedipus, but also with some significant departures in sense. I
will first discuss some of the similarities. Pestilentia is first used near the beginning of De
Medicina, when Celsus is describing the early days of medicine and its role in the distant past.
Citing Homer, Celsus states that Podalirius and Machaon, the sons of Aesclepius, did not
provide help with the pestilentia that ravaged the Greeks who fought in the Trojan War:
…quos tamen Homerus non in pestilentia neque in variis generibus morborum
aliquid adtulisse auxilii, sed vulneribus tantummodo ferro et medicamentis
mederi solitos esse proposuit. Ex quo apparet has partes medicinae solas ab iis
esse tentatas, easque esse vetustissimas.
…Homer did not state that they [Podalirius and Machaon] supplied any help in
the plague or in the various types of illnesses, but only that their usual practice
was to heal wounds by the knife and by medicines. Thus it appears that only
those parts of medicine were attempted by them, and that they are the oldest.
(1.Pr.3.4-4.2)
Celsus states that pestilentia, unlike vulnera, were not treated in the distant past. It is not
made clear whether this was due to inability, or to unwillingness on the part of Podalirius and
Machaon, but it is suggested that pestilentia posed a problem for healers during the time of the
Trojan War. It appears that pestilentia cannot be helped, even by physicians descended directly
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Boyask also suggests that the Greek tragedians generally avoid λοιμός because of superstitions concerned with
its usage. (see Mitchell Boyask 2008: 59)
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Liddell, Scott, Jones, and McKenzie 1996: s.v. λοιμός.
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from the semi-divine healer Aesclepius. This depiction of pestilentia as a harsh and untreatable
form of illness parallels the virulent representation of pestis in Oedipus. In addition, the use of
pestilentia in the singular suggests a general, all-inclusive category of illness, in contrast with
other forms of illness which are here expressed in the plural (variis generibus morborum).
While there are various types of morbi (as I discuss further in the next section of this chapter),
pestilentia appears to be a category of illness without subdivisions. The fact that Celsus
identifies pestilentia separately from the morbi suggests that these are two different types of
illness, and that these words are not “synonymous” or “interchangeable” in usage.
Celsus only hints about the highly severe nature of pestilentia in the above passage, but in
other sections of De Medicina he uses the related adjectives pestifer (“dangerous to health”,
“noxious”, “disastrous”), pestiferus (cf. pestifer), and pestilens (“full of disease”, “unhealthy”,
“causing danger to life or health”) when describing serious and potentially life-threatening
conditions.86 These include Celsus’ descriptions of κεφαλαία (a condition characterized by
paralysis, blurred vision, mental displacement [mentis alienatio], vomiting, etc.)87 and angina (a
condition characterized by difficulty breathing, and swallowing, swelling of the tongue and
throat, revolving eyes, pallor, etc. ).88 Celsus labels the former condition pestifer, and then
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Glare 2012: s.v. pestifer; pestiferus; pestilens. Lewis and Short provide “destructive” as a possible translation of
each of these words. (Lewis and Short 1879: s.v. pestifer; pestiferus, pestilens). They also note that pestifer is more
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horror calidus, nervorum resolutio, oculorum caligo, mentis alienatio, vomitus, sic ut vox supprimatur, vel sanguinis
ex naribus cursus, sic ut corpus frigescat, anima deficiat. (4.2.2.1-2)
88
Ut hoc autem morbi genus circa totam cervicem, sic alterum aeque pestiferum acutumque in faucibus esse
consuevit. Nostri anginam vocant: apud Graecos nomen, prout species est. Interdum enim neque rubor neque
tumor ullus apparet, sed corpus aridum est, vix spiritus trahitur, membra solvuntur: id συνάγχην vocant. Interdum
lingua faucesque cum rubore intumescunt, vox nihil significat, oculi vertuntur, facies pallet, singultus est: id
κυνάγχην vocant. Illa communia sunt: aeger non cibum devorare, non potionem potest, spiritus eius intercluditur.
(4.7.1.1-12)
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proceeds to note some very serious symptoms, culminating in death. Celsus calls the latter
condition pestiferus, and also associates it with some rather serious symptoms, including
obstructions to breathing (vix spiritus trahitur; spiritus eius intercluditur). In these examples,
Celsus reveals little differentiation in usage between pestifer and pestiferus, as both adjectives
are used to describe conditions which are severe and potentially fatal. As we have seen, the
noun pestis is associated with death and destruction in Oedipus, notably when Oedipus relates
that the funesta pestis (deadly plague) subdues people without regard for age or sex (51-55).
Although Celsus does not use the adjective funesta, it is apparent that in both Celsus and
Seneca the semantics of the root pest- often have to do with deadly forms of illness.
In another passage about general signs of health and illness, Celsus contrasts signs that are
pestifera with signs that are salutaria (healthful).89 Spencer observes that Celsus frequently
uses pestifer in a way analogous to use of θανατώδης in Hippocratic texts90, where it often has
the sense of “deadly” or “fatal”. 91 Thus, the Latin root pest- itself is frequently associated with
(or suggests or connotes) death, even though it does not denote it in the same way as the
Greek word θανατώδης (a word which is built on the very root that denotes death, unlike the
Latin pestiferus). At the same time, Spencer also observes that Celsus does not always reserve
the use of pestifer for conditions that are fatal; in some instances, the word is associated with
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Non si quid itaque vix in millensimo corpore aliquando decipit, id notam non habet, cum per innumerabiles
homines respondeat. Idque non in iis tantum, quae pestifera sunt, dico, sed in iis quoque, quae salutaria; siquidem
etiam spes interdum frustratur, et moritur aliquis, de quo medicus securus primo fuit: quaeque medendi causa
reperta sunt, nonnumquam in peius aliquid convertunt. (2.6.17.1-5) Cicero draws a similar dichotomy between
things which are pestiferae and things which are salutares (De Natura Deorum 2.12.34; 3.27.69). In their gloss of
pestis, Ernout and Meillet similarly assert: “pestilens s’oppose à saluber”. (Ernout and Meillet 1951: s.v. pestis)
90
Spencer 1935: 112 note a.
91
Liddell, Scott, Jones, and McKenzie 1996: s.v. θανατώδης.
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symptoms or conditions that are merely “noxious” or “harmful”92, but not necessarily deadly.
Celsus also describes certain kinds of serpents as pestifera, indicating that these serpents are
“poisonous”93; this use recalls the passage from Oedipus where the chorus observes that the
serpent has lost its poison (perdidit pestem latebrosa serpens, 152) as a result of the plague.
These examples from both Seneca and Celsus suggest that a pestis is akin to a serpens in that it
may strike suddenly and have fast-acting, potentially lethal effects.
While the pestis in Oedipus affects the conditions of the surrounding environment, Celsus
states that pestilentiae can be caused or exacerbated by meteorological, climatic, and
geographical factors.94 Celsus asserts, for instance, that pestilentiae brought by the south wind
are especially dangerous95, and he also claims that pestilentiae occur more frequently in certain
“unhealthy locales (gravibus locis).” 96 In addition, Celsus suggests that outbreaks of
pestilentiae are particularly common in the winter.97 In another passage (which does not
feature the words pestis or pestilentia), Celsus states that a change in location from Italy to the
drier climate of Alexandria can be very helpful for people suffering from phthisis, a condition
discussed later in this chapter.98 Such ideas have precedence in the Hippocratic treatise Airs,
Waters, Places, which strongly identifies weather, climate, geography, and ethnicity as factors
in the causation of illness (Celsus’ work, unlike this treatise, does not delve into the realm of
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e.g. 2.6.10.1.1-2; 2.6.11.1; 2.6.12.1.
Verum haec genera serpentium et peregrine et aliquanto magis pestifera sunt…(5.27.10-1-2)
94
Allbutt also notes that Celsus regards climate and the seasons to be factors in health and illness. (Allbutt 1921:
209)
95
Cum vero haec in omni pestilentia facienda sint, tum in ea maxime, quam austri excitarint (1.10.4.1-3)
96
Magis vero gravibus locis ista servanda sunt, in quibus etiam pestilentiam faciunt. (1.2.3.7-9)
97
Nec aliud magis tempus pestilentiae patet, cuiuscumque ea generis est; quamvis variis rationibus nocet. (2.1.9.68)
98
Opus est, si vires patiuntur, longa navigatione, caeli mutatione, sic ut densius quam id est, ex quo discedit aeger,
petatur: ideoque aptissime Alexandriam ex Italia itur. (3.22.8.4-7)
93

66

ethnography). Adverse weather, winds, and climate are also elements of the pestis in Oedipus
(cf. 1-5; 37-51), but they are not presented as factors in the causation of the pestis. Instead,
these elements are depicted as manifestations and results of the pestis, contributing to the
larger sense that the environment itself is ill. Oedipus’ role in the causation of the illness and
the polluting influence he has on the condition of the environment are also reinforced when
Creon predicts that Oedipus’ departure from Thebes will usher in a vitalis aura (life-giving air,
651).
Celsus also connects pestilentia and “heat”, recalling the vapor and flammae associated with
the pestis in Oedipus (47; 185). Celsus uses different vocabulary, however, stating in one
instance that calor (heat) can make the body particularly susceptible to pestilentibus morbis99,
and in another instance Celsus describes pestilentia as a type of febris (fever).100 In the former
example, Celsus is stating that calor can render a person more susceptible to deadly illness; this
is the reverse of the situation in Oedipus, where heat (e.g. vapor) is portrayed as a symptom,
rather than a cause, of the Theban pestis. This is the only instance in De Medicina in which
Celsus uses the adjective pestilens (as opposed to the more frequently appearing adjectives
pestifer or pestiferus). It is also striking that pestilens is used to modify the noun morbus in this
context; this speaks to the generic nature of the term morbus (which is further discussed in the
ensuing section of this chapter), which is delimited as “harmful” by the adjective pestilens.
Celsus’ usage of pestis and pestilentia differs from the usage of pestis in Oedipus in other
important ways. Perhaps the most striking difference pertains to the severity of these forms of
99

Calor concoctionem prohibit, somnum aufert, sudorem digerit, obnoxium morbis pestilentibus corpus efficit.
(1.9.6.6-8)
100
Desiderat quoque propriam animadvorsionem in febris pestilentiae casus. (Among fevers, the case of pestilentia
demands special consideration. 3.7.1.1-2)
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illness in each text. In Oedipus, the pestis is repeatedly portrayed as an untreatable form of
illness from which no one can escape, except for Oedipus himself (at least initially). Celsus
often represents pestis and pestilentia as rather virulent and potentially deadly forms of illness,
but this is not always the case. For instance, in one passage Celsus relates that it is actually
possible for a person to remain healthy (integer) when exposed to a pestis by taking various
precautions, which include avoiding fatigue, monitoring one’s diet, adhering to various forms of
moderation in one’s lifestyle, and walking outside each day before it becomes too hot (which
again suggests that heat can induce this form of illness).101
In another passage, Celsus discusses possible treatments for people afflicted with pestilentia;
he finds blood-letting to be the most effective, but if the patient is deemed to have too little
strength for that treatment, other treatments are viable, including emetics, baths, and dietary
restrictions.102 Celsus does not consistently present pestis or pestilentia as the greedy, allconsuming, manifestation illness that we find in Seneca’s play. Cure or treatment seem
unimaginable with the pestis described in Oedipus (cf. 69-70103), as does the possibility that one
could avoid being affected by it in the first place (nec ulla pars immunis exitio vacat, 52).104
From the opening lines of the play, the outlook of the pestis is extremely dismal—moreso, for
purposes of comparison, than the situation in Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannos, where there is at
least initially some hope for remedy, as is expressed by both a priest (40-51) and Oedipus
himself (69-77).
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See 1.10.1.1-4.3.
See 3.7.1.A.1-10. In this section Celsus also identifies certain treatments as generally not helpful when dealing
with pestilentia, such as fasting (fame), medicines (medicamentis), and enemas (ducere alvum).
103
These lines are discussed more in depth in this chapter’s comments on morbus.
104
Despite the strong medical connotations of the English word “immune”, Celsus does not use the word immunis.
102
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Morbus
The noun morbus can be translated in various ways, including “illness”, “disease”,
“sickness”, “infirmity”, “weakness”, and even “vice”.105 Lewis and Short note that it can be
used with respect to either the body or the mind.106 Morbus occurs only ten times in Senecan
tragedy, four of which come in Oedipus, the play in which it is used most often. The related
adjectives morbosus and morbidus never appear in Seneca’s plays. In each of its four uses in
Oedipus, morbus occurs in close context with the word pestis. The word first appears during
Oedipus’ opening speech about the effects of the plague:
Non vota, non ars ulla correptos levant:
cadunt medentes, morbus auxilium trahit.
No prayers, no skill relieves those who are afflicted:
healers fall, the illness draws away remedy. (69-70)
As with his reference to the funesta pestis (deadly plague, 55) earlier in this speech, this use
of morbus suggests a particularly virulent and pernicious form of illness.107 Having described
the pestis as an unavoidable and untreatable form of illness (cf. 52), Oedipus now refers to the
same illness as a morbus that cannot be treated by either means of prayer (vota) or skill (ars).
The mention of healers (medentes) in the following line makes it clear that ars refers most
obviously to the practice of medicine.108 Oedipus emphasizes that the sheer destructiveness of
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Glare 2012: s.v. morbus. Ernout and Meillet observe that its resemblance to mori (to die) is only coincidental,
and that the two words have no etymological connection. (Ernout and Meillet 1951: s.v. morbus)
106
Lewis and Short 1879: s.v. morbus.
107
Migliorini similarly observes that these lines emphasize “la gravità della peste.”
108
The use of the word ars in apparent opposition to vota is interesting in light of arguments, which go back as far
as Hippocratic treatises such as On the Sacred Disease, about the relationship between medicine and what might
be called magico-religious approaches to healing. The syntax of the sentence suggests that Oedipus views vota as
separate from the ars of medicine, not unlike the author of On the Sacred Disease. Celsus frequently speaks of
medicine as an ars (e.g. vix ulla perpetua praecepta medicinalis ars recipit, 1.Pr.63.2-3), and his summary of the
history of medicine points to the eventual divergence of the medical ars from magico-religious approaches to
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the morbus by observing that even healers are victims of its wrath, removing hope for the
possibility of remedy or relief. The paradoxical notion of healers infected with and thus
possibly spreading illness develops the idea that the morbus at hand is highly unusual,
inexplicable, and ultimately untreatable. 109
Creon paints a similarly bleak image of Morbus in describing the various personified
manifestations of illness and infirmity (Furor, Horror, Luctus, Morbus, Senectus, Metus, Pestis,
589-594) he observed during rites of necromancy conducted by Tiresias. Each manifestation of
illness is said to be suffering in ways that call attention to effects it can have upon other people;
morbus, for instance, is characterized as weak and weary: aegreque lassum sustinens Morbus
caput (Illness bearing weary head in a sick way, 593). This description underscores the
tendency of Morbus to bring about frailty and feebleness—not only upon others, but also upon
itself, as even the figure “Illness” shows signs of being ill. This personified image accentuates
the sense that morbus, much like pestis, affects all: this form of illness cannot be avoided or
overcome by anyone or anything, including the very figure Morbus! There may also be a
suggestion that Morbus has become exhausted from his own handiwork, having relentlessly
inflicted illness upon everyone and everything.
An image of exhaustion is also put forth in the play’s closing speech, part of which I
translated earlier in this chapter (1052-1061). As he goes out into exile, Oedipus observes that
the people of Thebes are weary at heart (fessi pectore, 1052) and heavy with illness (morbo
graves, 1052), with half-dead bodies (semianima…corpora, 1053) which are unable to hold up
healing which tended to ascribe illness to the wrath of the gods (…morbos tum ad iram deorum immortalium
relatos esse, 1.Pr.4.3-4). For an examination of Celsus’ use of the word ars, see von Staden 2007.
109
Boyle notes that “the uselessness of medical, religious, and other help was a theme which opened Thucydides’
famous account (2.47.4) and became a commonplace of Roman depictions of plague”. (Boyle 2011: 128)
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their heads (relevate colla, 1054). Although the specific language associated with morbus in
this passage differs from the language in 593, in both cases morbus is associated with lifesucking fatigue. Morbus is then used one last time in the play when Oedipus comments that his
departure from Thebes will restore the city to health. He lists tremor Morbi (the shaking of
Illness, 1059 among the various forms of illness and suffering that he will be taking away with
him, including Macies (Wasting, 1060), atra Pestis (black Illness, 1060), and rabidus Dolor
(raging Pain, 1060). Here, Morbus again takes on an element of personification and it is
associated with Oedipus himself, but it is not strongly differentiated from the other
manifestations of illness.
While morbus does not frequently occur in the plays of Seneca, it is very frequently used in
Celsus, and an exhaustive analysis of all of Celsus’ uses of this word is beyond the scope of this
study. Here I will focus primarily upon Celsus’ usage of the word in the Proemium of De
Medicina. This preface to Book 1 gives an overview of the history of medicine up to Celsus’
time, describing and commenting upon various approaches to the detection and treatment of
illness. Since the Proemium is deeply concerned with the conceptualization of illness, Celsus’
usage of the word morbus here is worth a closer look.
At no point in De Medicina does Celsus directly define what constitutes a morbus.110 This is
in contrast with Cicero, who explicitly attempts to define morbus as totius corporis corruptio (a
despoiling of the entire body) and distinguishes it from other words in the semantic sphere of

110

Spencer’s translation of De Medicina usually renders morbus as “disease”, but it is not always consistent,
sometimes opting for “illness” or “malady” instead.
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illness, such as aegrotatio and vitium.111 Celsus’ usage is less specific, as he applies morbus to a
vast array of conditions which have disparate causes, symptoms, and treatments. As previously
noted, Celsus relates that there are various types of morbi (morborum varia genera, 1.Pr.23.2;
cf. variis generibus morborum, 1.Pr.3.5). Later in the Proemium, Celsus outlines three general
categories of morbi, which are associated with certain generic symptoms: unum adstrictum
(constriction; e.g. constipation leading to intestinal obstruction), alterum fluens (flux; e.g.
diarrhea and dysentery), and tertium mixtum (i.e. conditions not fitting into the other two
categories).112 These are rather broad categories, applicable to diverse forms of illness that are
identified throughout De Medicina. By contrast, Celsus does not specify that there are
different genera of pestes or pestilentiae, although he does observe some variations in these
forms of illness (e.g. some pestes and pestilentiae are fatal, while others are not). Complicating
matters further, Celsus sometimes uses the adjectives pestilens and pestifer to modify morbus.
As previously mentioned in the above discussion of pestis, Celsus notes that heat (calor) can
render the body susceptible to morbis pestilentibus (1.9.6.7-8). In another instance, Celsus
describes a pestifer morbus (4.2.2.1), using pestifer, as in other instances, to describe a form of
illness as “deadly”. The fact that adjectives such as pestilens and pestifer are used to modify
morbus while distinctions are made between morbi and pestilentiae in other sections of De
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Morbum appellant totius corporis corruptionem: aegrotationem morbum cum imbecillitate: vitium cum partes
corporis inter se dissident: ex quo pravitas membrorum, distortio, deformitas. (Tusculanae Disputationes 4.13.2829)
112
See 1.Pr.54.9-55.2. The examples provided above are mentioned in Spencer’s note on this section, which helps
to clarify these categories. (Spencer 1935:30 note b) Note that Celsus also mentions the first two categories of
morbi later in this Proemium (conpressorum et fluentium morborum genera diversa, 1.Pr. 66.6-7). The importance
placed upon excretions in categorizing and diagnosing illness in Greek and Roman medicine is discussed further in
Chapter 3.
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Medicina (e.g. 1.Pr.3.4-4.2) serves as another reminder that it is important to be attentive to
differences in sense and usage when comparing nouns and adjectives built upon the same root.
The fact that Celsus uses a rich variety of adjectives to modify morbi is a further indication of
his generic usage of the term, under which are lumped a vast array of conditions and
experiences. These conditions need not be purely “physical” in nature—indeed, various forms
of insania, which are characterized by mental symptoms and “cannot be assigned to any
particular part of the body” (qui certis partibus adsignari non possunt, 3.18.18.3-4), are also
called morbi.113 The fact that Celsus applies the word morbus to what might be called “mental
illness” flies in the face of claims made by Szasz about conceptualizations of illness over history.
Szasz, an influential and controversial critic of the moral and scientific foundations of psychiatry
and psychotherapy, makes the broad-stroking assertion that, until the nineteenth century, the
concept and label “illness” (and whatever similar words exist in other languages) was only
applied to physical disorders displaying “an alteration of bodily structure.”114 Celsus, however,
applies the word morbus to forms of illness which do not necessarily display any physical
“alteration”.
Mudry also comments on Celsus’ usage of morbus, stating that “morbus désigne d’ordinaire
chez Celse les maladies internes, c’est-à-dire les affections qui relèvant de la diététique.”115 It is
certainly true that Celsus sometimes uses the word morbus in reference to forms of illness that
are localized internally and that can be treated through dietetics, but Celsus also uses the word
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See 3.18.2.8; 3.18.16.4; 3.18.20.7; 3.18.20.10; 3.18.20.12. Celsus’s use of the term insania is discussed in much
more detail in Chapter 4.
114
Szasz 1974: 11.
115
Mudry 1982: 68. Mudry makes this assessment in commenting on Celsus’ description of Dietetics
(Διαιτητικήν…quae victu morbos curat... 1.Pr.9.3-6).
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in reference to conditions that manifest external symptoms. Moreover, as I further explain in
Chapter 3, Celsus presents a complex and dynamic relationship between the interior and
exterior of the body, which problematizes a dichotomy of “internal” and “external” illnesses.
Mudry also appears to overlook the fact that Celsus uses the word morbus when discussing
forms of illness, such as the various forms of insania, for which he recommends treatments that
would not fall into the category of dietetics. In fact, in Book 2 Celsus submits that most morbi
should be treated by blood-letting116, which is not a dietetic treatment.
Celsus uses morbus in reference to forms of illness that are both acute and chronic in nature.
Distinguishing between morbi that are acuti (short-lived) and longi (chronic) is an important
delineation in the categorization of illness, not only for Celsus, but earlier Greek writers of
medical prose as well.117 In fact, at the beginning of Book 3 Celsus observes that this distinction
drawn between acute and chronic illnesses originated with the Greeks (3.1.1.1-4), and Celsus
uses this as a way of classifying morbi throughout De Medicina (both before and after this
remark).118 Celsus does not make such a distinction with his usage of the words pestis or
pestilentia. Similar to Seneca’s representation of the pestis in Oedipus, Celsus associates both
pestes and pestilentiae with the fickle forces of nature, including the winds, weather, and
seasonal changes (which never take the exact same yearly pattern), thus emphasizing the
unpredictable nature of these forms of illness themselves. A sudden change in one of these
116

Sanguinem incise vena mitti novum non est: sed nullum paene esse morbum, in quo non mittatur, novum est.
(2.10.1.1-3)
117
Examples include the Hippocratic treatise Regimen in Acute Diseases, and a work by the fifth-century Latin
author Caelius Aurelianus’ entitled On Acute and Chronic Diseases. The latter work translated an earlier, nonextant Greek work by Soranus (first or second century CE), suggesting that the distinction between acute and
chronic diseases remained important in Greek and Roman medical thought for a very long time. On this point, see
Bosman 2009: 5.
118
Celsus first makes the distinction in the Proemium to Book 1 (haec autem genera morborum modo acuta esse,
modo longa… 1.Pr.55.4-5)
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elements could bring a quick end to an illness, while the persistence of these factors could
cause an illness to continue indefinitely. These elements of unpredictability may help explain
why Celsus does not use the labels “acute” or “chronic” in relation to pestes and pestilentiae, as
he does with morbi.119
While Celsus often links the causes of pestes and pestilentiae with environmental conditions,
he attributes a wide variety of possible causes to morbi. In a section of the Proemium (45-53)
in which Celsus discusses his own stance in relation to the “rationalist” and “empiricist” schools
of medicine120, he notes that a morbus may be caused by such diverse factors as fatigue, thirst,
heat, cold, sleeplessness, hunger, overconsumption of food or wine, and even immoderate
sexual desire.121 This list proceeds from exhaustion and deprivation as causes of morbus—
factors also associated with morbus in Oedipus (cf. 593, 1054)—to hyperconsumption and
hyperactivity as causes of morbus, thus covering a wide range of human experiences. This list
again highlights Celsus’ highly generic usage of morbus, a word he applies to many different
forms of mental and physical distress, thus bearing out the word’s wide semantic range. In
Book 1, Celsus observes that many of the aspects mentioned in the above list should be avoided
in the situation of a pestilentia122, but he does not describe these aspects as potential causes of
a pestilentia.
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Commenting on the use of λοιμός, the Greek word most often used to denote mass illness or “plague”, Ralph
Rosen states that this term necessarily “implies an acute affliction.” (Rosen 2001: 239 n. 27) While I am not
questioning this assertion, I would point out that the Latin words pestis and pestilentia, as used by Celsus, do not
necessarily carry connotations of being either “acute” or “chronic” in nature.
120
See Mudry 1982: 139. These schools of thought are discussed more in depth in Chapter 3.
121
Interest enim fatigatio morbum an sitis, an frigus an calor, an vigilia an fames fecerit, an cibi vinique
abundantia, an intemperantia libidinis. (1.Pr.52.4-53.1)
122
…vitare fatigationem, cruditatem, frigus, calorem, libidinem, multoque magis se continere, si qua gravitas in
corpore est. (1.10.1-7-9)
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Seneca’s use of morbus (and Morbus) in Oedipus suggests that this form of illness can bring
about physical debility. Celsus’ work also suggests as much, while also showing, conversely,
that a weak constitution can make one more susceptible to morbus. In one passage of the
Proemium Celsus states that the body can become more liable to morbus as a result of a
“weakness” (ex infirmitate).123 Another possible translation of infirmitas is “sickness”124, but
Celsus does not consider infirmitas itself to be a “sickness” or “illness”, as he makes the
distinction that infirmitas is a cause that can “give rise to illness” (concitent morbum).125 In
passages throughout De Medicina, Celsus consistently uses infirmitas, and the related adjective
infirmus, when describing weak bodily conditions that render the body susceptible to morbi or
other formulations of illness.126 While infirmitas and infirmus are important to Celsus, they are
not used in Oedipus; the former word never appears in Senecan tragedy, and the latter word is
used only three times127, and never in close connection with morbus.
Celsus also observes that physical weakness can result in a predisposition to morbi during his
discussion of the origins of healing (morborum curatio) earlier in the Proemium. He connects
the origin of healing with philosophy (rerum naturae contemplatio), explaining that
philosophers had a special need for healing because their physical strength was constantly
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Possunt enim quaedam subesse corpora vel ex infirmitate eius vel ex aliquo adfectu, quae vel in alio non sunt,
vel in hoc alias non fuerunt eaque per se non tanta, ut concitent morbum, tamen obnoxium magis aliis inuriis
corpus efficiant. (1.Pr.58.6-59.1)
124
Glare 2012: s.v. infirmitas.
125
A similar relationship between infirmitas and morbus is evident in remarks which Celsus makes about digestive
processes: …adsuescit enim non ali corpus, cum omnibus morbis obnoxia maxime infirmitas sit. (1.3.26.3-5)
126
Celsus uses infirmitas in eight instances, and infirmus with significantly more frequency.
127
Hercules Oetaeus 1677; Octavia 118; Phoenissae 385.
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sapped by contemplation and sleeplessness.128 At the same time, Celsus associates morbus
with forms of excess, including an overindulgent sexual appetite (libido129), suggesting that
various forms of pleasure are in the realm of morbi. The language of morbus is connected with
sexual behavior in some Latin texts, for example in reference to the condition of “effeminate
men who seek to be penetrated”.130 These specific connotations are not apparent in Celsus’
usage of morbus. In other parts of the Proemium, Celsus relates that both idleness (desidia)
and extravagance (luxuria) can compromise one’s health131, but he does not connect these
words directly with the language of morbus.132 In general, Celsus’ ideas about health are
predicated upon maintaining a state of moderation—an idea familiar from earlier Hippocratic
treatises, where health is frequently conceptualized in terms of equilibrium; illness, on the
other hand, is a state of imbalance tending toward one extreme or the other.133 Celsus’
remarks in the Proemium and other sections of De Medicina leave a distinct impression that
morbus is constantly lurking and threatening to act upon the human body, which is susceptible
to morbus in a multitude of ways and thus constantly on the precipice of illness.
128

Primoque medendi scientia sapientiae pars habebatur, ut et morborum curatio et rerum naturae contemplatio
sub iisdem auctoribus nata sit: scilicet iis hanc maxime requirentibus, qui corporum suorum robora inquieta
cogitatione nocturnaque vigilia minuerant. (1.Pr.6.3-7.4)
129
For other references to libido as a threat to health, see 1.Pr.70.7 and 1.10.1.8. Celsus similarly warns about the
dangers of over- or underindulging in concubitus (copulation, 1.1.4.1-3).
130
Williams 2010: 199; see also 200. As Williams notes, morbus is used in this sense in Caelius Aurelianus’ De
Morbis Acutis et Chronicis (4.9.131-7).
131
…verique simile est inter nulla auxilia adversae valetudinis, plerumque tamen eam bonam contigisse ob bonos
mores, quos neque desidia neque luxuria vitiarant… (1.Pr.4.7-5.1)
132
Stok has compared Celsus’ comments on desidia and luxuria with remarks Seneca makes in Epistula 18, where
morbi are equated with supplicia luxuriae (the worship of extravagance). Von Staden points out that this passage
suggest that desidia and luxuria—and thus morbi—exist in Roman society only because of the debasing influence
of Greek culture: “the Roman body too has fallen into degeneracy, by following the deplorable Greek example
(prius in Graecia, deinde apud nos).” Thus, according to von Staden, Celsus is implying that “Greek decadence” is
responsible both for the necessity of “Greek scientific medicina” and “Roman physical degeneracy”—without
which, in turn, “there would be no Latin text by Celsus, and no need for it.” (von Staden 1999: 259-260)
133
Cf. The Nature of Man 4.4-7. For discussions of the concept of balance in Greek and Roman medical thought,
see Majno 1975: 178; Nutton 2013: 74, 78-79.
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Although Celsus intimates that morbi are constant threats to human health, he also states
that many kinds of morbi can be treated or cured. At various points in the Proemium, Celsus
discusses the possibility of treating morbi, grouping this word with various verbs associated
with treatment or healing.134 At the end of the Proemium, Celsus directly states that
treatments of morbi will be a major focus of his forthcoming discussion (…tum ad ea transibo
quae ad morbos curationesque eorum pertinebunt, 1.Pr.75.6-8).135 This contrasts with Celsus’
comments on pestes and pestilentiae, which, as we have seen, are often depicted as deadly and
untreatable. Celsus does make some remarks about treatments of pestes and pestilentiae, but
they are much more limited than his remarks about treatments of morbi. Such distinctions in
usage are not apparent in Oedipus, where there is no hope cure or treatment for the Theban
illness (save for the eventual departure of Oedipus), whether the illness is referred to as a pestis
or a morbus. This departure is in turn portrayed as a potential cure for morbi, pestes, and all
the other manifestations of illness afflicting Thebes.
Celsus also indicates, however, that certain types of morbi pose problems for treatment,
particularly morbi that are said to be novi (“new”, “strange”, “unforeseen”, “not previously
known”136). Celsus characterizes the appearance of nova…genera morborum as a phenomenon
that is rare and perplexing in that it offers no precedent for understanding or treatment.137 In
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e.g. curare (9.6, 14.4); mederi (12.2-3; 19.8); levare (33.6); tollere (38.5-6).
Celsus eventually goes on to devote a large section of Book 2 (9-33) to the treatment of morbi.
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Glare 2012: s.v. novus.
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1.Pr.17.7-12. For other references to “new” (novi) types of morbi in Celsus, see also 1.Pr.36.9; 1.Pr.49.1;
2.1.9.3-4. For a discussion of Celsus’ views on the appearance of novi morbi (as well as views on this phenomenon
in empiricist and rationalist schools of thought), see Mudry 1982: 128-129. Nutton also discusses references to
“new diseases” in other Greek and Latin authors, emphasizing how Plutarch attributed this phenomenon not to
any change in the human constitution, but to “the luxurious lifestyle of modern Rome, with exotic foods arriving
from all over the Empire and beyond.” (Nutton 2013: 36) Another Roman author who discusses “new diseases” is
Pliny the Elder; in the opening paragraphs of Book 26 of Naturalis Historia, he comments on the recent rise of new
135
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one instance, Celsus describes a case of a morbus novus in which a woman died only a few
hours after experiencing prolapsed and withered flesh around her genitals. Celsus’ description
of this case emphasizes that “the most eminent physicians were able to determine neither the
type nor remedy of the illness” (…nobilissimi medici neque genus mali neque remedium
invenerint, 1.Pr.49.5-50.1). After initially identifying the woman’s illness as a novus morbus,
Celsus then uses the word malum in reference to her condition. The word malum will be
discussed at greater length later in this chapter, but here we are offered a revealing glimpse
into Celsus’ conceptualization of a novus morbus, as this term is quite clearly being applied to a
form of illness which defies identification, treatment, and understanding in general.138 Even
though Celsus often portrays pestes and pestilentiae as highly unpredictable, he never speaks of
“new” types of these illnesses.
The idea that new illnesses are continually emerging runs counter to earlier mythic
narratives about the origin of illness. In works such as Hesiod’s Works and Days, the genesis of
all forms of illness and suffering is traced to the single moment when Pandora, the world’s first
woman, opens the jar in which they are all contained.139 Hesiod uses various pieces of
vocabulary in relating the assorted form of illness and suffering that were introduced, including

diseases (novi morbi) which affect a person’s face. He observes that such diseases are not deadly, but that they
are so disfiguring that death would actually be preferable. (…sed tanta foeditate, ut quaecumque mors
praeferenda esset. Naturalis Historia 26.1; see also 26.2-3)
138
In his discussion of the Roman Empire’s “urban ecosystem”, Morley claims that processes of immigration would
have “brought a regular influx of new diseases” into cities in the Roman empire. Celsus, however, does not draw a
connection between such processes and the appearance of “new” diseases. (Morley 2005: 196)
139
See Works and Days (esp. 90-105). King observes that the notion that humanity was free from illness until the
advent of Pandora also contrasts with the views expressed in the Hippocratic treatise On Ancient Medicine. The
author of this text claims that illness existed from the beginning of humanity and that it resulted from people
consuming raw and uncooked foods in the manner of wild animals. Illness, according to this text, eventually came
to be controlled by finding a diet suitable for human beings. (see King 2005: 7-8)
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κήδεα (95), νοῦσοι (102) and κακὰ140 (103); all of these manifestations of illness are, in turn,
closely associated with the advent of Pandora.141
The concept of a “new” illness is explored not only in Celsus, but also in Senecan tragedy.
While the word novus is not directly associated with the word morbus in Oedipus, some aspects
of illness are presented as “new” and described as novus. Notably, the chorus laments that the
Theban illness is a dira novi facies leti / gravior leto (new form of death that is more severe than
death, 180-181). Oedipus also relates that the illness brings a “new kind of grief” (novus luctus,
62) in that mourners succumb right behind the corpses they are mourning. In another instance,
Manto, the daughter of the prophet Tiresias, relates that she is observing novus cruor
(fresh/strange blood, 355) pouring out of the body of a sacrificed heifer when she performs a
divinatory sacrifice along with Tiresias; Manto then proceeds to describe other unusual aspects
of the heifer’s condition, such as the fact that it is pregnant despite not having mated (371373). These examples show how the adjective novus is used to emphasize aspects of illness
which are perceived as perplexing and/or untreatable142, recalling the connotations of novi
morbi in Celsus. In addition, it is noteworthy that Manto, while observing the strange condition
of the heifer, states: natura versa est; nulla lex utero manet (nature is overturned, no rule
abides in the womb, 371). The idea that nature has been overturned resonates not only with
the heifer’s disordered physical constitution and with her “unnatural pregnancy”, but also with
140

Adjective used substantively here.
For further discussion of the link between the advent of disease and the appearance of the first woman in
Greek myth, see Cyrino 1995: 50-53.
142
A parallel example from Greek tragedy, also commented upon by Kosak, occurs in Euripides’ Bacchae, when
Pentheus states that Dionysus is introducing a “new disease” (νόσον καινήν) into the city of Thebes. (see Kosak
2004: 189-190) Since Pentheus feels threatened by Dionysus and believes that Dionysus’ presence is inimical to
Theban society, this rhetoric underscores the sense that “new diseases” are particularly dangerous and
destructive.
141
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the perplexed nature of Oedipus himself (and of course his “unnatural” impregnation of his
mother143). Indeed, the messenger reports that when Oedipus realizes the truth of his identity,
he uses language highly similar to the wording used earlier by Manto (cf. 371): Illa quae leges
ratas / Natura in uno vertit Oedipoda… (Nature, which has overturned laws in the case of
Oedipus alone… 942-943). Furthermore, even though Oedipus in his agony is exclaiming that
natura has turned upon him alone, we can also see a larger scale inversion of nature in the ill
state of Thebes’ social and environmental conditions.
Aegritudo / Aeger
The noun aegritudo can be used in reference to either “physical sickness” or “mental
distress”.144 It does not appear in any of Seneca’s tragedies. Nor does the related noun
aegrotatio (“physical illness” or “an unhealthy moral condition, morbid desire, or passion”).145
The adjective aeger (“physically ill”, “unwell”, “sick”, “disturbed”, “weak”, “troubled”, etc.)146
does appear in Senecan tragedy, occurring more frequently in Oedipus (six times) than in any
other Senecan play. Senecan tragedy does not, however, make use of aegrotus. According to
the Oxford Latin Dictionary, this adjective can be translated in various ways, including
“physically ill”, “lovesick”, and “pining”.147 Lewis and Short, on the other hand, contrast
aegrotus with aeger, stating that the former “is generally used only of physical disease”.148
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As Boyle puts it, “Oedipus has inverted nature and breached all laws of the womb.” (Boyle 2011: 200; see also
Busch 2007: 249)
144
Glare 2012: s.v. aegritudo.
145
Glare 2012: s.v. aegrotatio. Lewis and Short, on the other hand, state that aegrotatio is restricted to “only
physical disease”. (Lewis and Short 1879: s.v. aegrotatio). The slippery dichotomy of “physical” and “mental”
illness is discussed more in depth in Chapter 4.
146
Glare 2012: s.v. aeger.
147
Glare 2012: s.v. aegrotus.
148
Lewis and Short 1879: s.v. aeger; cf. aegrotus.
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Ernout and Meillet assert that aeger places special emphasis upon “l’idée de souffrance et de
peine causée par la maladie”.149
In Oedipus and other Senecan tragedies, aeger is used in diverse ways, sometimes modifying
parts of the physical body that are “ill” (e.g. aegro…in vultu, 183; cor…aegrum, 356)150, and also
in reference to an “ill” mind (aeger animus, 204).151 Aeger is applied not only to the body parts
of humans but also those of animals, as we see when Manto examines the cor aegrum of a
sacrificial bull in Oedipus (356). This particular use is noteworthy since other words in the
semantic sphere of illness (morbus, pestis, etc.) are not used in this passage despite the
passage’s emphasis on the unsound and “unnatural” (natura versa est, 371) state of the bull’s
body. In addition to modifying parts of the body and the mind, aeger is also applied to people
in Oedipus, both individually (aeger parens, 59) and collectively (aeger populus, 874).152 In
Seneca’s Thyestes, aeger is even applied to an inanimate entity when Atreus refers to the house
of Thyestes itself as “ill” (domus aegra, Thyestes 240), thus producing a sense of
personification. Furthermore, aeger may be used in conjunction with other language of illness,
such as pestis. In Oedipus’ opening speech, he makes reference to an aeger parens (ill parent,
59); here, it is clear that the parent is aeger as a result of the pestis, showcasing the semantic
affinity between these two words.
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According to Ernout and Meillet, the etymology of aeger and related nouns and verbs is unknown. (Ernout and
Meillet 1951: s.v. aeger)
150
This adjective is also applied to body parts in Hercules Furens (pectori…aegro, 1320) and Hercules Oetaeus
(aegro…pectore, 1643).
151
As Fitch notes, there has been some debate about whether or not this line should be attributed to the chorus or
to Oedipus (Fitch 2004: 33), and thus it is not clear which of the two would be describing their animus as aeger.
Another reference to an “ill mind” occurs in Agamemnon (mens aegra, 418).
152
cf. populus aeger (Agamemnon 181)

82

In Oedipus, then, aeger is used to describe various aspects of illness, all of which are
connected directly or indirectly to the pestis that affects the city of Thebes. In Celsus, aeger is
used frequently and in diverse ways; in addition, the verb aegrotare is used five times, the
positive adverb aegre is used four times, the comparative adverb aegrius is used twice; and the
superlative adverb aegerrime is used in one instance. As is the case with Seneca’s tragedies,
Celsus does not use the nouns aegritudo or aegrotatio; nor does the adjective aegrotus
appear.153 Ernout and Meillet boldly state that “aeger est l’adjectif de morbus”154; obviously
they are speaking in semantic, rather than etymological terms, but by simply equating these
words, they diminish the semantic nuances of each word and the differences in what each word
can connote. It is also worth noting that they draw a parallel between an adjective (aeger) and
a noun (morbus), instead of comparing aeger with adjectives such as morbosus or morbidus155.
Nonetheless, there are numerous instances in which Celsus’ usage does in fact point to a close
semantic connection between aeger and morbus. This is evident, for example, in Celsus’
remarks on the treatment of a pulmonary illness:
In pulmonis morbo si sputo ipso levatur dolor, quamvis id purulentum est tamen
aeger facile spirat, facile excreat, morbum ipsum non difficulter fert, potest ei
secunda valetudo contingere.
In a case of pulmonary illness, it is possible to regain favorable health, if pain is
relieved by expectoration (even if it is full of pus), if the person who is ill [i.e. the
patient] breathes easily, excretes easily, bears the illness itself without difficulty.
(2.8.2.1-3)
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Lewis and Short note that Celsus does not use aegrotus. (Lewis and Short 1879: s.v. aeger) Langslow notes that
neither Celsus nor Scribonius Largus use aegrotus, while observing that authors such as Plautus, Terence, and
Cicero use it “in ordinary down-to-earth medical contexts.” (Langslow 1999b: 205 n. 62)
154
Ernout and Meillet 1951: s.v. aeger.
155
These adjectives are listed as compounds of morbus under the entry for morbus, but are not included in the
entry for aeger.
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Here, as in other instances, Celsus uses aeger as a shorthand way to refer to a person who is
affected by a morbus. But this relationship is not always present in Celsus’ usage of these
words, and it would be an overstatement to suggest that aeger is an adjectival equivalent of
morbus.
Celsus often uses aeger substantively156, as in the above passage, in reference to a person
who is ill. The Oxford Latin Dictionary cites “patient” as a possible translation157, and Spencer
often (but not consistently) translates substantive uses of aeger in this way. In English usage,
the noun “patient” most often refers to “a person receiving or…registered to receive medical
treatment, [especially] at a particular establishment or from a particular practitioner”158;
Celsus, however, does not always use aeger in the context of “treatment”. Given the usage of
“patient” in English, Spencer’s translation misleadingly implies that the person who is “ill”
(aeger) is receiving treatment. Furthermore, what it means to receive treatment as a “patient”
in the modern world is far different from what it would have meant to receive treatment as a
“patient” in the first century Roman Empire. For instance, no one was treated “at a particular
establishment”159, nor, as Celsus’ use of aeger shows, did a “patient” necessarily receive
treatment at all. Therefore, Spencer’s tendency to translate aeger as “patient” is potentially
confusing for readers accustomed to modern impression of patienthood—and all the more
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e.g. 1.Pr.55.1-4; 2.4.1.1-3.
Glare 2012: s.v. aeger.
158
See OED Online: s.v. patient (n.). The semantic range of the English word “patient” is significantly more
restricted than the Latin verb from which it is derived (pati, to suffer). This reflects a process of semantic
narrowing: “one suffering” becomes narrowed down to “one suffering an illness”, which then becomes further
narrowed down to “one suffering an illness and being treated for it”.
159
Nutton observes that some Roman physicians might treat patients from their own home, while many others
lived an itinerant lifestyle, travelling around and looking for “patients”. (Nutton 2013: 87) In both cases, it is clear
that the Romans had no concept of a “public hospital” to house and care for the sick. (on this point, see also
Scarborough 1969: 77; Contino 1988: 44-45)
157
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because readers may also be deeply influenced by their own, highly personal experiences of
being treated as a patient. Because these connotations do not closely align with Celsus’
substantive uses of aeger, I would offer up “the ill person” or “the sick person” as better
possible translations, clunky though they are, because they are more neutral and have fewer
connotations which would be inappropriate to Celsus’ cultural and medical milieus.
Celsus uses aeger (and related verbs and adverbs) in descriptions of many different forms of
illness; as with his usage of morbus, aeger encompasses both physical and “mental”
manifestations of illness.160 Overall, he uses aeger in a very open-ended way, seemingly
applicable to any condition in which there is a problem with health. The generic nature of
Celsus’ usge of the word is reflected in the very opening lines of De Medicina:
Ut alimenta sanis corporibus agricultura, sic sanitatem aegris Medicina promittit.
Just as agriculture offers nourishment for healthy bodies, so does Medicine offer
health for the ill. (1.Pr.1.1-2)
In these opening lines, Celsus makes an analogy between agriculture and medicine, indicating
that both arts are important to health. Interestingly, language of health appears in both parts
of the analogy (sanis and sanitatem), but these words are not used in parallel ways, creating a
complicated comparison. First, Celsus observes that agriculture puts forth nourishment for
bodies that are already healthy (sanis corporibus); agriculture, in other words, helps to maintain
health. When this effect is compared with the effects of Medicine, there is subtle but key
difference: instead of just maintaining healthy bodies, medicine has the capability of restoring
health (sanitatem) to people who are sick (aegris). The lack of parallel syntax in the two parts
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Celsus uses aeger when describing a specific form of insania (3.18.2.2) which is discussed more in depth in
Chapter 4.
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of the sentence makes the comparison a bit jarring, even if Celsus is attempting to make a
segue from his encyclopedia on agriculture (which, according to Spencer, immediately
preceded De Medicina161). What is clear from this analogy, however, is that Celsus is using
aeger in contrast with the language of sanus and sanitas162—words having the generic sense of
a “healthy” or “sound” state (of body, mind, or both).163 At the same time, it is apparent that
Celsus is also using aeger rather generically to convey an absence of health (sanitas) without
referring to a specific kind of illness. This sets the precedent for the highly generic way in which
Celsus uses aeger throughout De Medicina.
One scholar who has commented on the difficultly inherent to defining “disease” is Grmek,
who observes that “definitions of disease tend to be caught in the vicious circle of stating that
disease is the opposite of health…”164 Celsus’ use of language at the beginning of the
Proemium tends toward this sort of diametric opposition, but he is more specific in his
comments about what it means to be sanus in the opening sentence of Book 1:
Sanus homo, qui et bene valet et suae spontis est, nullis obligare se legibus
debet, ac neque medico neque iatroalipta egere.
A healthy person, who is both strong and self-sufficient, should be constrained
by no rules, and need neither a doctor nor an anointer. (1.1.1-3)
Celsus indicates that a person who is sanus is not only free not from rules (by which he
presumably means rules restricting one’s regimen), but also from the need for medical
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Spencer 1935: 2 note a.
Celsus similarly juxtaposes language of sanitas/sanos and aeger in 1.Pr.29.1-3; 2.9.1.7; 2.13.3.6; 4.5.3.3.
163
Glare 2012: s.v. sanus; sanitas. I discuss Celsus’ use of these words, and their relationship to the words insanus
and insania, more in depth in Chapter 4.
164
Grmek 1998: 123. King has also observed that “the construction of disease/health as an opposition…[is] not
entirely straightforward.” (King 2005: 3)
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attention. The phrase sua sponte165 underscores that be sanus is to be independent and selfsufficient.166 For Celsus, however, this state seems to be only a theoretical ideal, and not a
practically achievable condition. Indeed, Celsus quickly moves from defining health to
explaining the many factors that frequently threaten health for all people, to discussing the
need to monitor one’s regimen constantly (thus subjecting oneself to leges), and to describing
situations that require medical treatment. Such impediments to health are at the forefront of
Celsus’ discussion throughout much of De Medicina, collectively leaving the impression that it is
ultimately impossible to be sanus for more than a fleeting moment. As have seen with
instances involving Celsus’ use of morbus (e.g. 1.Pr.52.4-57.1), it is apparent that health or
sanitas requires a very delicate balance to exist. Health, as described by Celsus, is so precarious
that it seems he would be hard-pressed to find anyone who is not aeger in some way. Among
Greek and Roman writers concerned with medicine, Celsus is hardly alone in his
characterization of health as transient, if not altogether unattainable. Nutton points out the
prevalence of these views in Hippocratic texts such as Aphorisms, which suggests that “even a
trained athlete can only remain briefly at his peak”, and The Nature of Man, which presents
“human health [as] perpetually endangered.”167
As previously mentioned, Celsus occasionally uses the adverb aegre, as well as the
comparative and superlative adverbs aegrius and aegerrime; these adverbs sometimes occur
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For this particular phrase, the Oxford Latin Dictionary offers translations such as “in the exercise of one’s own
will’ and “one’s own master”. (Glare 2012: s.v. spons)
166
Formisano and Gourevitch also note this passage’s appeal to medical self-sufficiency. (Formisano 2004: 136;
Gourevitch 1998: 122)
167
Nutton 2013: 81.
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when Celsus is describing treatments which are carried out “painfully” or “with difficulty”168 (as
opposed to ones that are carried out facile). In such instances, the difficulty may have to do
with suffering or discomfort brought upon the person being treated169, or it may have to do
with the perception that a treatment is unlikely to be successful, as in the following passage:
Morbus quoque comitialis post annum XXV ortus aegre curatur, multoque
aegrius is, qui post XL annum coepit, adeo ut in ea aetate aliquid in natura spei,
vix quicquam in medicina sit.
Also when morbus comitialis170 has arisen after the twenty-fifth year, it is treated
with difficulty, and with much more difficulty when it begins after the fortieth
year, with the result that at this age while there may be some hope in nature,
there is hardly any hope in the art of medicine. (2.8.11.1-4)
Here, Celsus uses both the positive and comparative forms of the adverb aegre in order to
emphasize that it is increasingly difficult to treat morbus comitialis as the age of onset
increases. In such instances, Celsus’s usage is not relating that an individual is ill (that much can
be assumed from the necessity for treatment), but calling attention to the difficulty of a
treatment.
Lues
The noun lues is, by my reckoning, used sixteen times in Senecan tragedy171, and it appears
more often in Oedipus (four times) than in any other Senecan tragedy. This is not surprising
since, apropos to the themes of the play, it can be translated as “plague” or “pestilence”,
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See Glare 2012: s.v. aegre.
For an example of this usage, see 7.29.3-6.
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Morbus comitialis, a condition often identified as epilepsy, is discussed more in depth in Chapter 4.
171
This count includes two occurrences of lues in Hercules Oetaeus, a work whose authorship has been questioned.
Fitch identifies only thirteen total uses of lues in the entire Senecan corpus, and he states that twelve of these
instances occur in Senecan tragedies. (Fitch 1987: 220) It is not made clear whether Fitch’s count is excluding the
two occurrences of lues in Hercules Oetaeus, but even if this is the case it would still leave one use of the word in
Senecan tragedy unaccounted for.
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senses that overlap significantly with the semantic range of pestis and pestilentia. Lues can also
be translated as “a destructive force”, “scourge”, and “corruption (of morals, etc.)”172—all
senses that are also highly relevant to the situation in Oedipus. The breadth of the word’s
semantic core is reflected in the variety of words Fitch uses to render it in his translations of
Seneca’s tragedies: blight, cataclysm, contagion, death, disaster, infection, ruin, scourge, taint.
In his commentary on Hercules Furens, Fitch states that “lues in all senses is uncommon before
[Seneca]” and that Seneca uses it more times than all previous writers together. 173 Ernout and
Meillet maintain that lues is “presque uniquement du vocabulaire poétique.”174 While I would
again question the usefulness of drawing distinctions between “vocabulaire poétique” and
“vocabulaire technique”, it is in fact the case that lues does not appear in Celsus’ De Medicina
or the work of Caelius Aurelianus, another Latin author concerned with medicine.175
While the semantic range of lues is certainly broad, throughout Senecan tragedy lues is
consistently depicted as a highly destructive force capable of large-scale devastation. This is
apparent from the opening speech of Oedipus, when Oedipus expresses bewilderment about
the nature of the plague:
Nam quid rear quod ista Cadmeae lues
infesta genti strage tam late edita
mihi parcet uni? Cui reservamur malo?
For what am I to think that this hostile plague
of the Cadmean race, having produced carnage so widely,
spares me alone? For what evil am I being preserved? (29-31)
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According to the OED, there is a possible etymological connection with λύειν (to unbind, release, dissolve,
destroy). (Glare 2012: s.v. lues)
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Fitch 1987: 220.
174
Ernout and Meillet 1951: s.v. lues.
175
Lues does, however, appear once in Senecan prose (Epistula 95.30.1).
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Here, Oedipus suggests that the lues is destined to destroy an entire race of people, while
seemingly not bringing any harm upon him. This situation is of course ironic, as noted in our
earlier discussion of pestis, since Oedipus is the leader of the Cadmean race and, as Tiresias
later asserts, is actually the cause of the mass illness (see 631-634). This irony becomes even
more pronounced when one reflects upon the use of the word by the shepherd Phorbas later in
the play:
Ferrum per ambos tenue transactum pedes
ligabat artus, vulneri innatus tumor
puerile foeda corpus urebat lue.
A thin iron rod driven through both feet
was binding his limbs; the swelling born in the wound
was burning the young body with a foul pestilence. (857-859)
Here, Phorbas is informing Oedipus about an infant whom he long ago gave away, suspecting
that the infant would not survive due to its injured condition. This information puts Oedipus on
the path toward realizing that he is in fact the infant whom Phorbas describes. Lues is thus a
defining aspect of Oedipus’ identity from infancy, but at the start of the play he is not able to
recognize his role in the lues which is afflicting Thebes. This is one example of how focusing on
vocabulary of illness sharpens our awareness of characteristic themes and motifs in the text (in
this case, paradox and irony). Commenting on the usage of this word, Boyle states that it is not
accidental that lues is used “to connote the ‘infection’ attacking the baby’s wounds. Seneca
suggests verbally the origins of the Theban plague in the wounds of Oedipus.”176
When we look to other Senecan tragedies, we find that the label lues is repeatedly applied to
characters that are perceived as having the potential to wreak destructive effects upon an
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Boyle 2011: 305-306. See also Mastronarde 1970: 303; Paratore 1956: 130.
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entire race or a large group of people.177 In Medea, for instance, Creon calls Medea
pessimam...luem (the worst plague, 183), foreshadowing the havoc Medea is about to inflict on
Creon’s city. In Troianes, Andromache suggests that Helen brought great suffering upon both
the Trojans and the Greeks, characterizing her as pestis exitium lues / utriusque populi
(pestilence, ruin, plague of both peoples, 892-893).178 Similar language occurs in Hercules
Furens, when Megara calls Amphitryon the nostri generis exitium ac lues (ruin and plague of our
people, 358). In Thyestes, the ghost of Tantalus expresses concern that he has become a
gravem populis luem (a severe plague upon people, 88), obviously referring to the suffering
that is about to unfold for his family, which can be traced back to the transgressions he
committed long ago. In Phaedra, Theseus calls Hippolytus himself a generis infandi lues (a
pestilence of/from an unspeakable race, 905)—a phrase which invites multiple interpretations.
If we understand generis infandi as an objective genitive, the phrase may suggest that
Hippolytus is a disgrace even to the Amazons (whom he is a descendant of through his mother,
Aerope), a race which is called “unspeakable”. On the other hand, if we understand generis
infandi as a genitive of origin or genitive of description, the phrase then seems to imply that the
source of Hippolytus’ perceived potential for destruction can be traced to his Amazonian
lineage: in other words, Theseus is suggesting that Hippolytus is a lues simply because he is an
Amazon. Under this interpretation, the phrase takes on undertones of ethnic intolerance,
although these undertones are in keeping with mythic representations in which the Amazons
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As Boyle states, the term lues is “used figuratively in Senecan tragedy as a term of personal abuse”. Both Boyle
and Stok trace the earliest use of the word to Cicero’s De Haruspicum Responsis. (Boyle 2011: 141; Stok 1987:
278).
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Similarly, earlier in the play the chorus implies that Helen is a lues: dum luem tantam Troiae atque Achivis /
quae tulit Sparte procul absit… (so long as Sparta, which is absent, bore such a plague for Troy and the Achaeans,
853)
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are often shown in destructive combat with other peoples. In each of these examples, lues
refers to destructive forces embodied by an individual character. These usage patterns recall
the passage from Oedipus where Creon’s speech characterizes Lues (along with other
manifestations of illness) as a personified being, and where he also suggest that Lues will depart
from Thebes when Oedipus himself departs (652-653). While the word lues is often associated
with human characters in Senecan tragedy, it can also be used in reference to catastrophic
forces of nature. In Phaedra, for instance, the messenger refers to the huge wave that brought
about the death of the exiled Hippolytus and threatened many other people as a lues (1017).
In Oedipus, the word lues is associated not only with the character Oedipus, but also with the
Sphinx. Unable to comprehend the nature and cause of the Theban lues, Oedipus suggests that
the Sphinx may be somehow responsible:
Ille, ille dirus callidi monstri cinis
in nos rebellat, illa nunc Thebas lues
perempta perdit.
Indeed, the ill-omened ash of that devious monster
is renewing war against us, that vanquished plague
is now destroying Thebes. (107-108)
Even though Oedipus had previously vanquished (perempta) the Sphinx, which is here called a
lues, by solving its riddles, Oedipus believes that the Sphinx (or more precisely its ashes) is
paradoxically continuing to wreak havoc upon Thebes.179 In Phoenissae, a play set after
Oedipus’ departure from Thebes, the Oedipus character underscores the inexplicable
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Boyle compares this use of language to an oxymoronic phrase spoken by Clytemnestra in Agamemnon: perde
pereundo (“kill by being killed”, 201). (Boyle 2011: 141)

92

(inextricabile, 133) nature of the Sphinx.180 Oedipus also uses the language of lues in this
passage, referring to the Sphinx as saeva Thebarum lues (a cruel plague of Thebes, 131). As
with the phrase generis infandi lues (Hippolytus 905) discussed above, the grammatical
construction of saeva Thebarum lues can be construed as either an objective genitive (a cruel
plague upon Thebes) or as an genitive of origin or a genitive of description (a cruel plague from
Thebes); this ambiguity underscores both the origins and effects of the cruel Sphinx. Here, as in
other instances from Senecan tragedy, lues is depicted as an elusive and devastating
manifestation of illness.
Macies
Macies can be used in the senses of “wasting”, “thinness of body”181, or “diminution”182; it
can thus be used in reference to either the state or process of emaciation (one of its English
derivatives). In Oedipus, it is mentioned at the end of the play as one of the personified
manifestations of illness that are to serve as “guides” of Oedipus’ exile.183 This sentence
includes macies along with other words that are in the semantic sphere of illness, such as
morbus and pestis, but macies is more restricted in semantic range than those other terms (my
translation “Wasting” is in keeping with Boyle and Fitch). Thus macies is decidedly more
specific than the English word “illness”, and Celsus mentions it as a symptom of various kinds of
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Boyle suggests that the perplexing nature of the Sphinx is reflected in the hybrid composition of its body. A
union of the incongruent parts of various animals (the wings of a bird, the head and breasts of a woman, and the
body of a lion), the Sphinx “embodies to an unusually intense degree a confusion of disparate categories.” (Boyle
2011: 137)
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Glare 2012: s.v. macies.
182
Lewis and Short 1879: s.v. macies.
183
Violenta Fata et horridus Morbi tremor, / Maciesque et atra Pestis et rabidus Dolor, / mecum ite, mecum.
Ducibus his uti libet. (1059-1061) A more extended form of this passage is translated and discussed in later in this
chapter.
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illness, as I discuss below. Aother work in which Macies is personified is Silius Italicus’ 1st
century CE epic poem Punica; here, as Boyle notes, Macies is included in a list of personified
“underworld abstractions” that accompany illness: malis comes addita morbis (an added
companion to serious illnesses, Punica 13.581).184 Although Oedipus does not use the specific
word comes in his speech at the end of the play, the arrangement of his words also suggests
that Macies is a “companion” to more general manifestations of illness, namely Morbi and
Pestis, since Maciesque inserted between these words. Moreover, the attachment of the
enclitic –que further reinforces the idea that Macies is tagging along with the other forms of
illness—all of which are in turn accompanying Oedipus himself as he departs from Thebes at
the end of the play. The juxtaposition of noun morbus, and the adjective malus, which itself
can be translated as “ill”, is also striking; I return to this particular combination of words when
discussing Celsus’ usage of the adjective malus.
Macies is used only one other time in Senecan tragedy185; it appears in Hercules Oetaeus
when the chorus of Oechalian women are bewailing the “wasting” Hercules has brought upon
them:
Nos turpis macies et lacrimae tenent
et crinis patrio pulvere sordidus.
Foul wasting and tears hold us
with hair dirtied by the dust of our fatherland. (119-120)
Here, we find a close parallel between the “wasting” of the Oechalian women and the ravaged
condition of their city, as both experience a decline in physical condition. The noun macies is
used four times by Celsus, who also associates it with various conditions marked by diminution.
184
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Boyle 2011: 360.
Macies appears only five times in Senecan prose.
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He states that macies is a sign of stomachus infirmus (weak digestion, 1.8.2.2)186, as well as a
possible consequence of both hyperurination (4.27.1-4) and the dislocation of bones or joints
(8.11.5.1-6.1). Celsus also notes that summa macies (extreme wasting) can result from a lack of
nourishment, thus giving rise to bodily decomposition. Celsus equates this particular type of
macies with the Greek word ἀτροφία (3.22.1.5-6), a word sometimes associated with
starvation.187 This aspect is reflected in Celsus’ comments that macies / ἀτροφία may result
from a person not eating enough due to nimio timore (excessive fear), thus making the person
weak (infirmat, 3.22.1.8-10). At the same, Celsus also observes that macies / ἀτροφία can
result from overeating, which is attributed to aviditate nimia (excessive desire; 3.22.1.7-10) and
is said to weaken a person’s physical constitution and cause the person to waste away
(corrumpitur, 3.22.1.10). The verb corrumpere sometimes carries connotations of moral
corruption188, a sense which may be apparent in this passage, as Celsus might be hinting that
this form of macies stems from a moral flaw. If this is the case, it would serve as an example of
Celsus’ tendency not to make sharp distinctions between “mental” and “physical” illness.
Celsus’ descriptions of macies also bring to mind what might today be called “eating
disorders”—a subject I will return to later in this chapter.189
Celsus also uses the related verbs emacire “to cause to waste away”190 (twice), and
emacescere “to grow thin” or “to waste way” (six times).191 These verbs are typically used in
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On Celsus’ use of stomachus to denote the esophagus (and thus the process of digestion), see Mudry 1982: 104.
Liddell, Scott, Jones, and McKenzie 1996: s.v. ἀτροφία.
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Glare 2012: s.v. corrumpere.
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The application of the term “eating disorder” to conditions described in Latin literature is no doubt fraught with
problems and complexities which, though fascinating, cannot be fully pursued in the present study. Here I use the
phrase in a very general way, and in anticipation of relevant discussion later in this chapter.
190
Glare 2012: s.v. emacire.
187
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contexts where Celsus is describing particularly severe forms of illness; Celsus in fact makes this
explicit: Mali etiam morbi signum est nimis celeriter emacrescere (To grow lean too quickly is
the sign of a serious illness, 2.4.4.1-2). This sentence’s use of language also recalls Silius
Italicus’ characterization of Macies as malis comes addita morbis, again presenting macies as a
symptom of mali morbi. These associations with harsh forms of illness are apparent when
Celsus discusses how it is possible to tell whether a morbus will be long-lasting, with prolonged
wasting (aeger pro spatio parum emascrescit, 2.5.3.1) being one of the signs.
Tabes
Like macies, the noun tabes can be used in the sense of a “physical wasting away”; it can also
be used in the senses of “melting” 192, “decay”, and “moral corruption”.193 The latter senses of
the word have strong connotations of moral and/or physical debasemen, degradation, and/or
dissolution. One example of the word’s sense of “moral corruption” can be seen in Sallust’s
work of historical prose The Jugurthine War, when tabes is used in reference to the vice of
certain Roman soldiers who committed scandalous and unpatriotic deeds after being bribed
with gold: tanta vis avaritiae [in] animos eorum veluti tabes invaserat (such power of greed,
like a moral pollution, had assailed their spirits).194 Tabes, then, typically has a strong sense of
corruption, contamination, and/or dissolution; in contrast, macies suggests a state of thinness
or a process of thinning, or perhaps a more general decline in condition, but generally without a
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Glare 2012: s.v.emacrescere.
Ernout and Meillet note an etymological connection to the Greek τήκειν (to melt, to waste away, to pine).
(Ernout and Meillet 1951: s.v. tabere)
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Glare 2012: s.v. tabes. Ernout and Meillet also note that tabes can be used in “sens physique et moral”. Their
entry also labels the word “poétique”, but Celsus uses it more than twenty times. (Ernout and Meillet 1951: s.v.
tabes)
194
Bellum Jugurthum 32.4.2.
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96

strong sense of moral or physical corruption, contamination, or dissolution. In addition, tabes
can be applied to either a fluid produced from a melting, dissolving, or decaying substance, as
well as to a fluid that causes such melting, dissolution, or decay (e.g. a “poisonous exudation”,
or, according to Lewis and Short, simply a “poison”).195 While these senses of tabes are more
specific than the aspects noted above, they are still connected with the idea of decay and
dissolution which lies at the word’s semantic core. Overall, the semantic range of tabes is
significantly broader than macies, and this relatively broad sematic range affords tabes a good
deal of poetic potential, which may help explain why it is used more frequently in Senecan
tragedy than macies (tabes appears only once in Oedipus, but a total of nine times in Senecan
tragedy). Tabes is similar to lues in that both words can suggest moral corruption, but lues, as a
word that can be translated as “plague” or “pestilence”, typically affects a larger number of
people or spreads larger-scale destruction than what we find with tabes.
Tabes makes its sole appearance in Oedipus when Creon includes it in a list of various
personified manifestations of illness (652) that he foresees as companions for Oedipus in his
future exile; this recalls the use of Macies in the list at the end of the play (1059-1060). Given
the related semantics of these two words, it could be argued that Seneca substitutes Macies for
Tabes in the later list.196 This is not to say, however, that these two words should be
considered simply interchangeable; tabes in fact has a broader semantic range than macies in
both Senecan tragedy and Celsus. The moral sense of tabes is particularly relevant to Oedipus’
situation, since he is a cause of moral contamination (and morally contaminated himself).
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Glare 2012: s.v. tabes; Lewis and Short 1879: s.v. tabes.
Senis has commented on the close relationship between these two words, noting that “macies…assimilato con
tabes, indica il dimagrimento.” (Senis 1987: 297; see also Ernout and Meillet 1951: s.v. macer)
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As noted above, tabes can be used to refer to “poisonous exudations”, and it repeatedly
assumes this sense (along with the sense of “physical wasting”) in Hercules Oetaeus, the
Senecan play where it appears most frequently (five times), possessing several layers of
significance. Poison has important connections to the plot and themes of the play, which
portrays the myth in which Hercules’ body is painfully consumed by a poisoned shroud given to
him by his wife Deianira. The play relates how the centaur Nessus had insidiously convinced
Deianira that this poisonous substance was actually a love-potion capable of recapturing
Hercules’ desire after his many infidelities. This is Nessus’ way of seeking revenge against
Hercules for killing him with an arrow tipped in the poisonous blood of the Lernaean hydra, a
many-headed creature which Hercules had destroyed in completing his second labor. Thus
Nessus, while dying, gave Deianira a draught of his own blood contaminated by the fatal blood
of the hydra. Deianira repeatedly uses the word tabes in reference to this poisonous mixture of
bloods197, quite ironically even when she still believes that it is actually a love-potion (520, 528)
and not a harmful “poison”.198 In these instances, Deanira’s usage of tabes draws attention to
her state of ignorance, while also hinting at the physical wasting it will inflict upon her husband.
It is also worth recalling that tabes can also be translated as “melting”; this sense is fitting in
that Deianira was hoping for Hercules to “melt” metaphorically in desire for her. Deianira
clearly does not expect Hercules actually to melt away physically; her usage of tabes is not
intended to refer to wasting or physical disintegration, but rather to a specific substance that
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Hercules Oetaeus 520, 528, 716, 738. Tabes is also used in this sense in during the chorus’ description of
Hercules’ death in Seneca’s Medea: tabe consumptus gemini cruoris / munere nuptae (consumed by the poison of
the twofold blood, the gift of his wife, 641-642).
198
Similarly, the nurse also refers to this substance as a pestem even before she is aware of the fatal effects it will
have upon Hercules (565).

98

she believes will help rekindle Hercules’ desire for her. Without discussing the word tabes
specifically, Katz and Volk note in an article about the poetics of hardening and softening in
Virgil’s Eighth Eclogue that melting is frequently portrayed as a symptom of erotic desire in
Greek and Latin literature.199 One example of this (not discussed by Katz and Volk) can be seen
in Ovid’s story about Narcissus in the Metamorphoses. Ovid compares the way in which
Narcissus is physically weakened by love (attenuatus amore) as he gazes at his own reflection in
a pool of water to the melting of wax, using the verb intabescere, which is related to the noun
tabes, to connote both physical and erotic “melting”.200 The sense of physical melting is again
evident at the end of the story, when Narcissus’ body withers away and ultimately disappears,
with only a flower left in his place.201
Returning to Hercules Oetaeus, there is yet another way in which it is fitting that Deianira
uses the word tabes to refer to the substance provided to her by Nessus, even though she is
initially unaware that it is a harmful poison. After all, this substance (or at least the portion of it
derived from the hydra) has previously brought wasting upon other figures, including the
centaur Nessus.202 Although Hercules Oetaeus does not provide explicit details about Hercules’
act of killing of the hydra, an influential mythic account from Pseudo-Apollodorus’ Bibliotheca
(first or second century CE) depicts Hercules subjecting the hydra to what could be described as
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Katz and Volk 2006: 172. Katz and Volk also note the practice of melting down physical objects as a way to
induce erotic “melting” in the context of sympathetic magic. (Katz and Volk 2006: 171, 174; see also Faraone 1989)
For a more general discussion of sympathetic magic, see Graf 1997.
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…sed ut intabescere flavae / igne levi cerae matutinaeque pruinae / sole tepente solent, sic attenuatus amore /
liquitur et tecto paulatim carpitur igni... (Metamorphoses 3.487-490)
201
…nusquam corpus erat; croceum pro corpora florem/ inveniunt foliis medium cingentibus albis (Metamorphoses
3.509-510).
202
Littlewood suggests that there is an element of poetic justice in the fact that the poison is derived from the
blood of a rapist (Nessus) and that it becomes the downfall of a man “whose labors, at least in Deianira’s eyes,
were a mere pretext for rape.” (Littlewood 2014: 517; cf. Hercules Oetaeus 417-422)
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physical wasting by decapitating each of the hydra’s heads and then scorching each of its necks
until the creature was completely wasted away.203 In this respect, the effects of the tabes
administered to Hercules by Deianira resemble Hercules’ treatment of the hydra. Ultimately,
Hercules becomes a victim of the poison he had so daringly obtained and used against others,
completing a cycle of “wasting” involving the hydra, the centaur Nessus, and finally Hercules
himself. Thus it is highly ironic that, while dying and wishing that he had met a more heroic
end, Hercules exclaims:
Utinam meo cruore satiasset suos
Nemeaea rictus pestis aut centum anguibus
vallatus hydram tabe pavissem mea!
I wish that the Nemean plague had satisfied its jaws
with my blood or that I had fed the hydra,
fortified with its hundred serpents, on my own wasting! (1192-1194)
As he starts to waste away and die from the poisonous blood of the hydra, Hercules wishes that
he had instead wasted away earlier by having had his blood consumed by either the Nemean
lion or the hydra. This wish is paradoxical on multiple levels. On the level of language, Hercules
juxtaposes imagery of wasting (tabes) and feeding (pavissem), which becomes all the more
jarring when one notes, as we will see in the discussion of Celsus below, that tabes is
sometimes associated with starvation and “eating disorders”. In this way, Hercules’ use of
language plays upon the idea of being “consumed” (to use an English word whose polysemy fits
well with the ambiguity and paradox evoked in this passage). It is also ironic how Hercules uses
the word tabes to refer to the wasting he wishes he had “fed” to the hydra at the very moment
he is being overcome by the poison of the hydra—especially since this poison is referred to as
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e.g. Apollodorus’ Bibliotheca 2.5.2.

100

tabes elsewhere in the play. The irony is heightened even more when one notes that Hercules’
wish is ultimately fulfilled, since he is in an important sense finally vanquished by the hydra.
Hercules himself suggests as much when he is dying and speculates about the cause of his
sudden illness: Numquid cruore es genita Lernaeae ferae (were you born of the blood of the
Lernaean beast? 1256).
Tabes is only one of several words that Seneca uses to refer to “poison”; this list includes
pestis, venenum, and virus. It should be noted that virus does not have the sense of “infectious
disease” as in the modern English word “virus”. In addition to “poison”, virus can also refer to
an “acrid juice or element in something (as affecting its taste or smell)” or a “secretion (in
plants or produced by the body) having medical, magical, etc., potency”.204 The only Senecan
tragedies in which virus appears are Hercules Oetaeus (536, 565, 719, 914, 916, 1396) and
Medea (699, 778). In these plays it almost always has the primary sense of “poison”, while also
possessing magical connotations. Indeed, in all but two uses in Hercules Oetaeus, virus is
directly connected with the poison of the hydra and how it consumes Hercules. In the other
two instances (536, 565), Deianira and then her nurse ironically use the word in the intended
sense of a magical love potion, unaware that it is in fact a lethal “poison”, to much the same
effect as Deianira’s ironic usage of the word tabes. In both of the instances in which virus occur
Medea, it is again connected with the hydra’s poison and its effects on Hercules. In the latter
instance, Medea states that the virus “drank” Hercules (virus Herculeum bibit, 778)—another
example from Senecan tragedy in which an element of illness is personified. Medea’s
references to this virus call to attention to Nessus’ revenge against Hercules while Medea
204

Glare 2012: s.v. virus. Lewis and Short also note that it can refer to “a slimy liquid”. (Lewis and Short 1879: s.v.
virus. Virus is etymologically related to the Greek ἰός (poison). (Ernout and Meillet 1951: s.v. virus)
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herself is plotting revenge, which she accomplishes through the use of magical poisons. Thus,
in both plays virus is repeatedly connected with the themes of vengeance, magic, deception,
poisonous animals, and quite specifically with the mythological figure Hercules. Celsus only
uses virus three times, and in each instance it is unambiguously used in reference to poisonous
animal bites. He states that almost every animal bite has poison (Omnis autem fere morsus
habet quoddam virus, 5.27.1a.6), and he expresses special concern about the poisonous bite of
a rabid dog (rabiosus canis, see 5.27.2a.1-2; 5.27.2b.1-2). More frequently, Celsus uses the
word venenum in reference to poison inflicted through animal bites205, while (unlike Seneca) he
does not use tabes in the sense of poison. In Celsus, neither virus nor venenum take on a more
generalized sense of “illness”, as is sometimes the case with words used to refer to poison in
Senecan tragedy (pestis, tabes).
As noted earlier in this chapter, Hercules also refers to his wasting away as a pestis (1225,
1230, 1260). Pestis, as we have seen, usually refers to a form of illness that affects a large
group of people, but Hercules applies this term to his own personal suffering. Tabes, on the
other hand, tends to be more associated with individual cases of illness (this, as we will see, is
also the case in Celsus), but Hercules never directly applies the term tabes to his condition.206
In applying the word pestis to his current condition, Hercules is using a word that carries
connotations of large-scale illness and devastation, thus emphasizing the magnitude of his
illness, perhaps in keeping with the grandiose nature of the character. Pestis can also be used
in reference to “death”, and this sense underscores the imminence of Hercules’ demise.
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Venenum appears in De Medicina thirteen times.
It seems possible to make the interpretation that Hercules is identifying his current condition as tabes in 11921194, but it is also possible that he is simply stating that he wishes he could have fed the hydra with his own tabes.
This usage is ultimately ambiguous.
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In Book 3 of De Medicina, Celsus uses tabes in reference to a general category of illness
which is considered to be long-lasting and dangerous:
Diutius saepe et periculosius tabes eos male habet, quos invasit.
Wasting often has a longer-lasting and more dangerous effect upon those whom
it has attacked. (3.22.1.1-2)
Celsus states that tabes is a chronic and dangerous form of illness, and he emphasizes its
virulence and penetrativeness with the use of invadere (“to enter in a hostile fashion”, “to
attack”), a verb with connotations of militaristic violence.207 It is noteworthy that this verb
occurs only two other times in De Medicina, and both uses occur in descriptions of rather
severe conditions.208 Celsus’ usage thus demonstrates that tabes is a harsh and serious form of
illness; these connotations are consistent with the connotations of tabes in Senecan tragedy,
even though Celsus does not use the word in reference to “poison” as Seneca does in Hercules
Oetaeus. Celsus’ meditations on illness do not address love-sickness209, and there is no sense in
which his usage of tabes has erotic connotations.
Celsus outlines three specific types of tabes. In contrast with the ordered classification
schemes Celsus draws up in other sections of De Medicina210, these categories do not appear to
be arranged any particular order, although it is specified that the third type is the most
dangerous (periculosissima, 3.22.3.1). Celsus’ first category of tabes is called macies (or
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Glare 2012: s.v. invadere. As noted above, the Roman historiographer Sallust also uses tabes in connection with
the verb invadere. (Bellum Jugurthum 32.4.2; see also 36.5.4)
208
In the first instance, Celsus uses this verb in relating that lippitudo, a condition characterized by ocular
inflammation, can result in ulceration when each eye is “attacked” (utrum oculum invaserunt, 6.6.1b.8) by the
condition simultaneously. In the other instance, Celsus uses the verb when describing the action of gangrene
making an “attack” upon oral ulcers. (ulcera oris cancer invasit, 6.15.1.1)
209
The noun amor does not appear in De Medicina.
210
Celsus’ categories of insania, for instance, proceed from the shortest-lasting to the longest-lasting condition, as
is discussed in Chapter 4.
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ἀτροφία in Greek, 3.22.1.5-7), which makes it clear that tabes is a more general term than
macies. As previously noted, macies is characterized by either a dearth or excess of eating (see
3.22.1.8-10; 3.22.1.7-10), which are said to result in the weakening of one’s physical
constitution and concomitant physical degeneration. Celsus’ second form of tabes is given only
the Greek name κακεξία. This condition, according to Celsus, can be marked by persistent
pustulation (adsiduas pustulas), ulceration on the surface of the skin (ulcera summa cutis), or
swollen body parts (corporis partes intumescant, see 3.22.2.2.8-11). These symptoms, which
suggest a sort of physical decay or dissolution, are mentioned in addition to the typical
“wasting” that should be expected, which Celsus again refers to by using the generic term tabes
(3.22.2.9). As for the causes of κακεξία, Celsus states that the condition is brought about by a
“bad habit of body” (malus corporis habitus) which may be found in “bodies that have been
corrupted by a prolonged disease” (longo morbo vitiata corpora) or in a body that has been
affected by bad medicines (cum malis medicamentis corpus adfectus est, see 3.22.2.3-6). Given
the wide variety of possible symptoms and causes associated with κακεξία, this subcategory
of tabes is also clearly rather generic. Celsus’ third and most threatening form of tabes is not
given a specific Latin name; Celsus only notes that he is describing a condition “which the
Greeks have called phthisis” (quam Graeci phthisin nominarunt, 3.22.3.1-2).211 Celsus notes
that this condition begins in the head and trickles down into the lungs (Oritur fere a capite inde
in pulmonem destillat), giving rise to ulceration (exulceratio) and slight fever (febricula, see
3.22.3.2-4).
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Celsus also mentions this condition, without describing it, earlier in De Medicina when listing conditions that
tend to arise during the season of autumn. (2.1.8.4)

104

Celsus’ usage of phthisis has also been discussed by Capitani, who argues that one specific
use of tabes (2.1.8.4) is “sinonimo” with the Greek term.212 The idea that two words—and
especially two words from different languages—are “synonymous” remains probematic, but
Capitani goes on to point out an important inconsistency in Celsus’ usage: in Book 2 Celsus
essentially equates the terms tabes and phthisis, whereas in Book 3 he considers phthisis to be
a subcategory of tabes, thus making tabes the more general term.213 Grmek, however, notes
that the Greek word φθίσις can denote wasting rather generally, not unlike tabes in Latin.
Grmek notes that φθίσις “in its original sense is nothing more than a state of diminution or
withering” applicable to the waning of the moon, the setting of the sun, or the “any diminution
of an object that will conclude with its disappearance.”214 Similarly, Kudlien has observed that
Herodotus’ Histories contain the earliest attestation of φθίσις, where it is used in reference to
various forms of physical decline.215 In later works of literature, including certain texts in the
Hippocratic Corpus, φθίσις takes on the more specific sense of “pulmonary consumption”216
which is evident in Celsus’ usage.
Celsus’s formulation of three categories of tabes appears to be influenced by the three
categories of φθίσις which are described in the Hippocratic treatise Internal Affections217, even
though the details provided in that text do not closely correspond to the details in Celsus’
account. It is worth noting that Celsus is not particularly systematic in his classifications of
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tabes, as he focuses on different aspects with each category. He discusses, for instance, the
causes of his first and second forms of tabes, but does not comment on the causes of the third
form. In his comments on the third form of tabes, he points out the body part where the
condition originates, but this is not discussed with the other forms of tabes. In addition, he
gives a Latin name (macies) to the first form of tabes, but not to the others. These
inconsistencies make it challenging to compare the different forms of tabes, and it is a bit
peculiar that these rather disparate conditions are lumped together under the same general
label. Indeed, the information provided by Celsus presents an amalgam of conditions, with
differing causes, symptoms, and expected outcomes. Nor, considering these categories on the
level of language, are there significant overlaps in the vocabulary used to describe the
conditions. These conditions can only be connected insofar as they all involve forms of bodily
degeneration218, but this is a characteristic of several other conditions which are described by
Celsus but without being labelled tabes. Celsus’ usage of the tabes in other sections of De
Medicina is similarly elusive, although he repeatedly states that tabes is especially dangerous
for people who are already thin.219
In his attempt to pin down the sense of tabes in Celsus’ usage, Spencer asserts that Celsus
“means wasting or malnutrition, whether due to disease or want of food.”220 This explanation
is vague and is predicated upon shaky dichotomies, but it encourages us to contemplate some
important points. First, Spencer’s phrase “wasting or malnutrition [italics added]” implies that

218

Celsus’ use of the verb tabescere (which appears three times in De Medicina) also suggests a general sense of
physical disintegration; in one instance it is used in reference to the process of dissolving salt into a solution to be
used in the treatment of oral ulcers. (6.15.2.5)
219
e.g. 2.1.23.1-2; 2.6.4.1-2; 2.24.1-3.
220
Spencer 1935: 324 note a.

106

these are separate manifestations or aspects of tabes, an implication which would overlook
Celsus’ observation that malnutrition can in fact cause certain forms of tabes (macies and
κακεξία) and thus result in physical degeneration (i.e. “wasting”). Moreover, Spencer’s
comments about the causes of tabes implies that “want of food” is necessarily separate from
“disease”, but as we have seen above, Celsus considers “want of food” to be a cause of certain
forms of tabes, thus drawing a close link between “want of food” and “disease”. In his phrase
“want of food”, it is possible that Spencer is referring to a lack of available food, but Celsus
does not describe any such circumstances; his comments on tabes only describe situations in
which a person refuses to consume food due to “excessive fear” or when “unusual or
unserviceable” (inusitatos aut inutiles cibos, 3.22.2.8) food has been consumed. In addition,
since some of these conditions might, at least from a modern perspective, be labeled “eating
disorders”, a diagnosis which brings them more into the realm of “illness” or “disease” and
further problematizes the distinction Spencer draws up between “want of food” and “disease”.
Spencer’s definition is thus not particularly helpful in its own right, but it provides a useful
opportunity to look more critically at Celsus’ ideas concerning the causes of his various
categories of tabes and conceptualizations of illness more broadly. Ultimately, Celsus’ usage of
tabes is very broad, covering various specifically defined conditions, all of which involve some
form of physical degeneration or “wasting”.
Malum
The adjective malus is one of the more common and semantically-broad words appearing in
Senecan tragedy, where it is used as both adjectivally and substantively. The Oxford Latin
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Dictionary supplies a wide variety of possible translations for the adjectival usage, including
“bad, “unpleasant”, “painful”, “wicked”, “harmful”, “unfavorable”, “poor in condition”, etc.221
Lewis and Short’s entry also notes that malus can also be used “of the sick”, citing a substantive
use in Celsus (in malis aeger est, 3.15.6.10).222 A similarly rich assortment of translations is
offered for the substantive form malum, including “trouble”, “misfortune”, “pain”, “misdeed”,
“evil”, “harm”, “insult”, “injury”, “fault”, and—quite notably for this study— “illness”, “disease”
and “sickness”.223 Ernout and Meillet note that the substantive malum can be used in a
“physical” or “moral sense”224, not unlike its English derivative “malaise”.225 We can also relate
the semantic breadth of malum to the parallel semantics of the English word “ill”, which can be
used in contrast with the adjective “good” (as in the phrase “for good or for ill”), as well as in
contrast with the adverb “well” (as in “ill suited”, as opposed to “well suited”), while also of
course having the senses of “sick”, “unhealthy”, “diseased”. Due to the frequency with which
malum is used by both Seneca and Celsus, an exhaustive discussion of the word is beyond the
scope of this dissertation. Instead, this section will focus on analyzing some particular instances
in which malum carries connotations of illness.
In Oedipus, the broad semantic range of malum repeatedly produces ambiguity and mystery,
adding layers of complexity to the play’s theme of illness. This especially apparent early on in
the play, when Oedipus, having observed the illness and suffering of his own people, fearfully
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wonders about the kind of evil for which he is being “saved” (Cui reservamur malo? 31).226
Here, the most obvious significance is a general “evil” or “misfortune” which Oedipus fears and
is struggling to comprehend. The word is used in a similar way in Hercules Furens, when
Amphitryon is puzzled and disturbed by Hercules’ violent, delusional state, and refers to
Hercules’ condition as a malum (952). Oedipus’ use also suggests a sense of moral “evil”227,
perhaps hinting at the pollution connected with Oedipus’ identity, while also foreshadowing the
moral crisis Oedipus is destined to experience when he finally comes to understand his own
nature and his role in bringing illness upon Thebes. This specific use of malum also points to
plague or illness more generally, since Oedipus has just made reference to the “hostile plague
of the Cadmean race” (Cadmeae lues / infesta genti, 29-30), and shortly thereafter doubts that
he has a “healthy kingdom” (regnum salubre, 36).228 Through this sense of malum, Oedipus is
observing that he has not yet become physically ill—unlike all of the other Thebans, and the
Theban environment itself—and he that believes that a special kind of illness is awaiting him. It
is apparent that malum is suggesting illness when the chorus, following Oedipus’ opening
speech and immediately after describing the sickened, moribund conditions of the Theban
environment, states: omnia nostrum sensere malum (everything feels our illness, 159).
Later in the play, Oedipus unwittingly highlights his own ignorance about the nature of the
Theban plague while speaking with Creon. Creon is reticent about giving advice, but Oedipus
continues to probe:
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Iners malorum remedium ignorantia est.
Itane et salutis publicae indicium obrues?
Ignorance is an unskilled remedy for illnesses.
Will you really bury information about public welfare? (515-516)
Oedipus uses language strongly associated with healing (remedium, salutis), which again shows
how he is assuming that the mala confronting Thebes are only “medical” in nature. He admits
his ignorantia about how to remedy the mala, but Oedipus does not realize just how unaware
he is concerning the nature and cause of the mala. Even in acknowledging his own ignorance,
Oedipus remains unaware about the extent of that ignorance—a paradox suggested by the
ambiguity of mala.
The play also features the recurring theme that mala are lurking or hiding from Oedipus.
This theme is apparent from early on in the play, for instance when Oedipus states:
Quisquamne regno gaudet? O fallax bonum,
quantum malorum fronte quam blanda tegis!
Does anyone take pleasure in kingship? O deceptive good,
how many evils you conceal with how pleasant an appearance! (6-7)
Here Oedipus contrasts the difficult realities of kingship (quantum malorum) with the deceptive
impressions of glory (fallax bonum) often associated with being a king. Oedipus makes these
remarks immediately after observing that the return of Titan (i.e. the sun) has made the effects
of the avida pestis apparent (see 1-5). There is thus a strong association between the
unexpected mala and the pestis. Oedipus is able to observe the mala that are molesting his
city, but he cannot see the future mala that await him (cf. cui reservamur malo, 31), nor is he
aware of mala he has already committed. This lack of awareness is in contrast with the
knowledge possessed by the hypothetical audience of the play, which, as Boyle states, “knows
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that the ‘evils’ hidden are the patricide and the incest already committed”. 229 Oedipus’ initial
use of mala, then, unknowingly calls attention to the transgressions he will learn of later in the
play. In using this word, Oedipus reveals aspects of himself about which he is not yet aware,
further underscoring the sense that reality is being concealed (cf. tegis) from him.230
The polysemous nature of the word mala also allows other characters to allude to Oedipus’
transgressions without directly acknowledging them. Tiresias, for instance, tells Manto: Sunt
dira, sed in alto mala. (Terrible evils are here, but down deep. 330) Shortly thereafter, he
informs Oedipus: His invidebis quibus opem quaeris malis (You will envy those illnesses for
which you are seeking help. 387). The ambiguity of the word mala points toward Oedipus’
incomplete understanding of himself, while simultaneously keeping him in the dark about the
exact nature of those mala. Even though Tiresias is a prophet with full understanding of these
matters, he uses an open-ended word which is capable of evoking illness, suffering, and the
like. In this way, Tiresias’ usage of mala highlight the riddle-like, obfuscatory nature of his
speech (a characteristic commonly associated with prophetic figures in Greek and Latin
literature). It is also possible to find an element of softening or euphemism in Tiresias’ usage of
mala: Oedipus’ transgressions are so unspeakable, so taboo that Tiresias can only acknowledge
them by using a fuzzy word like mala.
Oedipus’ mother, Jocasta, also uses the word malum with a sense of evasiveness during a
conversation in which Oedipus is inquiring about the ill-fated circumstances of his birth:
Sive ista ratio sive fortuna occulit
latere semper patere quod latuit diu:
saepe eruentis veritas patuit malo.
229
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Whether reason or chance has concealed these things
Allow what has long been concealed always to be concealed
Truth when exposed is often an ill to the one who digs it out. (825-827)
Jocasta hopes to keep the truth buried, and thus speaks only vaguely about the malum which is
often experienced by those who pry too deeply into the truth. The character of her speech is
highly general and impersonal231, not identifying any potential danger to Oedipus himself, only
to whomever “digs out” truth which has long been concealed. Jocasta uses verbs associated
with both concealment (occulere, latere [twice]) and revelation (patere)232, with concealment
ultimately winning out as she prefers for the malum to remain buried. As Busch has observed,
“in Seneca’s drama, rational inquiry, such as that conducted by Oedipus…does not resolve
enigmas; it perpetuates them.”233 As we are seeing, the perpetuation of these enigmas is in
part enabled by the use of the word malum by characters such as Jocasta and Tiresias.
Jocasta’s use of the participle eruentis is also worth noting, as the messenger uses the exact
same form of this word when relating how Oedipus prepared to dig out his eyes (cf. iamiam
eruentis, 961) after finally uncovering the truth which Jocasta is warning him not to pursue in
the above lines. In his response to Jocasta’s attempts to bury the truth, Oedipus can only speak
about the matter in the vaguest terms, mimicking his mother’s use of malum: Malum timeri
maius his aliquod potest? (Is it possible that there is any ill to be feared more than these? 828).
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Oedipus’ use of this highly ambiguous word once again draws attention to his own ignorance,
and by contrast the understanding possessed by other characters.
Another noteworthy instance in which the use of malum highlights a character’s state of
ignorance is seen in Seneca’s Phaedra, when the nurse, who is struggling to understand the
nature of Phaedra’s illness, refers to her condition as a malum (Spes nulla tantum posse leniri
malum, 360). Phaedra also uses this word to describe her own condition (alitur et crescit
malum, 101), also employing vagueness in attempting to keep the true nature of her illness
concealed. Casamento comments that this particular use of malum “traduce il greco νόσος
con cui nell’Ippolito euripideo è designata la malattia della regina (40, 394 e 405).”234 While
Casamento makes an interesting comparison of terminology used by Seneca and Euripides, the
relationship between malum and νόσος is not so straightforward. The assertion that malum is
a “translation” of the Greek word νόσος is problematic because no two words from different
languages (or even two words from the same language) possess the exact same senses and
connotations. Compared with the Latin word malum, the Greek νόσος has a significantly
narrower semantic range, restricted to the senses of mental or bodily “illness”/ “sickness”/
“disease” and plague, without the possible senses of “misfortune”, “fault”, “evil-doing”, etc. as
with malum.235 In this respect, Seneca’s usage of malum in Phaedra, Oedipus, and other plays
evokes certain connotations that are not available with the usage of νόσος in Euripides’ play.
As these examples from both Phaedra and Oedipus bear out, the polysemous nature of malum
lends itself to usage in situations in which illness is concealed and/or not fully understood.
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The above examples from Oedipus illustrate how the usage of malum contributes to the
play’s complexly interwoven themes of concealment, illness, and self-awareness. The multifaceted and versatile nature of this word is acknowledged somewhat directly when Creon
makes a comparison between Oedipus and the Sphinx:
…fratres sibi ipse genuit—implicitum malum,
magisque monstrum Sphinge perplexum sua.
…he has produced brothers for himself—an entangled illness,
a monster more confused than his own Sphinx. (640-641)
Creon’s use of ipse and malum in apposition emphasizes that Oedipus is a malum, an
embodiment of illness and evil. As in other parts of the play, illness is personified as a living
being236 and explicitly connected with Oedipus. Creon describes Oedipus, and therefore the
malum or illness that he embodies, as “entangled” (implicitum) and “confused” (perplexum)—
even moreso than the Sphinx, a monster known for its riddles. Creon’s use of the adjectives
implicitum, which Renger renders as “muddled”237, and perplexum—a word built on the same
root plec(t)-, “weave”, “entangle”—emphasizes both that Oedipus is a complex, many-layered
manifestation of illness, and that Oedipus’ confusion runs deep. The illness caused by Oedipus
is linked to his own convoluted identity as an incestuous patricide. In addition, Creon’s
comments call to attention the perplexing irony that Oedipus has become a greater plague to
Thebes than the dreaded Sphinx, which he subdued in trying to protect the city. Creon’s usage
of malum highlights the multitude of paradoxes wrapped up in the singular figure of Oedipus.
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Like Seneca, Celsus uses malum frequently, in both adjectival and substantive ways238.
Throughout De Medicina, the adjectival malus is used to modify a variety of nouns; some
examples of this use include: mala signa and mala indicia (bad symptoms, e.g. 8.4.21.1 and
8.4.6.9, respectively), malus corporis habitus (bad habit of the body, e.g. 2.1.22.3), mala ulcera
(bad ulcers, e.g. 5.18.18.3), malus odor (2.6.10.4, bad odor)239, mala urina (bad urine, e.g.
2.4.8.1), and malum vulnus (a bad wound, e.g. 5.26.3b.3-4). In such cases, malum often
underscores the severe or troublesome nature of symptoms or conditions. In three instances,
Celsus also makes reference to mali morbi—a combination of words which is particularly
interesting, as the adjective malus is used to modify illness (morbus) itself. Despite the fact that
these instances occur in close context with each other (all are mentioned in Book 2.4), Celsus
does not present a monolithic picture, as he identifies various symptoms that can indicate a
malus morbus, including breathing irregularities (2.4.3.1-2), throbbing blood vessels (2.4.4.1-2),
and awakening from sleep in a state of fright (2.4.7.2). In these instances of usage, malum is
used not to construct a formal category of illnesses (as he does with phrases such as acuti
morbi and longi morbi), but to convey that a particular symptom is indicative of an illness that
may be particularly severe or life-threatening.
Celsus’ substantive uses of malum, on the other hand, produce some rather generic
categories of illness. This is apparent with phrases such as in recentibus malis (in recent
illnesses, 6.6.8e.2), in levoribus malis (in slight illnesses, 7.18.5.7), and in omnibus corporis malis
(in all illnesses of the body, 5.Pr.3.5-6). These are roughly-defined, unspecific classifications
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encompassing various types of illness—and, with the latter example, in fact all types of physical
illness. In such instances, mala functions in much the same way that morbus does in phrases
such as in…recentibus morbis (2.14.4.5) and omnibus morbis (1.3.26.4), suggesting a highdegree of semantic overlap between such uses. Commenting of the apparent
interchangeability of these words in such contexts, Mudry has observed that Celsus while
typically uses morbus to refer to “maladies internes”, he sometimes uses the terms malum or
vitium instead.240 These semantic parallels are on display in the Proemium, for example when
Celsus mentions nova genera morborum (new types of illnesses, 1.Pr.36.10) and then refers to
mali genus aliquod ignotum (an unknown type of illness, 1.Pr.37.1-2) in the sentence that
immediately follows. Here, Celsus closely relates “unknown” illnesses and “new” types of
illness (the similarity being that they are both not well-understood), alternating between using
nova and ignotum as well as morbus and malum. Whereas Celsus needs to use a modifier such
as ignotum to indicate that a malum is not well-understood, in Oedipus malum, used simply on
its own, suggests a form of illness that is perplexing. Celsus also does not use the substantive
malum with the ambiguity that is apparent in many uses of the word in Oedipus. As we might
expect from a writer of medical prose, he does not use malum with the senses of irony,
paradox, or euphemism that are repeatedly activated by uses of the word in Oedipus.
Vitium
Seneca and Celsus also use the word vitium in the sense of “illness”. Like malum, vitium has
an extremely broad semantic range; other possible translations include “fault”, “defect”,
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“shortcoming”, “imperfection”, “vice”, “and “disorder”.241 As this list makes quite apparent,
vitium can have both physical and moral connotations, and both sets of connotations are
evoked each of the three times the word is used in Oedipus.242 This goes against the claim
made by Ernout and Meillet that vitium specifically denotes a “défaut physique”243, and it also
goes against the opposite view, which is taken by Pisi, that vitium is restricted to the moral
sphere.244
Near the end of his speech at the beginning of the play, Oedipus lists various forms of
devastation that he wishes he could escape: contacta regna (infected kingdoms, 78), lacrimas
(tears 78), funera (funerals), and tabifica caeli vitia (the consuming maladies of the sky, 79).245
This list evokes deterioration of both physical bodies and society as a whole, particularly with
the phrase tabifica caeli vitia. These vitia bring about “consuming” or “wasting” through
physical illness; this idea is emphasized by the use of tabifica, a word that is etymologically
connected to tabes.246 These vitia are associated with the sky, once again illustrating that the
Theban environment is in a state of illness.247 There is also the sense that Thebes is being
consumed not only by physical illness, but also by a form of moral corruption. Earlier in this
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speech, Oedipus bemoans the corruption of Theban societal conventions, citing a neglect of the
customary funereal rites, which is said to occur due to a “loss of shame” (nullus…pudor, 65).
Oedipus’ use of the word vitia later in the speech thus calls attention to how his city is being
consumed by both physical illness and moral corruption, paradoxically while Oedipus himself is
unaware of the own role he has played in this illness and corruption.248
Immediately before he lists the personified manifestations of illness that will become his
companions end of the play, Oedipus states: mortifera mecum vitia terrarum extraho (I am
dragging out the deadly maladies of the land with me, 1058). As Boyle has noted, the phrase
mortifera…vitia echoes Oedipus’ earlier reference to tabifica…vitia (79).249 These lines are also
metrically equivalent, futher contributing to this element of ring-composition, which suggests
that the entire play is encompassed by vitia. At 1058, Oedipus uses vitia to introduce various
forms of illness (Morbi, Macies, Pestis) as well as “faults” with moral implications (Violenta
Fata). But unlike Oedipus’ earlier reference to vitia, which are connected with the sky, the vitia
at the end of the play are associated with the land (terrarum), indicating a downward motion
with respect to the vitia.250 Boyle notes this transposition, stating that “Oedipus began by
pointing to the heavens (1-5); he ends by summoning hell.” Boyle does not, however, comment
on the fact that vitia are involved in this reversal.
Vitium is used in one other instance in the play, when Oedipus is speaking with an old man
(Senex) and inquiring into the circumstances of his birth. Responding to Oedipus’ question
about how his feet became disfigured, the old man explains:
248

Pratt has similarly noted that “the corruption caused by Oedipus’ crimes is portrayed as a total corruption of
nature.” (Pratt 1983: 97)
249
Boyle 2011: 130.
250
Boyle 2011: 359.

118

Forata ferro gesseras vestigia,
tumore nactus nomen ac vitio pedum.
Your feet had been pierced with iron,
and your name was born from the swelling and defect of your feet. (812-813)
Here, vitium is clearly used to refer to a physical wound, and this is underscored by the old
man’s reference to its swelling (tumore). This vitium is associated with a specific part of the
body, namely the feet (pedum), but vitium can also be used in reference to a moral “fault” or
“defect”. This act of foot-binding, which was intended to prevent Oedipus’ survival, set into
motion the tragic faults of Oedipus’ life: his lack of knowledge about his family and his origins,
and his subsequent, unwitting acts of patricide and incest. The old man draws a direct link
between the vitium of the foot binding and Oedipus’ identity, as he informs Oedipus that his
name came about from this very act.251 The fact that Oedipus was unable to make the
connection between his name and his wound or vitium once again showcases his selfignorance. It is also telling that, in the line prior to the old man’s explanation, Oedipus refers to
his wounds merely as notas (marks, 811). The word nota does not possess the sense of moral
blemish conveyed by vitium, which suggests that Oedipus does not comprehend the moral
implications of his wounds. It is also that nota can—as I discuss further in Chapter 3—be used
to refer to “signs” or “symptoms” of illness. Interpreted in this way, Oedipus is asking the old
man to help diagnose his condition, even though Oedipus has little awareness about the actual
extent of his illness.

251

The old man is thus providing an etymological explanation for Oedipus’ name, which in Greek can be
understood as “swollen-footed” (Οἰδί-πους), although this etymology has been debated.

119

Vitium occurs very often in Celsus, and the related adjective vitisosus and the verb vitiare
also appear, though much less frequently. Celsus often uses vitium in reference to a specific
body part where an illness arises or is centralized. For instance, Celsus states:
At qui spumantem sanguine excreant, iis in pulmone vitium est.
But with those who cough up blood, the illness is in the lungs. (2.7.16.1-3)
The prepositional phrase in pulmone vitium est is example of a formulaic construction which
Celsus uses throughout De Medicina. Celsus describes vitia in various other parts of the body,
such as in renibus (2.7.13.1), in eadem vesica (2.7.13.4), in umero (2.10.14.3), in stomachi
(2.15.4.9), and in cute (3.6.17.1). In such instances, it is clear that a specific body part is
impaired or afflicted in some way, but it is not always possible to tell whether Celsus is only
suggesting that the illness is localized in that particular body part, or whether he is also implying
that the body part is the cause of the illness.252 This sort of ambiguity is apparent in the
sentence above, in which it is not clear whether the illness is simply thought to reside in the
lungs, or whether Celsus is also attributing the cause of the illness to the lungs. In other cases,
it is more clear that Celsus is using vitium in reference to the causation of an illness, as in the
phrase si in umidis omne vitium est (if the entire fault lies in the humours, 1.Pr. 15.1). The fact
that the humours are thought to exist throughout the body and are not localized to any single
body part suggests that vitium implies a sense of causation in this context.253

252

Serbat’s French translation of this sentence (“En revanche, ceux qui crachent un sang écumeux ont une
affection pulmonaire”) does not suggest an element of causation, but the ambiguity remains in the Latin. (Serbat
1995: 65)
253
Another example in which Celsus uses vitium with a sense of causation is apparent in his observation that pain
may occur “either from the fault of weather, or from the fault of the body” (sive tempestatium vitio sive corporis,
6.6.8d.8).
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In other instances, it is fairly clear that Celsus is using vitia without any sense of causation,
such as when he refers to vitia pulmonum (illnesses of the lungs, 2.7.28.5) and vitia articulorum
(illnesses of the joints, 2.8.10.1). In such examples, Celsus is simply relating that an illness is
localized or confined to a particular part of the body. In one way, this usage recalls the old
man’s use of vitio pedum in Oedipus (813) in reference to the “defect’ of a particular body part.
At the same time, the old man’s usage also suggests an element of causation, since the binding
of Oedipus’ feet brings about other woes, moral and physical. Celsus’ usage of vitium, on the
other hand, remains firmly grounded in the physical sphere without any apparent moral
implications.
One can find a possible moral element, however, in one instance where Celsus employs the
verb vitiare. Discussing the state of health in the distant past, Celsus asserts that health was
then more common due to bonos mores, quos neque desidia neque luxuria vitiarant (good
habits, which were blemished by neither idleness nor extravagance, 1.Pr.4.7-5.1). Interestingly,
Seneca expresses rather similar sentiments in one of his epistles where he lists various physical
illnesses that currently plague humankind, and he then poses the rhetorical question: Quid alios
referam innumerabiles morbos, supplicia luxuriae? (Why should I mention the other
innumerable illnesses, the punishments for extravagance? Epistula 95.18)254 Here, Seneca
makes quite explicit the idea that illness (morbus) can occur as a result of “immoral” behavior

254

Earlier in this letter, Seneca also asserts that people’s bodies were healthier in the past because they were not
as spoiled by art (ars) and pleasure (voluptas): Nec est mirum tunc illam minus negotii habuisse firmis adhuc
solidisque corporibus et facili cibo nec per artem voluptatemque corrupto… (Epistula 95.15)
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(luxuria), whereas Celsus uses morally-tinged words such as luxuria and desidia without
explicitly criticizing these qualities as “immoral”.255
Celsus’ usage of the adjective vitiosus does not appear to have any moral implications, and,
like the noun vitium, is often used in reference to body parts or bodily processes where illness is
localized.256 It is noteworthy that vitium is not used during Celsus’ discussion of insania in Book
3, which generally avoids moralizing and instead focuses on physiological explanations for
insania (which, as we will see in Chapter 4, contrasts sharply with conceptualizations of insania
and other forms of “mental” illness in Senecan prose and tragedy). The fact that vitium does
not appear in Celsus’ discussion of insania may also relate to the fact that he considers insania
to be one of the forms of illness “which are not able to be assigned to specific parts” (qui certis
partibus adsignari non possunt, 3.18.1.3-4).
As with malum, Celsus uses vitium in reference to broad, generic classes of illness. He refers,
for instance, to longa vitia (chronic illnesses 4.12.1.2)—a phrase whose sense and construction
parallels longi morbi.257 Celsus also describes vitia that affect not just a particular body part,
but the entire body, thus requiring the aid of medicines (quae per totum corpus orientia
medicamentorum auxilia desiderant, 6.1.1.1-2). This use of vitia in reference to broad
categories of illness recalls the generic, all-encompassing categories of illness suggested by
Oedipus’ usage of the word (79, 1058). It should also be noted that certain Latin authors use

255

Von Staden has also noted Celsus’ use of “evaluative terms that resonate powerfully within the Roman moral
register” in this passage, although he does not discuss the use of vitiare specifically. (von Staden 1999: 260; see
also 264 and von Staden 1996: 405)
256
e.g. stomachus bile vitosus (4.12.6.1); vitiosi ungues (6.9.3.11-12); vitiosus sinus (7.13.2.3), vitiosi ossis (8.3.4.2)
257
Similarly, Celsus refers to viti genus (a type of illness, 6.7.8a.1; cf. 7.7.1a.1), which recalls his use of the phrase
genera morborum (types of illnesses, 1.Pr.55.4-5; cf. 1.Pr.66.6-7).
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the word vitium in naming one specific condition, namely “epilepsy” (comitiale vitium).258
Celsus, however, calls this condition as morbus comitialis (e.g. 2.1.6.5-6), and he does not use
the word vitium in naming any other specific condition. In calling the condition morbus
comitialis, Celsus avoids the suggestions of moral fault which are implicit with a term like
comitiale vitium.
Chapter Conclusions
Like the English language, Latin contains a rich vocabulary pertaining to illness. The various
words in both English (illness, sickness, disease, disorder, plague, pestilence, et al.) and Latin
(pestis, pestilentia, morbus, infirmitas, aegritudo, lues, macies, tabes, vitium, and malum, et al.)
each possess subtly different nuances in sense and connotation, which in turn emphasize
different aspects of “illness”. While I have identified some semantic overlaps between these
words, it would be an oversimplification to suggest, as some scholars have, that any of these
pieces of vocabulary are simply “synonymous” or “interchangeable”. To attribute a single,
generic concept of “illness” to these words, without attention to nuance or context, is to
overlook the semantic range of such words and thus miss out on significant interpretive
opportunities. Nonetheless, throughout this chapter I have typically translated or glossed such
diverse words as morbus and malum with the English “illness” with the intention of allowing the
various possible connotations and implications of the Latin words to speak for themselves.
Latin’s complex and diverse vocabulary of illness is on display in Seneca’s Oedipus and
Celsus’ De Medicina. Although these works approach the experience of illness from different

258

This includes Seneca (De Ira 3.10.3.1-4.1; this passage is discussed in Chapter 4). See also Pliny, Naturalis
Historia 20.191.7.
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perspectives, they employ similar constellations of vocabulary, offering fascinating
opportunities for comparison and interpretation. Examining the vocabulary of illness across
genres of literature in this way offers a broader window for understanding the semantics and
connotations of the vocabulary, thus offering further insight into the conceptualization of
illness in each work. We find, for instance, that a plethora of words that appear in Celsus are
used to describe the condition of the Theban environment, and when this is noted it becomes
even more apparent that the environment itself, and not just the people of Thebes, is mired in
a medicalized state of illness.
Certain sections of Celsus’ work demonstrate a distinct interest in medical taxonomy (as we
will see with the discussion of insania in Chapter 4), but Celsus is neither explicitly systematic
nor always consistent in his usage of vocabulary in the semantic sphere of illness. Unlike other
Latin writers, such as Cicero, Celsus does not attempt to make a firm distinction between
morbus, malum, and vitium, using all of these words in the generic sense of “illness”; moreover
he applies the adjective aeger to individuals who suffer from a great variety of conditions.
Although Celsus uses these pieces of vocabulary in a general way and often without clear
categorical distinctions, other words (e.g. pestilentia, tabes, virus) are more specific and tend to
occur in certain contextual environments. The connotations and usage patterns of these words
in Celsus can enrich our understanding of Seneca’s vocabulary usage and representations of
illness, and vice versa.
Seneca uses a wide variety of words to refer to the mass illness of Thebes; in the opening
speech alone, it is figured as a pestis, morbus, lues, macies, tabes, vitium, and malum; neither
“illness” nor “plague” nor any other English word can possibly cover the rich array of
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connotations associated with this group of vocabulary. Throughout the play, these various
Latin words are in turn connected with Oedipus’ experience, sometimes by Oedipus himself,
and he is thus closely aligned with the plague. The play’s vocabulary of illness calls attention to
how the topsy-turvy condition of Thebes mirrors the sick, entangled identity of Oedipus.
In comparison with Seneca, Celsus tends to use certain words, such as lues, macies, and
tabes, in a more specific sense. Celsus generally uses these terms to denote individuallyexperienced forms of illness, rather than mass illness (to which Celsus often applies the term
pestilentia). In light of Celsus’ usage, the Theban plague can be seen as embodying many
different forms of illness all at once, which in turn highlights the apparent impossibility of
diagnosis and treatment. Indeed, even though Oedipus recognizes and identifies various
elements of the illness at the beginning of the play, he cannot arrive at a coherent
understanding of the situation. Even after the cause of the plague has been revealed, it still
cannot be encapsulated by a single word. Furthermore, this focus on medical language
highlights the peculiar, paradoxical, and painful situation of Oedipus himself, who is once a
patient and ostensible healer.
Seneca also personifies aspects of illness, thus giving them a sense of agency, and in certain
ways Oedipus himself is characterized as a personification of illness. This blurs the distinctions
between Oedipus and the plague, and thus between cause and effect. Celsus, on the other
hand, does not use vocabulary of illness with a sense of personification, nor with the irony,
paradox, ambiguity, and euphemism evident in Oedipus and other Senecan tragedies. These
differences speak in part to the differing aims of the authors: as a tragic poet, Seneca is
interested in exploring the complexities of illness, both as a phenomenon in and of itself, and in
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terms of its effects on individual human beings and societies, whereas Celsus, as a writer of an
encyclopedic prose text on medicine, seeks to categorize, diagnose, define, and otherwise pin
illness down. This difference is apparent, for instance, with their respective uses of malum:
Celsus uses this substantive adjective in the very general sense of “illness”, and this is the sense
understood by Seneca’s character Oedipus. Oedipus, however, is oblivious to the moral
connotations the word takes on in the context of the play, and the word’s relevance to his own
situation and identity. In this and many other instances in Senecan tragedy, vocabulary of
illness is used to draw attention to matters of ignorance and self-awareness, themes we will
continue to examine in the following chapters of this study. In Oedipus, then, the vocabulary
of illness and with it the experience of illness are not funneled into specific categories or
identified with particular conditions, but are instead jumbled together in a complex
conundrum.
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Chapter IIII
Illness Unveiled: Language of Concealment and Revelation
The human body is a subject of great interest in both the medical prose and tragic poetry of
the Greek and Roman literary tradition. The internal structure and internal operations of the
body are special concerns, as is reflected in the works of both Celsus and Seneca, whose
representations of the body’s internal (and usually invisible) organs are frequently marked by
opacity and obscurity. These representations are in certain ways indicative of the limited
knowledge of the body afforded by the Greek and Roman medical traditions, both of which
largely eschewed practices of human dissection. Some of the reasons why dissection was so
rarely performed will be discussed in this chapter’s forthcoming comments on Celsus. Because
there were limited opportunities for direct observation of the interior of the human body, such
as examining battle wounds and the rare instances of dissection, understandings of the interior
of the human body were largely derived from what was externally apparent. This meant that
bodily processes and phenomena break the divide between the interior and exterior of the
body, such as bleeding, excretions, and visible indicators of distress, came to play an integral
role in shaping understandings of the interior of the body.1 In this way, the symptom—a
disruption “either to the experience of self or to the outward presentation of the self”2—was
thought to provide valuable insight about the interior of the body, and thus served as an

1

In the words of Grmek, practitioners of medicine in the ancient world “were obliged to reconstruct the internal
structures of the human body, either by working from what they saw or felt through an external examination or
else by making use of what they observed in dissections of animals.” (Grmek 1991: 56) See also Kuriyama 1999:
121-122; Padel 1995: 146.
2
This is the crux of the definition that Holmes assigns to the word “symptom” in her book The Symptom and the
Subject: The Emergence of the Physical Body in Ancient Greece. (Holmes 2010: 2).
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important tool for the detection and diagnosis of illness.3 Without the surfacing of
interpretable symptoms, on the other hand, illness would often lurk in an undetectable state of
obscurity, posing problems for diagnosis and treatment.
Celsus’ De Medicina and Seneca’s tragedies, we will see, frequently reflect this conceptual
paradigm in their themes and use of language. Their works often employ terminology and
metaphors of concealment when describing conditions of illness in which there are no apparent
symptoms, or in which symptoms are apparent but are not comprehensible. Conversely, in
contexts in which illness is thought to be well understood, or in which the causes of an illness
seem more obvious, illness is often described in terminology and metaphors suggesting
transparency and revelation. This chapter will examine this dichotomy of concealment and
revelation, and in particular the relevant terminology used by Celsus and Seneca. Scholars such
as Ruth Padel have previously explored some of the conceptual and semantic nuances
associated with “the known or seen and the unknown or unseen”4 in a variety of genres of
Greek literature, including the Hippocratic treatises, but these issues have not been thoroughly
examined in Latin literature. This chapter will move the discussion in that direction while
building upon the work of scholars such as Holmes and Patel.

3

Holmes goes on to state that “symptoms point to an imperceptible dimension of reality that cuts across the world
that we do perceive. In one sense, this hidden world can be laid bare.” (Holmes 2010: 2; see also ix, 121-122)
Throughout her book, Holmes stresses the importance placed upon symptoms in ancient conceptualizations of the
body, showing that symptoms are repeatedly portrayed as a source of insight into internal state of the body in
various genres of Greek literature. Padel similarly observes that external bodily conditions play an important role
in conceptualizations of the internal body in Greek literature. (Padel 1992: 67; Padel 1995: 30, 120). On the
importance of the symptom as a tool for understanding the interior of the body in classical literature, see also
Ferrini 1978: 60; Webster 2014: 30 (although Webster’s dating of Celsus to the 2nd century BCE is erroneous).
4
Padel 1992: 67
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Celsus’ Vocabulary of Concealment and Revelation
I begin with an overview of Celsus’s terminology pertaining to the concealment and
revelation of illness, and then in the following section I will compare this terminology with
language in Seneca. In this section, my comments will focus mainly upon the Proemium to
Book 1 of Celsus’ De Medicina, where Celsus provides his account of the history of medicine,
including an overview of the dominant medical schools of thought in his time, which scholars
generally refer to as rationalism (see esp. 1.Pr.13-26) and empiricism (see esp. 1.Pr.27-44).
Here, Celsus’ use of language underscores how the concepts of concealment and revelation
were central to each school’s attempts to understand the causes, diagnosis, and treatment of
illness. As Celsus explains, the rationalists, on the one hand, sought to gain insight into what
Celsus refers to as abditae causae (hidden causes, 1.Pr.14.1) in their approach to diagnosing
and treating illness.5 This approach sought to obtain insight into the body’s internal state
through indirect means, first by making inferences about internal conditions based upon
external signs of health or illness. This included, for instance, drawing conclusions about the
state and proportions of the four humors which were supposed to circulate through the body,
despite the fact that their operation within the body could not be observed directly (1.Pr.15.1).6

5

Abditas causas vocant, in quibus requiritur, ex quibus principiis nostra corpora sint, quid secundam, quid
adversam valetudinem faciat. (They call “hidden” the causes in which people inquire into the principles of which
bodies are composed—that is, what acts favorably and what acts adversely to health. 1.Pr. 14.1-3) The rationalists
inquired into such “hidden causes” because—in contrast with the empiricists—they “assert[ed] that no treatment
was possible unless the underlying causes of the disorder were known.” (Rey 1995: 26)
6
Due to its belief that knowledge can be gained independently of sensory experience, the rationalist school is
sometimes referred to as the “dogmatic school” in scholarly discourse on the history of medicine and science. See
Barnes, Brunschwig, Burnyeat, Schofield 1982: 2.
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The rationalist emphasis on interpreting “hidden” causes of illness through processes of
deduction and intuition has roots in Hippocratic works such as On the Tekhnē7:
ὅσα γὰρ τὴν τῶν ὀμμάτων ὄψιν ἐκφεύγει, ταῦτα τῇ τῆς γνώμης ὄψει
κεκράτηται· (11.7-8) … Ὅταν δὲ ταῦτα μὴ8 μηνύωνται, μηδ’ αὐτὴ ἡ
φύσις ἑκοῦσα ἀφίῃ, ἀνάγκας εὕρηκεν, ᾗσιν ἡ φύσις ἀζήμιος βιασθεῖσα
μεθίησιν· ἀνεθεῖσα δὲ δηλοῖ τοῖσι τὰ τῆς τέχνης εἰδόσιν, ἃ ποιητέα.
Whatever escapes the vision of the eyes is grasped by the vision of the mind. (…)
When these signs9 are not revealed, and when nature does not willingly send
them forth, medicine has found ways to set them loose without harm; having
released them, it makes clear to experts10 what must be done. (12.9-11)
This passage reflects the rationalist idea that it is possible to gain insight into hidden aspects of
the body through the application of mental reasoning (γνώμης ὄψει); when this fails, insight
can be gained by finding a way to release (μεθίησιν; ἀνεθεῖσα) 11 internal signs so that they
can be observed more directly. The wording in the passage underscores the body’s propensity
for concealment (τῶν ὀμμάτων ὄψιν ἐκφεύγει; μὴ μηνύωνται), which can inhibit
7

This text is often referred to as De Arte or The Art, but these titles are misleading because the text seeks to show
that medicine is “an exact science, not an undefinable art.” (Lloyd 1983: 139) Recognizing the polysemy of τέχνη
(art, science, craft, trade, skill)—and also of the Latin ars and English “art”, for that matter—I have simply
transliterated the word here.
8
In Littre’s text, which is followed by most commentators, μὴ is placed in square brackets to indicate that the
negation of μηνύωνται can be assumed, based upon the use of the negative conjunction μηδ’ in the following
phrase.
9
“Signs” does not translate any specific word in the above section of Greek, but picks up on a previous sentence’s
reference to σημεῖα ταῦτα (these signs, 12.8). This phrase refers back to a list, given earlier in this section, of
various aspects of the human body which are not visible but which can be observed by means of the other senses.
These include the quality of the voice, respiratory rate, and the smell and color of fluids flowing from the orifices of
the body (12.4-8). These are all listed as ways to gain insight during the process of diagnosis when the causes of
disease lurk deep inside the recesses of the body. “Signs” also follows the translation of Chadwick and Mann in
Lloyd 1983: 146-147. For other discussions of the conceptualization of “signs” in Hippocratic writings, see Padel
1992: 52, 55, 88-98 and Padel 1995: 43.
10
Lit. “it makes clear to those who know the tekhnē”
11
My translation of these terms is meant to reflect their similar semantics and their shared root - ἵημι (to set
loose, let go). One distinction between the two terms that is noteworthy for the present discussion is that ἀνίημι,
(unlike its cousin μεθίημι) carries with it connotations of sending/releasing in an upward direction, which may be
seen as relevant to the idea of a “sign” or symptom emerging from a state of concealment beneath the surface of
the body.
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understanding until internal signs (visible or otherwise observable) are outwardly exposed.
With such understanding, according to the passage, understanding and treatment become
clear. We have seen that Celsus speaks of abditae causae (1.Pr.14.1), considering them
problematic for detecting illness; similarly, the author of this treatise declares that the very
nature of the human body hinders—but does not totally prevent—recognition and diagnosis of
illness.12
The empiricists, on the other hand, were not disposed to using deduction or making
conjecture about internal states of the body based upon observations of external signs and
conditions. Instead, the empiricists concentrated their attention upon evidentes [causae]
(1.Pr.18.1)13—“obvious causes”, which encompass directly observable symptoms, such as
calor…an frigus, fames an satietas, et quae similia sunt (heat…or cold, hunger or satiety, and
the like, 1.Pr.8.2-3).14 The empiricists thus found it impossible to treat states of illness that
originate in interioribus partibus (in the internal parts, 1.Pr.23.1), and that it was futile
(supervacuus) to try to expose the body’s internal signs, since they ultimately believed that
“nature cannot be comprehended” (non comprehensibilis naturalis sit, 1.Pr.27.5). The
empiricists, then, prioritized the knowledge acquired through medical practice and experience
(1.Pr.31), rather than abstract reasoning about uncertain causes and attempts to expose hidden

12

Von Staden also discusses the notion that On the Tekhnē portrays nature as having “a tendency to conceal”, and
he also points out that this idea is evident in Celsus’ representation of the human body. (von Staden 2007: 366367; cf. On the Tekhnē 12.3)
13
According to Mudry (1982: 87), the Latin phrase evidentes causae is closed modeled upon the Greek phrase
πρόδηλοι ἀιτίαι.
14
Gourevitch nicely summarizes this in her discussion of Celsus’ Proemium, explaining that obvious causes are
“perceived directly by the senses”. This is in contrast with hidden causes, which “lie in the state of the body’s
component elements, [and] are accessible only to the mind” (Gourevitch 1998: 108). This description of hidden
causes recalls the phrase ταῦτα τῇ τῆς γνώμης ὄψει κεκράτηται in the Hippocratic text On the Tekhnē (11).
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signs from the interior of the body. The rationalists, on the other hand, believed that
investigating the interior of the body could provide insights about otherwise hidden signs of
health and illness, thus furnishing a better understanding of natura. To pursue this idea
further, I will discuss Celsus’ remarks on human dissection, providing some historical
background information about the place of dissection in the Greek and Roman medical
traditions, and then some observations concerning the language Celsus uses to describe these
practices.
In his discussion of the rationalists’ perspective, Celsus describes experiments which the
Greek physicians Herophilus and Erisistratus performed upon condemned criminals while those
criminals were still living (ex carcere acceptos vivos inciderint, 1.Pr.24.1). These experiments
were allegedly conducted in Hellenistic Alexandria in the early third century BCE, but Celsus is
the earliest Greek or Latin source to mention them. Such experiments constitute acts of
vivisection, or cutting into a living body, resulting in exposure of the body’s internal structures;
by contrast, the better-known term “dissection” generally refers to the act of cutting into a
body which is not alive. While the veracity of Celsus’ remarks about vivisection is ultimately
impossible to confirm15, scholars have observed that these remarks are astonishing in light of
Greek and Roman restrictions and inhibitions toward opening up the human body. As Heinrich
von Staden notes, barriers to human dissection—let alone vivisection—existed for a variety of
reasons, including “religious, moral, and aesthetic considerations, as well as the sheer tenacity

15

As Vallance notes, the veracity of Celsus’ reports of vivisection have been “fiercely disputed in modern times”,
although “the balance of modern opinion…seems to be in favor of accepting” these reports as true. (Vallance 2004:
763, 772)
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of taboos”16, not to mention the Hippocratic Oath’s famous prohibition on “cutting”. For most
of Greek and Roman antiquity—both before and after the vivisections supposedly performed
by Herophilus and Erisistratus—the interior of the human body would remain largely
inaccessible and inadequately understood, and this would remain very much the case until the
Renaissance.17 One can find descriptions of certain surgical procedures in Books 7 and 8 of
Celsus’ De Medicina18, as well as in some of the later treatises from the Hippocratic Corpus, but
these descriptions suggest that cutting into the human body was generally limited to “relatively
superficial surgical incisions and excisions”19—a far cry from systematic investigation into the
internal organs and structures of the human body. According to Lang, the apparently shortlived practices of dissection and vivisection in third century Alexandria may have been enabled
by “the power of [the Ptolemaic] rulers to transgress social norms…[in a society] in which
political power was ultimately individual, arbitrary, and hierarchical.”20

16

von Staden 1989:141; see also von Staden 1992: 225-231.
For an overview of the history of dissection and vivisection in Greek and Roman antiquity, and discussion
concerning why these practices were so infrequently performed, see Lloyd 1975: 113-147 (esp. 131-134) and von
Staden 1992: 223-241.
18
In Book 4, Celsus also provides a detailed description of the internal anatomy of the human body (4.1.1.14.1.13.5), but he does not indicate where this information is derived from (whether from surgical procedures,
dissection/vivisection, inference, comparative anatomy, earlier texts, or other methods). Craik has argued that this
passage may have been influenced by the Hippocratic treatise “On Anatomy”, which in turn seems to have been
based at least in part upon observations of animal bodies. Whatever the case, Celsus does not connect this
description of the human body to the treatment of illness, and despite the revelatory nature of the passage, it
features very few pieces of vocabulary associated with revelation.
19
von Staden 1992: 225. Prohibitions on cutting into the human body were also a well-known aspect of the
Hippocratic Oath (οὐ τεμέω δὲ οὐδὲ μὴν λιθιῶντα), although other Hippocratic texts, and Books 7 and 8 of
Celsus, suggest that this prohibition was far from universally heeded by physicians during Greek and Roman
antiquity.
20
Lang 2013: 256. Von Staden echoes this view, while also attributing the brief rise of dissection and vivisection to
a unique confluence of various other possible factors, including the open intellectual and cultural atmosphere of
third century Alexandria, the influence of Aristotelian philosophical views concerning the ontology of dead bodies,
and the influence of native Egyptian customs pertaining to the treatment of the dead. (von Staden 1992: 231-234)
Mattern encapsulates many of these possible factors in suggesting that Alexandria’s ”atmosphere of
frontiersmanship” contributed to the rise of these practices. (Mattern 2013: 72)
17
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The remarks of Aristotle in his zoological encyclopedia Historia Animalium reflect the fact
that opportunities to examine the interior of the human body were quite limited in Greek and
Roman antiquity, thus calling for alternative heuristic methods21:
Ἄγνωστα γάρ ἐστι μάλιστα τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὥστε δεῖ πρὸς τὰ τῶν ἄλλων μόρια
ζῴων ἀνάγοντας σκοπεῖν, οἷς ἔχει παραπλησίαν τὴν φύσιν.
The [inner parts22] of human beings are especially unknown; in consequence, it is necessary to
make examination in reference to the parts of other animals whose nature is very similar.
(1.16.494b21-4)
Experimental dissections of animals could have provided familiarity with the internal parts of
animals for those engaged in science or medicine, and ritualized animal sacrifice would have
provided such familiarity to many other types of people.23 The interior of an animal body,
however, of course does not offer a perfect analogue for understanding the internal workings
of the human body. Aristotle suggests as much in stating that there are some animal species
with bodies that are “very similar” (παραπλησίαν) to the human body, while not saying that
they are “the same”. In the century after Celsus, the physician Galen would famously revive the
practices of animal dissection and vivisection, while forgoing performance of these procedures
on human beings.24 Celsus’ comments on dissection and vivisection, then, represent a highly
unique opportunity to gain insight into understandings of the interior of the human body in
Greek and Roman antiquity. This much is intimated by Celsus himself, as he states that the
21

Nutton also discusses Aristotle’s attempts to derive knowledge about the human body through the dissection of
animals. (Nutton 2013: 121)
22
In the previous sentence, Aristotle makes reference to these unknown, inner parts (τὰ δ’ ἐντὸς τοὐναντίον),
contrasting them with the parts of the body which are externally visible and thus familiar (1.16.494b17-20).
23
See Grmek 1991: 56. Craik also notes that certain ideas about the interior of human body were derived from
investigations of animal bodies. She argues, for instance, that the Hippocratic treatise “On Anatomy”, which
describes the internal structure of the human torso, was highly influenced by “extensive observation of animals”.
(Craik 1998: 135, see also 160)
24
von Staden 1992: 223. See also Mattern 2013:75; 150-155.

134

experiments of Herophilus and Erisistratus allowed for the observation of quae natura ante
clausisset (what nature had previously concealed, 1.Pr.24.2); this phrasing suggests that these
experiments defy and subvert nature in unprecedented ways, thus bringing the structure of the
human body into sharper focus. Summarizing the rationalists’ views on these practices, Celsus
goes on to provide a thorough list of various physical qualities and aspects of the internal
organs that would be revealed when a living body is laid open:
…eorumque positum, colorem, figuram, magnitudinem, ordinem, duritiem, mollitiem, levorem,
contactum, processus deinde singulorum et recessus, et sive quid inseritur alteri, sive quid
partem alterius in se recipit…
…their position, color, shape, size, arrangement, hardness, softness, smoothness, how they are
connected, the extensions and retractions of each, and whether something is inserted into
something else or else receives into itself a part of something else. (1.Pr.24.3-6)
The storehouse of information contained in this list demonstrates the vast amount of
knowledge thought to be concealed (clausisset)25 by natura, and, in turn, the vast amount of
knowledge which the rationalists thought vivisection could reveal. Later in the first century CE,
Pliny the Elder hinted at the medical knowledge that could be gained through dissection in
stating that Herophilus was the first one who delved into the causes of illness, presumably
because he engaged in this practice.26

25

As Marioni notes, the verb claudere has a specialized usage in medical contexts, where it is often highlights the
potential of the uterus (the abdomen or belly) to conceal. (Marioni 1995: 16 n. 59) In later patristic authors such as
Vindician and Tertullian, the idea that the inner-workings of the human body were concealed by “nature” came to
be replaced by the idea that the interior of the human body had been concealed by God. With that idea, there is
an implication that exposing the insides of the body through the process of dissection is a violation not only of
nature, but also of God’s designs (cf. von Staden 1989: 143). Tertullian, for one, questioned the knowledge that
could be gained through such inquiry, suggesting that Herophilus should be considered more a “butcher” (lanius)
than a “doctor” (medicus; see De Anima 10.4).
26
….causas morborum scrutari prius Herophilus instituerat… (Naturalis Historia 26.14.4)
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Celsus goes on to explain the rationalists’ view that, contrary to popular opinion at the time,
the dissection of criminals is not a cruel practice because of its potential to furnish the
discovery of remedies for innocent people of future ages.27 Near the end of his Proemium
Celsus states that he himself is opposed to the practice of vivisection, not only on the grounds
that is a cruel (crudele) practice, but also because he finds it supervacuum (futile). This is
because he believes that a dead body displays the interior of the human body better than a
living body does (1.Pr.74.1–75.4).28
Rather than taking sides between the rationalists and empiricists, Celsus generally treads a
fine line in describing each school of thought, offering critiques of both schools and using
language marked by a tone of neutrality.29 It is thus no surprise that Celsus’ descriptions of
illnesses throughout De Medicina display concerns for both “hidden” and “obvious” causes and
origins of illness. Celsus makes his moderate perspective explicit when he declares that
27

Neque esse crudele, sicut plerique proponent, hominum nocentium et horum quoque paucorum suppliciis
remedia populis innocentibus saeculorum omnium quaeri. (Nor is it, as most say, cruel that in the punishment of
guilty men, and but a few of them, remedies are sought for the innocent men of all ages. 1.Pr.26.6-8) Scarborough
has argued that Celsus must be referring to vivisection here, while not actually endorsing the practice, as he is
reporting the rationalists’ view. (Scarborough 1976: 27-28; on Celsus’ views concerning vivisection, see also
Meißner 1999: 204) But it is worth noting that Celsus does not explicitly identify the exact nature of the treatment
of the “guilty men” (i.e. dissection or vivisection), as suppliciis can be used to refer to punishment rather generally,
as well as specific forms of punishment including torture and execution. Moreover, this reference to punishment
does not actually specify any cutting into the body, although Celsus’ preceding remarks strongly suggest that here
he is referring to a form of medical inquiry that involves cutting. Spencer translates hominum
nocentium…suppliciis as “the execution of criminals” (Spencer 1935: 15), which still does clarify whether the
criminals’ bodies are cut into after they have been executed, or whether they are vivisected during the process of
execution. Celsus does refer to the vivisections performed by Herophilus and Erisistratus (1.P.23.4-24.1) a little
earlier in this part of the Proemium, but there remains some ambiguity whether he is still talking about vivisection
in 1.Pr.26.6-8.
28
This critique differs from the typical empiricist objection to dissection. The empiricists believed that a dead body
was qualitatively different from a living body, and thus unable to provide insight into how illness would affect the
bodies of the living. (see 1.Pr.42.1-11; see also Lang 2013: 256; Mudry 1982: 203)
29
Conte 1994: 388. For further discussion of Celsus’ neutrality, as evident in his use of impersonal verbal phrases
and in his critiques of both schools of thought, see von Staden 1994b: 79; von Staden 1999: 281-283; Flemming
2001: 130-131; Allbutt 1921: 209, 211. Some scholars have attempted to identify Celsus with methodism or
Pyrrhonian skepticism, but connecting Celsus with a specific medical or philosophical school remains elusive. (see
Mudry 1994; Hornblower, Spawforth, and Eidinow 2012)
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practitioners of medicine should concentrate upon evidentes causae, while maintaining that it
is still possible to learn from obscurae [causae].30 In taking this stance, Celsus adopts a model
that associates hidden causes of illness with concealment within the body, while associating
“obvious causes” with that which can be observed externally. What is less consistent, however,
is the terminology that Celsus uses to speak of “hidden” and “obvious” causes. Just a few
paragraphs after speaking of abditae causae (1.Pr.14), Celsus refers to the same phenomenon
by the periphrasis in obscuro positas causas (causes located in obscurity, 1.Pr.17). Moreover,
the above remarks concerning the role of rationalism and empiricism in medicine (obscurae
[causae], 1.Pr.74) represent a variation upon the periphrasis used earlier (1.Pr.1731), where the
causes themselves are said to be obscure.32 Another variation in terminology comes when
Celsus is commenting on the lack of concern that certain physicians have for the causes of an
illness, whether obvious or hidden, in preference for their concerns about the treatment of the
illness. Here, Celsus refers to inquiry into the “hidden” causes as latentium rerum coniecturas
(conjectures into the hidden causes, 1.Pr.38.4); similar language is used elsewhere in both the

30

Igitur…rationale quidem puto medicinam esse debere, instrui vero ab evidentibus causis, obscuris omnibus non
ab cogitatione artificis sed ab ipsa arte reiectis. (Therefore…I think that medicine ought to be rational, but to be
built upon obvious causes, with all the obscure [causes] being rejected from the [practice of] the art itself, but not
from the consideration of the practitioner, 1.Pr.74.1-4)
31
Celsus also uses this noun-adjective combination at 1.Pr.27.3 (obscurarum…causarum).
32
Earlier in the Proemium, there are also the phrases obscuris causis (1.Pr.32.6) and obscuras causas (1.Pr.48.1-2).
Following the latter example, Celsus elaborates upon instances in which causes may be “obscure”, stating that
such instances lay beyond both the art of conjecture (coniectura, 1.Pr.48.5) and experience (experientia, 1.Pr.48.6),
as illnesses may not follow their expected course in such situations. Celsus also mentions that in rare situations,
one may be faced with a morbus…novus (new illness, Pr.49.1)—a situation in which the causes of illness often defy
explanation (as I discuss in Chapter 2). Celsus then goes on to mention, as a specific example of this phenomenon,
a case in which a woman suffered from prolapsed, gangrenous genitals and died after only a few hours. In this
situation, Celsus observes that doctors of the highest standing were able to discover neither the genus mali neque
remedium (type of illness nor the remedy. 1Pr.49.1-50.1).
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Proemium and other sections of De Medicina.33 The verb latere is one of the primary terms
that Celsus uses in reference to “hidden” causes of illness, but it is not strongly differentiated in
usage from other words Celsus uses in reference to “hidden” causes. In fact, during one
specific passage in the Proemium, Celsus essentially equates the phrase rebus latentibus with
the adjectives dubiae and incertae by placing each of these words in opposition with
evidentibus causis.34 Along with abdita and obscura, these are words that Celsus frequently
uses in reference to situations in which the cause(s) of an illness is thought to be concealed.35
It is also important to note that Celsus uses the phrase causa incognita (an unknown cause,
4.2.7.7-8), in reference to treating an illness whose cause cannot be discerned. The specific
illness that Celsus is discussing in this section is a headache accompanied by fever (…auxilia sunt
capitis, ubi cum febre dolor, 4.2.4.9-10); the possible causes of the condition are said to be calor
(4.2.6.4) and frigus (4.2.7.1).36 The use of causa incognita in this case, rather than causa abdita
or causa obscura, is consistent with the idea that, even if the exact cause of illness is not
known, there are still some suspected causes (calor or frigus). It is also noteworthy that
treatment (auxilia) is still considered possible, despite the fact that the cause is unknown. I
would argue, then, that Celsus uses the phrase causa incognita to refer to a cause of illness

33

See 1.Pr.52.2 (rebus latentibus); 1.Pr.57.6 (rerum latentium); 2.7.23.1-2 (latentium vel futurum reum); 6.6.8.c.8
(intus latentia acria); 8.4.15.2 (nihil latens in eo osse; note that the text is corrupt here).
34
1.Pr.52.2. Celsus also refers to hidden causes by using the adjectives incertus and dubius in close context earlier
in the Proemium (1.Pr.31.3).
35
This is of course not the default terminology for all Latin authors. In Cicero’s Academica, the term incerta (given
as a translation of the Greek ἄδηλα) is used to describe such conditions (2.54). The fifth century writer Caelius
Aurelianus renders the Greek ἄδηλοι ἀιτίαι as occultae causae (De Morbis Acutis et Chronicis). See also Mudry
1982: 86.
36
In antiquity a “fever” (often expressed by the Latin term febris, or its Greek counterpart πυρετός) was generally
thought to be a disease itself, unlike how fever is regarded as a symptom of illness in modern medicine. (see
Nutton 2013: 32)
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which may be unknown, but which is not necessarily unknowable, as contrasted with causes so
“hidden” as to be unknowable, which are described as abdita causa or obscura causa.
One can also find that Celsus uses various expressions to express that the causes of illness
are known. Celsus alternately refers to known causes with the adjectives evidens37 and
manifesta38; both of these words suggest perception by the senses—evidens through its
connection to the verb videre (to see) and manifesta through its etymological connection to
manus (the hand).39 While different in their etymologies, these words are not strongly
differentiated in Celsus’ usage, as they are both used to emphasize perceptibility. It is worth
mentioning, however, that in each of the two instances where the phrase manifesta causa40
appears in Celsus’ work, this phrase is preceded by the word sine, indicating that there is not
any observable cause present, which, in effect, seems conceptually equivalent to the phrases
abdita causa or obscura causa.
In circumstances where the causes of illness are known, Celsus also uses the verb apparere.
This verb appears when Celsus is discussing the empiricists’ ideas concerning the relationship
between the observation of causes and the treatment of illness41:

37

For example, in the aforementioned sections of the Proemium (1.Pr.18.1; 74.3). Von Staden observes that the
terms evidens and manifestus—along with experimentum (experience) and usus (practice) embody concepts
central to empiricist thought. (1999: 283)
38
…nam si longae febres sine dolore, sine manifesta remanent (2.7.29.2); quidam sine ulla manifesta causa
(6.6.37b.2).
39
The etymology of the verb manifestare can be explained as “to strike the hand” (manus + festus). (cf. Ernout and
Meillet 1951: s.v. manifestare; Glare 2012: s.v. manifestus). Senis notes the etymology of the adjective manifestus
(“a portata di mano”; see Senis 1987: 346), citing a passage from Isidore’s Origines: manifestum dicitur quod in
manu est promptu. (10.183) Here Isidore’s use of promptus, translatable as “visible” or “exposed to view”,
underscores the sense of perceptibility intrinsic to the word manifestus.
40
2.7.29.2; 6.6.37b.2.
41
The sentences are in indirect statement because they continue a report of the empiricists’ views, which Celsus
begins at 1.Pr.27.
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Saepe etiam causas apparere, ut puta lippitudinis, vulneris, neque ex his patere
medicinam. Quod si scientiam hanc non subiciat evidens causa, multo minus
eam posse subicere, quae in dubio est.
Often, too, the causes are apparent, as, for example, [the causes] of
inflammation of the eyes, or [the causes] of wounds, and even so the cure is not
revealed by these causes. For if the obvious cause does not supply this
knowledge, much less can a cause which is in doubt supply it. (1.Pr.30.6-7)
Here, both apparere and evidens are used in reference to situations in which the causes of
illness are plainly known. These words are used without much differentiation in sense, both
emphasizing visual perceptibility. Also noteworthy is that Celsus’ assertion that even in
situations where the causes of illness do reveal themselves, treatment can still be elusive. This
idea is expressed using the verb patere, which can be translated “to be open”, “to be
accessible”, “to be obvious”, etc.42 Here, this verb is negated, and rather than being used in
reference to the inaccessibility of the body itself, it is used to convey that treatment (medicina)
is not always obvious even when causes of illness are apparent. Celsus’ summary of the
empiricist view then goes on to observe that if this is the case with obvious causes, there is little
hope to be able to treat causes which are in dubio—a phrase contrasted with evidens causa
similarly to the way in which abdita causa and obscura causa are contrasted elsewhere with
evidens causa.
To return to Celsus’ usage of apparere, this word also occurs in contexts where it is negated,
making reference to unknown causes of illness. One example comes when Celsus is discussing
the symptoms of various illness in Book 2, and comments on women who suffer from inguinal
swelling:
42

Glare 2012: s.v. patere. As Monami notes, patere has a wide semantic range which includes “‘essere accessibile’,
‘estendersi’, ‘essere manifesto’—to be accessible, to extend, and to be manifest.” (Monami 1987: 1012)
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Si mulieri inguen et febricula orta est, neque causa apparet, ulcus in vulva est.
If, in the case of a woman, a swelling in the groin has arisen with a slight fever,
and there is no apparent cause, there is ulceration in the womb. (2.7.10.5-11.1)
The phrase neque causa apparet represents yet another way Celsus has to describe conditions
of illness in which the cause is not visible. In this case, the source of illness—ulcus, or
ulceration—is not readily apparent because it is concealed within the vulva, or womb, a part of
the body particularly opaque to Greek and Latin writers on medicine.43 In her analysis of
descriptions of the body in the Hippocratic treatise On the Tekhnē, Brooke Holmes notes that
the “mysterious inner space of the female body…[was believed to be especially] capable of
concealing and nourishing disease…”44 Thus, Celsus’ assertion that there is no apparent cause
for the ulceration in the womb is in keeping with a larger tendency seen in Greek and Latin
writings on medicine, which frequently present the female body as difficult to understand and
inclined to conceal disease. It is striking, then, that in this case the illness is ultimately
diagnosed (ulcus in vulva est) despite the lack of an apparent cause, and this diagnosis is only

43

The Latin term vulva generally refers to the womb (of humans or animals), and should not be confused with the
English word “vulva”, which of course traces its origins back to this word, but refers to external parts of the female
genitalia. As Adams acknowledges, by the early Empire vulva was also being used to refer to other internal parts of
the female genitalia, including what English calls the vagina. (Adams 1982: 103) A sense of concealment is
apparent in the etymology of the Latin word vulva or volva (literally a “wrapper” or “covering”); this word is
related to the verb volvere (“to wrap”) and cognate with the Greek “ἐλύειν (“to roll” or “to wrap”). Von Staden
points out that vulva “has its origin in ordinary language…but it is not an obscenity and…is freely welcomed into
literary Latin by Celsus…[unlike] obscenities such as cunnus”—an “obscenity” which Celsus entirely eschews. Not
all writers of medical prose avoid using this word, as von Staden notes, citing the example of Mustio, an author of
a gynecological treatise dating to circa 500 CE. (von Staden 1991: 290) In post-Republican era literature, the Latin
word uterus, it should be noted, typically refers not to the “womb”, but to the abdomen or belly (see Adams 1982:
100; von Staden 1991: 281), unlike the English word “uterus”, which corresponds more directly to the Latin
“vulva”. Regarding the use of uterus in Seneca’s tragedies and works by other authors, see Marioni 1995: 16 n. 58
and André 1991: 138. Yet another Latin word used to refer to the “womb” is matrix; this term does not carry
connotations of “concealing” or “wrapping”, and it is not used by either Celsus or Seneca.
44
Holmes 2010: 122 ; see also 185. Celsus directly acknowledges a qualitative difference between the bodies of
men and women, stating that sexus must be taken into account when diagnosing and treating illness (1.3.1.3) See
also Padel 1995: 61; von Staden 1991: 271.
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possible because of the outward signs (inguen et febricula) that emerge from the body.
Without these symptoms coming to light, the ulcus would continue to lurk in a hidden state and
diagnosis would be elusive.
These examples thus far examined have demonstrated conditions in which we have the
causa of illness has been said either to be concealed (abdita, obscura, neque…apparet, etc.) or
revealed (manifesta, evidens, etc.), not the illness itself. Celsus also describes conditions said to
have no cause. In one such instance, Celsus refers to a form of madness in which a person may
experience laughter, or have feelings of sadness or dejection “without a cause”: Interest etiam,
ipse sine causa subinde rideat, an maestus demissusque sit… (It also matters whether [the
patient] repeatedly laughs without cause, or if he is sorrowful and dejected…, 3.18.22.3-4) The
expression sine causa is also used when Celsus describes the fearful prognosis of a condition in
which a person starts to grow thin “without a cause”.45 Celsus also uses this terminology when
describing head pain which spreads to the shoulders sine causa46, fevers that occur sine
manifesta causa47, and the sudden onset of blindness sine ulla manifesta causa.48 As with
Celsus’ descriptions of hidden and obvious causes, one finds slight variations in terminology or
phraseology in cases where there is said to be “no cause” responsible for a condition of illness.
It is possible that Celsus’ phrase sine causa functions as a shorthand expression for sine
manifesta causa (although Celsus does not make this explicit). In some instances, Celsus’ use of
45

Si sine causa quis emacrescit, ne in malum habitum corpus eius recidat, metus est. (2.7.2.4-5)
Si sine causa longus dolor capitis est, et in cervices ac scapulas transit, rursusque in caput revertitur, aut a capite
ad cervices scapulasque pervenit, perniciosus est… (2.8.36.1)
47
Suppuratio vero pluribus morbis excitatur: nam si longae febres sine dolore, sine manifesta causa remanent…
(2.7.29.2) Note that in this example, the fevers occur not only without no apparent cause, but also without pain
(sine dolore).
48
Quidam in posteriore vitio calidis aquis usi relevatique: quidam sine ulla manifesta causa subito obcaecati sunt.
(6.6.37b.2)
46
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the qualifier manifesta (negated by sine) raises questions about exactly what Celsus means
when describing an illness as being sine causa. Does he mean that certain conditions actually
occur without there being any cause? Or, is suggesting that certain conditions occur without
any discernable cause? Under the latter interpretation, the phrases sine causa, sine manifesta
causa, and sine ulla manifesta causa would serve as yet another way in which Celsus refers to
“hidden” causes. This would be in keeping with the dichotomous framework of “hidden” and
“apparent” causes that Celsus sets forth in the Proemium to his work. At no point in his
Proemium does Celsus mention a school of thought that believed in the possibility that an
illness could occur completely without a cause49, and while he himself does acknowledge cases
in which certain conditions occur sine causa, he does not specify that those conditions always
occur without a cause. Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that Celsus uses sine causa as an
alternate way to convey that there is a “hidden” cause. I would argue then, that while Celsus is
not always consistent with the terminology he uses for conditions occurring “without a cause” /
“without an apparent cause” and conditions resulting from “hidden causes”, all of these
phrases express the same basic idea, which is that the cause of a condition is unknown, and not
that the cause is non-existent. At the same time the examples cited above illustrate that when
Celsus uses the phrases sine causa, sine manifesta causa, and sine ulla manifesta causa, the
illness in question is often rather serious, with harsh symptoms and potentially fatal outcomes.

49

The closest Celsus comes to saying as much is when he discusses certain practitioners who, apparently following
the ideology of Themison (a first century BCE physician and the founder of the methodic school of medicine),
believe that knowledge of causation is not pertinent to treatment (…contendunt nullius causae notitiam quicquam
ad curationes pertinere, 1.Pr.54.6-7). But the idea that having knowledge of causation is not relevant to healing is
not tantamount to believing that illness might occur without a cause.
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Concealment and Revelation in Senecan Tragedy
Like many works of tragedy, Seneca’s plays are concerned with both internal and external
symptoms and causes of illness50, and thus the ways in which illness, and its causes, can be
concealed or revealed. As we will see, Seneca’s representations of the concealment and
revelation of illness use some of the same language as Celsus, but Seneca also uses words that
do not appear in Celsus, as well as metaphorical imagery. My observations in this section will
focus primarily on scenes from two Senecan tragedies, Thyestes and Phaedra, which are
particularly concerned with the concealment and revelation of illness.
Thyestes
I will begin by analyzing some scenes from Thyestes, a work that explores themes of
concealment in various ways, some of which are relevant to matters of illness. In this play
Atreus reunites with his estranged brother, Thyestes, and prepares a feast to be masqueraded
as an offering to solidify their fraternal reconciliation. In truth, this feast is intended to bring
great anguish to Thyestes, since Atreus surreptitiously conceals the blood and body parts of
Thyestes’ murdered sons in the meal, stating implebo patrem / funere suorum (I shall fill the
father with the death of his sons, 890-891). Thus the action itself climaxes with an especially
disturbing image of concealment: Thyestes' body, unbeknownst to him, contains within itself
the flesh of his own sons. Along with concealment, the theme of revelation, likewise anchored
50

Kosask has noted the emphasis on both internal and external factors in Euripidean tragedy, as well as in
Hippocratic writings on medicine. She observes that the Hippocratic writer may see “both external, physical forces
(e.g. air, water, geography) and internal forces (e.g. blood, bile, water, phlegm) as essential elements in causing
disease, [and that] tragedy too considers the relative weight of external (e.g. divine, social) and internal (e.g.
hereditary) factors in stories it represents.” (Kosak 2004: 1-2; see also 67) Commenting on Greek tragedy, Holmes
similarly observes that “the tragedians themselves were deeply interested in ‘internal’ as well as ‘external’
causes…” (Holmes 2010: 239) Neither Kosak nor Holmes discuss these themes in relation to Latin literature.
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in the body and just as disturbing, is important too. At the end of the fourth act of the play, the
messenger reports to the chorus how Atreus dismembered Thyestes’ sons, providing a
description that recalls the precise procedures of a medical dissection51:
Erepta vivis exta pectoribus tremunt
spirantque venae corque adhuc pavidum salit;
at ille fibras tractat ac fata inspicit
et adhuc calentes viscerum venas notat.
Postquam hostiae placuere, securus vacat
iam fratris epulis: ipse divisum secat
in membra corpus, amputat trunco tenus
umeros patentes52 et lacertorum moras,
denudat artus durus atque ossa amputat…
Torn from living chests, the organs are still trembling,
the sinews still breathing, and the hearts still leaping in terror.
But he handles the innards and investigates the fates,
and he observes the sinews of their innards, still hot.
After he is satisfied with the sacrificial victims, he relaxes, free from care,
ready for his brother’s feast: he himself cuts the body, divided up, into parts,
he cuts back all the way up to the trunk
the exposed shoulders and the upper arms that delay him,
pitiless, he lays bare the joints and cuts up the bones… (755-763)
Various scholars, including Mattern, have observed that it is rare, outside of Celsus’ comments,
to find references to human dissection—let alone vivisection—in Greek and Latin literature53,
but this conclusion seems to be heavily based upon the medical prose of authors like
Hippocrates, Aristotle, and Galen, seemingly overlooking depictions of dissection and

51

Most also notes this passage’s high degree of anatomical detail, which he associates “more with cookbooks than
with tragedies.” (Most 1992: 395) A close relationship between medicine and cooking is evident in works such as
the Hippocratic treatise On Ancient Medicine, which suggests that the beginnings of medicine were rooted in
observation of how people reacted to the consumption of different foods. According to the author of this treatise,
these beginnings help explain why dietetics came to play such a prominent role in Greek and Roman medicine. (On
Ancient Medicine 3-4, 6; see Nutton 2013: 96-97)
52
Here, my quotation of the Latin (patentes) departs from the Oxford Classical text (patentis), following the textual
editions of Fitch and Tarrant. (see Fitch 2004a: 294; Tarrant 1985: 74, 199)
53
Mattern 2013: 72.
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vivisection in other literary genres. Although vivisection is often associated with anatomical
study and medical experimentation, and Atreus’ acts are not specifically dedicated to those
purposes, in the above passage we nevertheless see bodies which are opened up, having their
internal features exposed and described in “medicalized” language. The messenger notes how
the functioning of various organs (exta, venae, corque) can be observed (some of them
apparently still functioning as if inside a fully living body), and these organs are the subject of
verbs (tremunt, spirantque, salit, respectively; 755-756) which reinforce the sense of continued
animation. The use of these verbs, all of which strongly suggest lively human activity
(trembling, breathing, leaping), endows the organs with an element of personification,
ironically while the children themselves are being deprived of life. Indeed, it is not the children
who are said to be still living, but their chests (vivis…pectoribus, 755), and the vivacity of the
organs becomes evident only through the children’s brutal deaths. This gruesome ambiguity,
along with the ambiguity concerning the precise moment of the children’s deaths, evoke a
macabre scene of vivisection, thus casting Atreus in the role of a rogue physician. In keeping
with Celsus’ views on vivisection, this passage portrays the cutting up of living bodies (or at
least parts of the body that are still “alive”) as pitilessly cruel and sadistic.54

54

The elder Seneca also emphasizes the sadistic nature of vivisection in a passage from the Controversiae which
relates how an Athenian painter, Parrhasias, vivisected a slave in order to make a realistic painting of Prometheus
as the eagle ate his liver. Throughout this passage (10.15), allegations and language of torture (torquere,
tormentum) abound. In response to these allegations of torture, Parrhasias offers the argument that certain
license has always been granted to the arts, and he singles out the art of medicine in particular, observing that
doctors have been allowed to open up the body in order to investigate illness: quantum semper artibus licuisset:
medicos, ut vim ignotam morbi cognoscerent, viscera rescidisse; hodie cadaverum artus rescindi ut nervorum
articulorumque positio cognosci possit. (Controversiae 10.5.17) While the passage overwhelmingly portrays
Parrhasias’ actions as a form of torture, the defense which Parrhasias offers in his own defense resembles the
rationalist justifications for vivisection described in Celsus’ Proemium (26.6-8). Samellas and Squire also note the
element of torture in this passage (Samellas 2010: 27 n. 15; Squire 2011: 64).
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The liveliness of the children’s bodies is also emphasized by other elements in the passage.
In his commentary on Thyestes, R.J. Tarrant observes that Atreus behaves like a Roman priest
conducting an extispicium on the bodies of victims, and he points out that “only the organs of
freshly killed victims were thought suitable”55 for this practice of divination. The phrases fata
inspicit (he investigates, 757)56 and notat (he observes, 758) also serve to characterize Thyestes
as priest examining the organs of a sacrificial victim, and the fact that the internal vessels are
still warm (calentes…venas, 758) further suggests that the bodies as still suitable for a perverted
form of extispicium. It is important to note that Atreus is preparing the bodies for a feast; as
ghastly as this feast may be, these preparations further cast Atreus in the role of a Roman
priest, since in Roman culture “all sacrifices, except those addressed to the divinities of the
underworld, were followed by a sacrificial banquet.”57 Furthermore, the use of the noun exta
(755) in reference to the children’s organs adds further support to reading this passage as a
scene of extispicium. In Seneca’s Oedipus, for example, exta is used in reference to the organs
of a bull which are examined during a scene depicting a more clear-cut example of extispicium
(354; 372).58 If we accept the etymology of exta posited by Ernout and Meillet (ex-secta—i.e.
“cut out”59), we find that the use of this word heightens the sense that the internal body is
being exposed through the act of cutting into the body.
The messenger’s use of the phrase umeros patentes (762) raises some translation issues
that are important to the theme of concealment and revelation. I choose to translate patentes
55

Tarrant 1985: 198; see also Pratt 1983: 105.
The verb inspicit (757)—with its roots in + spicere (literally to look into)— also reinforces the sense that the
internal body becomes observable in this scene.
57
Scheid 2004: 630.
58
I return to discuss this scene in more depth later in this chapter.
59
Ernout and Meillet 1951: s.v. exta.
56
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as “exposed”, noting that the passage places emphasis upon Atreus’ revealing the internal
features of the children, and that the verb denudare (to lay bare, to uncover) is used in the
following line. In his commentary on this line, Tarrant acknowledges that the word patens can
have the sense of “bare” or “exposed”, but he also states that “this sense seems out of place
here.”60, Tarrant instead chooses to translate umeros patentes as “spreading shoulders”, taking
patens in a sense that is, for example, more closely aligned with Celsus’ use of patere in
5.28.9.4-5. Admittedly, this translation makes good sense, but in the context of Atreus’
dismemberment of Thyestes’ sons we can also recognize the word’s connotations of revelation.
In other words, I am arguing for sensitivity to the polysemy of the word patens, particularly in
connection with the imagery of concealment of revelation, while acknowledging that an English
translation probably needs to narrow it down to a single word which will not reflect the Latin
word’s semantic range.
Tarrant, however, dismisses the polysemy of patens in this passage, somewhat surprisingly
in view of his comments on the phrase lacertorum moras (762)—literally, to borrow from
Tarrant’s translation, “the delays caused by the [upper arms].”61 This phrase, according to
Tarrant, refers to the sinews of the upper arm “slow[ing] down the process of
dismemberment.”62 Tarrant goes on to call this reference “brilliant in its clinical exactness”63, a
phrase which again calls to mind the process of a doctor revealing internal parts of the body
during a surgical procedure. Indeed, in this passage the lines between careful dissection and
60

Tarrant 1985: 199.
One detects a possible bilingual pun involving the word moras (delays), which resembles the Greek μέρη /
μόρια (parts), resonating with the references to membra and artus in the lines that come immediately before and
after.
62
Tarrant 1985: 199.
63
Tarrant 1985: 199.
61
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violent mutilation are blurred, very much through Seneca’s use of language. The repeated use
of the verb amputare (761, 763), which can be translated “to trim” or “to prune” (careful,
controlled actions), as well as “to mutilate” (a destructive action, often with impulsive
connotations), reinforces this ambiguity.64 It appears that Atreus is at first performing a
vivisection, and then a dissection of some of the body parts that have been cut off, but it is not
clear where the vivisection ends and the dissection begins. This in turn has some unsettling and
paradoxical implications pertaining to the continuity of personal identity. As Most asks in his
discussion of the themes of dismemberment and mutilation of the body in Neronian poetry
more generally, “at what point [does] the mutilation of the body lead to the loss of personal
identity of the body’s owner?”65 This question, which has no straightforward answer, is
particularly germane to the above passage, where body parts become increasingly animated
after being severed from the rest of the body. As we will see later in this chapter, Thyestes
contains other examples in which a discontinuity of personal identity occurs as a result of the
disturbance of the body’s normal mode of operation.
The language used in lines 755-757 strikingly echoes wording from another passage where
the lines of vivisection and dissection are blurred: Ovid’s description of the flaying of the satyr
Marsyas in the Metamorphoses.66 Tarrant recognizes similarities in the diction of these two
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Although the word amputare is used in this quasi-medical context, it does not appear in Celsus.
Most 1992: 406; see also 409-410. Most speculates that the recurrence of dismemberment scenes in Neronian
literature may reflect the contemporary popularity of spectacles in which participants were torn limb from limb by
animals. Sedley also discusses paradoxes of identity resulting from amputation and the place of such paradoxes in
Stoic philosophical thought. (see Sedley 1982: 267-270)
66
In turn, Marx has argued that Celsus borrows words, phrases, and other stylistic elements from Ovid. (Marx
1915: 466; see also Spencer 1935: vii) Serbat notes Marx’s observations in the introduction to his edition of De
Medicina, without explicitly stating his own views on the matter. (Serbat 1995: ix-x) Önnerfors, on the other hand,
strongly disputes the idea of any Ovidian influence on Celsus, arguing that the resonances cited by Marx are not
65
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passages, but he does not discuss their common theme of vivisection.67 Ovid’s mythological
narrative recounts how the god Apollo punishes the satyr Marsyas for challenging him to a
flute-playing contest by removing Marsyas’ skin68—thus exposing Marsyas’ internal organs—
while he is still alive:
Clamanti cutis est summos direpta per artus,
nec quicquam nisi vulnus erat; cruor undique manat
detectique patent nervi trepidaeque sine ulla
pelle micant venae; salientia viscera possis
et perlucentes numerare in pectore fibras.
The skin is snatched from the surface of the limbs as he cries out,
and he was nothing if not a wound; blood gushes everywhere,
the uncovered sinews lay exposed, and the trembling vessels quiver
without any skin; you can count out the jumping internal organs
and the tissues clearly visible in the chest. (Ovid, Metamorphoses 6.387-391)
Numerous pieces of vocabulary in the above passage resemble vocabulary used in the
messenger’s report of Atreus’ “dissections”.69 While Atreus is carving up the limbs and bodies
of Thyestes’ sons, Seneca is metapoetically cutting up—and reassembling—phrases (or
membra70) from Ovid’s poetry. Seneca’s apparent appropriation of language from Ovid’s

significant enough to be anything more than coincidence. (Önnerfors 1993: 238-239) A fuller discussion is beyond
the scope of this dissertation, but I hope to explore interconnections between language usage in Ovid, Seneca, and
Celsus more in depth in future studies.
67
Tarrant 1985: 199.
68
von Staden discusses various mythological narratives in which valorizations of human or animal skin either
reflect or reinforce the “taboo” element of dissection and vivisection in Greek culture. This discussion somwehat
surprisingly makes no mention of the Marsyas myth. (von Staden 1992: 227-230)
69
These similarities include patent (cf. patentes 762); trepidaeque (cf. tremunt, 755); venae (cf. venae, 756; venas,
758); salientia (cf. salit, 756); viscera (cf. viscerum, 758); pectore (cf. pectoribus, 755); fibras (cf. fibras, 757).
70
The word membrum, which is used to refer to dismembered body parts in 761 and in other parts of Thyestes (60;
1062), can also refer to “a small section of a speech or literary work”. (Glare 2012: s.v. membrum) To be clear, in
pointing out the possibility of this metapoetic interpretation I am not attempting to argue that metapoetry was
necessary intended by Seneca here (on the relationship between metapoetic readings and authorial intention in
Latin literature, including some comments on examples from the Senecan corpus, see Liebermann 2014a: 419). At
the same time, Seneca would not be the first to employ this sort of play on words. As Most notes, Horace, for
instance, makes a pun using membra in reference to both “limbs” and “a section of a poem” with his phrase
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account of Marsyas is highly fitting, seeing that in both contexts murderous acts of revenge
expose internal features of the body which continue to operate in their usual, living function.
Ovid is explicit about the observability of Marsyas’ organs, as indicated by the phrase
possis…numerare (you can count out, 6.390-391. The use of the second person verb possis
makes the observation of Marsyas’ internal body into more of a first-hand experience for the
reader, as if including the reader in the process of examination. In Latin, the second person
singular can, of course, be used impersonally (translatable into English as “one can…”), but in
this particular context the verb makes the vivisection especially vivid, as the reader is being put
into the role of an observer, who, like the perpetrator of the act, can see and count
everything.71 In addition to this phrase, the revelation of Marsyas’ body is strongly conveyed by
the words detectique (uncovered, 6.389), patent (lay exposed, 6.389), and perlucentes (clearly
visible, 6.391). While the movements and animation of Marsyas’ various internal features
become apparent, Marsyas himself is transformed into nec quidquam nisi vulnus (nothing if not
wound, 6.388)72; this phrase recalls the paradoxical way in which Seneca emphasizes the
liveliness of the organs of Thyestes’ children after the children themselves have been killed.
The notion of being “nothing if not a wound”, and thus gaping and open, suggests the absence
of solidity and being while essential parts of Marsyas’ body are being revealed. This is another

disiecti membra poetae (Sermones 1.4.62), and Aristophanes uses the analogous Greek word μέλη simultaneously
in reference to “limbs” and the “songs of tragedy”. (Frogs 862; see Most 1992: 407)
71
Similarly, Anderson observes that Ovid also uses “the present tense to make his account of the flaying
grotesquely vivid”. (Anderson 1972: 202-203)
72
This phrase also recalls language used by Ovid in his description of the death of Hippolytus: unum erat omnia
vulnus (he was all wound, Metamorphoses 15.529). As Erasmo notes, Ovid characterizes Hippolytus’ corpse “as a
living wound”. (Erasmo 2004: 132; see also 133) Hippolytus’ corpse is characterized similarly in Seneca’s Phaedra,
as seen in the messenger’s report: haesere biiuges vulnere (horses cling to the wound, 1101). Most has also noted
the Ovidian influence in Seneca’s description of Hippolytus’ death. (Most 1992: 393)
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way in which Ovid’s phrase approaches Senecan paradox, even if Thyestes does not have an
exact parallel for the specific language used by Ovid. Indeed, in both descriptions, the internal
state of the body “comes to life” in vivid descriptions only when the individuals to whom the
bodies belong die or enter into a near-death state. Since Marsyas possesses the body of a
satyr, and thus not an entirely “human” body, it is even more interesting that the revelation of
these bodies is described in such highly similar terms. By modeling his use of language upon
language in the passage from Ovid, it appears that Seneca imagined the interior of the human
body to be analogous enough to that of a mythological satyr.73
In the messenger’s report, the exposure of the children’s internal parts is also emphasized
by patentes (762)—echoing the use of patent in Ovid’s description of Marsyas (6.389)—as well
as by divisum (760) and denudat (763). Celsus also uses the words patere and dividere in close
proximity when describing a large, boil-like swelling called a phyma. Explaining this condition,
Celsus states that a phyma typically extends over a larger area (latius patere consuevit, 5.28.9.45) than a boil (furunculus). The use of the comparative adverb latius suggests that Celsus
intends patere in the sense of “extending” or “spreading out”74—a sense which, as we have
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It is also noteworthy that many of the words which occur in both the passage from Seneca and the passage from
Ovid also appear in a description of necromancy in Lucan’s De Bello Civili (6.719-722; 750-755). While not exactly a
description of dissection or vivisection, this passage describes a process in which the witch Erichtho’s reanimates a
dead soldier, thus blurring lines between life and death as in the passages from Seneca and Ovid. Furthermore,
Lucan, similar to Seneca and Ovid, emphasizes how the organs of the corpse come to life (Percussae gelido
trepidant sub pectore fibrae, 6.752; Tunc omnes palpitat artus, / tenduntur nervi, 6.754-755), while in other ways
the soldier remains in a death-like state (et nova desuetis subrepens vita medullis / miscetur mori, 6.753-754;
Nondum facies viventis in illo, / iam morientis erat, 6.758-759). I thank Dylan Bloy for bringing this passage to my
attention.
74
Spencer also interprets the term this way, as shown by his translation: “a phyma commonly extends even over a
wider area.” (Spencer 1938a: 143). In a separate passage, Celsus uses patere in a different sense, describing how
suppuration can be detected by observing various symptoms (the list of symptoms is long and I do not quote that
part of the sentence): Omnis etiam suppuratio, quae nondum oculis patet, sic deprehendi potest… (Also, every
suppuration, which is not yet visible to the eyes, can be detected thusly…, 2.7.35.1-3) Here, the verb patere is tied
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seen, can be understood in the Seneca's polysemous phrase patentes umeros. Celsus goes on
to state that when one “divides” the phyma, pus then appears (ubi divisum est, pus eodem
modo apparet, 5.28.9.6-7). Here, divisum refers to creating an incision, and it is clear that this
process can provide insight (emphasized by apparet) into aspects concealed within the interior
of the body (in this case, pus). Thus, cutting into the body is depicted as a revealing act, as in
the case of Atreus’ surgical operations. In another example, Celsus uses a very similar
construction when discussing a surgical procedure that one can perform upon a follicular
abscess called a κηρίον75: Si divisum est, multo plus intus corrupti quam in furunculo apparet…
(If it is cut into, there appears much more internal decay than in a boil…, 5.28.13a.5) Here, the
act of incision is said to provide insight into the internal state of the body (intus), and the verb
apparere is again used to convey the idea of revelation.
After the messenger describes Atreus’ apparent act of vivisection and the subsequent
dissection, he proceeds to explain how Atreus cooked the body parts of Thyestes’ sons. The
messenger then closes out his speech by stating that these horrors will soon be revealed to
Thyestes, who is still unaware of the nature of the feast Atreus is preparing:
Verterit currus licet
sibi ipse Titan obvium ducens iter,
tenebrisque facinus obruat taetrum novis
nox missa ab ortu tempore alieno gravis,
tamen videndum est. Tota patefient mala.
Even though the Titan has turned his chariot,
taking a path counter to himself,
to ideas of exposure and observability (or in this case, a lack thereof, since the verb is negated). The juxtaposition
of patere and oculis (the eyes) reinforces the idea of perceptibility in this context.
75
Celsus does not offer a Latin term for this condition. The Greek word κηρίον can be translated as “honeycomb”,
a name derived from the resulting appearance of the skin.
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and although the heavy night, having arisen from the east and
at an unusual time, covers up the repulsive crime in unheard-of shadows,
it nevertheless must be seen. All the ills will be exposed. (784-788)
At the end of the messenger’s speech, the verbal stem pate- is again employed to convey a
sense of revelation: Tota patefient mala (All the evils will be exposed, 788). The theme of
revelation is also highlighted by the passive periphrastic videndum est. This phrase, which
comes at the end of a complex sentence about the inauspicious motion of the sun (i.e. Titan,
785)76 reversing its usual course across the sky77, emphasizes the connection between
revelation and sight. The messenger acknowledges that the revelation of Atreus’ crimes will be
seen despite the unusual presence of nox (night, 787), which covers things up with tenebrae
novae (unheard-of shadows, 786). These references to night and shadows serve as metaphors
for Thyestes’ state of ignorance, and are echoed by Atreus when he prepares to unveil his plot
and initiate the revelation of sorrows for Thyestes. In addition, apropos to Thyestes’
experience the idea of illness is accentuated by the use of the adjective gravis (modifying nox).
I have translated gravis as “heavy” to underscore the figurative gravity of the events that are
about to unfold, as well as the idea that the heavens are weighed down by what is transpiring.
Gravis can also be translated as “seriously ill” when used in reference to the body or health.78
Celsus, in fact, uses this word quite frequently when describing serious forms of illness.79 Thus
it is noteworthy that the messenger also describes Thyestes as gravisque vino (heavy/sick with
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Titan is often used, especially by post-Augustan poets, to refer to the sun. (Coffey and Mayer 1990: 152; see also
Grimal 1965: 111)
77
Commenting on the complexity of this sentence, Tarrant observes that the “length and involved syntax parallel
the Sun’s efforts at concealment. In the end, though, symbolizing the failure of resistance, the language descends
to the minimal: videndum est, tota patefient mala.” (Tarrant 1985: 203)
78
Glare 2012: s.v. gravis.
79
e.g. in gravi morbo (2.7.36.6), gravior febris (3.4.14.7)
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wine, 781), thus activating the polysemy of gravis to suggest that Thyestes is both “full” from
eating and “sick” (though at this point he is unaware of it) because he has in fact consumed his
own sons (778-779). Tarrant observes that gravis is “insistently repeated” in the last act of the
play, and that this word “relate[s] the oppressive external darkness to…the abnormal heaviness
with Thyestes”80, but he does not note the word’s connotations of sickness, which are highly
relevant to Thyestes’ experience. Noting these connotations of the word gravis raises some
interesting questions about the nature of sickness: can a person in fact be “sick” if s/he does
not feel “sick” or reveal any outward symptoms of sickness, and if so, how would it be possible
for either that person or for other people to know that the person is sick? Inherent to these
questions is an element of Senecan paradox, and later in this chapter we will see that the play
continues to explore such paradoxical questions about the nature of sickness.
After a long choral passage describing the occurrence of various cosmic calamities81, Atreus
directly addresses Thyestes’ present state of ignorance concerning his plot. He describes this
ignorance as a darkness which is concealing sorrow from Thyestes, while noting that the
darkness will soon be dispelled when the true nature of the feast is revealed:
Sed cur satis sit? Pergam et implebo patrem
funere suorum. Ne quid obstaret pudor,
dies recessit: perge dum caelum vacat.
Utinam quidem tenere fugientes deos
possem, et coactos trahere, ut ultricem dapem
omnes viderent—quod sat est, videat pater.
Etiam die nolente discutiam tibi
80

Tarrant 1985: 203-204.
This list of calamities includes the disruption of the natural cycles of day and night (813-814), as well as the
disappearance of the moon and stars (825-827). These events are linked to Phoebus’ reversal of course (802-804),
which produces a sense of concealment, as is reflected in the language used in the passage: noctis opacae (791);
non Luna graves digerit umbras (827); Natura tegat (834). This language and imagery reinforces the idea that
Thyestes is unaware of his brother’s subterfuge.
81
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tenebras, miseriae sub quibus latitant tuae.
Nimis diu conviva securo iaces
hilarique vultu; iam satis mensis datum est
satisque Baccho: sobrio tanta ad mala
opus est Thyeste. Turba famularis, fores
templi relaxa, festa patefiat domus.
But why should it be enough? I shall proceed and fill the father
with the funeral of his sons. Lest shame provide any obstacle,
the day has departed: proceed while the sky is empty.
Indeed I wish that I could restrain the fleeing gods,
constrain and drag them so that they all
might see the feast of vengeance—but it is enough that the father should see it.
Although the day is unwilling, I will disperse for you
the shadows in which your sorrows lie hidden.
Too long do you lie about with a cheerful expression
at an untroubled feast; now enough has been given for the dinner table,
enough for the wine: for such great evils, it is necessary to have
Thyestes sober. You group of slaves, open up the doors
of the temple, let the festivities of the household be exposed. (890-902)
Various elements in Atreus’ language draw attention to the dichotomy of concealment and
revelation. In observing that Thyestes will soon see the nature of the feast—and thus
understand the cause of his impending illness—Atreus uses the words viderent (895) and videat
(895). The verb videre is obvious and common enough, to be sure, yet it is worth recalling that
one of Celsus' terms for causes of illness that are obvious and able to discerned is evidentes
causae. These words link revelation to perception by sight, also recalling the passive
periphrastic videndum est used near the end of the messenger’s speech (788). Presently,
knowledge of Atreus’ crimes is concealed from Thyestes’ perception, as are the feelings of
illness that will he will soon begin to detect. Referring to Thyestes’ “hidden sorrows”
(miseriae…latitant, 897), Atreus uses a verb that recalls one of Celsus’ terms (latens) for
“hidden” causes of illness.
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Atreus’ language also plays upon the dichotomy of day and night (cf. dies recessit, 892; die
nolente, 896), with the day corresponding to states of exposure and knowledge, and the night
corresponding to states of concealment and ignorance. Thyestes is metaphorically “in the
dark” as his illness and sorrows are hidden by shadows (tenebras, 987), and meanwhile he sits
with a cheerful expression (hilarique vultu, 899). It is, on the one hand, deeply ironic that
Thyestes is characterized as hilaris82 after consuming his own children, but this depiction also
suggests that Thyestes is mad or deluded because of his ignorance. Indeed, Celsus repeatedly
uses the adjective hilaris and the noun hilaritas when describing various forms of insania83, as I
discuss more in depth in Chapter 4.
Preparing to inform Thyestes about the true nature of the feast, Atreus asks the household
slaves to open up the doors of the palace, setting the stage for the truth to be revealed (festa
patefiat domus, 902). Here, the verb patefieri underscores the theme of revelation at a key
moment in the text, as it also does at the end of the messenger’s speech (tota patefient mala,
788). This usage also recalls how Celsus uses the related verb patere when discussing
revelation of the internal parts of the body. Atreus’ use of patefieri foreshadows the tragic
realizations that Thyestes is about to experience, while perpetuating the sense of concealment
in sarcastically referring to his horrible acts as festa (festivities). While the messenger’s use of
patefieri acknowledges the reality of the situation more straightforwardly, both characters use
this word in relation to Thyestes’ emergence from a state of ignorance as he begins to realize
the true nature of what had been concealed from him.
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This usage is all the more noteworthy because it is only instance in which the adjective hilaris is used in Senecan
tragedy.
83
e.g. 3.18.3.6; 3.18.9.8; 3.18.20.2; 3.18.20.3; 3.18.22.5; cf. exhilaretur, 3.24.5.5.
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Following his order to have the doors of the household opened, Atreus gives a candid
description of the reactions he expects to observe in Thyestes when the truth is revealed:
Libet videre, capita natorum intuens
quos det colores, verba quae primus dolor
effundat aut ut spiritu expulso stupens
corpus rigescat. Fructus hic operis mei est.
Miserum videre nolo, sed dum fit miser.
Aperta multa tecta conlucent face.
I am eager to see what colors he gives off,
looking at the heads of his children, what words
his initial pain pours out, and how his body goes stiff,
stunned, having breathed out his spirit. This is the fruit of my work.
I do not wish to see him in a wretched state, but to see him becoming wretched.
Opened up, the house is bright with much light. (903-908)
Immediately before the palace is opened up (aperta, 908), Atreus enthusiastically anticipates
observing Thyestes suffer, and he predicts a variety of symptoms that Thyestes will experience.
The signs of illness which Atreus so gleefully imagines are all perceptible by the senses,
including the colores (904)84 that will be revealed in Thyestes’ appearance, the verba (904) that
will emerge from his mouth, and the spirit or breath that will pour out (spiritu expulso, 905)85 as
his body goes stiff (rigescat, 906). Atreus also predicts that Thyestes will experience dolor, a
symptom which is not always physically observable, but even this will be apparent in the words
Thyestes is expected to utter (904). Indeed, Atreus anticipates that Thyestes’ physical body
(corpus, 906), as well as his mind, will be stunned (stupens, 905). The idea that Thyestes will
84

Color as a symptom of illness is also discussed in Chapter 2.
The word spiritus can refer to “respiration”, and thus the phrase spiritu expulso might suggest a deep exhalation
of breath. It can also refer to one’s “life”, “spirit” or “soul”—in which case spiritu expulso would suggest the
escaping of life and the onset of death. (cf. Glare 2012: s.v. spiritus) Due to this ambiguity, it is not clear what
Atreus is expecting as the ultimate fate of Thyestes, whether he should live or die. Atreus’ statement in line 907
(miserum videre nolo, sed dum fit miser) implies that he is in fact not very concerned about whether Thyestes will
live on in a miserable condition, or whether he will die. Instead, Atreus is most interested in observing symptoms
of illness arise in Thyestes.
85
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experience an externalized—and thus observable—form of illness is also underscored by words
prefixed by e-/ex- in this passage (effundat, 905; expulso, 905). Atreus’ interest in observing
Thyestes’ symptoms, even before they are revealed, situates him simultaneously in the roles of
sadistic, voyeuristic spectator and medical observer, while Thyestes is thrust into the role of
“the patient” even though he has yet to manifest any symptoms of illness. Commenting upon
the characterization of Atreus, Fitch suggests that Atreus is “playing the role of…director or
régisseur of the drama, providing a spectacle to be watched by himself and by the implied
spectators.”86 In this respect, Atreus is placed in a position of agency and control, while
everyone else—especially Thyestes—must watch and wait. Similar power dynamics can be
seen in the aspects of “doctor” and “patient” that are respectively embodied by Atreus and
Thyestes. Fitch does not explore these specific aspects of characterization, but we can see that
Atreus, as “doctor”, wields control over the medical situation of his brother, who is relegated to
suffering and struggling to understand his own condition. These elements of characterization
also resonate with the characteristically Senecan theme of self-awareness, a topic I will return
to later in this chapter.
Immediately after the above remarks from Atreus, Thyestes begins to describe symptoms
of illness starting to take hold in him, and he notes that his perceptions have been dulled
(hebetata, 920), making his sensations of the illness slow to develop.87 The verb hebetare also
appears in Celsus, who suggests that inactivity, in contrast with work, “dulls” the body
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Fitch 2000: 3. Schiesaro similarly notes the “authorial role” assumed by Atreus and other characters in Senecan
tragedy. (Schiesaro 2003: 13-16; 55-69)
87
Fitch 2000: 3. Schiesaro similarly observes that Atreus assumes an “authorial role” in this particular play, and
that other characters do much the same in other works of Senecan tragedy. (Schiesaro 2003: 13-16; 55-69))
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(…siquidem ignavia corpus hebetat, labor firmat, 1.1.1.7-8). This idea resonates with the plot of
Thyestes, since Atreus has been working hard to prepare the feast for Thyestes, who in contrast
has remained comparatively idle, underscoring the active and passive roles played by these
characters. While Thyestes continues to be unaware that he has unwittingly consumed the
flesh of his sons, symptoms of illness begin to materialize in him. These symptoms are
manifested both mentally and physically:
…quid flere iubes,
nulla surgens dolor ex causa?
Quis me prohibet flore decenti
vincire comam, prohibet, prohibet?
Vernae capiti fluxere rosae,
pingui madidus crinis amomo
inter subitos stetit horrores,
imber vultu nolente cadit,
venit in medias voces gemitus.
…why do you direct me to weep,
pain arising without any cause?
Who prevents me from girding my hair
with decorous flowers, who prevents me, who prevents me?
The springtime roses have slipped from my head,
my hair, infused with dense myrrh,
has stood on end amidst sudden fright,
a downpour falls from my unwilling face,
a groan interrupts my words. (943-951)
Even while various symptoms of illness are revealed to Thyestes, they continue to defy his
understanding and therefore the sense of revelation remains incomplete. He observes, for
instance, that he is paradoxically experiencing nulla surgens dolor ex causa (pain arising from no
cause, 944). The present participle surgens underlines the oncoming symptoms which are just
beginning to surface, while the words nulla…ex causa emphasize that there is no obvious cause
for the disturbance which Thyestes is beginning to experience. Thyestes speaks in very strong
160

terms about the causes of his illness: it is not as if there is a “hidden” cause, but rather he
supposes that there is no cause at all. In addition to nulla…ex causa, Thyestes uses other
expressions to state that there is no cause for his symptoms, including sine causa (964) and nec
causa subest (967). As we saw earlier in this chapter, Celsus uses a variety of comparable
expressions, such as sine causa (2.7.2.4-5; 2.8.36.1; 3.18.22.3-4), sine manifesta causa (2.7.29.2;
6.6.37b.2), and sine ulla manifesta causa (6.6.37b.2). In each instance, however, Celsus uses
these phrases in stating that the cause of illness is unknown, not that there is no cause of illness
at all. Thyestes, on the other hand, is not necessarily saying that there is no cause for his
illness, but at this point he cannot imagine what that cause would be, and as a result he, unlike
Celsus, leaves open the possibility of illness occurring without any cause.
Paralleling Thyestes’ inability to understand the causes of his symptoms, earlier in the play
the chorus states that it cannot understand why Phoebus has reversed his celestial path:
Quid te aetherio pepulit cursu?
Quae causa tuos limite certo
deiecit equos?
What has propelled you out of your heavenly course?
What cause has tossed your horses
from their fixed path? (802-804)
Like Thyestes, the chorus struggles to understand the causes behind unexpected phenomena
which have recently become apparent. These situations problematize the relationship between
cause and effect, as well as the relationship between what can be observed and what can be
known or understood. This presents a bleak view of sensory perception, very much in line with
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the Stoic view that the senses are an untrustworthy means by which to understand reality.88
Celsus also acknowledges the limitations of the senses when explaining the empiricist view that
even an evidens causa (obvious cause) sometimes cannot supply scientia (knowledge) or hope
for medicina (treatment); such knowledge, he adds, is even less assured when a causa is in
dubio (in doubt, i.e. uncertain). Even the empiricist school, then, is cautious about the
knowledge that can be gleaned from the senses, and similarly Seneca’s play is suggesting that
the revelation of symptoms does not necessarily provide a possibility for understanding or
treatment.
Thyestes’ inability to comprehend the cause of his own symptoms is also emphasized by the
repetition of the word prohibet (945-946) in a direct question introduced by quis (945), as
Thyestes futilely searches for understanding. According to Wills, the form of repetition seen in
946 (known as adjacent gemination, or “twinning”), is common in Senecan drama, even though
it is generally unusual to find gemination of indicative verb forms in Latin poetry.89 In this
instance, gemination underscores the insistence—and futility—of Thyestes’ inquiry into the
cause of his present experience. Interestingly, even though Thyestes speech is richly colored by
vocabulary of illness, his rhetorical question assumes that a person (quis, rather than the quid
we might expect) is behind this. This is a particularly fine example of dramatic irony, as the
audience knows what he does not (i.e. that indeed a person is behind it, and that it is his own
brother); here, as throughout Seneca’s tragedies, the audience can understand that there are
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On this point in Stoic thought and its role in Senecan tragedy more generally, see Busch 2007: 259-261.
Wills 1996: 102-103. Wills explains that “imperatives are the foremost expressions of verbal geminations.”
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larger forces at work, while these forces remain concealed from Thyestes, and thus contribute
to his decreasing sense of self-awareness.
In this confusion, Thyestes experiences a growing sense of dissociation from his own body.
This is apparent in the deluge that pours forth unwillingly from his face (imber vultu nolente
cadit, 950) and in the groan (gemitus, 951)—an uncontrolled kind of utterance—which
interrupts the words (voces, 951) he tries to articulate.90 A few lines later, Thyestes compares
the incomprehensible nature of his present sensations to the seas becoming tumultuous
without any wind:
Mittit luctus signa futuri
mens ante sui praesaga mali:
instat nautis fera tempestas,
cum sine vento tranquilla tument.
The mind, perceiving its own ills beforehand,
sends signs of future grief:
a wild storm looms upon sailors
when a calm sea swells up without any wind. (957-960)
In this metaphor, the phrase cum sine vento tranquilla tument (960) is used to imply that the
onset of Thyestes’ symptoms defies explanation. The expression sine vento closely parallels
Thyestes’ use of the phrase sine causa a few lines later (964), while also recalling Thyestes’
earlier reference to nulla causa (944). In addition, the use of the verb tumere (to swell up) also
resonates with Thyestes’ reference to the pain that is arising in him (surgens dolor, 944), as the
verbs tumere and surgere convey the similar actions of swelling (tumere)91 and rising
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Glare 2012: s.v. tumere.
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(surgere).92 Celsus uses both of these verbs, along with related nouns and verb forms, such as
tumores (swellings)93, adsurgere (to rise up)94, and resurgere (to rise up; to become active
again).95 Especially prominent are Celsus’ comments on tumores, which are discussed in every
Book of De Medicina except for Book 1. Tumores are associated with a great variety of
conditions, serving as visible indicators of illness. In one passage, Celsus describes a condition
in which tumores arise, subside, and then recur once more96, using the verb adsurgere to
express their recurrence. In another passage, Celsus uses the verb resurgere in reference to the
recurrence of tumores (5.28.7a.1-8). The use of these words in close context with each other
recalls how the verbs tumere and surgere97 are used in reference to the onset of Thyestes’
illness. Indeed, in the above passage from Thyestes, we see that the swelling of the seas, as
expressed by the verb tumere, metaphorically alludes to the emergence of physical symptoms
in Thyestes, even though the nature of the illness is still not apparent to him.
Excursus: Agamemnon (456-474)
Thyestes’ reference to the sea swelling up sine vento recalls a passage from Seneca’s
Agamemnon in which the Greek herald Eurybates describes the stormy scene that arose when
the Trojans sailed away from their destroyed city. Eurybates’ speech is rife with language and
imagery of concealment and revelation:
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Iam litus omne tegitur et campi latent
et dubia parent98 montis Idaei iuga;
et vix (quod unum pervicax acies videt)
Iliacus atra fumus apparet nota.
Iam lassa Titan colla relevabat iugo,
in alta99 iam lux prona, iam praeceps dies.
Exigua nubes sordido crescens globo
nitidum cadentis inquinat Phoebi iubar;
suspecta varius occidens fecit freta.
Nox prima caelum sparserat stellis, iacent
deserta vento vela. Tum murmur grave,
maiora minitans, collibus summis cadit
tractuque longo litus ac petrae gemunt;
agitata ventis unda venturis tumet:
cum subito luna conditur, stellae latent;
in astra pontus tollitur, caelum perit,
nec una nox est: densa tenebras obruit
caligo et omni luce subducta fretum
caelumque miscet.
Now the whole shore is hidden and the plains are concealed
and the peaks of Mount Ida are barely apparent;
and the smoke of Ilium is scarcely visible as a black mark
(the only thing which a steady eye sees).
Now the Titan was releasing weary necks from the yoke,
now the light is sinking toward the deep, now the day is hurtling headlong.
A slight cloud, growing into a foul mass,
tarnishes the shining splendor of the setting Phoebus;
its variegated setting makes the sea concerned.
The early night splashes the sky with stars,
while the sails lie slack, abandoned by the wind. Then a deep groan,
threatening much more, falls from the highest hills,
and the shore and rocks roar in a long and drawn out way;
the waves swell, stirred up by winds that will come:
when suddenly the moon is hidden, the stars concealed;
the sea is hoisted up to the stars, and the sky vanishes—
there is not just one night: a thick fog covers up
the shadows, and, with all light removed,
98

Here, my quotation of the Latin (parent) departs from the Oxford Classical text (pereunt), following the reading
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2004a: 164)
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it mixes up the sea and the sky. (456-474)
In this passage, a sense of concealment arises in the natural environment, as forces of darkness
pervade the atmosphere, overcoming the day (460-463) and even overshadowing the moon
and the stars: luna conditur, stellae latent (the moon is hidden, the stars concealed, 470). The
verb latere also appears at the beginning of this passage: campi latent (the plains are
concealed, 456). While Celsus uses the verb latere in reference to causes of illness which are
“hidden” by the human body, here latere is used in reference to aspects of the environment
which are hidden by darkness. The herald uses various other words to set the mood of
concealment that runs throughout this passage, beginning with the verb tegere (litus omne
tegitur, 456). This verb occurs repeatedly in Thyestes (nine times total), in connection with the
concealment of Atreus’ plot, the concealed causes of Thyestes’ illness and suffering, and
Thyestes’ desire to conceal his shame after the plot is revealed. Celsus uses this verb nine
times, but never in connection with the concealment of illness or shame.100
In the above passage from Agamemnon, the theme of concealment is also conveyed through
the use of the verb obruit (472), and the nouns nubes (clouds, 462) tenebras (shadows, 472)
and caligo (fog, 473). As a cumulative effect of this language, there is a deep, multi-layered
impression of concealment. As the herald notes, the darkness is greater than could be
furnished by any single night (nec una nox est, 473). As in the opening lines of Oedipus101, the
natural environment is thrown into confusion by the pervasive darkness, as indicated by the
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phrases in astra pontus tollitur, caelum ferit (the sea is hoisted up to the stars, and the sky
vanishes, 471) and fretum caelumque miscet (it mixes up the sea and sky, 473-474).102 Unlike in
Oedipus, however, the tumultuous state of the environment is not figured as a condition of
illness with medicalized symptoms.
Despite the passage’s overbearing imagery of darkness and concealment, the scene is not
one of complete obscurity. Indeed, two famous symbols of Troy—Mount Ida, and the city’s
smoldering ruins—remain visible, but in a qualified way (457-459). The idea that these ruins
are observable is conveyed by the verbs parent (457), videt (458), and apparet (459). As
previously noted, the verbal roots vide- and appare- play an important role in contexts of
revelation from both Thyestes and De Medicina. Nevertheless, in this passage from
Agamemnon, the idea of revelation is still downplayed: even though there is a clear line of sight
(pervicax acies, 458), Troy only appears as a “black mark” (atra…nota, 459). This use of nota
resonates with usage in Celsus; he uses this word, along with signum and indicium, to refer to
“signs” or (“symptoms”) of illness.103 According to Romano, Celsus does not make a strong
distinction in his usage of these words; indeed, each word is used in contexts in which Celsus
appears to be translating passages from Hippocratic texts in which the Greek word σημεῖον
appears.104 Celsus uses the word nota, for instance, when discussing signs of oncoming illness:
Ante adversam autem valetudinem, ut supra dixi, quaedam notae oriuntur… (Yet before an
102
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adverse state of health, as I have said before, certain signs arise…, 2.2.1.1-2). Just a few lines
later, Celsus employs the word signum in a highly analogous manner: Peius tamen signum est,
ubi aliquis contra consuetudinem emacuit et colorem decoremque amisit (It is a still worse sign
when someone, contrary to habit, becomes thinner and loses their complexion and
appearance, 2.2.2.1-3).105 While Celsus uses words like nota in reference to the condition of
the body, in the above passage the herald applies this word to the condition of an entire city
experiencing its demise.
Another element common to this passage from Agamemnon and the metaphor from
Thyestes (957-960) is the imagery of waves swelling up on the sea. In the herald’s speech, this
seems to occur for an obvious reason—oncoming winds: agitate ventis unda venturis tumet
(469). The reason for the swelling of the sea appears to be clearer than in Thyestes (cf. 959960), but even here there is a qualification: the waves are stirred up “by winds that will come”.
The future participle venturis suggests that the winds have not yet arrived, but they are
nonetheless already affecting the waves. In this way, both passages complicate ideas of
causation by presenting an image of the sea swelling although winds are not present, while
using similar language to express this idea (in each passage, “the sea”, expressed by the
respective words unda and tranquilla, governs the verb tumere).106 In the passage from
Agamemnon, however, the cause for the swelling of the waves is known and identified, which is
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A similar phrase is also used in Medea: tumuit insanum mare / tacente vento (the maddened sea swells up with
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paradoxical since it has not yet appeared. In Thyestes, the causes of illness remain even more
deeply concealed for Thyestes, as he is not able to identify any possible cause.
Thyestes (Continued)
As Thyestes gradually becomes more aware of the various symptoms he is experiencing, he
begins to suspect that these symptoms are “signs of future grief” (luctus signa futuri, 957).
Nevertheless, the cause of this grief remains unclear, at least to Thyestes himself.107 The fact
that symptoms of illness are called signa in Celsus and other medical texts further supports the
idea that Thyestes is struggling to interpret his own symptoms. In particular, these signa are
associated with the mens…praesaga (the mind, perceiving beforehand, 958), which informs us
that Thyestes perceives symptoms of illness before he is able to discern any reason for their
sudden onset; thus, we return to the theme of undetectable or possibly unknowable causes of
illness. As Tarrant observes, the wording in lines 957-958 echoes language used by Virgil108, and
I would add that they are also reminiscent of language Celsus uses in explaining the important
role symptoms play in the prediction of future illness: Sunt enim quaedam proprietates
hominum, sine quarum notitia non facile quicquam in futurum praesagiri potest. (For there are
certain qualities of persons, without the knowledge of which it is not easy to predict anything in
the future, 2.2.4.4-5) Romano observes that Celsus is placing an emphasis on the predictive
107
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function of the symptom, and asserts that the phrase in futurum praesagiri hearkens back to
the prophetic origins of the medical art.109 Parallels between prophecy and medicine are also
evident elsewhere in the play, such as when the messenger describes Atreus’ treatment of the
bodies of Thyestes’ sons (755-763). Here, as we have seen, language of sacrifice and extispicy is
conflated with language of vivisection and dissection, eventually culminating in predictions
prophesying Thyestes’ eventual consumption of his son (778-779) and the revelation of great
suffering (789).
The Latin words signa, futura, and praesaga in 957-960 suggest foreknowledge, but these
lines take on an element of irony when one notes that Thyestes remains deeply unaware of the
future trajectory of his illness and his future experience. Atreus is actually the one who has a
power to predict, as both the causes and symptoms of Thyestes’ illness are very apparent to
him at this point. Thyestes, on the other hand, continues to suspect his that burgeoning
feelings of illness are sine causa (without a cause, 964)—a phrase which reprises his earlier
thoughts (i.e. nulla surgens dolor ex causa, 944). In this way, at this moment in the play Atreus
takes on a role akin to that of doctor who is interpreting symptoms which his patient does not
fully understand or recognize. As readers of the play, we know that the doctor's diagnosis is
correct—primarily because the doctor himself has taken actions to provoke the “illness”. This
rift in understanding between Atreus and Thyestes bears out some of the complexities and
experiential barriers typical of the doctor-patient relationship. Generally, one would expect a
patient to have a more immediate firsthand knowledge of their own symptoms and sensations
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than their doctor, but the doctor, as a specialist, is expected to offer insights about causes,
diagnoses, treatments, and thus help the patient. In view of this, the idea that a patient-doctor
relationship exists between these two brothers becomes profoundly ironic, since Atreus has
more knowledge of Thyestes’ symptoms than Thyestes himself, and since Atreus seeks to bring
terrible harm upon his Thyestes.
By having Thyestes experience both mental and physical distress even before coming to his
tragically painful realization, Seneca’s play complicates the relationship between the sensation
and causation of illness. Even when he begins to weep, Thyestes maintains that there is no
underlying cause (nec causa subest, 967). As Tarrant notes, the verb subesse accentuates the
latent nature of the causes behind Thyestes’ growing fears and symptoms of illness.110 The
verb subesse appears numerous times in Celsus, where it can also connote underlying
conditions of illness. In one instance, Celsus uses this verb to imply that illness is “lurking”: At si
longa tristitia cum longo timore et vigilia est, atrae bilis morbus subest. (But if there is a
prolonged sadness with prolonged fear and wakefulness, an illness of black bile is lurking.
2.7.19.3) Although Thyestes experiences only one of the symptoms mentioned in this example
(timor), the idea that illness is “lurking” is certainly relevant to Thyestes’ state of ignorance
about his own condition. This use of subesse, which can also be translated “to sink beneath the
surface”111 and, according to Lewis and Short, “to lie in concealment”112, also calls attention to
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the subterfuge of Atreus’ plot and to the fact that his underlying motives remain concealed
from Thyestes when Thyestes is starting to reveal symptoms of illness.
When Atreus later reveals the nature of the feast, he uses the verb superesse: Quidquid e
natis tuis / superest habes, quodcumque non superest habes (Whatever of your children still
exists, you have—and whatever no longer exists, you also have, 1030-1031). This verb, which
can be translated “to remain in existence”113, and, according to Lewis and Short, “to be
apparent”, or “to be prominent”114, contrasts morphologically and semantically with subesse.
The use of this word is very fitting in this context, given that the cause of Thyestes’ illness is no
longer an underlying one, but rather clear and out in the open. This use of subesse takes on
special significance because this is not the sense in which subesse is typically used in Senecan
tragedy—in most instances, it is best translated “to remain in existence”.115 This sense of
“remaining” is also apparent in Celsus’ numerous uses of subesse, although Celsus typically uses
it in reference to aspects of the body or forms of illness that continue to remain in existence, or
otherwise in reference to topics that remain to be discussed.116 I would argue that this aspect
of subesse is also on display in these lines from Thyestes, adding an ironic and sinister element
since Thyestes’ sons have been removed from existence. Atreus is mean-spiritedly saying that
some part of Thyestes’ sons remains in existence, and that another part does not, and that
Atreus “has” both parts. The phrase quodcumque non superest suggests the flesh that Thyestes
now has concealed in his stomach, while quidquid…superest evokes the heads, hands, and legs
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which are revealed to Thyestes in the ensuing lines.117 Each of these aspects of their being, and
the fact that Thyestes now “has” both of them (as conveyed by the cruel repetition of habes)
signify their death. The concealment of their flesh within their father's bodies is now revealed;
paradoxically, their absence (death) is now made present to their father, who now finally
realizes the cause of his ill feelings.
The idea that an illness could lack a cause problematizes the influential pattern of guilt and
causality which has been described by Burkert. Drawing from a plethora of examples found in
various genres of Greek and Latin literature, as well as biblical writings and lore from various
other cultures, Burkert has argued that human responses to illness and disaster typically follow
a universal pattern: when an illness or disaster occurs, people tend to seek explanation by
consulting a mediator (such as a priest, prophet, shaman, magician, etc.); the mediator then
reveals the “hidden cause” of an illness and the corresponding cure, which is typically achieved
by assessing and expiating guilt associated with wrongs committed.118 This pattern reminds
about the evolution of medicine from prophecy, as evoked by Celsus’ phrase in futurum
praesagiri.119 Indeed, Burkert generally associates his pattern with “religious therapy”120, but
he also notes that the pattern’s interest in identifying hidden causes responsible for suffering
sometimes “looks medical rather than religious”121 in certain cases. Indeed, drawing
distinctions between figures such as “priests” and “doctors” in the Greek and Roman world is

117

Abscisa cerno capita et avulsas manus / et rupta fractis cruribus vestigia. (1038-1039)
This pattern is discussed throughout Burkert’s chapter entitled “Guilt and Causality” in Creation of the Sacred:
Tracks of Biology in Early Religions (1996: 102-128). The pattern is most succinctly summarized as “disaster, the
seer, the hidden cause, and the corresponding cure.” (Burkert 1996: 112)
119
See this earlier chapter’s discussion of this phrase and Romano 1991: 50, 51 n. 5; see also 56-57.
120
Burkert 1996: 102,
121
Burkert 1996: 112.
118

173

fraught with many problems, as Nutton has thoroughly and persuasively argued.122 Moreover,
many of the examples that Burkert uses to explain how this pattern works involve responses to
plagues, and he in fact states that “disease may be the most common occasion to trigger the
mechanism” of this pattern.123
If we consider Thyestes’ situation in relation to this model, we see that his experience
follows a somewhat different trajectory. Thyestes begins questioning his future experience of
grief and illness before these things have even arrived (cf. 957-960), which inverts the initial
steps of Burkert’s pattern. Then, when Thyestes speaks with a “mediator”—his brother,
Atreus—this mediator is eventually able to reveal a hidden cause for Thyestes’ perceptions of
illness , but this revelation offers no respite or cure for Thyestes’ suffering, and instead brings
even greater woe upon Thyestes. One of the major groups identified by Burkert as “mediators”
is priests/diviners, and we may put Atreus in this category when we recall his associations with
extispicium and prophecy (755-763; 778-779). One of the reasons that Burkert’s pattern breaks
down in this situation is that Atreus is a mediator who actually causes the suffering that he later
“mediates”.124 In addition, it is significant that when Thyestes wonders about the symptoms of
his illness, he speaks as though they have no cause, instead of a “hidden cause” as in Burkert’s
model. Burkert’s model does not allow for the acceptance of no cause, since it suggest that the
search for hidden causes is a universal human response to situations of illness and calamity.
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Atreus’ involvement with the causation of Thyestes’ illness thus throws the chain of action
described by Burkert into disarray.
Shortly after Thyestes talks about how his illness lacks a cause, Atreus offers Thyestes a cup
with an infusion of wine (poculum infuso cape / gentile Baccho, 982-983). The fact that Atreus
says this wine is said infused in a poculum gentile (a “family cup”, or as Tarrant translates it, a
“cup of our bloodline”125) suggests that the cup may contain blood from Thyestes’ butchered
sons, in addition to wine (or perhaps even instead of wine).126 Despite Atreus’ mention of the
poculum gentile, Thyestes remains in the dark about the contents of the cup and Atreus’
treachery in general, and he proceeds to drink from the cup. The concealment of the cup’s
contents builds upon the other elements of concealment which are present in the scene and
the play more broadly. Thyestes’ consumption of this infusion is thus presented as one of the
causes of his dulled perceptions (cf. hebetata, 920).
When Thyestes attempts to drink from this cup, other signs that something is awry become
apparent: Thyestes’ hands do not obey his intentions (nolunt manus parere, 985-986), the
125

Tarrant 1985: 227.
Based upon the wording in these lines, it is unclear whether the cup is filled with blood, wine, or with a mixture
of blood and wine. On the one hand, gentile could allude to the family heritage of Thyestes and Atreus, which
would be fitting considering how this situation resembles the way in which Tantalus, one of their ancestors, served
up the flesh of his own son. Understood this way, the reference to the poculum gentile depicts Atreus’ actions as a
reenactment of Thyestes’ infamous deed. (cf. Tarrant 1985: 227) On the other hand, gentile could allude to the
fact that “family” (i.e. Thyestes’ children) is contained within the cup (i.e. in the form of blood)—a possible
reference which is clearly beyond the grasp of Thyestes. This is how it is understood by Kohn, who, in his
discussion of the dramaturgy of the scene, states that the cup “in fact contains wine mixed with the blood of
[Thyestes’] sons.” (Kohn 2013: 130) By mixing in wine, Atreus expects Thyestes not to realize that blood is present
in the cup, as Atreus’ earlier comments indicate: restat etiamnunc cruor / tot hostiarum; veteris hunc Bacchi color /
abscondet (there still remains the blood of so many victims; the color of the aged wine will conceal it, 914-916) and
mixtum suorum sanguinem genitor bibat (may the father drink the blended blood of his sons, 917). After the
cannibalistic nature of the feast is revealed, Atreus expresses a wish that Thyestes had drunk not a mixture of wine
and blood, but pure blood—and, even more cruelly, not using the intermediary of a cup, but directly from the
wound to his mouth: …ex vulnere ipso sanguine calidum in tua / defundere ora debui, ut viventium / biberes
cruorem (I ought to have poured the hot blood into your mouth straight from the very wound, so that you could
drink the stream of blood while they lived, 1054-1056).
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“wine” escapes from his lips (Bacchus a labris fugit, 987), and even the dining table jumps up at
the ground’s trembling (et ipsa trepido mensa subsiluit solo, 989.) The latter sign is the first of
several natural and supernatural phenomena that occur in this scene, prefiguring the revelation
of the cause responsible for Thyestes’ growing distress:
Quid hoc? Magis magisque concussi labant
convexa caeli ; spissior densis coit
caligo tenebris noxque se in noctem abdidit:
fugit omne sidus. Quidquid est, fratri precor
natisque parcat, omnis in vile hoc caput
abeat procella.
What is this? More and more the arc of the stricken sky
is sinking; a rather thick fog is gathering among dense shadows
and night has concealed itself in night:
every star is in flight. Whatever it is, I pray that it may spare
my brother and my sons, and the entire storm may turn itself
upon this worthless head. (992-997)
Signs of disorder are now evident not only in Thyestes’ body, but are also figured in the external
world and even the wider universe.127 Moreover, I would argue that these are not only signs of
a general or generic 'disorder' but that, especially when read with Celsus' De Medicina,
Thyestes' language specifically suggests symptoms of illness, particularly through the use of
concussus128, caligo129, and tenebrae.130 Caligo (994) gives particular emphasis to the idea that
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Thyestes also makes mention of cosmic manifestations of illness after he realizes the causes of his illness: …hoc
egit diem aversum in ortus (this drove the day back toward where it rises, 1035-1036).
128
Cf. De Medicina 6.6.36.8; 6.7.9b.9; 7.26.3c.5; cf. concutere 3.6.13.8; 3.21.12.6; 3.27.1c.8; 7.12.1b.1; 7.12.1b.6;
7.16.3.2; 8.12.3.2.
129
Cf. De Medicina 1.3.3.5; 1.3.25.2; 2.7.2.2; 2.7.30.4; 2.8.18.1; 2.12.2a.5; 4.2.2.3; 6.6.32.1; 6.6.34a5; 6.6.34b.2;
6.6.37a5.
130
Thyestes’ reference to tenebrae recalls earlier uses of language by the messenger (tenebrisque…novis, 786) and
Atreus (discutiam…tenebras, 896-897). These tenebrae cloud Thyestes’ ability to perceive the nature of his illness.
In Celsus, offusae tenebrae oculis (shadows obscuring the eyes) are considered a sign of madness (2.7.25.2).
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the cause is concealed from Thyestes, as this word can be used in reference not only to fog131,
but also to mental blindness or dullness of perception.132 In Celsus, the noun caligo and the
verb caligare are used in reference to a literal dimming of a person’s vision.133 While Seneca
uses caligo to refers to a natural phenomenon in this passage, the word also carries with it
connotations of blindness appropriate to Thyestes’ impaired ability to understand his own
perceptions in this scene. The adjective caligans is also applied to Thyestes in one of Martial’s
epigrams: Qui legis Oedipoden caligantemque Thyesten… (You who read of Oedipus and of
blind Thyestes…, 10.4.1). Here, caligans is used in a prominent place—the opening line of an
epigram that addresses its own readers. It is interesting that this adjective is applied to
Thyestes immediately after the mention of Oedipus—a tragic figure perhaps more obviously
associated with blindness (although one could argue that caligantemque colors Martial’s
reference to Oedipus, as well). It is interesting, then, that this word is most directly applied to
the figure who experienced a metaphorical form of blindness (Thyestes), and not the one who
experienced a literal form of blindness (Oedipus). Moreover, it striking that Martial uses
caligans to describe Thyestes himself, whereas Seneca has Thyestes use the noun caligo to
describe the disordered state of nature that he is observing. This furthers the sense that nature
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Tarrant observes that the use of the words caligo and tenebris in this passage contribute to evoking the image
of “mists that figure in disastrous storms.” (Tarrant 1985: 228) This effect is reminiscent of the storm-language
used previously in lines 959-960. Earlier in this chapter, I discussed the use of the word caligo in Seneca’s
Agamemnon (473), where it contributes to the lack of visibility present in the scene. Tarrant’s commentary on
Agamemnon draws an explicit connection between the usage of caligo in Agamemnon 473 and in Thyestes 994.
(Tarrant 1976: 264)
132
For example, see Cicero’s De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 5.15.43; Pliny Epistulae 5.8.8.
133
In discussing Celsus’ “innovazioni semantiche”, Mazzini cites Celsus’ use of caligo as a metaphor for blindness.
(Mazzini 1991: 182) It is not always possible to tell whether Celsus is referring to “full” or “partial” forms of
blindness, nor is it always possible to tell whether these conditions are permanent or temporary.
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itself is represented in a state of illness (not unlike the condition of the Theban environment in
Oedipus) with symptoms akin to those of Thyestes himself.
In addition, the sustained motif of concealment is also conveyed by the verb abdidit (994).
As we have seen, the adjective abdita is also used by Celsus in reference to “hidden” causes of
illness.134 The use of such a word is both fitting and ironic in this context—fitting because the
cause of Thyestes’ illness still remains beyond his understanding at this point, and ironic in light
of the many signs that have been revealed. Thyestes’ state of ignorance is also reflected in the
redoubling of night, which is the subject of abdidit and also is also employed in a prepositional
clause in the same line (noxque se in noctem abdidit, 994). We can also see Thyestes’ lack of
comprehension in the repeated questions he asks about the signs of distress: quid hoc (what is
this? 985, 992), and by his use of the indefinite pronoun—“whatever it is” (quidquid est, 995)—
when referring to the bodily and cosmic confusion he is perceiving.
Next, Thyestes expresses a desire to see his children, believing the sight of them will dispel
his present feelings of grief:
Quis hic tumultus viscera exagitat mea?
Quid tremuit intus? Sentio impatiens onus
meumque gemitu non meo pectus gemit.
Adeste, nati, genitor infelix vocat,
adeste. Visis fugiet hic vobis dolor…
What is this disturbance that stirs up my innards?
What has shaken inside me? I sense an imperceptible burden
and my chest groans with a groan not my own.
Come here, sons, your unhappy father calls you,
come here. This grief will flee once you have been seen… (999-1003)

134

Cf. 1.Pr.13.2; 1.Pr.14.1; 3.3.6.1.
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At this point, Thyestes’ language becomes more focused on the internal signs of his illness. The
nature of this illness is still unknown to him, but it is about to become apparent, indeed when,
ironically, the children are finally seen. The source of Thyestes’ illness is still manifested
internally (intus, 1000), with an emphasis on the disturbance of the innards (viscera, 999); at
the same time, this internal disturbance is being stirred up and starting to emerge from
concealment, as suggested by exagitat (999). This verb can be translated “to stir up”, “to
harass”, “to drive away”135, and also, according to Lewis and Short, “to drive out of position”.136
Although Celsus does not use the verb exagitare, he does use the related verb agitare in
reference to various bodily processes, including the throbbing of veins.137 In one instance,
Celsus also uses the noun agitatio in reference to a mental disturbance (agitatio animi), noting
that such a disturbance is particularly harmful after eating (inutilis…post cibum).138 In light of
this remark, it becomes even more apparent that Thyestes’ postprandial disturbance is
portrayed as a medicalized response to Atreus’ ruse. It is also significant that Seneca uses the
verb exagitare, with the prefix ex- attached. This contributes to the passage’s motif of
externality, while the use of intus in the following line highlights the motif of internality. This
internal/external dichotomy is tied to the dichotomy of concealment and revelation: Thyestes’
trembling (tremuit intus, 1000) is concealed internally, but simultaneously represented
externally—and thus revealed—by the jumping up of the dining table as the ground itself is
trembling (et ipsa trepido mensa subsiluit solo, 989).
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Glare 2012: exagitare
Lewis and Short 1879: s.v. exagitare.
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2.4.4.1.
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1.5.2.1-5.
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At this point of the play, Thyestes is still dealing with a dissociation of body and self; this is
apparent in the questions Thyestes asks about the internal state of his own body (999-1000), as
well as the groaning he produces involuntarily (gemitu non meo pectus gemit, 1001). This
phrase recalls Thyestes’ earlier lament about his uncontrolled groaning: venit in medias voces
gemitus (951). The new groaning in 1001 is significantly different from the previous reference,
however, in that Thyestes now imagines, paradoxically, that the groaning that comes forth from
his chest is not his own (gemitu non meo). These lines are indicative of Thyestes’ selfalienation, as well as Thyestes’ continued alienation from his own sensory experience. These
struggles are evoked by the phrase sentio impatiens onus (1000) when one notes that impatiens
can be translated as “imperceptible” or “free from sensation”—senses it often has in Seneca’s
Stoically-colored prose works.139 My translation draws attention to these aspects of impatiens,
which are oxymoronic in light of the word’s juxtaposition with sentio, and keenly reflect
Thyestes’ situation at this moment when he experiences symptoms of illness, but still cannot
perceive any reason for them. Indeed, these impressions of imperceptibility are in keeping with
the larger motifs of concealment that occur throughout this section of the play. But this
interpretation takes a different understanding than Fitch’s translation, which renders
impatiens…onus as “a restless weight.”140 Perhaps a more obvious way to understand the
phrase, this translation emphasizes the restlessness of the burden, but not its
imperceptibility—interpretations that I do not consider mutually exclusive. Fitch’s
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e.g. Hoc obicitur Stilboni ab Epicuro et iis quibus summum bonum visum est animus inpatiens. (This is the
objection to Stilbo made by Epicurus and by those who believe that the highest good seems to be the soul which is
insensible to feeling. (Seneca’ Epistula 9.1)
140
Fitch 2004a: 313.
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interpretation of impatiens suggests that Thyestes senses that there is something inside him
that wants to move and that he needs to get it out, and this is indeed consistent with Thyestes’
experience in this scene.
The notion of a “restless burden” also foreshadows the horrid suffering Thyestes is about to
endure. Moreover, even this understanding of impatiens onus contains an element of paradox,
as Tarrant points out that “an onus would normally be inert”.141 The noun onus and the verb
onerare are used to this effect by Celsus, often in reference to forms of illness in which pressure
builds up on the internal organs, such as the heart.142 In one passage, Celsus uses the verb
onerare when explaining that the body can become “overburdened” by an unaccustomed
quantity of food, thus impeding digestion. 143 While Thyestes does not exactly suffer from
overeating, he is burdened by the onus inside of him—which, as he will soon realize, is
something he should not have digested. The word impatiens, on the other hand, does not
appear in Celsus’ work, offering no basis for comparison with Senecan usage. Forms of the verb
sentire occur so frequently throughout De Medicina that it not possible to comment on them
here.
The moment of revelation of the cause of Thyestes’ illness now comes, as Atreus shows him
his sons’ decapitated heads and exclaims: Venere. Natos ecquid agnoscis tuos? (They have
come. Do you perchance recognize your sons? 1005)144 On the one hand, this question is
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Commenting on this line, Tarrant similarly states that “Seneca links unrelated ideas…to produce a jarring
combination.” (Tarrant 1985: 229)
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e.g. 2.7.35.1; 2.10.7.2; 2.17.10.7.
143
…si corpus insuetum subita multitudine oneraverit, concoctionem impediat. (3.22.4.5-6)
144
In these lines spoken by Atreus, it is left somewhat unclear exactly how the children would be revealed in a
staged performance. As Fitch notes, this leaves open various dramaturgical possibilities: “a vessel containing the
heads could be opened...at this moment by Atreus or attendants or Thyestes. Or the heads could be carried
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sardonic in tone, with injurious and mocking intentions toward the unknowing Thyestes145; on
the other hand, the question reflects how it may be genuinely difficult for Thyestes to recognize
his sons by their mutilated body parts at this point. Thyestes’ response, agnosco fratrem (I
recognize my brother, 1006), does not actually respond to Atreus’ question about recognizing
his children, but fittingly indicates that Thyestes finally recognizes the true nature and intent of
his brother. This recognition is driven home by Thyestes’ repetition of the verb used by his
brother (agnoscis…agnosco), showing that the two brothers are finally (and tragically) on the
same page, having reached a shared state of recognition. It is also noteworthy that these two
instances are the only times in the play where the verb agnoscere appears146—a fact
appropriate to Thyestes’ lack of recognition throughout most of the play. The verb agnoscere is
thus given special weight in these lines, serving as the primary indicator that the revelation
occurs at this point. While the verb agnoscere, along with its participles and related forms,
does not appear in De Medicina, Celsus does use forms of the unprefixed verb noscere, for
example when discussing recognition of causes, prognoses, and treatments of certain
conditions, as well as information the medical practitioner should know.147 In one instance,

onstage at this point.” (Fitch 2004a: 315, note 45). In addition to Fitch’s ideas, there are other possibilities that
one could imagine for staging this revelation. These questions of staging assume, of course, the performability of
the play. Reviewing the various arguments about whether Seneca’s plays could have been staged and whether
they were in fact staged in the Neronian court during Seneca’s lifetime is beyond the scope of this study, but for a
comprehensive list of major scholarship on these issues see Schiesaro 2003: 6 n. 9.
145
As Fitch notes, “Atreus does not say ‘Look, father, at the severed heads of your sons.’ On the contrary, he
speaks until the very last moment as if they were alive…” (Fitch 2000: 4)
146
No other related forms (nouns, adjectives, or adverbs) of the word are used, either.
147
2.19.1.1-2.6; 5.26.20a.1; 7.7.4c.6; 8.9.2.5, 7.20.4.1; 8.20.8.4.
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Celsus uses the passive periphrastic noscenda sunt (they must be known) in reference to
various properties of food which he has just listed.148
Thyestes communicates his understanding not only by saying agnosco (1006), but also by
using the verb cerno (I perceive, 1038) and by stating hoc est quod avidus capere non potuit
pater (this is what the voracious father could not take in, 1040). In this statement, capere
serves not only as a metaphor for mental comprehension, but also as a reference to the fact
that Thyestes literally had physical difficulty digesting the children’s flesh.149 This sense of
capere becomes more apparent when we note that Celsus frequently uses this verb in
reference to the consumption of food, especially with the repeated phrase cibum capere.150 As
for cernere, this verb appears three times in De Medicina; in two of these contexts it is negated,
expressing an inability to see at night (noctu nihil cernunt, 6.6.38.2) due to a weakness of the
eyes, or conveying that certain blood vessels in the scrotum cannot be observed well (non
aeque quidem cernuntur, 7.18.10.3) relative to other blood vessels in the scrotum that are
closer to the surface and thus more apparent.
Shortly after the revelation is made, Thyestes reverts to the language of concealment,
expressing a desire to be hidden away, along with his brother:
…si quid infra Tartara est
avosque nostros, hoc tuam immani sinu
demitte vallem, nosque defossos tege
Acheronte toto.
…if there is anything below Tartarus
and our ancestors, send your hollow down
148

Quae omnia ideo noscenda sunt, quoniam aliud alii vel corpora vel valetudini convenit. (2.19.2.5-6)
On the polysemy of this line, see Fitch 2004a: 317.n. 46.
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e.g. 1.1.2.6; 1.3.31.1; 1.3.34.4; 3.15.4.9; 4.26.2.3.; 7.4.4b.1.
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to the vast interior, and hide us, buried,
under all of Acheron. (1013-1016)
At this point, the theme of concealment shifts away from Thyestes’ perceptions and
misperceptions concerning his illness, to language of darkness and concealment pertaining to
the realm of the underworld and its various features (Tantalum, 1011; Tartara, 1013;
Acheronte, 1016; Phlegethon, 1018). Thyestes is so horrified by the nature of this revelation
that he wishes, if possible, to be sent below the depths of Tartarus (infra Tartara, 1013),
traditionally the deepest point of the underworld in Greek and Roman mythology. This would,
in effect, remove Thyestes from being seen or perceived by others. This is accentuated by the
use of sinus, which can refer to a “refuge”151, or, according to Lewis and Short, a “hiding-place”
or “place of concealment”.152 Thyestes is so horrified by what has transpired that he wishes to
be buried deeper than his ancestors in Tartarus.
After Thyestes’ initial reactions of shock and revulsion, Atreus adds insult to injury in giving
his own description of his treatment of the children’s bodies. This speech recounts the actions
described by the messenger earlier in the play (cf. 755-763), yet differs in that it is less
interested in emphasizing the “clinical exactness” of the operations153, and more focused on
communicating to Thyestes the horrible violence that was performed:
…ex vulnere ipso sanguinem calidum in tua
defundere ora debui, ut viventium
biberes cruorem—verba sunt irae data
dum propero. Ferro vulnera impresso dedi,
cecidi ad aras, caede votiva focos
placavi, et artus, corpora exanima amputans,
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Glare 2012: s.v. sinus.
Lewis and Short 1879: s.v. sinus.
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Cf. Tarrant 1985: 199 and note 61 of this chapter.
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in parva carpsi frusta et haec ferventibus
demersi aenis; illa lentis ignibus
stillare iussi; membra nervosque abscidi
viventibus, gracilique traiectas veru
mugire fibras vidi et aggessi manu
mea ipse flammas—omnia haec melius pater
fecisse potuit, cecidit in cassum dolor:
scidit ore natos impio, sed nesciens,
sed nescientes.
…I ought to have poured the hot blood into your mouth straight
from the very wound, so that you could drink the stream of blood
while they lived—my anger was deceived as I rushed.
I dealt wounds with a sword pressed in,
I gave slaughter at the altars, I appeased the hearth with
vowed murder, and, cutting up the half-dead bodies, I tore the limbs
into small pieces and sunk some
into boiling cauldrons; others I arranged to drip
over gentle fires; I sliced the limbs and sinews
as they still lived, and having pierced the entrails
with a slender skewer I saw them groan, and I loaded up fires
by my own hand—all of these things the father could have done better,
my labor was for naught:
He tore his sons with a defiled mouth—but with him not knowing,
and them not knowing. (1054-1068)
Atreus’ account of this scene largely agrees with the details provided by the messenger, and it
even uses several pieces of vocabulary found in the messenger’s description.154 Despite these
similarities in language, however, Atreus’ account does not highlight the exposure and
examination of the internal body as prominently as the messenger’s speech. In fact, we see
that Atreus is inconsistent in relating his treatment of the bodies, only sometimes
characterizing it as a careful procedure. He concedes that he rushes (propero, 1057) and states
that he tore the bodies into pieces (carpsi frusta, 1060). The verb carpere can have
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calidum (1054), cf. calentes (758); viventium and viventibus (1055 and 1063), cf. vivis (755); artus (1059), cf.
artus (763); amputans (1059), cf. amputat (761, 763); membra (1062), cf. membra (761); fibras (1064), cf. fibras
(757).
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connotations of violent tearing, as I take it here, but to be fair, it can also connote more
controlled plucking movements. Tarrant prefers the latter interpretation, stating that carpere
suggests pulling the flesh into pieces with bare hands. The intention is not to stress Atreus’
cruelty, but his care: he thoughtfully does for Thyestes what a guest would normally do for
himself.”155 This reading of carpsi frusta is appealing in the context of preparing for a feast, and
we can also see Atreus acting in a careful manner as he prepares the spits (1062-1065).
On the other hand, Tarrant’s interpretation renders carpere paradoxical in light of the
rushing, careless action suggested by propero. The passage’s unrelenting paratactic syntax—
with no period in the text from 1057-1068—also reinforces this sense of non-stop, frenzied
activity. But paradox seems be just the point here, as it contributes to the heightened
ambiguity inherent in the passage’s representation of how Atreus conducts his handiwork. For,
as in the messenger speech, the language here also suggests that Atreus is something like a
priest performing extispicy (cf. 757-758). This is suggested by the phrase cecidi ad aras, caede
votiva focus placavi (I gave slaughter at the altars, I supplicated the hearth with vowed murder,
1058-1059). Atreus’ use of the word votiva is particularly striking: on the one hand, it
emphasizes Atreus’ determined (or “vowed”, as I have translated it above) devotion to
achieving vengeance, and it also carries connotations of dedication and consecration relevant
to religious ritual.156 Operating in this priestly role, Atreus conjures up notions of carefulness
and dutifulness, not the careless whimsy of bloodlust. As Schiesaro notes, Atreus operates here
with “empirical enquiry”, as “the furor that inspired his actions is thus far is now also explicitly
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Tarrant 1985: 237.
Glare 2012: s.v. votivus; cf. votum.
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presented as a viable source of rational understanding.”157 Along these lines, Atreus is also
characterized as something like a doctor performing a vivisection or dissection (although less so
than in the messenger speech). The conflation of these religious and medical roles in the
characterization of Atreus resonates with the overlaps between doctors and prophets (and/or
priests) in Burkert’s guilt pattern. According to Burkert, it is natural to consult mediators such
as these in times of calamity. Atreus underscores the relative ignorance of those who consult
the mediators by using the pleonastic phrase sed nesciens, sed nescientes, and, by contrast, the
perceived ability of the mediator to “know”, and thus diagnose and predict.
While Atreus can takes on aspects of the priest and doctor, the picture is further complicated
because Atreus also describes his actions in terms of injuring and killing: vulnera…dedi (I dealt
wounds, 1057), cecidi (I gave slaughter, 1058) and caede (murder, 1058). Such language
distances his actions from priestly examination of internal organs, and moves those actions
more toward the realm of sadistic vengeance and a preoccupation with violating the children’s
bodies. This language of wounding and killing also stands in tension with the implicit role of the
doctor as healer of wounds and as one who does not kill.158 When one compares vocabulary
usage in this speech with the messenger’s earlier speech, it becomes apparent that Atreus’
actions take on a greater degree of cruelty when narrated by Atreus himself. For instance, the
messenger speaks of the children’s living chests (vivis…pectoribus, 755), with emphasis placed
upon a body part which is said to be living (and not the children themselves). This contrasts
with language used in Celsus, who refers to vivorum corpora (the bodies of the living, 1.Pr.74.5)
157
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While Hippocratic texts such as The Oath give explicitly prohibition doctors from harming their patients, this
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when discussing vivisection, thus emphasizing that the people themselves are alive, rather than
just parts of the body. Atreus also states that he wishes Thyestes had drunk the blood of the
children while they were still living (viventium biberes cruorem, 1054-1055), and he notes that
he sliced up the entrails of the children while they were still alive (membra nervosque abscidi
viventibus, 1062-1063). In addition to heightening the sense of cruelty, Atreus’ emphasis on
the vivacity of the children also enhances the sense that a vivisection was being performed.
The brutality of Atreus’ actions is also highlighted by his use of amputare, especially when
compared with how the messenger uses the same word. Atreus observes that he was cutting
up the half-dead bodies of the children (corpora exanima amputans, 1059), whereas the
messenger uses amputat (761-763) in reference to Atreus’ cutting up of various pieces of
anatomy (umeros, lacertorum, ossa) without emphasizing their connection to the children
themselves. And while both passages refer to the fibras (entrails) of the children, the
messenger’s mention is somewhat less violent in nature: while the messenger has Atreus
handling (tractat) the entrails, Atreus proclaims that he “pierced the entrails and saw them
groan” (gracilique traiectas veru / mugire fibras vidi, 1063-1064). The verb mugire suggests the
sound that a living animal (especially a cow159) would make; it is thus strikingly, creepily
paradoxical to have fibras as its subject, giving them a sense of liveliness, but not quite
personifying them. These comparisons of vocabulary demonstrate that Atreus’ actions take on
a more vividly violent quality when described by Atreus himself.
It is also striking that Atreus states he saw the entrails groan (mugire fibras vidi, 1064); here
we find another element of paradox, and one that suggests the experience of synesthesia. This
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mixing up of the senses not only adds to the vivid impact of Atreus’ description of his violent
acts, but may also remind us of the condition of Thyestes, who experiences his own form of
sensory confusion earlier in the play. Although Thyestes does not experience a confusion of
two specific senses, as Atreus describes here, he does have sensations that come about
unexpectedly (e.g. imber vultu nolente cadit, 950) and out of sequence (luctus signa futuri
/…praesaga, 958-959), thus problematizing the relationship of cause and effect. Atreus’
observation of the entrails groaning, as expressed by mugire, also recalls the groans (gemitus,
951) which had come about the middle of Thyestes’ speech. While I am not suggesting that
Thyestes’ experience is hallucinatory in nature, I am arguing that the play repeatedly
problematizes processes of sensory perception. The experience of the two brothers is
connected by these unusual forms sensory perception, which is ironic since these unusual
perceptions stem from Atreus’ unbrotherly acts of vengeance. While Celsus does not directly
address synesthesia as a medical condition, he does discuss visual perceptions of things that are
not present (e.g. imagines), associating them with two different forms of madness.160
While Atreus emphasizes the vivacity of the children’s bodies more than the messenger
does, the state of their bodies is still ambiguous in his description. We previously observed
paradox in the messenger’s description of Atreus’ butchering of the children (755-763), where
the organs of Atreus’ children are portrayed in an animated light while the children themselves
are deprived of life. Atreus, on the other hand, implies that the children were, in some sense,
alive as he cut up their bodies through his mention of viventium (while they lived, 1055) and
viventibus (while they were still living, 1063). At the same time, the bodies of the children are
160
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described as exanima (1059), which gives emphasis to the ambiguous state of the children. This
word can be translated simply as “lifeless”, but it can also have the sense of “half-dead” 161 as I
have translated it to highlight the liminal state of the children’s bodies. The notion of being
“half-dead”, is, in itself, a paradox, since life and death are, at least from a medical perspective,
typically thought of as diametrically opposed, absolute states. In Phaedra, the sense of “halfdead”, rather than completely “lifeless”, is apparent when the nurse states that Phaedra’s body
“suddenly falls to the ground, half-dead” (terrae repente corpus exanimum accidit, Phaedra
585).162 Although the nurse may be foreshadowing Phaedra’s death and hyperbolizing her
present condition, she is not literally stating that Phaedra is actually dead. Instead, she is
indicating that Phaedra is showing signs of serious illness when she is approached by
Hippolytus.163 The use of this adjective also calls attention to the fact that Phaedra is
contemplating suicide (which she ultimately carries out), and thus, at least psychologically, in a
liminal zone between life and death. The dichotomy of life and death is also problematized in
another passage from Phaedra in which the messenger describes Hippolytus as semianimem
(1102)—a word which, similar to exanimis, can also be translated as “half-alive”164 or “nearly
dead”.165 With the use of exanimis in Thyestes, the prefix ex- may lead one to assume that the
children are fully dead, in the sense that their anima is gone. At the same time, ex, as a
preposition, can be used to indicate “a transitional stage between one quality and
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another”166—a sense which underscores the liminal condition of the children in this passage.
In Celsus, the adjective exanimis is used only one time, clearly with the sense of “lifeless” or
“inanimate”. This is evident since Celsus first discusses how to remove something that is living
(animal) from the ear, and then something that is inanimate (aliquid exanime, 6.7.9a.1-10). In
another passage, however, Celsus uses the verb exanimare in reference to a person who is not
dead, but merely incapacitated due to an illness arising ex vulva (4.27.1.1-4).167 Indeed,
exanimare can be used to convey that a person is simply “prostrate”168 or “put out of her
senses”.169 Thus, while the woman in this example is incapacitated, she is still very much alive.
Similarly, we can understand Atreus’ use of the adjective exanima as implying that even
through the minds or animae of the children are gone, their bodies are still alive in some sense.
Atreus downplays the children’s level of mental consciousness by referring to them as
nescientes (not knowing, 1068). Although nescire appears only twice in the entire De Medicina,
in both instances living human beings are the subject of the verb.170 The children’s marginal
state of life, along with the simultaneous representation of Atreus as a sacrificial priest and an
avenger bent of violation of the bodies—rather than a healer—problematizes whether the
scene presents us with an image of corpses being dissected, or vivisection of living bodies.
Ultimately, the ambiguities and paradoxes of the scene place it somewhere in between these
two forms of operation, or perhaps to function as both forms of operation at the same time,
adding yet another layer of paradox.
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One can find similar ambiguity between states of life and death in the extispicy scene in
Oedipus (353-383), when Manto, the daughter of Tiresias, observes that one of the two cattle
that are being sacrificed actually rises up and attacks the priests with its horns. 171 Having had
its internal organs thoroughly examined, this cow is described as an “empty body”
(inane…corpus, 379), yet in the same sentence it is paradoxically able to rise up and attack.
Commenting on this scene from a dramaturgical perspective, Kohn observes that the behavior
of the cattle and the representation of extispicy have produced much scholarly controversy in
regard to its staging.172 However the scene may have been performed, this passage suggests
that conducting extispicium on animals is a process that blurs the lines between life and death,
not unlike Atreus’ “dissections” of Thyestes’ children. Indeed, one of the cattle rises up and
attacks in the process of being killed, and Tiresias states that the organs of these animals are
removed “torn from living bodies” (fibra vivis rapta pectoribus, 391); this echoes language used
by the messenger in describing the dissected organs of Thyestes’ children (erepta vivis exta
pectoribus, Thyestes 755). In this scene of extispicium in Oedipus, the dissected body parts of
the animals remain strongly animated: their disturbed intestines, for instance, tremble with
force (non levi motu, ut solent, / agitata trepidant exta, 353-354), and blood continues to pump
171

…et inane surgit corpus ac sacros petit / cornu ministros (and the empty body rises and attacks the holy priests
with its horns, 379-380).
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Kohn provides a thorough discussion of various staging possibilities that could have been used. These include
having actors carry the heads of a bull and a heifer on stage, and then move around to emulate the cows’
movements (whether or not these might be the decapitated heads of real animals is not clear from Kohn’s
comments); having Manto relate what is happening out of sight (if it is assumed that the sacrifices are happening
offstage); having dancers represent the cows and portray their actions through pantomime; and—seemingly the
most unlikely of all scenarios—actually performing a sacrifice of real calves, which might be sedated by drugs.
Kohn also acknowledges the possibility that the play was meant to be recited, in which case there would not have
been a need for any staging innovation. (see Kohn 2013: 37-38; on the dramaturgical problems posed by this
scene, see also Boyle 2011: 186-187; Fitch 2000: 9-11; Sutton 1986: 23) Although pantomime has been proposed
as a possible technique for staging, Zanobi’s recent book entitled Seneca’s Tragedies and the Aesthetics of
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through their veins (novusque prosilit venis cruor, 355). As Kohn has remarked, these physical
details show astute accuracy, “both in terminology and in picking out the features that were
looked for” during the performance of extispicium.173 Similar realism and attention to physical
detail are also seen in Atreus’ human “dissections” as described by the messenger, and then
later by Atreus himself.
Horrified by Atreus’ descriptions, Thyestes responds by expressing his wish that night would
conceal the crimes that have occurred:
…aeterna nox permaneat et tenebris tegat
immensa longis scelera.
…may eternal night remain and hide
the immeasurable crimes in long-lasting darkness. (1094-1095)
As in line 1015 (…nosque defossos tege), this longing for concealment is expressed with the
verb tegere, and the mention of tenebris recalls Thyestes’ earlier apprehensions about being
enveloped in fog and shadows prior to realizing the cause of his illness (caligo tenebris noxque
se in noctem abdidit, 994).174 Thyestes’ reactions in this scene ultimately portray the revelation
and realization of the cause of his suffering not as an illuminating source of knowledge to be
embraced, but rather as a source of further darkness and despair. Revelation of the causes of
illness here lead neither to diagnosis nor to prognosis, nor to an attempt at healing, but to
further defeat and despair.
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Cf. Thyestes 786, 993-994; cf. Agamemnon 456.
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Phaedra
We see something comparable in Seneca's Phaedra. In Thyestes’ situation, the causes of
illness are initially mysterious to the one suffering (Thyestes), but signs of this illness are
evident to an outside observer (his brother Atreus, who is of course also a participant, and a
cause of Thyestes’ suffering). Conversely, in Phaedra, the character, Phaedra, suffers from an
illness whose causes she herself understands, but tries to hide from others, especially her stepson Hippolytus, who is the object of her passion and the cause of her illness. Themes of
concealment and revelation are thus intrinsic to the play, as they are to one of its precursors,
Euripides’ Hippolytos. Discussing this play, Kosak states that Phaedra feels that the cause of her
illness “must remain hidden, for its revelation would mean shame and the loss of honor for her,
a circumstance that she contends would render her life unlivable.”175 In Seneca’s play, we find
the “patient” Phaedra faced with similar circumstances, bent on concealing her illness from
discovery by others176, but eventually revealing it to Hippolytus. In Euripides' extant play, on
the other hand, Phaedra does not reveal her illness, but the nurse does.177 In the plays of both
Euripides and Seneca, the cause of Phaedra’s illness is a “love-sickness” for Hippolytus brought
on by the goddess Venus. A condition well-represented in Greek and Latin literature178, love-
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sickness can be described as a form of erotic desire which not only causes suffering and various
symptoms of illness, but also as a type of illness itself. 179 In Chapter 4, I further discuss various
pieces of Latin vocabulary associated with love-sickness and their connections with madness.
While not initially acknowledging her love-sickness in Seneca’s play, Phaedra early on
describes her experience as a condition of latent, internal distress that is on the brink of
erupting externally:
Sed maior alius incubat maestae dolor.
Non me quies nocturna, non altus sopor
solvere curis: alitur et crescit malum
et ardet intus qualis Aetnaeo vapor
exundat antro.
But another, greater pain weighs on me in my gloom:
no nightly rest, no deep sleep
releases me from my cares: my illness is nourished
and grows and burns inside, just as a fume billows out of
the cavern of Mount Etna. (99-103)
The wording used by Phaedra portrays her love-sickness as an intense internal affliction: it
burns internally (ardet intus) and a secret pain lies within (sed maior alius incubat maestae
dolor, 99). The verb incubare can be translated not only “to weigh upon”—as I render it above
to emphasize the sense that there is a physical burden pressing upon Phaedra— but also “to lie
upon”, “to lie within”180, and “to brood”.181 All of these senses are at work in this context.182

Praegnotione ad Epigenem 6.14). Although the parallels cannot be explored in depth here, one can note that this
story and Seneca’s Phaedra hold in common themes of incestuous passion, attempted concealment, and unwitting
revelation brought about by the appearance of symptoms.
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Shortly thereafter, incubare is used in a similarly open-ended way in a comment made by the nurse: si tam
protervus incubat menti furor…(268). One could render the line “…if such shameless madness lays in your mind” or
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The use of this verb conveys that unspeakable mental distress, in addition to obvious physical
suffering, is deeply burdening Phaedra (i.e. one form of illness “lies upon” another, as if an
additional burden), and it also suggests that her illness has a hidden, underlying cause. We can
also see that Phaedra’s woes are multiplied in the coupling of dolor with the substantive
adjective maestae. The use of this adjective is particularly striking when one notes that it
occurs only once in Celsus, when he is discussing a form of madness in which a person may
become sad (maestus) without a cause (sine causa).183 While I am not suggesting that Phaedra
should be diagnosed with this form of madness, Celsus’ reference to becoming sad without a
cause is interesting, as it serves to remind us that there is no obvious cause for Phaedra’s own
sadness at this point.
Indeed, Phaedra struggles to keep her suffering beyond detection, and in this respect
incubare gives emphasis to the underlying, or concealed, aspect of her suffering. This use of
incubare recalls how subesse is used to emphasize that the cause of Thyestes’ illness is still
unknown to him (Thyestes 976). Segal has also commented upon the internalized nature of
Phaedra’s suffering in these lines, stating that “Phaedra suffers the inner flames of an impure
and secret passion.”184 While Phaedra experiences a highly internalized form of illness, her
suffering is not completely confined internally. As she relates, her distress is beginning to burst

“if such shameless madness weighs upon your mind”. Grimal and Segal have also noted the reverberations
between the uses of incubare in lines 99 and 268. (Grimal 1965: 179; Segal 1986: 54-55) Segal focuses on how
these uses presents images of weightiness, as well as its connections to death, fear, and wrath. Segal also notes
that incubare carries these connotations in Thyestes (401-403) and Oedipus (47), but he does not explore the sense
of “lying within”. Coffey and Mayer deem incubare a “favorite word of [Seneca], especially in a figurative sense.”
(Coffey and Mayer 1990: 99)
183
Interest etiam, ipse sine causa subinde rideat, an maestus demissusque sit…(3.18.22.3-4). This form of madness
is discussed more in depth in Chapter 4.
184
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out and become exposed through physical signs of illness. The image of heat billowing out
from the cavern of Mount Aetna (qualis Aetnaeo vapor exundat antro, 102-103) is employed in
a simile which is appropriate to the breaching of internal and external boundaries. This simile
refers not only to the surfacing of Phaedra’s symptoms, it also alludes to the confession that
will soon emerge from Phaedra. The idea of emergence is emphasized by exundat, whose
prefix ex- highlights the externalized nature of the approaching revelation, similar to effects the
prefix has in Thyestes.185
The image of Phaedra about to burst at the seams is reinforced by the use of incubare, a
verb which is often used in the sense of “to brood” or “to hatch”. Indeed, this is just the sense
the word has the lone time it is used by Celsus, who states: …ideoque perniciosissimae sunt cum
incubant… (therefore [snakes] are the most dangerous when they are brooding, 5.27.10.11-12).
Phaedra is on the verge of a similarly dangerous outburst. Pursuing this line of thought, we
arrive at an image of pain brooding over Phaedra in her gloom like a snake brooding over its
eggs. This image of brooding not only contributes to the general tone of danger and the
potential for destruction, it also allows Phaedra herself to be seen as comparable to a
dangerous serpent. This characterization foreshadows the violent action Phaedra threatens to
perform upon herself, and the vicious lies she tells about Hippolytus, which ultimately bring
about his death.
Later in the play, Phaedra does indeed reveal the nature of her suffering, first to the nurse,
and then, with catastrophic consequences, to Hippolytus. Before she makes these revelations,
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the nurse is left to puzzle over the various symptoms Phaedra is exhibiting. As she struggles to
interpret these symptoms and diagnose a cause for Phaedra’s illness, the nurse explains her
observations to the chorus, using language that describes Phaedra’s state at once in terms of
both concealment and revelation:
Spes nulla tantum posse leniri malum,
finisque flammis nullus insanis erit.
Torretur aestu tacito et inclusus quoque,
quamvis tegatur, proditur vultu furor;
erumpit oculis ignis et lassae genae
lucem recusant; nil idem dubiae placet,
artusque varie iactat incertus dolor…
There can be no hope of alleviating such a terrible illness,
there will be no end to the mad flames.
She is scorched by a silent heat, and even though her madness is concealed,
shut up inside, it emerges in her face;
fire bursts forth in her eyes, and her wearied cheeks
refuse the light; no one thing is pleasing to her while uncertain,
and an uncertain pain tosses her limbs about in various ways… (360-366)
It is interesting that the nurse refers to Phaedra as dubia, a word that may remind us of
Phaedra’s own doubts, even though the nurse does yet not realize that Phaedra is in a state of
doubt about whether she should reveal her passion to Hippolytus. This word also emphasizes
the concealed nature of Phaedra’s illness, especially when one notes that Celsus contrasts
causae that are in dubio with evidentes causae. Celsus draws a strong connection between
causes of illness that are “hidden”, “doubtful” and “uncertain” in stating that the medicus
cannot formulate plans for treatment based upon rebus latentibus (istae enim dubiae et
incertae sunt), but instead based upon evidentibus causis.186 This choice of words is particularly
striking, because immediately after describing Phaedra as dubia, the nurse goes on to describe
186
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Phaedra’s pain as incertus. The similarity of the language used by Celsus and the nurse
underscores the inability to diagnose Phaedra because the causes of her illness remain
“hidden”.
Although the nurse remains very much at a loss to comprehend Phaedra’s condition, she is
able to observe multiple signs of obvious distress: flammis…insanis (mad flames, 361), proditur
vultu furor (madness emerges in her face 363), erumpit oculis ignis (fire bursts forth in her eyes,
364), and artusque varie iactat incertus dolor (an uncertain pain tosses her limbs about in
various ways, 366). These are perceptible aspects of Phaedra’s illness. While the references to
ignis and flammae are not meant literally, these words can provide some possible clues about
Phaedra’s condition. Indeed, fire and flames are some of the most common and traditional
metaphors for erotic desire in Latin literature, and such vocabulary is sometimes associated
with madness, as we will see in our discussion of Hercules Furens in Chapter 4. The externalized
aspect of Phaedra’s condition is also highlighted by the nurse’s use of proditur and erumpit.
Migliorini labels the verb erumpere a “termin[e] tecnic[o]”187, noting the use of the word in
Celsus (2.7.31.6), where it refers to an abscess (abscessus) breaking out (erumpit) around the
ears—thus describing an external manifestation of illness. Indeed, the Latin word abscessus
suggests contravening boundaries, both in its ability to refer to “a departure” or “absence”, as
well as the medical condition known in English as an “abscess” (a localized collection of pus,
often accompanied by swelling and inflammation).188 With this condition, we see that the
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condition of the internal body becomes more apparent through signs revealed externally
(swelling, inflammation, pus).
The verb erumpere is not used again in Phaedra189, but it does appear in a noteworthy
passage from Epistula 56190, where Seneca is discussing the prospect of treating various kinds of
illness:
Omnia enim vitia in aperto leniora sunt; morbi quoque tunc ad sanitatem inclinant cum ex
abdito erumpunt ac vim sui proferunt.
All ills are milder when out in the open; diseases also turn toward health when they burst forth
from a state of concealment and manifest their own power. (Epistula 56.10)
Here, Seneca is comparing forms of illness that have a morally-tinged element (vitia) and forms
of illness that are more tied to the physical body (morbi).191 Both kinds of illness are thought to
be more treatable when they are openly revealed. Seneca uses the phrase ex abdito erumpunt
in reference to the external revelation of diseases (morbi), which is thought to make those
diseases “turn toward health” (inclinat). I understand the words ex abdito as a substantive
adjective phrase (i.e. “from concealment”) which contrasts with the sense of revelation strongly
conveyed by words such as erumpunt and proferunt. Seneca’s use of the word abdito in
reference to “concealed” forms of illness, recalls Celsus’ references to abditae causae.192 The
term abdere is also appears in Senecan tragedy, as we saw earlier with Thyestes (cf. noxque se

189

Erumpere occurs only two other times in Senecan tragedy (Hercules Furens 290 and Hercules Oetaeus 1731),
neither of which are closely connected with the revelation of illness.
190
Migliorini also comments on this passage, observing that Seneca’s comments follow Hippocratic distinctions
between “malattie ‘nascoste’ e ‘palesi’, ‘interne’ ed ‘esterne’”— diseases which are “hidden” and “evident”, or
“internal” and “external”. (Migliorini 1997: 80)
191
The semantic range of vitia and morbi is discussed more in depth in Chapter 2.
192
Mudry has also noted this resonance in usage. (Mudry 1982: 88)

200

in noctem abdidit, 994); forms of abdere also appear four times in Phaedra, although these uses
are not connected with the concealment of illness.193
Seneca’s use of the verb inclinare is particularly noteworthy here, since this word can take on
the sense of “to abate” or “to diminish” when used in reference to a person suffering from
illness.194 Seneca goes on to state that when morbi reveal their own power (vim sui proferunt),
a state of health is closer at hand. Seneca is implying that health results from having a greater
possibility to understand—and thus treat—illness. Indeed, the phrase omnia vitia in aperto
leniora sint suggests that by simply being out in the open, ills in general and diseases in
particular become “milder”; but the implication may well be that they are also easier to
understand and treat. This may be compared to the empiricist view (cf. Proemim 30.6-31.3)
that an obvious cause (evidens causa) offers more hope for knowledge (scientia) and treatment
(medicina) than a cause which is in doubt (in dubio).
These comments from Epistula 56 suggest that illness naturally starts to lean toward health
when the illness emerges unconcealed, with externally visible signs. In Phaedra’s case,
however, despite the various signs that emerge from her body and become evident, the nurse
remains confounded, unable to treat the illness or fully understand its causes. The bursting
forth of fire in Phaedra’s eyes (erumpit oculis ignis), for example, does not produce the
understanding which is expected to come about when illness bursts forth from concealment (ex
abdito erumpunt) in Epistula 56. To be sure, only certain symptoms are “bursting forth”, not
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the illness itself, as in Epistula 56. This in turn raises the question of what exactly is meant by
morbi…ex abdito erumpunt. The most obvious interpretation is that when diseases “burst forth
from concealment”, there has been an appearance of symptoms. But whether it is a question
of symptoms appearing or more vaguely an illness emerging, both in Epistula 56 and in this
passage from the Phaedra we find the verb erumpere; and reading the two passages together
highlights the key difference. In Phaedra's desperate, doomed situation, emergence or
revelation of the diseased condition not only does not lead to diagnosis or a cure, but ushers in
catastrophe and death.
Following his remarks about the “bursting forth” of diseases in Epistula 56, Seneca
elaborates upon the harmful effects that come about when vitia (ills) are not openly exposed:
Et avaritiam itaque et ambitionem et cetera mala mentis humanae tunc perniciosissima scias
esse cum simulata sanitate subsidunt.
And so with greed, excessive desire to please, and the other ills of the human mind, you ought
to know that they are most destructive when they lie low under feigned health. (Epistula 56.10)
Seneca uses the verb subsidere to convey that the “evils of the human mind” (mala mentis
humanae) are concealed. In certain contexts, the verb subsidere can be translated “to lie in
wait for” and “to ambush”195, which relates to Seneca’s idea that illness is especially destructive
when it is concealed. This language recalls how subesse (to lie in concealment) is applied to the
underlying cause of Thyestes’ illness (nec causa subest, 967), while perhaps also evoking the
covert ambush plotted by Atreus.
It is also striking that Seneca describes concealed ills as perniciosissima—the same
superlative adjective used by Celsus in reference to snakes as they brood over—and thus
195
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conceal—their eggs (5.27.10.11-12). In this way, Seneca and Celsus both link concealment with
potential for destruction, and this idea certainly sheds light on how Phaedra is portrayed.
Despite the various symptoms that Phaedra exhibits in lines 360-366, the exact nature of her
condition is not revealed at this point, and the nurse remains incapable of providing diagnosis
or relief. It is telling, then, that the emergence of Phaedra’s symptoms is accompanied by
language of concealment. When describing Phaedra’s symptoms, the nurse notes aspects of
Phaedra’s condition that remain imperceptible, including her aestus tacitus (silent heat, 362)
and inclusus…furor (madness shut up inside, 362-363). The former phrase is a curious pair of
words that pertain to different senses (aestus evokes touch, while tacitus evokes hearing), not
unlike the synesthesia expressed by mugire…vidi in Thyestes (1064). The strangeness and
paradox inherent in this expression further contributes to the sense that the nurse is
bewildered and unable to derive much insight from Phaedra’s symptoms. Even though certain
symptoms are apparent, from the nurse’s perspective things are not much different than if they
were imperceptible. Coffey and Mayer drive at a similar point in their comment on the nurse’s
use of this word, observing that “even though Phaedra has revealed her passion it is still closed
within her.”196 By this, I assume they mean that Phaedra’s hidden passion is betrayed by the
symptoms she is revealing, since she has not yet directly confessed her passion to either the
nurse or Hippolytus. Coffey and Mayer also assert that tacitus is a word commonly used by
Latin poets to refer to wounds, “since they operate invisibly within us.” 197 This remark is
somewhat puzzling, since wounds can in fact offer insight into the interior of the human body,
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Coffey and Mayer 1990: 124.
Coffey and Mayer 1990: 124.
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as we saw with Atreus’ butchering of Thyestes’ children and the flaying of Marsyas, who is
described as “nothing if not a wound” (quidquam nisi vulnus erat, 6.388). In addition, Coffey
and Mayer seem to be blurring senses (perhaps a bit too much like Seneca) in associating the
word tacitus with “invisibility”. Perhaps it could be more precisely said that this word carries
connotations of imperceptibility.
Also paradoxical is the nurse’s reference to Phaedra’s inclusus…furor (madness shut up
inside), which is said to be concealed (tegatur, 363), but nonetheless emerges in her face
(proditur vultu, 363).198 The passive voice of the verb tegatur also highlights Phaedra’s limited
agency and lack of control over her symptoms.199 Furthermore, the juxtaposition of language
of concealment and revelation in this passage recalls Phaedra’s own description of her
condition, particularly when she speaks of her illness as an internal burning (ardet intus, 102) on
the verge of eruption (qualis Aetnaeo vapor / exundat antro, 103).200 In short, Phaedra’s illness
teeters between hidden and manifest states in the early stages of the play.
Later in this speech, the nurse uses language that expresses the liminal, vacillating quality of
Phaedra’s illness even more directly:
…attolli iubet
iterumque poni corpus et solvi comas
rursusque fingi: semper impatiens sui
mutatur habitus. Nulla iam Cereris subit
cura aut salutis; vadit incerto pede…
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Casamento has also noted the juxtaposition of tegatur and proditur. (Casamento 2011: 173)
Segal also comments on the passive voice of tegatur and other verbs in this passage, discussing how such
language emphasizes Phaedra’s “guilt and anxiety”. (Segal 1986: 33)
200
Focusing more on the imagery than the language used in this scene, Segal similarly observes that “the enclosed
fire is here nearer to bursting forth…as the doors of the palace open to reveal the lovesick queen in her hopeless
passion. The stage action of showing the queen languishing in her palace interior enacts the process of revealing
the mystery of passion hidden in her soul.”
199
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…she orders her body
to be raised and put down again and her hair to be unbound
and fixed up once more: incapable of enduring itself,
her condition is constantly changing. She does not have
any care for food or health; she proceeds with an uncertain foot… (370-374)
The nurse is not able to offer any reasoned diagnosis or render effective treatment, and this is
not only because Phaedra’s symptoms are partially concealed, but also because her disposition
is erratic and unpredictable. Her condition is always changing (semper…mutatur habitus, 373374) and incapable of enduring itself (impatiens sui, 373); this is also manifested in her
constantly changing preferences about how she wants her body and hair to be arranged (370372). The word habitus has strong medical connotations, and it appears many times in De
Medicina, where it is used in reference to the present condition of a person’s health (or to the
condition of a person’s symptoms or parts of the body) 201, in reference to a person’s regimen
(diet, exercise, etc.) as it concerns matters of health202, or in reference to the constitution of an
individual person.203 At times, Celsus’ usage of habitus seems to relate to a combination of
these three closely interrelated and often inseparable factors. All of these senses are active in
the case of Phaedra, whose symptoms are constantly shifting, whose health and diet are
unstable and unsustainable, and whose very nature and sense of self are in question. Indeed,
Phaedra is wrestling with her own personal integrity and character—matters of morality or
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e.g. ...cuive in eodem febris corporisque habitu… (or for a person in the same condition of fever and body ,
2.6.7.4-5)
202
e.g. …At si malus corporis habitus est, primum abstinendum est... (But if there is a bad habit of the body, the
person must first abstain [from wine]…, 3.22.7.1-2)
203
e.g. …quae sequi quisque pro habitu corporis sui debet. (each person ought to follow his own bodily
constitution, 1.9.3.2-3)
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ethics which are also encompassed under the semantics of habitus.204 In Celsus we do not find
any condition like Phaedra’s in which a person’s condition undergoes frequent change, and this
is not surprising considering Celsus’ goals of pinning down illnesses and placing them into welldefined categories. An ever-changing , undefinable condition such as that of Phaedra would
seem to pose a problem for such aims. In one instance, however, Celsus does note that it can
be helpful to change a person’s habitus when one is suffering due to a harmful humour:
habitum corporis mutari expedit (it is helpful for the habits of the body to be changed, 2.17.3.1)
It seems very unlikely that such an approach would helpful for Phaedra, though, since she is
already experiencing an overabundance of change, with the nurse expressing an implicit desire
for her condition to stabilize.
It is also noteworthy that the nurse describes Phaedra as impatiens, a word which also
appears in a passage from Thyestes (cf. sentio impatiens onus, 1000) which was discussed
earlier in this chapter. In that discussion, I associated impatiens with the imperceptible causes
of illness coming over Thyestes, along with the insufferable nature of Thyestes’ situation. The
latter sense is more applicable to Phaedra’s situation in this passage, since she, unlike Thyestes,
clearly perceives both the symptoms and causes of her illness.205 The nurse, on the other hand,
is the one who is unable to perceive these things clearly, as the inconstancy and concealment
inherent to Phaedra’s condition override the aspects of her illness that are revealed.
204

Glare 2012: s.v. habitus. One can note the closely parallel semantics of the Greek word ἕξις (state or habit of
the body, acquired habit, state or habit of the mind), which also has connotations similarly relevant to the spheres
of both medicine and morality. (Liddell, Scott, Jones, and McKenzie 1996: s.v. ἕξις).
205
The word impatiens appears two other times in this play, in both cases suggesting a sense of restlessness. In
the first instance, Phaedra refers to the bull with which her mother Pasiphaë mated as torvus impatiens iugi (bull,
intolerable of the yoke, 117). In the other instance, the nurse calls Phaedra impatiens morae (intolerable of delay,
583) as she prepares to confess her feelings of desire to Hippolytus. In Seneca’s Oedipus, the phrase impatiens
morae is also employed by Oedipus during his description of the Sphinx’s aggressive mode of attack (99).
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For the nurse, the picture remains very much one of uncertainty, and this is underscored by
her observation that Phaedra proceeds with incerto pede (an uncertain foot, 374)—a phrase
which recalls the incertus dolor (uncertain pain, 366) mentioned earlier. Coffey and Mayer
assert that incerto pede “repeats…unnecessarily” the phrase soluto…gradu (with a numbed gait,
367). While both phrases do draw attention to Phaedra’s gait, the phrase soluto…gradu does
not emphasize Phaedra’s uncertainty as explicitly.206 The nurse also conveys Phaedra’s
uncertainty in mentioning that “silent heat” (aestu tacitu, 362) scorches her, since aestus can
have not only the sense of “heat”, as in my translation, but also “passion”, “anxiety”, “disquiet”,
“worry”, “embarrassment”, “perplexity”, etc.207 All of these senses are highly relevant to
Phaedra’s experience.
The nurse’s language of perplexity relates not only to her own uncertain frame of mind in
this scene, but also to Phaedra’s indecisiveness about how to deal with her passions. Indeed,
both the nurse and Phaedra are in states of uncertainty at this point, and the nurse laments not
only the hopelessness of Phaedra’s situation, but also her own lack of recourse in lines 360-361.
These lines connect the situation of the ailing Phaedra and the helpless nurse, aligning the
experiencing of the “patient” and caregiver.208 Despite observing some externally manifested
signs of illness, the nurse’s attempts to diagnose Phaedra are thwarted by the partial nature of
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Coffey and Mayer 1990: 125.
Glare 2012: s.v. aestus. Cassamento also discusses the sense of uncertainty evoked by this phrase and other
language in this passage. (Casamento 2011: 173) Aestus is also used in Seneca’s Medea (939), where it highlights
Medea’s vacillating emotions and uncertainty. (see also Boyle 2014: 362)
208
Kosak notes a similar connection between the experiences of Phaedra and her nurse in Euripides’ Hippolytus.
Commenting on the experience of the nurse in Euripides’ play, Kosak goes even further in calling her a “healer who
claims to suffer in tending to her patient” and “an incompetent healer.” (Kosak 2004: 51)
207
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what is revealed, by the simultaneous existence of obvious and hidden signs of illness209, and by
the unstable nature of Phaedra’s condition.
After the nurse describes other symptoms and facets of Phaedra’s condition, she concludes
by noticing that the palace gates are opening, which reveals Phaedra in her state of illness:
Sed en, patescunt regiae fastigia:
reclinis ipsa sedis auratae toro
solitos amictus mente non sana abnuit.
But behold, the upper gates of the palace are opening:
lying on the cushion of her gilded seat,
she refuses her usual garb in her unsound state of mind. (384-386)
This presentation of Phaedra in her state of suffering bears a strong resemblance to the scene
from Thyestes in which Atreus orders the doors of his palace to be opened, revealing Thyestes
just before Thyestes’ own symptoms of illness begin to emerge. The similarity of the two
situations is particularly evident in the opening of the doors (patescunt, Phaedra 384; cf.
patefiat, Thyestes 902), which reveals Phaedra and Thyestes respectively reclining on ornate
seats (reclinis ipsa sedis auratae toro, Phaedra 385; cf. resupinus ipse purpurae atque auro,
Thyestes 909). The related verbs patescere and patefieri are used in reference to the
revelations of Phaedra and Thyestes, respectively; these verbs share the stem pate-, which, as
we have seen, is often used in contexts of revelation in both Seneca and Celsus. In addition, in
both of these scenes the lofty, resplendent nature of the character’s seat stands in ironic
contrast to the downtrodden state of the character’s health, and to the character’s forthcoming
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Segal also comments on this concurrence, although from a perspective focused more on imagery than
language: “In the Phaedra images of fire, enclosure, and heaviness and the contrasting imagery of interior and
exterior space depict the stifling emotional world in which the characters seem trapped.” (Segal 1986: 29; see also
46)
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downfall. In Thyestes, of course, as the doors are being opened Atreus predicts some of the
symptoms he expects to observe in Thyestes, and shortly thereafter these symptoms start to
become apparent. When the doors are opened revealing Phaedra, on the other hand, her
mentally disturbed state is immediately apparent after having been described by the nurse.
Phaedra’s impatiens habitus (373-374), for instance, is again evident in the fickle requests she
makes in this passage to have her outer clothing and jewelry removed, and her hair unbound
(387-403). Despite the fact that Phaedra’s physical body becomes more exposed in these ways,
the cause of her suffering (her love-sickness for Hippolytus) remains undetected by Hippolytus
until significantly later in the play, unfolding more slowly than the revelation of Thyestes’
illness.
The nurse goes on to have a long conversation with Hippolytus, in which he declares his
hatred for women. Phaedra then approaches, intending to reveal her feelings to Hippolytus,
but before she begins to speak, the nurse again describes signs of illness becoming apparent in
Phaedra:
Sed Phaedra praeceps graditur, impatiens morae.
Quo se dabit fortuna? Quo verget furor?
Terrae repente corpus exanimum accidit
et ora morti similis obduxit color.
Attolle vultus, dimove vocis moras:
tuus en, alumna, temet Hippolytus tenet.
But Phaedra, unable to endure delay, approaches directly.
To where will her fortune proceed? Where will her madness turn?
Suddenly her body has fallen to the ground, half-dead
and a death-like hue has covered her face.
Raise up your face, remove the hesitation of your voice:
behold, child, your own Hippolytus is holding you. (583-588)
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The sight of Hippolytus immediately provokes intense, visceral reactions in Phaedra. The
language used to describe these reactions evokes death, both in how her half-dead body
(corpus exanimum, 585) falls to the ground, and in the death-like color that comes over
Phaedra’s face (ora morti similis obduxit color, 586). This phrase suggests a loss of color or
becoming pale, which, as noted in Chapter 2, Celsus considers a very foreboding sign with
respect to health; in some instances it is even considered a sign that death is imminent.210
Furthermore, the word exanimum suggests that Phaedra is headed toward death; as discussed
earlier in this chapter, this word is similarly used to portray a liminal state in the bodies of the
children (corpora exanima, Thyestes 1059) whom Atreus dissects/vivisects. These evocations of
death foreshadow not only the gravity of what Phaedra is about to reveal, but also the act of
suicide that she commits after Hippolytus responds to her revelation with show of revulsion.
Even before she commits suicide, Phaedra is portrayed as in a near-death state.
It is also interesting that the nurse says to Phaedra that “your Hippolytus is holding you”
(tuus…Hippolytus tenet, 588). Imagining how the scene might be performed, Coffey and Mayer
find this use of tuus puzzling, suggesting that it is either meant to be heard only by Phaedra as
she is being held in Hippolytus’ arms, or that it would otherwise cause Hippolytus to wonder
why he is being labeled tuus, a term of endearment “too warm”, according to Coffey and
Mayer, “for a stepson’s embrace.211 The nurse’s reference to “holding” is also striking in light of
the fact that being “held” is a common metaphor for the experience of illness in various genres
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e.g. 5.26.8.2; cf. 2.2.2.2-3.
Coffey and Mayer 1990: 144.
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of ancient and modern literature.212 This concept can be seen in Celsus, who in one instance
refers to being “held by serious diseases” (gravibus morbis tenetur, 2.17.2.4). This metaphor
takes on particular significance in Phaedra’s present experience: as Hippolytus approaches and
holds her, she is being trapped and bound as if she were mired in illness. Under this
interpretation, Hippolytus becomes identified with the illness that constrains her: she is, now
both literally and figuratively, trapped in the grip of her illness. Phaedra is also trapped by her
own passions, which she still cannot bring herself to reveal. In response to being held by
Hippolytus, she can only offer:
Quis me dolori reddit atque aestus graves
reponit animo? Quam bene excideram mihi!
Who restores me to pain and renews these harsh waves
in my mind? How well I did to escape from myself! (589-590)
Immediately upon contact with Hippolytus, pain returns to Phaedra (dolor reddit). This runs
counter to the nurse’s expectations: instead of bringing comfort, Hippolytus’ embrace only
heightens her feelings of illness. Phaedra’s use of the word aestus reminds us that she is
wavering between a state of life and death, since this word can be used in reference to waves
of “heat” as well as a vacillating and irresolute state of mind (cf. aestu tacitu, 362). Phaedra
even hints hint at her thoughts of suicide by using the verb excidere, a word which can also be
translated in various ways, including “to lose control of one’s sense”, “to escape the memory
of”, “to fall away”, and “to perish”.213 Thus, Phaedra is simultaneously relating that she was
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Burkert puts it thus: “the experience of distress is the impression of being bound, fettered, caught in a trap.”
(Burkert 1996: 118-119; see also 120-121, 125)
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Glare 2012: s.v. excidere.
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experiencing less pain when her mind was not focused on Hippolytus, and that she would be
better off dead now that she has been reminded of Hippolytus.
As she struggles to bring herself to reveal her desire to Hippolytus, Hippolytus attempts to
understand the nature of Phaedra’s anguish. Phaedra makes reference to a malum (638)—a
substantive adjective which, as discussed in Chapter 2, can be translated variously as “illness”
“trouble”, “misfortune”, “pain”, “evil”, “fault” etc.214 Phaedra’s use of such an open-ended
word reflects her hesitancy to reveal the exact cause of her suffering, recalling how Tiresias’ use
of malum helps him keep Oedipus in the dark about the nature of his own condition and
identity (Oedipus 387).215 In the following exchange, Hippolytus recognizes that Phaedra is
being vague and evasive, prompting Phaedra to reveal some of the internalized aspects of her
illness:
Hippolytus:
Ambigua voce verba perplexa iacis:
effare aperte.
Phaedra:
Pectus insanum vapor
amorque torret. Intimis saevit ferus216
visceribus ignis mersus et venis latens
ut agilis altas flamma percurrit trabes.
Hippolytus:
You toss out unclear words in confused speech:
speak openly.
214

Glare 2012: s.v. malum. Earlier in the play, the nurse also rather generically refers to Phaedra’s illness as a
malum (360).
215
This example is discussed in Chapter 2.
216
Immediately after this line, Zwierlein places in brackets penitus medullas atque per venas meat. This line,
however, appears in only manuscript A (see Fitch 2002: 500 n. 642), and, according to Coffey and Mayer, “seems
to be cobbled out of Med. 836.” (Coffey and Mayer 1990: 148) I find this line to be unreliable and unnecessarily
repetitious—in both diction and imagery—with the following lines (643-644), and thus choose to leave it out, like
Fitch and many other editors.
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Phaedra:
The heat of passion217 sears my crazed chest.
A wild fire rages deep inside
buried in my inner flesh, hidden in my vessels
as a nimble flame runs through tall timber. (639-644)218
Hippolytus refers to Phaedra’s obfuscatory speech as ambigua voce verba perplexa (unclear
words in confused speech, 639); the interlocking word order in this statement further draws
attention to Hippolytus’ frustration with Phaedra’s obscure manner of speaking.219 In telling
Phaedra to speak in a more straightforward manner, Hippolytus speaks directly, using a phrase
with an unambiguous imperative: effare aperte (640). This use of the adverb aperte recalls
Atreus’ language when he describes the palace after its doors have been opened up, revealing
Thyestes (aperta…tecta, 908) just before he explains some of the symptoms starting to come
over him. In these instances, aperte and aperta occur immediately before Phaedra and
Thyestes disclose symptoms of their respective conditions, bringing their illnesses more into the
light for other characters. Similarly, when Theseus later asks the nurse to explain why Phaedra
has resigned herself to death, he also says effare aperte (speak openly, 859). At that point of
the play, Theseus is seeking clarification because the nurse speaks about Phaedra’s condition in
a cryptic manner. As Theseus observes: Perplexa magnum verba nescioquid tegunt (Unclear
words cover up some great mystery, 858). Here, Theseus echoes Hippolytus’ description of
Phaedra’s explanations as verba perplexa (639); the repetition of this phrase, along with effare
217

Following Coffey and Mayer, my translation takes the phrase vapor / amorque (“the heat of passion”, 639-640)
as hendiadys (more literally, “fume and love”; see Coffey and Mayer 1990: 148).
218
Following Fitch’s text, I omit line 642 (penitus medullas atque per venas meat), which appears only in
manuscript A. (see Fitch 2002: 500, 501 n. 30)
219
De Meo also notes the interlocking word order, which he views as a representation of Phaedra’s tortured state
of mind and body (De Meo 1990: 186). Casamento also comments on the phrase ambigua voce verba perplexa,
stating that it “ottiene l’effetto di spingere la donna a svelare i propri sentimenti.” (Casamento 2011: 197)
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aperte, align the experiences of not only the father and the son seeking to discover the hidden
cause of Phaedra’s suffering, but also Phaedra and the nurse as they attempt to conceal this
cause. Theseus’ use of the verb tegere (858) displays his skepticism about the nurse’s initial
explanations. This statement, coupled with his question quis gravet mentem dolori? (what pain
is leaving on your mind? 859), makes it clear that Theseus senses there is an underlying illness
afoot.
Phaedra partially obliges Hippolytus’ request to speak more openly by making reference to
her heat of passion (vapor amorque, 640-641). This is the first time in the play that she uses the
word amor. At the same time, Phaedra continues to speak cryptically about this passion, not
immediately acknowledging the object of her desire, and emphasizing the internally concealed
aspects of her condition, such as the fire that is buried deep inside her body (intimis…visceribus
ignis mersus, 641-643) and hidden in her internal vessels (venis latens, 643). In addition,
Phaedra’s reference to vapor (640) recalls her earlier reference to vapor billowing out of the
cavern of Mount Aetna (102-103).220 Earlier in this chapter I argued that this reference
foreshadowed that a confession was about to emerge from Phaedra, and it is thus fitting that
Phaedra uses the word again immediately before revealing her amor to Hippolytus. Phaedra’s
use of vapor in this context is also noteworthy because it can suggest environmental pollution,
as seen in Oedipus (47).221 In that play, the pollution of the Theban environment is portrayed as
a manifestation of the pollution within Oedipus’ family, which is strongly connected with
Oedipus’ improper relationship with his mother. In light of this usage, we can see that
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De Meo also notes the repetition of this word. (De Meo 1990: 188)
This sense of vapor is discussed in Chapter 2.
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Phaedra’s use of vapor also evokes the familial pollution stemming from her inappropriate
feelings toward her stepson. Phaedra is just about to reveal these feelings, which will make the
sense of familial pollution more apparent and set into motion the events that cause Theseus to
send his own son Hippolytus into exile, which leads to Hippolytus’ death. The immediate
juxtaposition of vapor and amor reinforces the sense that Phaedra’s passion is a polluting force.
The language Phaedra uses in 640-643 makes her experience more transparent to
Hippolytus, as if she is preparing him for her shocking confession. Yet even while providing a
more intimate glimpse into her inner self, she continues to use vocabulary connected with both
concealment and revelation. The concurrence of such diction speaks to the precarious state of
Phaedra’s thought and action at this point in the play. The obscure aspects of Phaedra’s speech
lead Hippolytus to think that the “passion” she is describing must be directed toward Theseus:
Amore nempe Thesei casto furis? (Are you then mad with a blameless love for Theseus? 645).
Phaedra goes on to make her revelation by comparing Hippolytus’ likeness to that of his father
(646-650), praising Hippolytus’ beauty (657), and finally by stating simply tibi mutor uni (I am
moved by only you, 669). In revealing these feelings, Phaedra tries to assert her purity,
maintaining that she is respersa nulla labe et intacta, innocens (stained by no blemish and
chaste, guiltless, 668). This assertion of purity becomes ironic when one notes that the verb
mutare, which Phaedra uses in the following line, can also be translated “to change”222; this
sense of the word unwittingly undermines Phaedra’s claims to uncompromised chastity.
Throughout the play, change is frequently evident in Phaedra’s physical health and vacillating
mental state, which are greatly affected because of Hippolytus. Phaedra’s use of mutare
222

Glare 2012: s.v. mutare.
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reminds us of these changes in health, especially when one notes that Celsus frequently uses
this verb to convey changes in bodily conditions (especially color), symptoms, and health in
general.223
Mutare can also be translated “to forsake” and “to abandon”—senses that Phaedra may not
intend or hope for, but ones that are evident in Hippolytus’ reaction. Indeed, Hippolytus
responds to Phaedra’s revelation with horror and disgust:
Magne regnator deum,
tam lentus audis scelera? Tam lentus vides?
Et quando saeva fulmen emittes manu,
si nunc serenum est? Omnis impulsus ruat
aether et atris nubibus condat diem,
ac versa retro sidera obliquos agant
retorta cursus. Tuque, siderum caput,
radiate Titan, tu nefas stirpis tuae
speculare? Lucem merge et in tenebras fuge.
Great ruler of the gods,
do you listen to crimes so calmly? Do you look up them so calmly?
And when will you send forth the thunderbolt from your stern hand,
if now it is clear? Let the whole upper sky fall, having been struck down,
and let it hide the day in black clouds,
and let the stars, having turned backward,
steer their paths astray. And you, celestial captain,
shining Titan, do you observe the offense of your descendant?
Bury the light and flee into the shadows. (671-679)
In using various verbs that highlight the sensory experience (audis, 672), vides (672), and
speculare (679), Hippolytus emphasizes that the true cause of Phaedra’s illness is now fully
observable. That the cause of Phaedra’s condition is now out in the open is also reinforced by

223

e.g. …si color aut rubore aut pallore novo mutatus est… (2.7.3.6); Accedit crebra coloris in facie totoque in
corpora mutatio… (4.3.1.5-2.1); ...aut aliter naturali colore mutato… (5.28.15b.4).
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serenum (674), which can be translated “clear”, as rendered above and by Fitch224, as well as
“cheerful” and “free from trouble”225—connotations which are highly ironic in this context. As
is the case in the above passage, Celsus uses this adjective in connection with atmospheric
conditions, stating that saluberrimi sunt sereni dies (clear days are the most healthful).226 In his
ensuing discussion, Celsus associates “clear days” (sereni dies) with an absence of wind, fog,
and clouds, thus suggesting that an unconcealed sky fosters health. Hippolytus seems to
associate these clear signs with health, as well, since he questions why the skies remain clear
and calm even after Phaedra’s illness has been revealed. He thinks it would be more
appropriate for the atmosphere to be shrouded in darkness, and he implores the ruler of the
gods to push matters back into a state of concealment: omnis impulsus / ruat aether et atris
nubibus condat diem (let the whole upper sky fall, having been struck down, and let it hide the
day in black clouds, 674-675) and lucem merge et in tenebras fuge (conceal the light and flee
into the shadows, 679). The vocabulary in these phrases recalls the vocabulary in the
messenger’s description of the darkness that pervades Troy in Agamemnon, a passage
discussed earlier in this chapter: ruat (cf. obruit, 472); atris (cf. atra, 459); nubibus (cf. nubes,
462); condat (cf. conditur, 470); diem(cf. dies, 461); lucem (cf. lux, 461); tenebras (cf. tenebras,
472).227 In both passages, these words contribute to the overall sense of concealment;
Hippolytus, through his hortatory verbal phrases in 674-675 and his imperatives in 679, wishes
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Fitch 2002: 503.
Glare 2012: s.v. serenus.
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2.3.1.1.-2. This is the only instance in which serenus is used by Celsus.
227
The vocabulary used here recalls vocabulary used in scenes from Thyestes that involve motifs of concealment,
for example when Thyestes begins to experience feelings of illness (caligo tenebris noxque se in noctem abdidit,
994) and when Thyestes wishes for death after the cause of his illness is revealed (aeterna nox permaneat et
tenebris tegat / immense longis scelera, 1094-1095).
225
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to be wrapped up in darkness, while the messenger’s language describes the darkness that
enveloped Troy in the aftermath of its destruction. In addition, these passages both make
mention of Titan (Phaedra 678; cf. Agamemnon 460)—in each case referring to a
personification of the sun, whose setting is expected to bring about darkness. The form of
darkness sought by Hippolytus is the darkness of death, as he explicitly states a few lines later
in the speech.228 This desire for death ironically unites Hippolytus and Phaedra at the very
moment when Hippolytus is feeling horrified and disgusted by her. This emphasis on
concealment in Hippolytus’ language suggests that he is more horrified and disgusted by the
fact that Phaedra reveals her passions than the fact that she experiences such passions. In
other words, he is not so disturbed by the nature of Phaedra’s illness and her symptoms, but
rather by the fact that she allows these things to erupt.
Shortly after expressing his desire for death, Hippolytus compares the offensiveness of
Phaedra’s revelation to the conception of the Minotaur by Phaedra’s mother, Pasiphaë.
Hippolytus concludes that, by comparison, Phaedra’s revelation is even more disgraceful than
her mother’s deeds:
O scelere vincens omne femineum genus,
o maius ausa matre monstrifera malum
genetrice peior! Illa se tantum stupro
contaminavit, et tamen tacitum diu
crimen biformi partus exhibuit nota,
scelusque matris arguit vultu truci
ambiguus infans—ille te venter tulit!
Oh, you who surpass the entire female race in wickedness,
oh, having dared a greater evil than your monster-bearing mother,
228

In me tona, me fige, me velox cremet / transactus ignis: sum nocens, merui mori…(Bring thunder upon me, bind
me up, let the swift fire, passing through, consume me. I am guilty, I am deserving of death…, 682-683)
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worse than the parent! She polluted only herself
with disgrace, and nevertheless her offspring,
with its double shaped mark, revealed her long-concealed offense,
the perplexing child displayed his mother’s wickedness in its ferocious face—
that was the womb that bore you! (687-693)
Hippolytus suggests that Phaedra spread her disgrace to others, unlike Pasiphaë, who polluted
only herself (690-691). This remark is somewhat surprising, since Pasiphaë’s “offense” (crimen)
establishes a precedent for illicit passions, which are also expressed in her daughter; in this
sense, the contamination of the mother has spread to the daughter. Indeed, by declaring ille te
venter tulit (that was the womb that bore you, 693), Hippolytus implies that Phaedra’s disgrace
can be traced to her maternal roots. Hippolytus identifies several other connections between
the experiences of these two figures. He notes that Pasiphaë’s offense also lurked in a hidden
state for a long time (tacitum diu / crimen, 690-691). Hippolytus’ use of the adjective tacitus
recalls the nurse’s reference to Phaedra’s concealed “silent heat” (aestu tacito, 362). Although
Hippolytus does not characterize Pasiphaë’s experience as an illness, he does describe the
exposure of her offense as a process of revelation with signs; this process is not unlike the
diagnosis of an illness based upon the observation of symptoms. The Minotaur reveals his
mother’s crime in his hybrid appearance (biformi…nota, 691); this phrase recalls Celsus’ use of
the word nota in reference to symptoms of illness.229 In Fitch’s translation of this passage nota
is rendered as “evidence”, which nicely brings out the word’s connotations of scientific
observation.
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Fitch 2002: 505.
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Moreover, it is noteworthy that nota appears alongside the verb exhibere (691) in this
passage; this verb occurs in Celsus seven times230, including in contexts where symptoms are
displayed. In one example, Celsus refers to signs of impending illness:
Sed cum ab iis coeperim, quae notas quasdam futurae adversae valetudinis
exhibent, curationum quoque principium ab animadversione eiusdem temporis
faciam.
But as I began with those things which display certain signs of adverse future
health, concerning treatment I will also begin by considering the same [future]
period of time. (3.2.5.1-4)
Here, Celsus employs vocabulary similar to the language Seneca uses to convey the idea that
Pasiphaë’s offense is apparent in the figure of her child: in both contexts, there are signs (cf.
notae and nota) that reveal (cf. exhibent and exhibuit) underlying conditions that are not
immediately apparent.231 Both passages also draw attention to the passage of time (cf. tacitum
diu crimen and futurae adversae valetudinis). Without the signs that are manifested in its
external appearance, the bestial pedigree of Pasiphaë’s child (and thus Pasiphae’s offense)
would remain unknown, similar to how an illness eludes detection if it does not exhibit
observable symptoms. In the passage from Phaedra, the verb arguit (displayed, 692) reinforces
the idea that these signs reveal the nature of the child.232 Furthermore, the reference to
Pasiphaë’s child as ambiguus infans (the perplexing child, 693) underscores the fact that the
Minotaur’s physical appearance provides signs that reveal what would be an otherwise
230

2.1.13.3; 2.1.15.4; 3.2.5.2; 3.4.3.4; 5.26.16.4; 7.26.Ic.3; 8.10.Ii.4
Similarly, the nurse later describes Phaedra’s crinis tractus et lacerae comae (pulled hair and torn locks, 731) as
facinoris tanti notae (signs of such a crime, 732).
232
The verb arguere can also be translated “to accuse”, “to bring a charge against”, and “to blame”. (Glare 2012:
s.v. arguere) These senses of the word relate to how Pasiphaë’s virtue is indicted by the monstrous nature of her
child. This is even more explicit later in this scene, when the nurse suggests that they try to transfer the crime
back onto Hippolytus: regeramus ipsi crimen atque ultro impiam / Venerem arguamus (let us transfer the crime
back to him, and accuse him of excessively unchaste lust. 720-721). This verb does not appear in Celsus.
231
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mysterious and uncertain nature. This use of the adjective ambiguus also recalls the remark
Hippolytus makes about Phaedra’s ambigua verba (unclear words, 639) before the underlying
cause of Phaedra’s illness has been fully revealed. While the adjective ambiguus does not
appear in Celsus, we have seen that other adjectives and phrases are used by Celsus to describe
causes of illness which are unclear or unknown, such as abdita, incognita, obscura, latens, and
in dubio.
Chapter Conclusions
This chapter has shown that the Latin vocabulary of concealment and revelation plays an
important role in describing illness in Celsus’ De Medicina on the one hand, and Seneca’s
Thyestes and Phaedra on the other. No previous study that I am aware of has performed an indepth analysis of such terminology in either of these authors, despite their shared interests in
the concealment and revelation of illness. Furthermore, while there has been a good deal of
scholarship on concepts and terminology of the concealment and revelation of illness in Greek
tragedy and Greek medical writing, these matters have been explored far less thoroughly in
relation to Latin literature. In the realm of Greek literature, there has been some debate
concerning the idea that illness is ever concealed. Concerning Greek thought about latent
forms of illness, Padel asserts that the idea “that you could have a virus, or madness, and no
one know, is not a concept available in ancient Greece.”233 Although she acknowledges the
relationship between internal and external states of the body, Padel considers latency to be a
modern construct not consistent with ancient Greek concepts of illness. Holmes has taken
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Padel 1995: 35; see also 43.
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issue with this argument, pointing out examples from Greek tragedy, Hippocratic treatises, and
works from other genres of Greek literature in which the concealment of illness is portrayed.234
Holmes’ observations about concealed forms of illness in Greek literature are consistent with
what we have seen in several works of Latin literature. Celsus’ De Medicina and Seneca’s
tragedies Thyestes and Phaedra offer numerous examples in which the concealment of illness is
described. In such contexts, these authors sometimes use similar words and word-roots,
including the verbs abdere and subesse. One word that Celsus uses with more frequency is
incognita, while ambiguus is sometimes used by Seneca but never by Celsus. Regarding the
revelation of illness, these authors employ even more similar terms, including the verbs videre,
latere, patere, apparere, and exhibere. One term that occurs with more frequency in Celsus is
manifestus. In addition to these terms, Celsus and Seneca are both interested in
signa/notae/indicia (signs or symptoms), as well as causae (causes) of illness.
Both Celsus and Seneca employ language of concealment when causes of illness are
unknown, unknowable, or both. Moreover, language of concealment may be used either in
reference to the one suffering from an illness, in reference to those who observe another
person experiencing symptoms of an illness, or in reference to both. Language of concealment
is also used when symptoms of illness are known, but remain (fully or partially) concealed. In
both authors, language of revelation tends to accompany the emergence of symptoms; the use
of such language sometimes, but not always, signals an understanding of the causes of illness.
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Holmes, for instance, observes that “we are largely unaware of what goes on inside the cavity [inside the body],
allowing trouble to develop without our knowledge. (Holmes 2010: 15) Responding to Padel directly, Holmes goes
on to state that “it is untrue that the concept of a hidden disease was not available to the ancient Greeks.” (2010:
15 n. 53)
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Thyestes, for instance, is able to perceive a multitude of signs and symptoms as his illness
develops, but he is not immediately able to comprehend the cause behind them. Atreus, on
the other hand, is able to comprehend the cause of Thyestes’ illness even before symptoms of
his illness begin to emerge. Although described in language of concealment and revelation, the
experience of both characters complicates the relationship between these phenomena, as well
as the relationship between cause and effect and the usual guilt pattern associated with illness
as described by Burkert. This is in contrast with Phaedra, where Phaedra’s nurse readily notices
various signs of illness emerging from Phaedra, but is at a loss to interpret what is causing
them. For both Thyestes and Phaedra’s nurse, an understanding of causation comes later, and
does not result from the symptoms they observe, but rather from information confessed by
others.
These delays in the revelation of illness lead to paradoxical situations which are often
conveyed on the level of language. Even when symptoms are revealed in Phaedra, Seneca’s use
of language emphasizes concealment, while Thyestes experiences symptoms seemingly sine
causa. Meanwhile, Atreus carves up the living organs of Thyestes’ children even though the
children themselves are described as dead, blurring the lines between dissection and vivisection
and complicating the life-death dichotomy. This is in contrast with Celsus’ comments on
dissection and vivisection, which he presents as forms of medical inquiry that are quite distinct
from each other, both ethically, and in terms of what they are able to reveal about the body. In
Atreus’ act of dissection/vivisection, he is simultaneously cast as a doctor, a Roman priest, and
a sadistic murderer all at once, while his brother remains a helpless patient, not even aware
that he is ill until it is too late. In such ways, Thyestes repeatedly raises perplexing, Stoically223

informed questions about the relationship between body and self. In Phaedra's case, there is
tension around whether concealment or revelation of this particular illness is desirable or not;
her suffering decidedly does not ameliorate as the illness emerges or “erupts”. In the end, the
revelation of the illness leads to no healing at all, but instead to catastrophe and death—not
only of the “patient” Phaedra but also of Hippolytus. All this is in contrast with Celsus, who
generally suggests that the revelation of symptoms and causae of illness aids in the process of
diagnosis and treatment.235
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The scope of this chapter has only allowed for extended consideration of two of Seneca’s plays, but further
studies might examine language of concealment and revelation and its connection with illness in other Senecan
tragedies, particularly Oedipus (esp. 1-5, 37-51, 212-216, 353-383, 591-592, 868-870), Hercules Furens (esp. 939954), and Medea (esp. 50-157).
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Chapter IV
Language of Madness
This chapter comes as the last in the body of this study because it brings together some
earlier-discussed themes, such as terminology for illness, concealment and revelation, and
symptoms, and also because it is a different category and leads into new directions beyond
“physical” forms of illness. Here, I raise new issues dealing with emotion, morality, and
psychosomatic manifestations of illness, while maintaining a focus upon language of “madness”
in Celsus’ De Medicina and philosophical texts and tragedies by Seneca. Unlike the previous
chapters of this study, the present chapter looks at Senecan prose, analyzing some key
passages where language of madness plays an important role. This chapter will provide insight
into how, and to what extent, these texts use language and imagery of madness, and how these
differing genres interact with each other with respect to such language and imagery.1
Several important studies have analyzed the terminology used to express “madness” in
Greek tragedy and Greek medical texts.2 After commenting on some of these studies, I return
to the question of terminology, noting that the very definitions of what constitutes “madness”
or “insanity” (or whatever similar terms there may be in other languages) vary across cultures
and time periods, as do the boundaries between what is considered “healthy” and what is

1

Bosman has noted that previous studies of madness in Greek and Latin literature have tended to take a narrow
perspective, focusing on madness in either the sphere of moral philosophy or the sphere of medicine, without
comparing the two. He persuasively argues that bringing together “the work done in both [of these] fields would
benefit our understanding of ancient madness.” (Bosman 2009: 2-3)
2
These include Padel 1995; Perdicoyianni-Paléologou 2009a and 2009b; Pigeaud 1989a.
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considered “insane”.3 Scholars such as Stok have discussed the terminology of madness in
works of medical prose in Latin4, but attention has been lacking with respect to other genres of
Latin literature. This trend continues even with the very recent collection of essays Mental
Disorders in the Classical World, whose introduction admits that the collection is interested “to
a lesser extent [in how] the Romans saw mental disorders” (i.e. in comparison with how the
Greeks saw these disorders).5 While this book contains much thoughtful discussion, it focuses
primarily upon authors traditionally considered “medical writers”, leaving room for further
analysis of representations of mental disorders in other authors, both Latin and Greek. Like
many other past studies of “mental disorders”, none of the essays in this book explore madness
across genres of Latin literature. This chapter blazes a new path.
Previous studies of mental disorders in Latin literature, including Mental Disorders in the
Classical World, have also tended not to offer close readings of specific passages or to focus on
the Latin terminology—a gap in the scholarship which Harris notes in his introductory
comments.6 This chapter begins to address that gap by performing close readings of Seneca
and Celsus and comparing their usage of terminology. In addition to charting these various
texts' usage patterns and looking for consistency and its absence, I will also be suggesting how
the differing usages reflect specific characteristics, preoccupations, and strategies of the
individual authors and genres at stake. In doing so, I demonstrate ways in which the
3

Foucault’s Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason is a landmark study in the cultural
construction of madness and sanity. (Foucault 1988)
4
See Stok 1980 and Stok 1996a.
5
Harris 2013: 21.
6
Harris 2013: 22-23.
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representation of mythic characters in poetic tragedies (in particular Hercules Furens and
Medea) is influenced and shaped by linguistic and conceptual habits pertaining to madness
which are evident in Celsus’ encyclopedic presentation of medicina and in the Stoically-colored
philosophizing of Seneca prose. My discussion of Senecan tragedy in particular will draw
attention to examples where language of madness reflects the characteristically Senecan
themes of paradox and self-awareness. I will also explore, for example, to what extent, both
Hercules and Medea (and others like them in Senecan tragedy) are described as if they are
suffering from specific conditions such as epilepsy or depression, or a generic but still
medicalized insania as conceptualized in Senecan prose works and Celsus’ De Medicina. My
analysis will show that in some cases the commonalities among these three bodies of texts are
indicative of general features of Latin textuality pertaining to the conceptualization and
expression of madness. Throughout this chapter my analysis continues to focus on
terminology, and there is a wide array of vocabulary in these works to be taken into account,
including insania/insanire, exsanire, phrenesis, dementia/demens, amentia/amens, vesanus,
furor, ira, rabies/rabere/rabidus, hilaritas/hilaris, delirium, and hysteria.
Before beginning to discuss the relevant terminology in Celsus, it is necessary to comment
on the English word “madness” and its use. Although the term “madness” is used throughout
the present chapter, we must acknowledge that it is, for many reasons, a problematic term to
use in an analysis of Latin literature.7 In the parlance of modern English, “madness” is, of

7

For a discussion of some of the problems associated with the applying terms such as “madness” and “mental
illness” to the context of classical literature, see Simon 1978: 31-34 and Bosman 2009: 1-3.
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course, a notoriously imprecise and general term which is used in reference to a variety of
psychological conditions and behaviors.8 The same can be said of the English word “insanity”,
which is sometimes used in a way similar to “madness.” Neither the terms “madness” nor
“insanity” are currently used in the establishments of medicine or psychology”9; the world of
psychology, for example, speaks instead of “mental illness” or “mental disorder”, and there is
no consensus about which term is preferable.10 Differences between registers of usage are also
evident in the Latin vocabulary of madness, as Stok has pointed out that there is a “tensione
esistente fra il significato ‘scientifico’ dei termini e l’uso prevalente nel linguaggio comune”.11
This tension makes it both impossible and undesirable to translate these Latin terms the same
way in every context.12
Despite its “non-technical” connotations, “madness” remains a prominent word in literary
studies of psychological disorders and mental illness, as is evident from the titles given to

8

In addition, the use of the adjective “mad” in American English Is marked by further complexity: it has also come
to have the sense of “angry”', as in: “I was sooo mad!” (a use which is interesting in light of connections Seneca
makes between insania and ira). This use only seems to apply to the adjective—the noun 'madness' does not
commonly have the sense of “anger” in American English. By contrast, the stereotypical British exclamation “Are
you mad?!” or the phrase “stark raving mad” convey the sense of “insane, crazed”. George Rosen also discusses
some of the semantic nuances of the English word “madness” and corresponding terms in Greek and Latin. (Rosen
1968: 90; see also OED Online: s.v. madness (n.); mad (adj.).
9
While “insanity” is no longer issued as a medical diagnosis, it continues to be used as legal term in the United
States, originating from its use in common law. (see Tighe 2005: 252) “Madness” is not currently used as either a
medical term or a legal term in the United States.
10
Simon 2013: 28.
11
Stok 1980: 11
12
Simon echoes this sentiment, observing that “despite several decades of scholarly activity aimed at delineating
the precise boundaries and meanings of the various mental terms, it is difficult to render these terms consistently,
let alone in a manner that consistently corresponds to English usage, poetic, popular or scientific.” (Simon 1978:
59)
228

recent works of influential scholarship.13 Some prefer to use the term “insanity” as a general
category for such disorders14, but this word is also tricky because of its superficial similarity to
the Latin word insania. Despite their etymological connection, the Latin insania does not neatly
correspond to the English “insanity”. It has a wide variety of possible translations: according to
the Oxford Latin Dictionary, “madness”, “rage”, “delusion”, “folly”, “imprudence bordering on
madness”, etc.15; Lewis and Short include other translations such as “senselessness”, “excess”,
“extravagance in any thing”, “enthusiasm”, “rapture”, and “inspiration”.16 This list underscores
the highly broad and complex nature of the Latin word. Insania is, of course, related to the
adjective insanus, which, according to Ernout and Meillet, is almost always applied to mental or
psychological states17, as is reflected in the first entry under insanus in the Oxford Latin
Dictionary: “of unsound mind”, “demented”, “frenzied”, “mad.”18 The Oxford Latin Dictionary
also indicates that when insanus is applied to non-human subjects, its sense is not as obviously
tied to mental health, with possible translations such as “exceeding reasonable limits”,
13

e.g. Foucault, Michel. Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason. (1988); Gill,
Christopher. “Mind and Madness in Greek Tragedy.” (1996); Padel, Ruth. Whom Gods Destroy: Elements of Greek
and Tragic Madness (1995); Simon, Bennett. Mind and Madness in Ancient Greece: The Classical Roots of Modern
Psychiatry. Ithaca 1978. French and Italian scholarship have also tended to use terms that have generic and “nonscientific” connotations (folie and follia, respectively), not unlike the English word “madness”: Pigeaud, Jackie. Folie
et cures de la folie chez les médecins de l'antiquité gréco-romaine (1989a); Pigeaud, Jackie. “La rélexion de Celse
sur la folie.” (1994). 257-279; Auvray, Clara-Emmanuelle. Folie et douleur dans Hercule Furieux et Hercule sur
l'Oeta: Recherches sur l'expression esthétique de l'ascèse stoïcienne chez Sénèque (1989); Stok, Fabio. “Follia e
malattie mentali nella medicina dell'età Romana” (1996a).
14
e.g. Foucault, Michel. Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason. New York 1988; Tighe,
Janet A. “‘What’s in a Name?’: A Brief Foray into the History of Insanity in England and the United States.” Journal
of the Academy of American Psychiatry and the Law 33.2 (2005): 252-258.
15
Glare 2012: s.v. insania.
16
Lewis and Short 1879: s.v. insania.
17
Ernout and Meillet 1951: insanus.
18
Glare 2012: s.v. insanus. Cf. Lewis and Short: “unsound in mind”, “raging”, “raving”, “foolish”, etc. (Lewis and
Short 1879: s.v. insanus)
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“extravagant”, “absurd”, “wild”, etc. In addition insanus can have the sense of “raging” or
“furious” when applied to “natural forces”, thus attributing a mental or psychological
component to things that are not living beings. As for the unnegated adjective sanus
(“[mentally or physically] sound”, “healthy”, “wholesome”19), the Oxford Latin Dictionary, Lewis
and Short, and Ernout and Meillet all note that it can be applied to both the body and the
mind.20 Etymologically speaking, then, insania rather generally suggests being “not sound” or
“not healthy”, and in this sense the word can have euphemistic undertones (much like an
English speaker might say that a mentally ill or mentally distressed person is “not well”). The
broad nature of the word sanus is on display at the very beginning of Book 1 of De Medicina,
which opens by commenting on the nature of a sanus homo (1.1.1.1); here, Celsus’ usage
seems to encompass all aspects of human health, both mental and physical.21 As we look more
closely at the usage of insania and insanus in Seneca and Celsus, it will become very apparent
that both of these words can have mental and physical connotations—and sometimes both at
the same time, since these authors do not always draw a firm boundary between mental and
physical health.
The Greek word μανία and its Latin derivative, mania, may approach the sense of
“madness”, as it is often rendered in English, but the Greek and Latin words do not, as we will
see, have exactly the same senses and connotations as the English “madness”. There is also the
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Glare 2012: s.v. sanus.
Lewis and Short: s.v. sanus; Ernout and Meillet 1951: s.v. sanus. Ernout and Meillet connect the etymology of
sanus to saluus/salus, which they in turn connect to the Greek ὅλος. (Ernout and Meillet 1951: s.v. sanus; saluus).
21
The opening sentence of Book 1 Is discussed more in depth later in this chapter.
20

230

English word “mania”, which psychologists use to refer to a condition characterized by
extremes of mood and “abnormally and persistently increased goal-oriented activity or
energy”, and various other symptoms.22 Harris has encountered similar translation issues in his
discussions of ancient Greek conceptualizations of “anger”. He observes that scholars have
often used the English word “anger” to translate a variety of Greek terms, such as μῆνις, ὀργή,
χόλος, and θύμος, despite the fact that none precisely correspond to the semantics of the
English word.23 A similarly diverse array of Latin words has been translated as “madness”, but,
as this chapter will show, they all fail to capture the nuances of the individual Latin terms.
While these semantic complexities are certainly important to note, we cannot allow our
discussion to be derailed by them. Thus, as a piece of working vocabulary, I employ the
imperfect but generic word “madness”. One reason this word is appealing is that it does not
rope off physical components in the same way that as phrases like “mental illness” or “mental
disorder”. Indeed, Greek and Roman descriptions of madness often entail physical dimensions
of suffering and/or bodily manifestations of illness, which make phrases like “mental illness” or
“mental disorder” problematic. 24 These phrases focus on the experience of the mind, while
“the mind”—itself a vague and flimsy concept—is not always perceived as the locus of
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American Psychiatric Association 2013: 124; see also 125-129.
See Harris 2001: 25. Commenting on the “language of emotions” more generally, Kaster notes that “no two
emotional terms in either [Latin or English] map perfectly onto each other: their amor is not always and exactly our
“love,” their odium is still less our “hate”. (Kaster 2005: 6; see also 7-12)
24
Discussing the representation of a condition known as phrenitis in Greek and Latin literature, Sakai observes: “in
order to avoid cultural biases, one must stress as much as possible the relationship between mind and body.”
(Sakai 1991: 194; see also 196, 198)
23
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“madness” in Greek and Roman thought.25 Commenting on the “somatic and behavioral
manifestations” of certain conditions depicted in classical literature, Harris observes that there
is not a “strict mind-body opposition such as has been familiar since Descartes”. 26 It is thus
somewhat curious that the collected volume edited by Harris is given the title Mental Disorders
in the Classical World. Since the mental experience is often closely connected with the physical
experience in Greek and Latin literature27, I avoid using terms like “mental disorder” and
“mental illness” whenever possible.
As with any other form of illness recognized in antiquity, it would be very problematic to try
to equate forms of the madness that are described by Celsus and Seneca with diseases or
disorders recognized by modern medicine. Drabkin has noted that ancient categories of mental
illness “would correspond to various modern manic-depressive and schizophrenic forms, and
also, apparently to some severe neuroses, whereas certain milder neuroses might not be
recognized as mental diseases at all by ancient medical writers.”28 To this I would add that the
reverse is also true: certain behaviors or symptoms categorized as mad or associated with
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Commenting on Celsus specifically, Roccatagliata observes, “per Celso, come per alcune scuole mediche antiche
le malattie mentali non sono affezioni di un organo determinate, ma disturbi ‘di tutto il corpo’ (totius corporis)…Il
sintomo psichico è manifestazione e espressione di una malattia globale (somatica) ovvero di una accentuazione
dell’influenza che le passioni umane hanno sul corpo.” (Roccatagliata 1973: 48; see also 49)
26
Harris 2013: 11; see also 14, 17.
27
Auvray is another scholar who has noted that Greek and Latin writings on medicine frequently conceptualize
madness as two-fold in nature, with both physiological and psychological components: “…la conception médicale
de la folie se présente sous deux formes complémentaires: justaposition des malaises du corps et de l’âme d’une
part, conséquences physiologiques de troubles psychiques d’autre part.” (Auvray 1989: 71) Auvray suggests that
this two-fold model of madness is a “conception médicale”, but in this chapter we encounter examples from socalled “non-medical writings” (i.e. Senecan prose works and tragedies) where madness is shown to have both
psychological and physiological components.
28
Drabkin 1955: 227.
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forms of “madness” in Latin texts (furor, insania, dementia, etc.) may not be considered
abnormal or “mad” in context of the modern world. Indeed, Drabkin's formulation almost gives
the impression that “modern” terms and categories are the objective truth against which
“ancient” terms can be measured for their proximity or distance from that objective truth, and
not possibly the other way around. It may be more judicious to simply state that ancient
observations about illness often do not fit with modern observations and modern medical
knowledge. Thus, my English translations of Greek and Latin terms pertaining to madness are
not intended to correspond to terminology currently used in the field of psychology or other
scientific fields. My translation of the Latin mania as “mania” in English, for instance, will not
have the same semantics as the modern psychological term. Another caveat is that mental
health is, to some extent, culturally constructed and thus culturally relative; to echo Harris,
what might be considered a form of insania or a disorder in antiquity might be considered
merely a “character flaw or moral failure” today29, and vice versa. By keeping these
methodological complexities in mind throughout this chapter, we aim to arrive at a more
sensitive and nuanced understanding of madness in Celsus and Seneca.
Language of Madness in Celsus
Celsus’ comments on madness in section 3.18 of De Medicina have received a good deal of
scholarly attention (though little in the way of English language scholarship).30 In my discussion
of this section, I will focus on the terminology that Celsus uses to describe different forms of
29
30

Harris 2013: 14.
e.g. Auvray (1989); Pigeaud (1981, 1994); Roccatagliata (1973); Stok (1980, 1994).
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madness and their symptoms, and I will point out some nuances of usage which have not
received enough attention. In doing so, I will lay the groundwork for the following sections of
this chapter, where I discuss Seneca’s usage of terminology.
Celsus’ remarks on madness in De Medicina follow a lengthy discussion of different types of
fever. As he brings this section to a close, Celsus connects the thread of his comments on
fevers with this new topic of discussion by observing that fever is also associated with certain
forms of insania (3.18.1-6). At the same time, Celsus shows that he is moving into a new area
by stating that he will be turning the discussion toward corporis adfectus…qui certis partibus
adsignari non possunt (conditions of the body which are not able to be assigned to specific
parts, 3.18.1.3-4). Celsus then elaborates upon these conditions that do not affect a specific
part of the physical body, grouping them under the vast label insania (3.18.1.5). Spencer
comments that Celsus uses the term insania “in its widest sense [sic] unsoundness (of mind)”31,
but certain forms of insania described by Celsus have physical as well as mental symptoms.
Thumiger, on the other hand, is one scholar who has noted that Celsus applies insania to a
disparate array of psychological and physical experiences.32 Celsus comments on three distinct
forms of insania, which scholars frequently refer to as phrenesis, bilis atra or melancholia, and
mania33, despite the fact that only the first label is actually used by Celsus. This tripartite
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Spencer 1935: 288 note a.
Thumiger 2013: 65. Allbutt also observes that Celsus, like Hippocrates, Asclepiades, Soranus, and Aretaeus
“realised the bodily causes of insanity…” (Allbutt 1921: 256)
33
In French scholarship, the term typically used to translate insania, as used by Celsus, is folie, and Celsus’ three
categories of folie are typically rendered as “phrénitis”, “mélancholie”, and “manie” (cf. Pigeaud 1994: 257, 264).
These French words appear frequently in scholarship on concepts of madness in Celsus.
32
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framework, arranged by duration (from the shortest to longest-lasting form of insania, with
each form broken down into further sub-types), allows Celsus to make distinctions between
symptoms, diagnosis, and treatment for each form. Celsus’ comments on insania have little to
say about causation, which may be related to Celsus’ belief that insania cannot be assigned to a
specific body part (3.18.1.3-4). Despite the fact that they cannot be assigned to a specific part
of the body, Celsus does not speak of “hidden causes” (abditae causae /obscurae causae) of
insania or forms of insania that lack a cause (sine causa).
The first form of insania described by Celsus is explicitly called phrenesis (3.18.3.1), a term
whose origin Celsus credits to the Greeks (φρένησιν Graeci appellant, 3.18.1.6).34 Here,
Marx’s text presents this term in Greek letters, using a spelling of the word which appears in
only De Medicina (the nominative form of the Greek word is typically written as φρένιτις).35
According to Harris, Celsus’ spelling is a “misspelling” attributable either to Celsus or to a
copyist of his text.36 Orthography aside, the term hearkens back to a belief connecting psychic
activity with the region of the φρήν37, an organ variously identified with the heart, the
diaphragm, and the midriff region. Although it is often linked to specific parts of the body in
the Greek and Roman imagination, phrenesis is not a word that translates well into English, and
this is especially true of Celsus’ usage. The Oxford Latin Dictionary supplies “madness”, “frenzy,
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The use of the Greek word φρένιτις can be traced back as far as the Hippocratic treatise Aphorisms (3.30).
See Andre 1971: 35.
36
Harris 2013: 22.
37
Drabkin 1955: 226, n. 9. In many Greek texts, the φρήν is regarded as the seat of the mental faculties, and
perception.
35
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and “delirium”38, but none of these translations is very helpful. Given that phrenesis is a
specific category, “madness” is much too general. “Delirium” is problematic because it looks
the same as the Latin word delirium, and because it is a word that Celsus associates with other
forms of madness. “Frenzy”, an English word derived from φρένησις, may be the most
acceptable39, but even that translation does not capture certain aspects of phrenesis as it is
described by Celsus. Thus, I choose to refer to this form of insania simply as phrenesis.
One important aspect of phrenesis that would not necessarily be understood from the
translation “frenzy” is that it is a condition which is said to be marked by the presence of febris
(fever).40 This is a defining aspect of the condition, and Celsus directly connects phrenesis with
“feverishness” earlier in De Medicina:
At si a prima hieme austri ad ultimum ver continuarint, laterum dolores et
insania febricantium, quam phrenesin appellant, celerrime rapiunt.
But if the south wind lasts from the beginning of winter to the end of
spring,pains in the sides and the insanity of those in fever, which they call
phrenesis, kill very swiftly. (2.1.15.1-4)
Here Celsus appears to equate phrensis with insania febricantium, and during his comments on
phrenesis in Book 3 he identifies certain symptoms that cannot occur except during the
presence of a strong fever: neque incidere potest nisi in febre vehementi (3.18.2.4). These
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Glare 2012: s.v. phrenesis.
Lawlor is one scholar who uses “frenzy” as a translation of phrenesis/phrenetis. (Lawlor 2012: 26) There are few
English translations to compare, as scholarship on phrenesis—not just in English, but in any language—is rather
scarce. Both Stok and Pigeaud—two of the major scholars of phrenesis—comment on the paucity of scholarship.
(Stok 1996: 2318; Pigeaud 1981: 125)
40
Febris occurs several times in this section (e.g. 3.18.1.6; 3.18.2.4; 3.18.2.8).
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symptoms include becoming at a loss with respect to one’s wits (desipere, 3.18.2.2)41 and
speaking nonsense (loqui aliena42, 3.18.2.2). Celsus mentions these symptoms, and especially
the symptom of fever, as a way of distinguishing phrenesis from other forms of insania
discussed in 3.18. Phrenesis is also distinguished from other forms of insania by its acuta
(3.18.1.6) or short-lasting nature.43
As Celsus moves on to explaining how phrenesis develops, he closely links it with another
condition, dementia:
Phrenesis vero tum demum est, cum continua dementia esse incipit, cum aeger,
quamvis adhuc sapiat, tamen quasdam vanas imagines accipit: perfecta est, ubi
mens illis imaginibus addicta est.
It becomes, finally, phrenesis, when a continuous dementia44 begins: when the
person who is ill, although in good senses up until then, nevertheless entertains
certain empty visions: it (i.e. phrenesis) is established when the mind is given
over to those visions. (3.18.3.1-4)
Here, Celsus identifies phrenesis as a continual, or long-lasting, form of dementia. The qualifier
continua suggests that dementia is typically a very short-term condition, since phrenesis itself is
said to be acute. Celsus also states that phrenesis entails a lack of “being in one’s good senses”
41

Spencer translates that the afflicted become “delirious” (Spencer 1935: 289), but this risks confusion with the
Latin term delirium.
42
This idiom also occurs in Ovid’s Tristia, where it has a similar sense. Addressing his wife, the exiled and
distressed narrator, whom we might identify with Ovid himself, cries out: Quin etiam, sic me dicunt aliena locutum
/ ut foret amenti nomen in ore tuum. (Indeed, they say that even when I spoke nonsense, your name was on my
senseless lips. 3.3.19)
43
Pigeaud and Stok note that the short-lived nature of phrenesis sets it apart from other forms of insania. (Pigeaud
1981: 73; Stok 1980: 21; Stok 1996: 2334) The distinction that many Greek and Latin writings on medicine make
between illnesses that are acuta and longa is also noted in Chapter 2.
44
Translations of dementia in the Oxford Latin Dictionary include “derangement of the mind”, “madness”,
“insanity”, and “folly” (Glare 2012: s.v. dementia). Since these translations overlap with the translations I use for
other terms discussed in this chapter, I choose to translate the term simply by using the English word “dementia”,
well aware that this translation possesses many connotations inappropriate to Celsus’ usage (for example, in
English “dementia” commonly refers to a mental condition that affects only people of advanced age).
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(sapere), which recalls his earlier comment that phrenesis involves “being at a loss with respect
to one’s wits”, which is expressed by a negated form of the same verb (desipere, 3.18.2.2). In
this respect, Celsus is consistent in his use of terminology.45 Less consistent, however, is the
translation Spencer offers for this sentence.46 Even though he renders insania as “insanity”
earlier in this section (3.18.1.5), Spencer translates phrenesis as “insanity” here (3.18.3.1), thus
flattening out Celsus’ distinction between insania and a form of insania.47
Celsus also considers the advent of vanae imagines (empty visions) to be a sign that
phrenesis has really set in. This comment is noteworthy especially because Celsus associates
imagines or “visions”48 with other forms of insania. In his comments on phrenesis, the imagines
are said to be vanae (empty)—a modifier which is not used with the other references to
imagines in De Medicina. Exactly what is meant by “empty”, however, is less clear, as Celsus
does not elaborate beyond pointing out that they are a sign of continua dementia. The
adjective vanus possesses a wide semantic range49, but it Celsus may be suggesting, in a
somewhat indirect way, that these visions are “empty” in the sense that they are not based
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Celsus also uses the verb desipere in a similar sense when describing a specific sort of phrenetics who cannot
control their own words (verba desipiunt, 3.18.3.7; verba desipiunt, 3.18.4.1-2).
46
“But insanity is really there when a continuous dementia begins, when the patient, although up till then in his
senses, yet entertains vain imaginings; the insanity becomes established when the mind becomes at the mercy of
such imaginings.” (Spencer 1935: 289, 291)
47
Migliorini asserts that the terms insania and phrenesis are used “senza sostanziali differenze” by Latin writers
such as Seneca and Pliny the Elder, but this is clearly not the case with Celsus, since he considers phrenesis to be a
specific form of insania. (see Migliorini 1997: 56-57)
48
In this context, Spencer translates the word as “imaginings” (Spencer 1935: 289, 291), which diminishes the
visual element present in Celsus’ use by the word imago. Mazzini notes that Celsus uses the word imago as a
metonym for “allucinazioni” (hallucinations), and he suggests that Celsus is the first Latin medical writer to use
imago in this way, citing this as an example of Celsus’ “innovazioni semantiche”. (Mazzini 1991: 182)
49
To list some of the many possibilities, vanus can be translated as “empty”, “hollow”, “illusory”, “false”,
“unreliable”, and “vain” (Glare 2012: s.v. vanus).
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upon or derived from any objective truth or externally verifiable reality. Celsus uses this
adjective in a similar sense when he later describes the treatment of an individual with
phrenesis who experienced vani metus (empty fears).50 This individual is said to have feared
starvation, despite the fact that he was very rich and thus had no reason for such concerns; in
this way, his fears were not based in reality. It is also significant that Celsus points out that
these visions overtake the mind (mens illis imaginibus addicta est, 3.18.3.4), thus explicitly
acknowledging a mental or psychological component of phrenesis. This aspect seems to given
little weight by Pigeaud, who states that phrenesis “est une maladie essentiellement
somatique”.51 There certainly are physical components of phrenesis (especially fever), but to
call it an illness which is essentially physiological in nature overlooks important psychological
components.
While Celsus considers phrenesis to be a subcategory of insania, he also identifies further
subsets of phrenesis:
Eius autem plura genera sunt: siquidem ex phreneticis alii tristes sunt, alii hilares;
alii facilius continentur et intra verba desipiunt; alii consurgunt et violenter
quaedam manu faciunt; atque ex his ipsis alii nihil nisi impetu peccant, alii etiam
artes adhibent summamque speciem sanitatis in captandis malorum operum
ocassionibus praebent, sed exitu deprenduntur.
But there are several kinds (of phrenesis52): indeed some among those who
suffer from phrenesis are sorrowful, while others are excited; some are easily
controlled and are only at a loss with respect to their words; others become riled
50

3.18.10.3-5.
Pigeaud 1981: 71
52
Spencer’s translation again lends itself to confusion between the more specific category of phrenesis and the
more general category of insania by rendering the phrase eius autem plura genera sunt as “there are several sorts
of insanity”.
51
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up and engage in physical violence, and among these, some do wrong only by
impulse, but others employ cleverness and project the greatest appearance of
sanity while seizing the occasion for bad deeds, but in the outcome they are
caught. (3.18.3.5-11)
At the beginning of this passage, Celsus refers to plura genera (several kinds) of phrenesis,
without specifying an exact number. The indefinite plura genera leaves open the possibility
that there are even other forms of phrenesis beyond those which are identified in his following
sentences. Celsus proceeds to identify four types of phrenesis53
1). phrenetics who are sorrowful (tristes)
2). phrenetics who are excited (hilares)
3). phrenetics who are easily controlled and only at a loss (desipiunt) with respect to their
words
4). phrenetics who become riled up (consurgunt) and act violently (violenter…manu faciunt)
The fourth category of phrenetics is further divided into two sub-types: those who do wrong by
impulse (impetu54 peccant), and those who employ cleverness while projecting the greatest
appearance of sanity (artes adhibent summamque speciem sanitatis). The latter subcategory
suggests a degree of self-awareness not evident in Celsus’ description of the other kinds of
phrenetics, and also not evident in the other forms of insania Celsus describes. This array of
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Roccatagliata identifies “essenzialmente tre” types of phrenesis in Celsus, based upon their “aspetto
semeiotico”: “un tipo con prevalenti disturbi a carico dell’umore, un tipo con disturbi ideoverbali e un altro con
alterazioni della psicomotilità”. Under this framework, the first and second types that I recognize above
(phrenetics who are tristes and phrenetics who are hilares) are subsumed into a single category (i.e. “un tipo con
prevalenti disturbi a carico dell’umore”). (Roccatagliata 1973: 50)
54
The word impetus can refer to “an attack of a disease” (Glare 2012: s.v. impetus). Celsus uses it in this way, as
well in reference to an attack of severe fever (e.g. 2.15.1.5-2.2). Since fever, according to Celsus, is an important
symptom of phrenesis, the phrase impetu peccant may imply that certain kinds of phrenetics may be “compelled”
to do wrong (through no planning or intention of their own, but because of their fever), as opposed to the next
type of phrenetics, who are crafty and try to conceal their misdeeds.
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behaviors and mental states illustrates the breadth of the term phrenesis.55 To what extent the
different categories of phrenesis are discrete and distinct from one another is not made totally
clear. Our discussions of the other forms of insania described by Celsus will point out instances
where Celsus uses similar language or mentions symptoms similar to those described in his
comments on phrenesis.
The remainder of Celsus’ rather extensive comments on phrenesis (secs. 3.18.4-3.18.16)
deals primarily with how to treat the different kinds of phrenetics—a subject which I will not
delve into here, keeping my focus on terminology. But one noteworthy term appears in this
section, when Celsus is commenting on the ineffectiveness of treating a phrenetic with a rising
fever:
Remedia vero adhibere, ubi maxime furor urget, supervacuum est: simul enim
febris quoque increscit.
Truly, to apply a remedy becomes futile when the raging is driven to its height:
for the fever is simultaneously intensifying. (3.18.6.1-3)
This use of the word furor (translated here as “raging”56) is interesting, both because of the
parallelism between the peaking furor and the intensifying fever (febris…increscit), and also
because the word furor does not appear anywhere else in Celsus’ discussion of phrenesis or in
his comments on the other forms of insania discussed in Book 3.57 Stok suggests that this
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Bosman has commented that phrenesis was described as “a disease of the body as well as the mind” by other
ancient medical authorities such as Herophilus, Asclepiades, and Caelius Aurelianus. (Bosman 2009: 134)
56
Spencer’s translates this use of furor as “delirium”, which again has potential for confusion with the Latin word
delirium.
57
According to Auvray, Caelius Aurelianus equates the terms furor and insania (Auvray 1989: 71), but this is not
the case with Celsus.
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particular use of furor is intended to refer to a highly severe stage of phrenesis.58 This is a
persuasive conclusion, given that the furor is said to be driven to its height (maxime…urget), as
if reaching a climactic moment, and by the fact that fever is said to be intensifying
(febris…increscit). The term furor appears only two other times in De Medicina, both in
contexts where Celsus is relating insaniae signa (signs of madness, 2.7.26.1), but without
mentioning any specific form of insania.59 In these instances, furor is not strongly differentiated
in sense from insania, since Celsus alternately mentions signs of insania and signs of furor in
this context. I will return to furor during my discussion of Seneca’s prose works and tragedies,
where the term plays a significant role.
The second form of insania described by Celsus (3.18.17-18) is not explicitly given a name,
but Celsus’ remarks strongly suggest a connection with the Greek term μελαγχολία60 (which
some authors, but not Celsus, transliterate into Latin as melancholia61). Because of this tacit
connection, scholarship on Celsus’ forms of insania often refers to this form as melancholia (or
malinconia in Italian, mélancolie in French, and Melancholie in German), despite the fact that
Celsus does not actually give the condition a name. Keeping this in mind, I refer to it as “Celsus’
second form of insania” (vel sim). Nonetheless, an apparent connection with melancholia is
evident in Celsus’ remark that “it consists of sorrowfulness, which black bile seems to bring
58

Stok 1996: 2335.
In the first instance, Celsus states that furor can arise when there Is a constant fever and inflammation which
subsides without the formation of pus; Celsus also states that this condition can bring about the danger of death.
(2.7.26.1-3) In the second instance, Celsus states that a suffusion of blood in a woman’s breasts indicates the
onset of furor (2.7.27.1-2).
60
For instance, Roccatagliata states: “Un secondo tipo di insania (follia) è malinconia.” (Roccatagliata 1973: 53)
61
On the transliteration and translation of μελαγχολία into Latin, see Jackson 1986: 4.
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about” (Consistit in tristitia, quam videtur bilis atra contrahere. 3.18.17.3-4). In Greek writings
on medicine, an excess of black bile is typically identified the cause of melancholia; indeed, it is
likely that the name of this condition is constructed from the Greek words μέλαινα (black,
dark) and χολή (bile).62 As Migliorini notes, Celsus’ phrase bilis atra appears to be a calque of
μελαγχολία understood this way63, and in Book 2, Celsus makes an even more explicit
connection between bilis atra and the Greek term μελαγχολία.64 Capitani has observed that
the phrase bilis atra also appears in works by earlier Latin authors such as Plautus, Varro, and
Cicero.65
Later in Book 2, Celsus implies that bilis atra is its own distinct disease, identifiable by specific
symptoms:
At si longa tristitia cum longo timore et vigilia est, atrae bilis morbus subest.
And if there is a prolonged sorrowfulness with prolonged fear and wakefulness,
the disease of black bile is lurking. (2.7.19.3.-20.1)
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Some scholars, however, have called into question this etymology. Langholf, for instance, asserts that “the
derivation [of μελαγχολία from μέλαινα + χολή] is extremely unlikely”, and posits instead that μελαγχολία
must derive instead from the adjective μελάγχολος, which contains the adjectival ending –χολος, “signify[ing]
functions of the soul such as wrath or anger”. (Langholf 1990: 47-48) For a thorough list of scholarship on the
etymology of this word, see Thumiger 2013: 63 n. 13.
63
See Migliorini 1988: 48 n. 104. Migliorini also notes that there are other Latin calques based upon
μελαγχολία, such as bilis atra and fel nigrum; the latter is in fact an expression used in Seneca’s Oedipus (felle
nigro, 358). Seneca’s reference to “black bile” in this play represents a difference with Greek tragedy, which never
uses the comparable word μελαγχολία. (see Padel 1995: 21)
64
2.1.6.4-5.
65
Capitani 1975: 504 n. 201. Cf. Plautus’ Amphitryon 727, Captivi 596; Varro’s Saturarum Menippearum 146;
Cicero’ Tusculanae Disputationes 3.11.
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This statement, which Pigeaud considers a reiteration of “la définition canonique de la
mélancholie66, parallels Celsus’ later comments on bilis atra in that it associates the condition
with tristitia (sorrowfulness, cf.3.18.17.3-4), a word that has sometimes been translated as or
equated with “depression”67. Later in this chapter, I discuss some of the reasons why it is
problematic to translate this term (or any other Greek or Latin term) as “depression”. Setting
aside matters of translation for the moment, we can note that these comments on tristitia
recall Celsus’ earlier reference to a type of phrenetics who have tristes cogitationes (sorrowful
thoughts, 3,18.10.9-10); this group is contrasted with phrenetics who hilares (cheerful,
3.18.3.6). Both phrenesis and bilis atra are thus associated with “sorrow”. Bilis atra /
μελαγχολία is attested to exist in both “depressive” and “manic” forms in Greek and Latin
literature, but Celsus, in identifying tristitia as a defining feature of the condition, appears to be
the first writer in either Greek or Latin to identify a “depressive” form of the condition68, and he
is also unique in not identifying a manic form of it. Before Celsus, this condition is thought to
assume a manic form, and even after Celsus’ time that perception remains prevalent in Greek
and Latin writings on the subject. At the same time, bilis atra is not the only piece of
terminology equated with the Greek term μελανχολία in Latin texts. Cicero, for instance,
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Pigeaud 1994: 274. As Pigeaud points out, Celsus’ remarks at 2.7.19.3.-20.1 appear to be a translation of a
sentence from the Hippocratic text Aphorisms: Ἤν φόβος ἠ δυσθυμίη πουλὺν χρόνον διατελέῃ
μελαγχολικὸν τὸ τοιοῦτον. (5.23)
67
The Oxford Latin Dictionary offers translations such as “unhappiness”, “despondency”, and “moroseness”, but
not “depression”. It does, however, offer “depression” as a possible translation of the closely related tristitas.
(Glare 2012: s.v. tristitia; tristitas) Lewis and Short provide translations such as “sadness”, “melancholy”, and
“dejection”. (Lewis and Short 1879: s.v. tristitia)
68
Toohey 2004: 207; see also Toohey 1992: 282.
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identifies the Greek term μελαγχολία with the Latin word furor, stating: quem nos furorem,
μελαγχολίαν illi [Graeci] vocant (What we call frenzy, the Greeks call melancholy, Tusculanae
Disputationes 3.11.18-19). By identifying μελαγχολία with furor—a violent, raving,
uncontrollable force—Cicero emphasizes the manic aspect of the condition.69 This example
serves to remind us that in this, and many other cases, there is and can be no one-to-one
mapping of Latin on to Greek terms (and, by extension, of terms in English or any other modern
language on to either Greek or Latin terms).
Another similarity between Celsus’ second form of insania and his description of phrenesis is
that both conditions are associated with fever. Celsus states that the latter form of insania
begins without a fever, but incites a slight feverishness (…sine febre incipit, leves deinde
febriculas excitat, 3.18.17.2-3). At the same time, the slightness of the fevers (conveyed by the
adjective leves and the diminutive noun febriculae) distinguishes atra bilis from phrenesis. In
addition, Celsus’ second form of insania is said to last for a longer duration than phrenesis
(quod spatium longius recipit, 3.18.17.1-2) because those afflicted are able to endure the slight
fever for a longer period of time than phrenetics can endure the fever associated with their
condition.
As with his second form, Celsus does not give a specific name to the third form of insania
that he describes (3.18.19-23). Lawlor refers to this third form of insania as “melancholy”70,
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On Cicero’s identification of these terms, see Padel 1995: 53; Pigeaud 1981: 259-260.
Lawlor 2012: 26. Note that Lawlor refers to Celsus’ second form of insania as “mania (raving)”, even though
neither the Latin word mania nor the Greek μανία occur in Celsus’ description.
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but this is obviously problematic, given the connections between atra bilis (the second form of
insania identified by Celsus) and μελαγχολία. Perhaps the most distinct aspect of the third
form of insania is its long-term nature, which is the first thing that Celsus points out about it:
Tertium genus insaniae est ex his longissimum, adeo ut vitam ipsam non
impediat; quod robusti corporis esse consuevit.
The third form of insania is the most prolonged of them all, yet in such a way as
not to threaten life itself, for it is typically associated with a strong body.
(3.18.19.1-3)
Celsus’ comments about the first two forms of insania focus on the sickened state of both the
mind and the body, but Celsus’ remarks here immediately draw attention to the bodily strength
(robusti corporis) possessed by people who have this form of insania. This third form of insania
is also distinct from the other forms of insania in that it does not have the symptom of fever
(febris). Celsus does not state it explicitly, but the absence of fever may have a correlation to
the prolonged nature of this form of insania, since fever is often associated with acute illnesses.
As with phrenesis, Celsus’ third form of insania is differentiated into further subcategories:
Huius autem ipsius species duae sunt: nam quidam imaginibus, non mente falluntur, quales
insanientem Aiacem vel Orestem percepisse poetae ferunt: quidam animo desipiunt. Si
imagines fallunt, ante omnia videndum est, tristes an hilares sint.
There are two types of this [form of insania]: for certain ones are led astray by visions, not by
the mind—the sort [of visions] the poets say Ajax, driven mad, or Orestes perceived; others lose
their ability to reason. If visions lead them astray, it must be observed above all whether they
are sorrowful or cheerful. (3.18.19.3-20.2)
Since I will be discussing madness in mythological figures in tragedies composed by a poet,
Celsus' application of his taxonomy of insania to Ajax and Orestes as they are described by
poets is of great interest. To paraphrase Celsus: “The poets say that Ajax and Orestes saw
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visions; using the terminology of medical learning, I say that they experienced a species of the
third genus of insania.” My own discussion asks a related question: how exactly, and with
which words, does one poet, Seneca, describe this and other kinds of illness? What overlaps
and divergences do we find from Celsus' descriptions? In this respect, Celsus’ comments about
Ajax and Orestes offer an ancient precedent for the study of madness across genres of
literature.
Celsus’ third form of insania is divided into the categories of those who are “led astray by
visions, not by the mind” (imaginibus, non mente falluntur), and those who “lose their ability to
reason” (animo desipiunt). From a modern perspective, this is a rather shaky dichotomy, as one
might conclude that the perception of “visions” would necessarily imply a loss of reason. Harris
takes the phrase imaginibus, non mente falluntur to suggest that “hallucinations are [the]
principal or only symptom” of this specific condition, but that is not explicitly stated by Celsus.
Harris does not address the dichotomy drawn between those who are “led astray by visions,
not by the mind” and those who are “at a loss of reason,” and Celsus’ comments in the rest of
the passage do not help to clarify his dichotomy, either. This dichotomy may not be very
transparent from a modern perspective, but it is, as Pigeaud has noted, nevertheless an
important part of the framework Celsus uses to outline his third form of insania.71 As noted
earlier in this chapter, Celsus also cites the perception of imagines as a symptom of phrenesis
(3.18.3.3; 3.18.3.4). But in the case of phrenesis, Celsus states that the mind itself is given over
to visions (mens illis imaginibus addicta est), and, although it is not explicitly stated in the text,
71

Pigeaud 1987: 122.
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this appears to mark a key difference between phrenesis and the third form of insania.72 In
addition, in Book 2 Celsus also mentions that imagines can be experienced in certain forms of
atra bilis73, which is identified with the second form of insania in Book 3. In this way, imagines
are associated with each of the three forms of insania discussed by Celsus—an interesting
aspect which, to my knowledge, has not been noted in previous scholarship.
The imagines associated with phrenesis are described as vanae (empty, 3.18.3.3), but no
such modifier is used in reference to the imagines associated with Celsus’ third form of insania.
While Celsus’ descriptions do not provide much direct clarification about the difference
between vanae imagines and imagines, but it might be significant that Celsus considers the
mens a factor in cases of phrenesis where vanae imagines are experienced, but not in cases like
those of Ajax or Orestes, where the mens is explicitly not a factor. But ultimately Celsus leaves
the distinction between visions that are “empty” and visions that are not “empty” unexplained.
Celsus does relate, however, that the imagines associated with the third form of insania were
experienced by Ajax and Orestes (quales insanientem Aiacem vel Orestem percepisse poetae
ferunt).74 The inclusion of figures from poetry and mythology is noteworthy, as this is the only
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In an effort to maintain consistency of translation, I have rendered imagines as “visions” in both contexts, in
contrast to Spencer, who translates imagines as “imaginings” in the context of phrenesis (3.18.3.3, 3.18.3.4), but
then translates the word as ”phantoms” in the context of the third form of insania (3.18.19.4, 3.18.20.1; see
Spencer 1935: 289, 291; 301) One advantage of Spencer’s differing translations is that—intentionally or not—they
draw attention to the differing nature of the imagines in each context.
73
2.7.20.1-21.1.
74
These references to mythological characters were surely well-understood by Celsus’ readers. In Greek and
Roman mythology, Ajax becomes enraged because Odysseus, and not he himself, is awarded the weapons of the
slain Achilles. In a deluded state, Ajax slaughters a flock of sleep which he imagines to be the leaders of the Greek
army (cf. Sophocles’ Ajax). Celsus describes Ajax as insanientem, using a term which brings to mind the general
term insania (rather than a specific form of insania, which is what Celsus is discussing in this context). Orestes is
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instance in which Celsus makes reference to named individuals (whether mythological or
historical) in his categories of insania. In works of Greek tragedy, the “visions” experienced by
these characters tend to have a divine component of causation75, but this is not reflected in
Celsus’ comments about them. This “removal of divine force” is, according to Bosman, an
important aspect in discussions of madness by other Greek and Latin writers of medical prose,
such as Aretaeus of Cappadocia and Caelius Aurelianus.76 Celsus thus suggests that Ajax and
Orestes are examples of individuals who experience visions but do not “lose their ability to
reason” (animo desipiunt)—a sentiment not totally in keeping with the representation of these
figures in Greek tragedy. It is also noteworthy that Celsus’ comments do not delve into the
causation of the imagines.
Within the subcategory composed of individuals who are led astray by visions under the
third form of insania, Celsus further distinguishes between those who are tristes and those who
are hilares (3.18.20.1-20). This dichotomy is familiar from two of the subcategories of
phrenetics distinguished by Celsus (3.18.3.6). The repetitiveness of these criteria has led Stok
to conclude that the third form of insania described by Celsus is rather imprecisely defined.77

driven into a state of madness and pursued by the Erinyes after murdering his mother, Clytemnestra, in his
attempt to obtain revenge for her lack of loyalty to his father, Agamemnon. In his state of madness, Orestes
perceives visions of the Furies haunting him and threatening to murder him (cf. Aeschylus’ Eumenides; Euripides’
Orestes).
75
Stok 1980: 28.
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Bosman 2009: 124; see also 126.
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Stok 1980: 28. Auvray also points to similarities in the symptoms that Celsus attributes to different forms of
insania, noting the problematic nature of “le caractère imprécis et général de ses symptômes.” (Auvray 1989: 70)
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This is also suggested by the vagueness in Celsus’ discussion of the imagines associated with
this form of insania.
The verb desipere is another word that appears in both the above passage (3.18.19.3-20.2)
and in Celsus’ comments on phrenesis.78 Celsus contrasts those who are led astray by visions
but not by the mind (quidam imaginibus, non mente falluntur) with those who are at a loss of
their reason (animo desipiunt). Stok describes the latter condition as “perdita completa delle
facoltà intellettuali”79, and this emphasis on the mental aspect of the condition is also evident
in Celsus’ use of the word animus.80 The use of this word parallels the use of non mente, which
makes the qualification that the imagines perceived by figures like Ajax and Orestes are not
caused by the mind. This qualification further emphasizes the mental aspect inherent to the
other set of sub-types categorized under the third form of insania. Here, mens and animus
both refer to the mind, without any apparent difference in sense. Celsus also uses the word
consilium to refer to mental faculties 81 when discussing how this form of insania should be
treated when the mind (consilium) is a factor.82 From these examples we can see that Celsus
uses a variety of words in reference to the mind and mental function.
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Cf. 3.18.2.2; 3.18.3.7; 3.18.4.1-2. The sense expressed by desipere in these contexts is similar to its sense in
3.18.19.3-20.2, where it also expresses a lack of reason.
79
Stok 1980: 22-23.
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The word animus has an extremely broad semantic range, with senses that include “the mind as opposed to the
body”, “the soul”, “consciousness”, “life”, “sense” and “character”. (Glare 2012: s.v. animus) Lewis and Short offer
“reason” as another possible translation. (Lewis and Short 1879: s.v. animus) A discussion of the word’s many
senses and connotations is beyond the scope of this study.
81
As is the case with animus, the word consilium has a very broad semantic range, ranging from “advice” and
“intention” to “judgment” and “mental ability”. (Glare 2012: s.v. consilium)
82
Si vero consilium insanientem fallit, tormentis quibusdam optime curatur. (If it is in fact the mind that leads
astray the maddened person, s/he is best treated by certain tortures. 3.18.21.1-2)
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Following extensive comments about the treatment of the third form of insania, Celsus
surprisingly introduces yet another, separate category of insania:
Raro sed aliquando tamen ex metu delirium nascitur. Quod genus insanientum
specie83… similique victus genere curandum est, praeterquam quod in hoc
insaniae genere solo recte vinum datur.
Rarely but once in a while delirium is born from fear. This type of insane
peoplehas similar subcategories, and it is to be treated with a similar type of
diet, except that in only this kind of insania is wine appropriately given.
(3.18.24.1-4)
Scholars often state that Celsus discusses three forms of insania, routinely glossing over
delirium (“a derangement of the mental faculties”, “delirium”, “frenzy”)84, or simply not
counting it as a category of insania. This is despite the fact that Celsus explicitly refers to those
who experience delirium as a type of insane people (genus insanientum), and despite the fact
that Celsus’ comments on delirium immediately follow his discussion of his third form of
insania. Scholars’ omission of this term from discussions of insania may be related to the fact
that although the word delirium occurs seven other times in De Medicina, it does not occur in
proximity with the term insania in any other context. In some of the other contexts where
delirium occurs, there are mentions of symptoms associated with other forms of insania
(particularly fever), but in no other context does Celsus describe delirium as a form of insania.
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There is lacuna in the text here. Spencer, following the suggestion in Marx’s edition of the text (1915),
understands species similes habet. My translation follows suit.
84
Glare 2012: s.v. delirium.
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In two instances, Celsus describes conditions in which trauma to the head or brain causes
delirium.85 In one of these instances, he relates that trauma can impair cognitive functioning in
various ways, but he stops short of calling this a form of insania:
Sin cerebrum membranave eius vulnus accepit, sanguis per nares, quibusdam
etiam per aures exit; fereque bilis vomitus insequitur. Quorundam sensus
optunduntur, appellatique ignorant; quorundam trux vultus est; quorundam
oculi quasi resoluti huc atque illuc moventur; fereque tertio vel quinto die
delirium accedit…
When the brain or its membrane has received a wound, blood comes out
through the nostrils, and in some also through the ears; bilious vomiting
generally ensues. Some people’s senses become dulled, and they are unaware
when addressed; some have a wild countenance; in some the eyes move about
back and forth as if they have been unleashed; generally delirium comes about
on the third or fifth day… (5.26.14.1-7)
This passage uses language which, as we will see later in this chapter, also appears in Senecan
descriptions of people who are consumed by anger (ira), such as an agitated vultus and darting
oculi.86 The lack of self-awareness that Celsus associates with delirium also parallels the
uncontrolled, oblivious state that Seneca associates with ira.87 Seneca, however, does not use
the word delirium in this context or anywhere else in his works of prose and poetry; he instead
refers to anger as brevis insania. The loss of cognitive function apparent in the above
description of delirium also recalls certain aspects of Celsus’ third form of insania (cf. animo
desipiunt), but the fact that this condition is caused by a head injury seems to set it apart from
what the other forms of insania. This suggests that Celsus’ usage of terminology associated
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2.7.28.7-8; 5.26.14.1-7.
Cf. De Ira 1.1.3.4;1.1.4.1.
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1.1.2.1-1.1.3.1.
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with madness and mental impairment takes into account not only the symptoms that are
displayed, but also the causes of those symptoms.
Overall, Celsus’ comments on delirium are not very specific, but he does differentiate
delirium from other forms of insania in terms of its causation and its treatment. According to
Celsus, the main thing that distinguishes delirium from other forms of insania is that it develops
from fear (ex metu…nascitur). This statement seems to be contradicted by Celsus’ comments
about how delirium can be caused by brain trauma, but it is noteworthy that “fear” is not
mentioned as either a symptom or a cause of any of the other forms of insania described by
Celsus. As treatment for delirium, Celsus recommends a diet that is similar to the treatment for
other forms of insania (similique victus genere curandum est), except that wine is also to be
given (vinum datur) in the treatment of delirium.
Celsus describes other conditions characterized by mental and/or psychological impairment
without referring to those conditions as forms of insania. These conditions have received little
attention in previous scholarship. One such condition is lethargus:
Alter quoque morbus est aliter phrenetico contrarius. In eo difficilior somnus,
prompta ad omnem audaciam mens est: in hoc marcor et inexpugnabilis paene
dormiendi necessitas. Lethargum Graeci nominarunt. Atque id quoque genus
acutum est, et nisi succurritur, celeriter iugulat.
There is also another illness, contrasting with the phrenetic [illness] in a different
way. In this sleep is rather difficult, and the mind is inclined to every
recklessness; in this [illness] there is a wasting away and an almost
insurmountable need for sleep. The Greeks call it lethargy. And it is also an
acute type, and if it is not treated, it is quickly fatal. (3.20.1.1-6)
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Celsus does not discuss lethargus during his main discussion of the three forms of insania
(3.18), but he still contrasts it with phrenesis. Exactly what the difference is, however, is not
made totally clear, and there are in fact certainly some similarities between the two conditions:
both are acute (acutum), and both result in mental impairment. A few sentences after the
above passage, Celsus states that fever is a symptom of lethargus (3.20.2.8)—another similarity
with phrenesis. Other Latin authors, such as Caelius Aurelianus and Pliny, actually consider
lethargus and phrenesis to be highly similar or even the same condition88, but Celsus explicitly
states that they are different from one another. What is clear is that Celsus identifies aspects
of lethargus that are not associated with phrenesis or other forms of insania, thus illustrating
what is distinct about lethagrus. This includes various symptoms, such as sleeplessness
(difficilior somnus; inexpugnabilis paene dormiendi necessitas), a disposition to recklessness
(prompta ad omnem audaciam mens est), wasting away (marcor), and the potential for a quick
death (celeriter iugulat).
Another noteworthy condition discussed by Celsus, but often left out of discussions of
madness in his work, is comitialis morbus. This condition is commonly identified with epilepsy
and is often translated as such89; the Latin term in fact refers to the practice of suspending
meetings of the comitia if a member experienced an attack of the illness, which was believed to
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See Stok 1996: 2319-2320.
In Spencer’s translation of Celsus, the term comitialis morbus is variously rendered as “epilepsy”, “epileptic fits”
or just “fits”.
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be divine in nature.90 In Greek literature, this condition was often called ἡ ἱερὰ νόσος, or “the
sacred disease”, due to the popular belief that those affected by it went under divine influence
when attacked by seizures, the most obvious symptom of the illness. Latin writers, such as
Caelius Aurelianus, Vegetius, and Aelius Lampridius refer to this condition as epilepsia (a
borrowing of the Greek ἐπιληψία), using a term which does not appear in Celsus. Spencer
observes that this word was avoided by some authors because it was considered to be “illomened”.91 Although Celsus never identities comitialis morbus as a form of insania, in multiple
instances it is discussed in close context with insania.92 Perhaps because he believes the
condition to be well-known, Celsus provides minimal description of its symptoms:
Inter notissimos morbos est etiam is, qui comitialis vel maior nominatur. Homo
subito concidit, ex ore spumae moventur, deinde interposito tempore ad se
redit, et per se ipse consurgit.
Among the better known diseases is the one which is called comitialis, or “the
greater disease”. A man suddenly falls down, foam is produced from his mouth,
and then, after an intervening time he returns to himself, and he stands up
under his own power. (3.23.1.1-4)
Celsus describes an intense physical experience, but his description does not provide much
insight into the mental or psychological components of the condition. Rather vaguely, he states
that one returns to oneself (ad se redit)—a phrase which could have mental or physical
implications (or both). In his discussion of phrenesis, Celsus uses a similar, but more specific
phrase when describing how one’s mind is recovered once the condition is relieved: mens
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Epilepsy was believed to be divine in cause at least as far back at the Hippocratic treatise “Περὶ Ἱερῆς Νόσου”
(On the Sacred Disease, probably late 5th century BCE), which challenges the idea of it having a divine cause.
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Spencer 1935: 332 note b.
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2.1.6.5-6; 2.1.21.1-5; 2.13.1.7; 2.13.2.6; 2.15.4.11.
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redit(3.18.2.6). Celsus’ more ambiguous phrase, ad se redit is also used to express recovery
when Celsus is describing a disorder of the womb, which he contrasts with morbus comitalis:
Ex vulva quoque feminis vehemens malum nascitur proximeque ab stomacho vel
adficitur haec vel corpus adficit. Interdum etiam sic exanimat, ut tamque
comitiali morbo prosternat. Distat tamen hic casus eo, quod neque oculi
vertuntur nec spumae profluunt nec nervi distenduntur: sopor tantum est.
Idque quibusdam feminis crebro revertens perpetuum est…Deinde ubi ad se
redit, circumcidendum vinum est in totum annum, etiamsi casus idem non
revertitur.
From the womb there also arises in women a very intense illness; after the
stomach, this [organ] is most affected, and affects the body most. At times it
drives one so out of their senses that one is laid prostrate as if by morbus
comitialis. This state differs from that one [morbus comitialis] because the eyes
do not revolve, nor does foam come forth, nor do the sinews spasm; there is just
a deep sleep. In some women this is a frequent thing, constantly recurring…
Then when she returns to herself, she must abstain from wine for a whole year,
even if the same state does not return to her. (4.27.1a.1-8; 4.27.1b.10-11)
Spencer identifies this condition with hysteria due to the similarity of the above description and
a description of hysteria in the Hippocratic text Aphorisms93, but it should be noted that Celsus
does not actually give it name. This condition, like morbus comitialis, appears to drive a person
out of her senses (exanimat), but there is some ambiguity since the verb exanimare can also
have the sense “to deprive [one] of life”.94 Celsus’ reference to sopor (sleep) reinforces the
sense that this condition, as well as morbus comitialis, produce an inability to act or reason,
perhaps akin to not being alive. This verb’s connotations of lifelessness, or at least nearlifelessness, recalls how Seneca uses the adjective exanimis to describe the “half-dead”
condition of the bodies of Thyestes’ children when Atreus is “dissecting” them (corpora
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exanima, Thyestes 1059).95 In Phaedra, the nurse also uses this adjective when she is
describing the condition of Phaedra’s body (corpus exanimum, 585) shortly before she reveals
her feelings of passion to Hippolytus. Here, Phaedra is not actually dead, although her ability to
think and reason has no doubt been impaired.
Celsus also points out some important differences between the condition described above
and morbus comitialis. In doing so, he describes other symptoms which are associated with
morbus comitialis (but not the condition in the passage above), including revolving eyes (oculi
vertuntur) and spasming sinews (nervi distenduntur). Celsus otherwise does not provide much
information about the mental or psychological experience of people who are affected by
morbus comitialis. Based upon the few symptoms Celsus does mention, and the language he
uses in relating them, it appears that morbus comitialis does not have a close resemblance to
any of Celsus’ forms of insania, or any of his other forms of madness. I will return to Celsus’
description of morbus comitialis when discussing Seneca’s play Hercules Furens later in this
chapter.
Language of Madness in Senecan Prose
In this section, I discuss selected passages of Senecan prose which are concerned with
various forms of madness in works. I begin with Seneca’s use of terminology in his Epistulae,
drawing comparisons with the terminology employed by Celsus. Seneca’s Epistulae are
collection of the 124 letters addressed to Seneca’s friend Lucilius, forming a series of
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See Chapter 3.
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philosophical essays which are concerned, directly or indirectly, with how to become a wise
person according to Stoic thought. Despite their title and epistolary form, many scholars
believe they are not records of actual correspondence.96
Celsus, as we have seen, uses the term insania as a very general label under which various
forms of madness are categorized. The term also has a rather broad semantic range in Seneca’s
Epistulae, encompassing a variety of mental and physical conditions and experiences. One
scholar who recognizes this is Ferndandez, whose article “La terminología médica en Séneca”,
discusses terminology “pertineciente al ambito psicologico”, beginning with an analysis of the
term insania. Fernandez notes that in Senecan prose insania is used in reference to a range of
conditions, including “enfermedad, ira (insania brevis), embriaguez (insania voluntaria),
desenfreno, locura (una de cuyas formas es la insania hilaris), deseo sexual exagerado, etc.”97
This list begins to show the multitude of senses and connotations associated with the use of
insania in Senecan prose, and Fernandez also offers some limited discussion about how the
terms insania and furor are used in Senecan tragedy.98 Migliorini also discusses terminology
pertinent to “le malattie mentali” in Senecan prose99, and she provides citations of relevant
passages and scholarship, but her discussion leaves room for a closer reading of the relevant
passages of Senecan prose and further comparisons with Celsus.100
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On the question of whether these letters represent a record of actual correspondence between Seneca and
Lucilius, see Setaioli 2014: 193-194; Edwards 1999: 256.
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See Migliorini 1997: 56-59.
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See Migliorini 1997: 56 n. 280; 57 n. 286.
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In Epistula 94, a letter concerned with giving advice, Seneca comments on the futility of
advising people who are in a state of madness. In describing this type of madness, Seneca uses
the terms insania and furor:
Inter insaniam publicam et hanc quae medicis traditur nihil interest nisi quod
haec morbo laborat, illa opinionibus falsis; altera causas furoris traxit ex
valetudine, altera animi mala valetudo est. Si quis furioso praecepta det
quomodo loqui debeat, quomodo procedere, quomodo in publico se gerere,
quomodo in privato, erit ipso quem monebit insanior: [si] bilis nigra curanda est
et ipsa furoris causa removenda. Idem in hoc alio animi furore faciendum est:
ipse discuti debet; alioqui abibunt in vanum monentium verba.
There is no difference between common madness (insaniam publicam) and that
which is subject to medical treatment, except that the latter is afflicted by a
disease, and the former by false opinions. The one derives the causes of folly
from a sickness of the body, the other is a sickness of the mind. If one should
offer advice to a frenzied person—how one ought to speak, how to walk, how to
conduct oneself in public, how to conduct oneself in private—he would be more
mad (insanior) than the one whom he would be advising; in such a case, the
black bile itself must be treated and the very cause of the folly (furoris) must be
removed. The same must be done in the other case involving the mind: the folly
itself should be shaken off; otherwise, your words of advice will come to naught.
(Epistula 94.17.1-10)
Here, Seneca differentiates between two forms of madness based upon causation: madness
caused by one’s bodily condition (valetudo), and madness caused by the condition of one’s
mind (animi mala valetudo).101 The latter form of madness is called insania publica, which
suggests a condition which is widespread; according to Seneca, this type of madness can be
caused by exposure to “common” opinions, which are in turn equated with opinionibus falsis
(false opinions). Although he does not make it explicit here, Seneca’s ideas about this form of
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As Aygon observes, “l’une provident d’un dérangement d’organes, l’autre est un derangement de l’âme.”
(Aygon 2004: 324 n. 77)
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madness are influenced by the Stoic paradox which holds that “all men are mad except for the
wise man”, with the implication that the wise man is rare and that madness is widespread. This
doctrine is also delineated in Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations and Horace’s Satire 2.3. Cicero, for
instance, observes that “the minds of all unwise people are in a state of illness: all unwise
people are therefore mad.” (…omnium insipientium animi in morbo sunt: omnes insipientes
igitur insaniunt. Tusc. Disp. 3.9).102 The wise man, on the other hand, could never be insane,
since in Stoic thought wisdom and insanity are mututally exclusive. In Horace’s Satire 2.3,
commonly known as “The Follies of Mankind”, this doctrine is explored through a conversation
between the characters Damasippus and Horace. Damasippus, who is influenced by the ideas
of the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus and Stertinius, holds that everyone, save for the sage, is
mad (…insanis et tu stultique prope omnes, / si quid Stertinius veri crepat… Sat. 2.3.32-33).103 In
support of this view, he provides examples of mad people from various walks of life while
arguing that greed, ambition, self-indulgence, and superstition are all forms of madness. In this
discussion, he comments on the madness of Orestes (Sat. 2.3.132-141), Ajax (Sat. 2.3.193-204;
211), and Agamemon (Sat. 2.3.199-204), likening the madness of these figures to
manifestations of madness in Roman society. While those comparisons cannot be pursued
further here, we can note that these exempla recall the use of Orestes and Ajax as examples of
madness in Celsus. But while Celsus associates those mythological figures with one particular
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Cf. …omnes stultos insanire (all fools are mad, Tusc. Disp. 4.24.54).
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103

260

form of insania, which is short-lasting and characterized by the perception of visions,
Damasippus’ discourse in Horace’s Satire suggests that the delusions of these figures are
manifestations of insania because they constitute a form of ignorance. In contrast with Celsus,
this Stoic doctrine is not interested in drawing up categories or distinctions between forms of
insania, since it regards any kind of foolishness as insania. All this illustrates, then, how
Seneca’s description of insania publica operates within a well-established Stoic tradition that
associates ignorance and foolishness with madness.
The other form of madness which Seneca describes in Epistula 94, namely that which is
associated with bodily causes, is not given a specific name, but it is identified as a form of
madness that is “subject to medical treatment” (hanc quae medicis traditur). Seneca goes on to
state that this form of madness can be remedied by treating the bilis nigra (black bile) which is
present with it, in addition to remedying ipsa furoris causa (the very cause of the folly). Here, it
is noteworthy that bilis nigra is not considered the cause of the condition, which is a departure
from the comments that Celsus makes about black bile when describing his second form of
insania: Consistit in tristitia, quam videtur bilis atra contrahere. (It consists of sorrowfulness,
which black bile seems to bring about. 3.18.17.3-4)104 Migliorini suggests that Seneca’s
description can be identified with the third form of insania described by Celsus105, but Celsus
does not mention black bile when discussing this form of insania. While Celsus associates black
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Note that the exact wording which Celsus uses to refer to black bile (bilis atra, and elswehere atra bilis) differs
slightly from the language used by Seneca (bilis nigra) in the above passage.
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“Seneca intenderà presumibilmente riferirsi a quel tipo di insania che Celso, nella sua distinzione delle malattie
mentali in tre categorie, considera più persistente (3.18.19)…” (Migliorini 1997: 57)
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bile with a specific form of insania, Seneca more generally associates it with forms of insania
that require medical treatment (hanc quae medicis traditur); all such forms of insania are in
turn are thought by Seneca to be caused by the body (altera causas furoris traxit ex valetudine),
not by the mind. In contrast, Celsus’ categories of insania do not distinguish between mental
and physical causes. In fact, aside from his remarks on the role of black bile in causing his
second form of insania, Celsus has little to say about the causes of his various forms of insania.
Furthermore, in the one brief remark that he does make about causes, Celsus is less definitive
than Seneca, stating that black bile seems to bring about (videtur…contrahere, 3.18.17.4) the
second form of insania. Celsus’ lack of certainty is somewhat surprisingly, given that he is
attempting to create well-defined categories.
Seneca’s Epistula 94 shows an interest in making distinctions between forms of madness
based upon their causes, but it is less interested in clearing distinguishing between how it is
using the terms insania and furor. In the beginning of the above passage, Seneca first uses the
term insania publica, but then shifts to using the noun furor and the adjective furiosus in
reference to both insania publica and the unnamed condition that requires medical
treatment.106 Although insania and furor are not clearly differentiated by Seneca in this
passage, my translation renders insania as “madness” and furor as “folly” (and furiosus as
“frenzied”) in order to reproduce Seneca’s lexical distinction. In translating insania as
“madness”, I follow my earlier translations of Celsus’ uses of insania, but my translation of furor
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Migliorini has also noted Seneca’s apparently indiscriminate usage of the terms insania and furor in this passage
and elsewhere (e.g. De Ira: …et irasci se negant non minus quam insanire furiosi (they [the angry] deny that they
are angry no less than the frenzied deny they are mad, 2.36.4; see Migliorini 1997: 57 n. 285).
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as “folly” is a departure from how I translate Celsus’ uses of furor (“raging”; cf. 3.18.6.1-3). All
this reminds us of the difficulties one encounters when attempting to translate Latin
terminology in the semantic sphere of madness, especially when looking across different
authors and context.
Seneca also describes forms of insania in De Ira. This work, which is addressed to Seneca’s
brother, Novatus, discusses the importance of controlling one’s anger (ira) and the
consequences of failing to do so. Near the beginning of this work, Seneca observes that some
consider ira to be a form of insania107:
Quidam itaque e sapientibus viris iram dixerunt brevem insaniam; aeque enim
impotens sui est, decoris oblita, necessitudinum immemor, in quod coepit
pertinax et intenta, rationi consiliisque praeclusa, vanis agitata causis, ad
dispectum aequi verique inhabilis, ruinis simillima, quae super id quod
oppressere franguntur.
And so certain wise men have called anger a short-lived madness; for it is equally
lacking in self control, forgetful of decency, unmindful of needs, unyielding and
relentless in what it begins, closed off from reason and consideration, incited by
pointless causes, incapable of discerning what is right and true, very much like
collapsed buildings which break apart on top of that which they have buried.
(De Ira 1.1.2.1-2.6)
According to this passage, one of the similarities between ira and insania is that they are both
“closed off from reason and consideration” (rationi consiliisque praeclusa). This is also a
characteristic of Celsus’ third form of insania. Celsus does not use the exact same language, but
he mentions that certain types afflicted by this form of insania are at a loss with respect to
reason (animo desipiunt, 3.18.19.6), suggesting that the mind leads this type astray (vero
107

Rey observes that it is common for moral philosophers to make analogies between anger and madness, but she
does not comment on Seneca in particular. (Rey 1995: 37)
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consilium insanientem fallit, 3.18.21.1). Celsus does not discuss ira in this passage, or any other
passage connected with insania108, but, like Seneca, he does mention consilium—one’s “mental
capacities” or “reason”. Both Celsus and Seneca, then, suggest that insania leads one’s reason
or consilum to be compromised.
Similar to how Celsus uses the adjective brevis to describe phrenesis (plerumque breve esse
consuevit, 3.18.2.7), Seneca uses the word brevis to describe a form of insania. This is a
similarity in usage which, to my knowledge, scholars have not previously remarked upon.
Celsus’ phrenesis and Seneca’s brevis insania do not have much in common in and of
themselves, except that they are both acute conditions. In the passage that immediately
follows, Seneca goes on to describe symptoms of insania, thus providing further opportunities
for comparison with Celsus, and anticipating some of the language we will be seeing below in
Seneca’s tragedies:
Ut scias autem non esse sanos quos ira possedit, ipsum illorum habitum intuere;
nam ut furentium certa indicia sunt audax et minax vultus, tristis frons, torva
facies, citatus gradus, inquietae manus, color versus, crebra et vehementius acta
suspiria, ita irascentium eadem signa sunt: flagrant ac micant oculi, multus ore
toto rubor exaestuante ab imis praecordiis sanguine, labra quatiuntur, dentes
comprimuntur, horrent ac surriguntur capilli, spiritus coactus ac stridens,
articulorum se ipsos torquentium sonus, gemitus mugitusque et parum
explanatis vocibus sermo praeruptus et conplosae saepius manus et pulsata
humus pedibus et totum concitum corpus magnasque irae minas agens, foeda
visu et horrenda facies depravantium se atque intumescentium—nescias utrum
magis detestabile vitium sit an deforme. Cetera licet abscondere et in abdito
alere: ira se profert et in faciem exit, quantoque maior, hoc effervescit
manifestius.
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The term ira appears four times in De Medicina (1.Pr.4.3, 3.6.6.2, 4.15.4.3, 8.9.1c.2), but never in connection
with insania or other forms of madness.
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Indeed, in order to know that those whom anger possesses are not sane,
observe their deportment itself. For just as the marks of madmen are clear—a
rash and menacing countenance, a sorrowful brow, a fierce expression, a rapid
gait, restless hands, an altered hue, quick and rather violent breathing—so too
are the signs of angry men: their eyes flash and gleam, there is much redness on
their entire face from the boiling up of blood from the depths of the heart, the
lips quiver, the teeth are clenched, the hair shudders and stands on end, the
breathing is labored and wheezing, there is a sound from the joints which distort
themselves, there are groans and bellowing, speech bursts forth in scarcely
intelligible utterances, very frequently there is a striking together of the hands
and a stamping of the ground with the feet, the entire body is riled up and
makes great threats in anger—the appearance of those who so abase
themselves and swell up with anger is disgusting to look at and fearful, you
would not know whether this disorder is more abominable or more unsightly.
Other things can be hidden and nurtured in concealment, but anger displays
itself and comes out in one’s expression—and the greater it is, the more
obviously it boils forth. (De Ira 1.1.3.1-5.3)
Seneca identifies those “whom anger possesses” (quos ira possedit) with those who are “not
sane” (non esse sanos). These people are also labeled furentes, suggesting, as in Epistula 94,
that Seneca is not making a strong distinction between furor and insania. Seneca then
proceeds to list numerous “symptoms” (indicia, signa)109 which can be observed in both those
afflicted with madness and those in a state of anger.110 One of the symptoms mentioned is a
sorrowful brow (tristis frons), which recalls how Celsus uses the adjective tristis and the noun
tristitia in discussing each of his three forms of insania. One of the symptoms identified in
Celsus’ comments on phrenesis is speaking nonsense (loqui aliena, 3.18.2.2-3), which recalls the
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The use of the words indicia and signa in reference to “symptoms” is discussed in Chapter 3.
Monteleone’s recent discussion of De Ira also notes the symptoms of ira identified in this passage. She suggests
that Seneca describes ira in terms of both moral and bodily decay: “ira = ugly, animal appearance, disease.”
(Monteleone 2014: 128-129)
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symptom of unintelligible speech (parum explanatis vocibus sermo praeruptus) described by
Seneca, despite the difference in language usage.
The remainder of Seneca’s description of madness in this passage, however, bears little
semblance to Celsus’ comments on madness, both in terms of the symptoms identified and in
terms of language usage. It is also apparent that in lumping together such disparate symptoms,
Seneca is presenting a rather monolithic portrait of madness and not distinguishing between
specific forms of madness in the way that Celsus does. At the same time, both Seneca and
Celsus related that madness can be detected through the observation of symptoms. In doing
so, Seneca uses some familiar vocabulary of revelation (proferre, exire, manifestius) to
emphasize that ira/brevis insania tends to be readily apparent, unlike other conditions, which
Seneca associates with language of concealment (abscondere, abditus111).
After noting some of the signs that make it possible to identify ira, Seneca goes on to
compare them with obvious signs that animals are about to spring into violent action:
Non vides ut omnium animalium, simul ad nocendum insurrexerunt, praecurrant
notae ac tota corpora solitum quietumque egrediantur habitum et feritatem
suam exasperent? Spumant apris ora, dentes acuuntur attritu, taurorum cornua
iactantur in vacuum et harena pulsu pedum spargitur, leones fremunt, inflantur
irritatis colla serpentibus, rabidarum canum tristis aspectus est: nullum est
animal tam horrendum tam perniciosumque natura ut non appareat in illo, simul
ira invasit, novae feritatis accessio.
Do you not see how the features of all animals who get up in order to do harm
precede them, and that their entire bodies put aside their usual peaceful
demeanor and goad on their own wildness? The mouths of wild boars foam, and
their teeth are sharpened by grinding, the horns of bulls are brandished into the
air and the sand is scattered by the beating of feet, lions roar, snakes’ necks puff
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These items of vocabulary are discussed in Chapter 3.
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up when they are disturbed, the countenance of raving dogs is grim: there is no
animal so awful and destructive by nature that, when anger comes upon it, an
attack of fresh wildness does not make itself known in it. (De Ira 1.1.5.3-7.1)
Here, we see that Seneca’s description of ira (i.e. brevis insania), emphasizes its violent and
destructive aspects, unlike Celsus’ descriptions of madness.112 The most comparable remarks
made by Celsus occur when he is describing the type of phrenetic who becomes riled up and act
violently (alii consurgunt et violenter quaedam manu faciunt, 3.18.3.6-7). But Celsus does not
make mention of feritas (wildness) during his discussion of insania; this word, in fact, does not
appear anywhere in De Medicina. Nor does Celsus associate insania with animal behavior.
One of the various groups of animals mentioned in the above passage is raving dogs
(rabidarum canum). Seneca again applies the adjective rabidus to dogs later in Book 1
(rabidos…canes, 1.15.2.5), again suggesting uncontrollability and volatility. Seneca also uses
this adjective in reference to emotion in the very first sentence of De Ira, where it is stated that
ira is the “most hideous and raving emotion of all” (affectum… maxime ex omnibus taetrum ac
rabidum, 1.1.1.3-4). The adjective rabidus does not appear anywhere in De Medicina, but the
closely related word rabiosus113 occurs twice. These two instances occur close together, in a
passage in which Celsus is discussing how to treat someone affected by the poisonous bite of a
rabid dog (5.27.2a.1; 5.27.2b.1). As noted in Chapter 2, Celsus considers the bite of a rabid dog
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As Vogt comments, Seneca generally portrays anger as an “excitement, raging toward violence.” (Vogt 2006: 57)
Boyle and Monteleone both observe that ira is connected with a desire for vengeance in various sections of De Ira.
(e.g. 2.3.5.1-6; see Boyle 2014: 128; Monteleone 2014: 128)
113
“rabid”, “raging”, “wild” (Glare 2012: s.v. rabidus); “rabid”, “frenzied” (Glare 2012: s.v. rabiosus)
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to be particularly dangerous. Celsus does not apply the adjective rabiosus to people afflicted
with madness or any other condition.
Later in Book 1 of De Ira, Seneca states that his views on anger are similar to those of
Aristotle because both view anger as a desire for revenge. Seneca then elaborates upon his
analogies between animal violence and human anger. Here, Seneca argues that even though
human anger resembles certain elements of animal behaviors, animals themselves are in fact
not capable of experiencing anger:
Aristotelis finitio non multum a nostra abest; ait enim iram esse cupiditatem
doloris reponendi. Quid inter nostram et hanc finitionem intersit, exsequi
longum est. Contra utramque dicitur feras irasci nec iniuria inritatas nec poenae
dolorisve alieni causa; nam etiam si haec efficiunt, non haec petunt. Sed
dicendum est feras ira carere et omnia praeter hominem; nam cum sit inimica
rationi, nusquam tamen nascitur nisi ubi rationi locus est. Impetus habent ferae,
rabiem feritatem incursum, iram quidem non magis quam luxuriam, et in
quasdam voluptates intemperantiores homine sunt.
Aristotle’s definition is not much different from mine, for he says that anger is
the desire to repay suffering. What is different between my definition and that
one would be long to pursue. Against both [definitions of anger] it can be said
that wild beasts become angry when they are neither disturbed by a wrongdoing
nor [become angry] on account of another's punishment or suffering; for even if
they accomplish these things, they do not pursue them. But it must be said that
wild beasts, and indeed everything except for man, are devoid of anger; for since
it is hostile to reason, it can only arise where there is room for reason. Wild
beasts do have impulses, raving, assaulting aggression, but they do not have
anger any more than they have extravagance of living, and in certain pleasures
they are even more unrestrained than man. (De Ira 1.3.3.4-5.1)
Seneca again describes ira as a force opposed to reason (inimica rationi), recalling language in
his earlier equation of ira and brevis insania (rationi consiliisque praeclusa, 1.1.2.4-5). But
Seneca’s comments on ira and ratio now go further, explaining that ira can only occur in beings
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that have a capacity for ratio. Seneca thus argues that animals do not in fact experience ira
because they lack the capacity for ratio. Seneca does not explicitly state that animals cannot
experience insania, but it seems safe to assume that he would not think this is possible, either,
given the strong connections he makes between ira and insania. If ratio is a prerequisite for ira,
presumably it is a prerequisite for insania as well. Even though Seneca asserts in De Ira that
anger can only be experienced by human beings, some of his tragedies contain metaphors in
which ira or furor are attributed to animals or non-living things.114 This reminds us that what
Seneca expounds upon in his philosophical prose is one thing, while the ideas he explores in his
poetic-tragic texts is another, even if the vocabulary is the same.
Later in Book 1, Seneca comments on the futility of ira, arguing against the idea that it can be
useful in certain situations:
“Utilis” inquit “ira est, quia pugnaciores facit.” Isto modo et ebrietas; facit enim
protervos et audaces multique meliores ad ferrum fuere male sobrii; isto modo
dic et phrenesin atque insaniam viribus necessariam, quia saepe validiores furor
reddit. Quid?
“Anger is useful,” it is said, “because it makes people more aggressive.” The
same can be said of drunkenness, for it makes people bold and daring, and many
have become better at the sword when drunk; in the same way, then, you might
say that phrenesis and insania are necessary for strength, because frenzy often
renders people stronger. But how can that be? (De Ira 1.13.3.1-5)
Here, the terms phrenesis and insania are very closely identified with furor. The similarity in the
use of insania and furor is consistent with other examples we have examined in Senecan
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e.g. Medea 862-865. Aygon also discusses examples from Thyestes where ira and furor are attributed to
animals. (Aygon 2004: 102)
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prose115, and Seneca also suggests a close correspondence between insania and phrenesis, such
that Migliorini identifies the pairing of the two words in this passage as an example of
hendiadys.116 Andre, on the other hand, argues that these uses of insania and phrenesis must
have a difference in sense. Citing Celsus, he points out that phrenesis is a different from the
more general insania because it is a condition accompanied by high fever, although Seneca
does not mention this symptom in this passage.117 One could also argue that it seems
unnecessarily redundant for Seneca to use two terms to refer to a single condition. Moreover,
even if Seneca were intending to use insania and phrenesis as “synonyms” or “near-synonyms”
in this context, the two words still have different connotations.118 Nevertheless, it is true that
Seneca does not make a sharp distinction between phrenesis and insania in the above
passage.119 Unlike Celsus, Seneca does not specify that phrenesis is a sub-category of insania,
and he does not describe symptoms of phrenesis here or in any other context.

The

connections that Seneca makes between ira, insania, and ebrietas (drunkenness) in the above
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Migliorini suggests that Seneca’s usage of furor differs from his usage of both phrenesis and insania, asserting
that the latter two terms refer to a pathological condition, whereas furor refers to the actual manifestation of the
madness associated with that condition. (Migliorini 1997: 57) Similarly, Fernandez suggests that in some cases
Seneca represents furor as the outward expression of ira, citing the closing lines of Epistula 18: Ita est, mi Lucili:
ingentis irae exitus furor est, et ideo ira vitanda est non moderationis causa sed sanitatis. Vale. (So it is, my Lucilius:
folly is the outcome of immense anger, and for that reason anger must be avoided—not only for the sake of
moderation, but also for soundness of mind. Farewell. Ep. 18.15). (See Fernandez 1973: 307) From the above
passage alone, however, the distinctions in usage suggested by Migliorini and Fernandez are not as apparent.
116
Migliorini 1997: 57. Migliorini also claims that the terms phrenesis and insania (and also dementia) are used in
Senecan prose generally without any significant difference in sense. (Migliorini 1997: 56)
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Andre 1971: 53.
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On the concepts of synonymy and near-synonymy, see the introduction of Chapter 2.
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There are also brief references to phrenetics in Book 3 of De Ira (3.26.1.5) and in De Constantia Sapientis
(1.13.1.4), but these references also do not serve to clarify how Seneca’s usage of phrenesis relates to his usage of
insania or other words associated with madness.
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passage from De Ira resonate with comments he makes in Epistula 83, a letter which focuses on
the matter of drunkenness:
Dic quam turpe sit plus sibi ingerere quam capiat et stomachi sui non nosse
mensuram, quam multa ebrii faciant quibus sobrii erubescant, nihil aliud esse
ebrietatem quam voluntariam insaniam. Extende in plures dies illum ebrii
habitum: numquid de furore dubitabis?
Show how foul it is to take in more than one can withstand, and not to know the
capacity of one’s own stomach; show how drunkards do many things that sober
people blush at; show that drunkenness is nothing other than a voluntary
madness. Draw the condition of the drunkard out for several days: will you have
any doubt about his madness? (Epistula 83.18.4-8)
Whereas Seneca equates ira with brevis insania in the opening sections of De Ira, here he
equates ebrietas with voluntaria insania. People who have this form of insania “do many things
that sober people blush at” (multa ebrii faciant quibus sobrii erubescant). Although Seneca
does not explicitly link ebrietas with brevis insania, these comments about the effects of
ebrietas/voluntaria insania recalls a passage from De Ira in which Seneca states those who have
brevis insania are “lacking in self control” and “forgetful of decency” (impotens sui est, decoris
oblita, 3.1.2.2-3).120 In addition, Seneca also helps us understand what furor is by proposing an
analogy between the drunken state of ebrietas, which is brief, and the longer-lasting furor
(extende in plures dies illum ebrii habitum: numquid de furore dubitabis).
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Konstan notes that Seneca considers both ira and ebrietas to be states in which one may not be “fully
conscious, and hence not responsible for his or her actions, [although] he or she does have the prior obligation not
to become inebriated [or angered] to the extent of losing all control.” (Konstan 2013: 435)
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I will come back to De Ira shortly, but first I will further explore the connections that Seneca
makes between insania and ebrietas in some other texts. In Epistula 59, a letter concerned
with pleasure and joy, Seneca notes the short-term nature of ebrietas:
…omnes istos oblectamenta fallacia et brevia decipiunt, sicut ebrietas, quae
unius horae hilarem insaniam longi temporis taedio pensat…
…all those people are beguiled by deceptive and short-lasting amusements, such
as drunkenness, which pays for a single hour’s cheerful madness with the
wearisomeness of a long period of time… (Epistula 59.15.6-8)
In Epistula 83 Seneca emphasizes the voluntary and short-term nature of ebrietas, and the
connection between ebrietas and insania, but here he refers to a form of insania which has a
“cheerful” (hilaris) aspect, and he associates that form of insania with ebrietas. The connection
made between ebrietas, voluntaria insania, and hilaris insania in these passages has been
noted by Fernandez121, but he does not further analyze Seneca’s usage of these terms. One
aspect worthy of further attention is the use of hilaris, a word which Seneca uses in other
contexts that discuss with insania.122 In his dialogue De Vita Beata, Seneca speaks of situations
in which people become “mad with a cheerful madness, and rave in laughter” (hilarem
insaniam insanire ac per risum furere, De Vita Beata 12.1). Here, hilaris insania is not explicitly
linked to ebrietas; instead it refers to a form of madness which is characterized by a highly
excited state. Seneca’s use of the word hilaris and the reference to laughter (risum) recall
language used by Celsus. In the description of his third form of insania, Celsus relates that
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Fernandez 1973: 307.
Fernandez also notes that Seneca uses this word in connection with insania, but he does not comment further.
(Fernandez 1973: 307)
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some individuals who suffer from this condition “laugh without cause” (sine causa subinde
rideat, 3.18.22.3-4) and experience hilaritas (3.18.22.5). Celsus goes on to state that people
with these symptoms are better treated by terrors (terroribus…melius curatur, 3.18.22.5-6), by
which he means that they should be suddenly frightened, a form of therapy Celsus also
mentions earlier. (cf. 3.18.18.2) Seneca, on the other hand, does not discuss treatments of
hilaris insania, and the limited nature of his comments in on hilaris insania in this section
discourage further comparisons with Celsus’ third form of insania.
As I briefly pointed out during my discussion of Thyestes in Chapter 3, Seneca uses the noun
hilaritas to suggest that the character Thyestes is in a mad or deluded state. Before realizing
that he has consumed the flesh and blood of his children, Thyestes is said to be lying about with
a “cheerful expression” (hilarique vultu, 899), which sharply and ironically contrasts with the
horror and suffering soon awaiting him. After imbibing what he believes is wine, but what
actually contains the blood of his children (or at least a mixture of blood and wine123), Thyestes
is portrayed in a drunken state of delusion. Even though the word insania is not used explicitly
in this passage, the situation is much like what Seneca describes in Epistula 59: once Thyestes’
ebrietas wears off and he comes to his senses, he will exchange his short-lasting hilaris insania
for long-lasting taedio (wearisomeness, loathing, disgust). We can also find comparable
language in a passage from Celsus, although it is used to a very different effect. Although
Celsus repeatedly associates the noun hilaritas and the adjective hilaris with insania124, he also

123
124

The ambiguity of the contents of this drink is discussed in Chapter 3.
hilaritas: e.g 2.13.1.5-6; 3.18.20.3; 3.18.22.5; hilaris: e.g. 3.18.3.6; 3.18.9.8; 3.18.20.2.
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states that a medicus should approach a patient hilari vultu (with a cheerful expression,
3.6.6.7). Here, hilaris vultus is not presented as a sign of madness (as in Thyestes), but a
reassuring sign for a person suffering from illness. Nonetheless, this is a rather surprisingly
choice of words in light of the connotations that hilaris and hilaritas take on in other sections of
De Medicina.
Seneca also makes reference to hilaris insania in Epistula 29, a letter that discusses the
abusive nature and psychological condition of Seneca’s friend Marcellinus. Seneca discusses
some of the invective he has had to endure from Marcellinus, likening Marcellinus’ behavior to
a fleeting form of madness:
Constitui tamen contumelias perpeti: moveat ille mihi risum, ego fortasse illi
lacrimas movebo, aut si ridere perseverabit, gaudebo tamquam in malis quod illi
genus insaniae hilare contigerit. Sed non est ista hilaritas longa: observa, videbis
eosdem intra exiguum tempus acerrime ridere et acerrime rabere.
Nevertheless, I have chosen to endure insults; he may move me to laughter, but
perhaps I will move him to tears, or if he persists in laughing, I shall rejoice, as it
were, in a bad situation because he is afflicted by a cheerful type of madness.
But that is not a long-lasting cheerfulness: observe, and you will see that those
same people laugh bitterly and rave bitterly within a short period of time.
(Epistula 29.7.2-8.1)
One aspect of Marcellinus’ condition which is highlighted by Seneca is his laughter (risum,
ridere [used twice]). He actually takes this laughter as a positive sign, since it can only last for a
short period of time (exiguum tempus). In the parlance of Celsus, we would say that
Marcellinus’ condition is acute (acutus) in nature, not unlike phrenesis (cf. 3.18.1.6). While

274

Seneca does not use the adjective acutus here125, he observes, like Celsus, that madness can
affect people for varying durations of time; this criterion is thus important to both authors’
conceptualization of madness and to the categories they use to distinguish between different
forms of madness. Seneca again presents hilaris insania as a short-term condition, as in
Epistula 59, but unlike in Epistula 59 he does not link hilaris insania with ebrietas. This suggests
that there are different forms of hilaris insania, and that ebrietas is not always the cause of this
condition.
Returning to De Ira, we find further grounds for comparison with Celsus in Seneca’s
discussion of the ira of the mythological figure Ajax. Noting the personal dangers associated
with ira, Seneca cites Ajax as an example:
Magis illud videndum est, quam multis ira per se nocuerit. Alii nimio fervore
rupere venas et sanguinem supra vires elatus clamor egessit et luminum suffudit
aciem in oculos vehementius umor egestus et in morbos aegri reccidere. Nulla
celerior ad insaniam via est. Multi itaque continuaverunt irae furorem nec quam
expulerant mentem umquam receperunt: Aiacem in mortem egit furor, in
furorem ira. Mortem liberis, egestatem sibi, ruinam domui inprecantur, et irasci
se negant non minus quam insanire furiosi.
This [fact] must be observed even more, which is that anger in and of itself has
done harm to many people. Some have burst their veins due to excessive
passion, a shout carried beyond out one’s strength has led to bleeding, and an
overly powerful flow carried into the eyes has stolen one’s sharpness of vision,
and the sick have returned to their illnesses. There is no swifter road to
madness. And so many have joined folly to anger, and they never restored the
reason which they had driven out: folly drove Ajax to his death, and anger drove
him into folly. They [i.e. those in a state of anger] invoke death upon their
children, extreme poverty upon themselves, destruction upon their household,
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Seneca does not use the adjective acutus frequently, and there is only one instance in the entire corpus of
Senecan prose and poetry in which this word is used in relation to illness, namely when Seneca describes a shortterm form of madness (acutae delirationis, Ep. 9.8.8). Seneca’s use of this phrase is discussed later in this chapter.
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and they deny that they are they are angry no less than the frenzied deny they
are mad. (De Ira 2.36.4.1-5.5)
This passage highlights the self-destructive nature of ira by pointing out examples in which it
brings harm upon a person’s own body, family, or property. According to Seneca, people who
reach this extreme state of ira lose their sense of reason and never get it back (nec quam
expulerant mentem umquam receperunt). This sustained loss of reason recalls the prolonged
nature of the form of insania that is associated with Ajax (and Orestes) in De Medicina
(3.18.19.4). Seneca, however, emphasizes the loss and absence of reason sustained by figures
like Ajax, which contrasts with Celsus’ idea that Ajax suffered from imagines, or visions
(3.18.19.4-5), and not a loss of reason. Indeed, this speaks to exactly the dichotomy established
in Celsus’ third form of insania, namely that some who suffer from this condition are led astray
by imagines, while others are simply at a loss of reason (nam quidam imaginibus, non mente
falluntur…quidam animo desipiunt, 3.18.19.4-5; cf. 3.18.21.1). Seneca’s description of Ajax’s
madness is actually more similar to the type of madness that Celsus contrasts with the
madness experienced by Ajax and Orestes. Even though Seneca and Celsus are both
attempting to diagnose Ajax’s condition and to provide an explanation for his behavior, they
have different ideas about the role that “reason” and “visions” play in Ajax’s illness, and
understand the nature of his condition differently.
Seneca’s account also differs from Celsus’ description in that he considers ira to be an
important aspect of Ajax’s condition, and in fact its cause. Celsus does not associate ira with
Ajax, but Seneca describes ira as the root of Ajax’s furor and a force that ultimately leads to his
276

death: Aiacem in mortem egit furor, in furorem ira. The parallelism of this sentence provides a
clear understanding of the outcomes of furor and ira, respectively, and the use of hysteron
proteron calls attention to the eventual outcome of death, resulting from furor. It is implied
that furor is more deadly than ira, or, to put it another way, that ira reaches the state of furor
when it becomes deadly. Celsus does not make any comparable distinction in his comments
about Ajax; in fact, shortly before discussing his example of Ajax, Celsus specifies that he is
describing a form of insania which “does not threaten life itself” (vitam ipsam non impediat,
3.18.19.2). Seneca’s comments about Ajax’s madness thus focus on the outcome of Ajax’s
madness in a way that Celsus’ does not. This speaks in part to the strategies of the authors:
Seneca is attempting to demonstrate and dissuade people from the horrible effects of ira,
whereas Celsus is using the well-known mythological figure Ajax as a way to explain a specific
medical symptom (perceiving imagines).

Seneca also suggests in the above passage that ira is

the quickest road to insania (nulla celerior ad insaniam via est). This remark is slightly different
in formulation from Seneca’s earlier equation of ira and brevis insania (cf. De Ira 1.1.2.1-2.6).
Seneca is now stating that ira is a cause leading to insania, instead of being a form of insania
itself. Connects this idea with the following sentence about Ajax, Fitch explains the relationship
among these terms as such: “Ajax’s ira led to furor, and furor in turn to insania”.126 This is the
logical implication of Seneca’s comments in the above passage, but the idea that ira progresses
into furor, and then becomes insania is quite different from stating that ira is equivalent to, or
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Fitch 1987: 31. Harris similarly observes that this passage is stating that “anger can lead to madness”, instead of
it is a form of madness/insania. (Harris 2001: 378)
277

definable as insania. At the beginning of De Ira Seneca appear to be equating ira and insania,
but he now speaks of ira as a cause of insania. Perhaps Seneca is suggesting an equation
between ira and insania because ira can only lead to insania, but he does not make this point
explicitly.
In the following sentence, Seneca seems to put ira in a separate category from insania and
furor. He states: irasci se negant non minus quam insanire furiosi (they deny that they are they
are angry no less than the frenzied deny they are mad). Here, being angry (irasci) is not
equated with being “frenzied” (insanire) or “mad” (furiosi). On the other hand, there is a close
connection made between insanire and furiosi, which seems to imply that the “frenzied”
(furiosi) actually do suffer insania. This implication is in keeping with other instances in Senecan
prose where the terms furor and insania are used with little apparent differentiation in sense.
But if Seneca is using these words with little semantic distinction here, it problematizes his idea
of a progression from ira to furor to insania; indeed, if these terms are semantically equivalent,
a progression from one to another would be logically impossible.
Seneca does, however, clearly describe such a progression in Epistula 18. Paraphrasing
Epicurus, he states that uncontrolled ira gives rise to insania: Delegabo te ad Epicurum, ab illo
fiet numeratio: 'inmodica ira gignit insaniam'. (I will defer to Epicurus—there will be a payment
from him: “unrestrained anger begets madness”. Epistula 18.14.3) All this suggests that Seneca
is not always consistent in his usage of such terms within his prose work. In this respect, he is
different from a writer such as Cicero, who makes rather clear and consistent distinctions
between terms such as furor and insania. Scholars such as Konstan and Merzlak have pointed
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out the consistency of Cicero’s usage of such terminology, but to my knowledge, Seneca’s
relative lack of consistency has not been pointed out in previous scholarship.127
In De Ira Seneca also discusses “epilepsy”, the condition which Celsus calls morbus comitialis
(cf. 3.23.2-4; 4.27.1b10-11). Seneca mentions this condition only once, referring to it as
comitiale vitium. He draws an interesting analogy, observing that just as epileptics can sense
that they are about to have an attack of their illness, people in general can train themselves to
recognize the signs that ira is arising:
Qui comitiali vitio solent corripi iam adventare valetudinem intellegunt, si calor
summa deservit et incertum lumen nervorumque trepidatio est, si memoria
sublabitur caputque versatur; solitis itaque remediis incipientem causam
occupant, et odore gustuque quidquid est quod alienat animos repellitur, aut
fomentis contra frigus rigoremque pugnatur; aut, si parum medicina profecit,
vitaverunt turbam et sine teste ceciderunt.
Those are accustomed to being seized by epilepsy recognize that the condition is
about to come on, if heat escapes from their extremities and there is unclear
sight, and there is a twitching of their tendons, and if their memory fails and
their head spins; and so they preempt the cause as it is starting with the familiar
remedies, and whatever it is that deprives one of reason is repelled by smelling
and tasting [something], or the cold and stiffness is combated with warm
applications, or, if the remedy is not effective enough, they avoid the crowd and
fall down without any witness. (De Ira 3.10.3.1-4.1)
In drawing this analogy, Seneca strongly suggests that ira is a form of illness like any other.
Unlike Celsus, he does not identify comitiale vitium as a form of insania, even though he
observes that it deprives people of their reasoning capabilities (alienat animos). Seneca also
states that this condition is characterized by a failure of memory (memoria sublabitur), without
explaining whether the memory loss is short-term, long-term, or permanent. Despite this
127
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ambiguity, Seneca still offers more information than Celsus about how epilepsy affects the
mind. Celsus only states that after an attack of the condition, the person “returns to their self”
(interposito tempore ad se redit, 3.23.1.4). We can identify some similarities between the two
authors’ descriptions of epilepsy, including similar symptoms, such as problems with vision or
the eyes (Seneca: incertum lumen; cf. Celsus oculi vertuntur), spasms (Seneca: nervorumque
trepidatio; cf. Celsus distentione autem nervorum, 3.23.2.1-2), and falling down (Seneca:
ceciderunt; cf. Celsus concidit, 3.23.2; prosternat, 4.27.1a.4). Their descriptions of the
symptoms also bear some significant differences: Celsus, unlike Seneca, says that foaming at
the mouth occurs (ex ore spumae moventur, 3.23.1.3); Seneca states that heat escapes from
the extremities (calor summa deservit), but no such symptom is mentioned by Celsus. Later in
this chapter, these observations about the symptoms and effects of comitiale vitium / morbus
comitialis will help shed light on the representation of Hercules’ condition in Seneca’s tragedy
Hercules Furens.
Another work in which Seneca discusses madness is Naturales Quaestiones, an encyclopedia
of various natural phenomena. In his discussion of earthquakes in Book 6, Seneca notes that
movements of the earth and other calamities tend to give rise to fear, which in turn often gives
rise to forms of madness:
Nam quod aliquos insanis attonitisque similes discurrere, fecit metus, qui excutit
mentes ubi privatus ac modicus est; quid, ubi publice terret? Ubi cadunt urbes,
populi opprimuntur, terra concutitur, quid mirum est animos inter dolorem et
metum destitutos aberrasse? Non est facile inter mala magna consipere. Itaque
levissima fere ingenia in tantum venere formidinis ut sibi exciderent. Nemo
quidem sine aliqua iactura sanitatis expavit, similisque est furenti quisquis timet.
Sed alios cito timor sibi reddit, alios vehementius perturbat et in dementiam
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transfert. Inde inter bella erravere lymphatici, nec usquam plura exempla
vaticinantium invenies quam ubi formido mentes religione mixta percussit.128
For fear has made some people run around as if mad and stupefied, as it shakes
up minds even when confined to the individual and of moderate degree; what
then, when it terrifies the public? When cities fall, when peoples are crushed,
when the earth is shaken, what wonder is it that minds wander astray, bereft
between grief and fear? It is not easy to stay in one’s right mind in the midst of
great adversity. And so, typically those of the most changeable nature arrive at
such a state of fear that they lose themselves. Indeed, no one becomes fearful
without some loss of mental soundness, and anyone who is fearful is like a
madman. But fear restores some people to themselves quickly, while it disturbs
others more deeply and carries them over into dementia. Thus during wars
people wander about panic-stricken, and you will never find more instances of
prophecy than when fear, mixed with divine reverence, strikes the mind.
(Naturales Quaestiones 6.29.1.1-3.3)
Previously, we have seen that Seneca links insania with the experiences of anger and
drunkenness, and now here he describes mental disturbance can be caused by fear (metus,
timor). Seneca relates this issue to the central theme of Book 6—earthquakes—as he points
out that the shaking of the earth (terra concutitur), can incite people’s minds to states of fear.
Seneca’s language use even evokes the quaking of the earth when he states that fear can
“shake minds” (excutit mentes). 129 In turn, these states of fear, according to Seneca, have a
tendency to bring about states akin to madness, which is conveyed through the use of various
terms. First, Seneca notes that fear makes some people act as if they are mad (insanis similes),
not quite stating that they actually are mad. Seneca similarly goes on to state that anyone who
is fearful is like a madman (similisque est furentis quisquis timet). In these two statements, the
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adjectives insanus and furens are used very similarly, each referring to an unsound states of
mind resulting from fear; this similarity in usage parallels connections made between insania
and furor in other works of Senecan prose. In addition, Seneca suggests that fear can bring
about conditions, such as dementia, which are similar to, but not the same as, insania or furor.
Seneca also asserts that it is impossible to become fearful without some loss of sanity (nemo
quidem sine aliqua iactura sanitatis expavit).
A condition involving a loss of sanitas, whether wholly or partially, would seem to suggest a
state of insania, but in the above passage Seneca only goes so far as to say that the condition
brought on by fear is similar to insania. It is possible that this reflects a slipperiness or lack of
precision in his usage of words like insanus and sanitas. Or, it is also possible that Seneca is
presenting sanitas as a continuum in which it is possible to lose some sanitas and thus enter
into a state similar to madness, but without entering into a full-blown state of insania. This
would suggest that Seneca is views insania and sanitas not as absolutes, but rather as
categories with some gray area in between them. On the other hand, this could be an issue of
semantics, indicative of a difference between the adjective insanus (which is usually applied to
an illness which is mental or psychological in nature) and the abstract noun sanitas (perhaps
more vaguely suggesting “health” or “soundness” of either of body or mind130). Whatever
Seneca intended, these complexities illustrate that the Latin words sanus/sanitas and
insanus/insania cannot simply be understood as semantic opposites, and that a noun (e.g.
sanitas) may not have the exact same semantic range as a related adjective (e.g. sanus).
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According to the above passage from Naturales Quaestiones, some people who are struck by
fear fail to recover their wits quickly, thus entering into a state of dementia. Here, dementia
refers to a form of madness that is longer in duration and more severe (vehementius perturbat)
than insania or furor. As we have seen, Celsus describes phrenesis as a condition characterized
by continua dementia, as well as by visions that overtake the mind (3.18.2.1-4). Celsus’ use of
continua as a modifier of dementia suggests that dementia is not necessarily a long-lasting
condition, and, according to Celsus, phrenesis is in fact the short-lasting form of insania. In
Seneca’s words quoted above, however, dementia seems to be a longer-term condition
because it is associated with fears which do not immediately go away and which continue to
disturb people. Once again, we find fluidity on the lexical level, the absence of a clearly
distinguished vocabulary for illness in general, and mental disorders or madness in particular,
when looking across Latin texts of various genres, and even when looking at passages written in
the same genre by a single author. A little later in this chapter, we will return to Seneca's usage
of the term dementia when discussing a passage from De Tranquillitate Animi.
As noted earlier, Celsus also discusses madness caused by fear (metus), which he describes
as the central component of the condition he calls delirium (3.18.24.1-4). Seneca never uses
delirium, but he does use the etymologically related noun deliratio and the verb delirare (each
occur in one instance). Deliratio can be translated as “delirium”, “craziness”, or even
“madness” (although Lewis and Short state that the latter sense is “very rare”) 131; possible
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translations for delirare include “to be out of one’s mind”, “to be mad” and “to rave”.132 The
etymological sense of delirare is “to go out of [de] the furrow [lira]”—that is, “to deviate from a
straight line”133—an agriculture metaphor which came to suggest madness. In Epistula 49,
Seneca uses the noun deliratio in observing that logic can be applied to create absurd
arguments. He describes this practice as an exemplum huius acutae delirationis (an example of
this sheer madness, 49.8.8). Here, deliratio is not associated with fear, as with Celsus’ delirium,
but rather with the absurd application of logic. It is also worth noting that in using the adjective
acutae to modify deliratio in this example, Seneca is emphasizing the “sharp” or “biting”134
nature of the deliratio, and not suggesting it is “short-lasting”, a sense which acutus often
carries in medical contexts.
We can also compare Celsus’ description of delirium with Seneca’s description of madness
caused by fear in Naturales Quaestiones. Celsus’ comments about delirium are rather limited,
but he does make it clear that delirium has subcategories similar to the subcategories
associated with his third form of insania, even though fear is not mentioned as a cause of that
condition. Nonetheless, Celsus’ third form of insania bears some similarity to Seneca’s
description of madness caused by fear. Celsus states that some people who suffer from this
form of insania lose the faculties of reason (animo desipiunt, 3.18.19.6; vero consilium
insanientem fallit, 3.18.21.1); these symptoms recall Seneca’s description of the loss of reason
(excutit mentes; animos…aberrasse, non est facile…consipere, et al.) and the insania-like
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condition brought on by fear in Naturales Quaestiones. In these ways, both authors relate that
the inability to reason is indicative of a form of madness (or near-madness in Seneca’s case).
Celsus does not specify that fear is a cause of his third form of insania, but he does mention
fear when commenting on the treatment of this form of insania. For the type that loses its
reason, Celsus recommends various forms of physical and mental coercion, as well as the
provocation of fear:
Ubi perperam aliquid dixit aut fecit, fame, vinculis, plagis coercendus est. Cogendus est et
attendere et ediscere aliquid et meminisse: sic enim fiet, ut paulatim metu cogatur considerare
quid faciat. Subito etiam terreri et expavescere in hoc morbo prodest, et fere quicquid animum
vehementer turbat.
When one says or does anything wrong, he must be restrained by starvation, bindings, and
beatings. He must be forced both to focus on something and to learn and remember it: thus
little by little he will be forced by fear to consider what he is doing. Moreover, to be terrified
suddenly and to become greatly frightened is beneficial in this illness, and so is anything in
general that strongly shakes up the mind. (3.18.21.4-22.7)
Celsus’ promotion of fear as a remedy for madness starkly contrasts with the ideas of Seneca,
who focuses on the capacity of fear to trigger forms of madness. Generally, Seneca’s prose
works are less interested in how to treat madness, instead seeking to provide advice about how
to avoid it in the first place. But according to Celsus, seemingly any stimulus that brings about
fear can stir up the mind and help a person regain their wits. Indeed, he describes ways of
inducing fear both gradually (paulatim) and suddenly (subito). The gradual method involves
forcing people to focus, learn, and memorize things while being tortured. The fear that results
from the torture is said to make the person more conscious of his actions (metu cogatur
considerare quid faciat), thus restoring ratio. Celsus does not provide many details about how
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this method is supposed to work, and one wonders how a person could concentrate and learn
things while being tortured. The other method Celsus describes involves inducing a sudden
fright or otherwise shaking up the mind (animum vehementer turbat). For Celsus, the principle
operating in these treatments suggests that madness and delusion can be corrected through
the use of fear. Such a principle seems to run counter to Hippocratic ideas concerning the
treatment of illness, which generally operate according to principles predicated upon opposing
the perceived causes of illness. For instance, as a treatment for μελαγχολία, the influential
Hippocratic text On the Nature of Man purging a patient of excess black bile, thus counteracting
the cause of the condition.135 But with his third form of insania, Celsus recommends a
treatment—fear— that would, at least initially, bring about a further disturbance of the mind,
rather than countering the disturbance. In the passage from Naturales Quaestiones, Seneca
uses language of shaking (excutit mentes) and disturbance (alios vehementius perturbat) to
indicate that fear can have a strong effect on the mind. But for Seneca, these effects are
considered setbacks, not roads to recovery.
We have now seen that Senecan prose uses a variety of terms to convey madness or states
of mental disturbance, and that these terms are not always clearly defined or used consistently.
In another prose work, De Tranquillitate Animi, Seneca describes a form of mental disturbance
which apparently cannot be identified by any existing Latin term. Seneca’s text begins in the
form of a dialogue, starting with comments by Serenus, a close friend and possibly a distant
135

Κατὰ ταὐτὰ δὲ καὶ χολὴ μέλαινα καθαίρεται, ἢν διδῷς φάρμακον ὅ τι χολὴν μέλαιναν ἄγει.
(Similarly, black bile can be purged if you give a drug that leads it up. On the Nature of Man 5.16-18)
286

relative of Seneca, as well as the dedicatee of De Tranquillitate Animi. Serenus opens by
describing some of the symptoms of the curious condition he is experiencing, hoping that
Seneca can help identify this condition and allay his distress:
Inquirenti mihi in me quaedam vitia apparebant, Seneca, in aperto posita, quae
manu prehenderem, quaedam obscuriora et in recessu, quaedam non continua
sed ex intervallis redeuntia, quae vel molestissima dixerim, ut hostis vagos et ex
occasionibus assilientes, per quos neutrum licet, nec tamquam in bello paratum
esse nec tamquam in pace securum. Illum tamen habitum in me maxime
deprehendo (quare enim non verum ut medico fatear?), nec bona fide liberatum
me iis quae timebam et oderam, nec rursus obnoxium; in statu ut non pessimo,
ita maxime querulo et moroso positus sum: nec aegroto nec valeo. … Haec animi
inter utrumque dubii nec ad recta fortiter nec ad prava vergentis infirmitas qualis
sit, non tam semel tibi possum quam per partes ostendere; dicam quae accidant
mihi, tu morbo nomen invenies.
Reflecting upon myself, Seneca, some vices appeared to me out in the open—
some which I could grasp with my hand, some that were more unclear and
fading away, and some that were not persistent, but recurred at regular
intervals; these I would call the most irksome, like a roaming enemy assaulting
one at every chance, [an enemy] because of whom one can do neither of these
two things: neither be prepared as if in war, nor be free of anxiety as if in peace.
This is the condition which I detect in myself (for why would I not confess openly,
as if to a doctor?), and I do not find myself freed in good faith from those things
which I used to fear and hate, nor on the other hand am I rendered subject to
those things. I am in a state which is not the worst, but which is very grievous
and painful: I am neither ill nor well. … What this weakness of the mind might be,
when it is in doubt between both and inclining neither toward the right path nor
toward the wrong, I am not so able to show you all at once, but rather piece by
piece. I will tell you the things that are happening to me, and you will find a
name for the illness. (De Tranquillitate Animi 1.1.-1.3; 1.4.-1.5.)
The seemingly ironically-named Serenus explains his symptoms, describing them to Seneca as if
he were speaking to a doctor, as Serenus himself acknowledges (quare enim non verum ut
medico fatear?). In the following section of this chapter, we will be seeing passages from
Senecan tragedy in which characters, such as Hercules, are also portrayed as suffering and
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struggling to understand the cause and nature of their condition, as well as possible remedies.
Serenus struggles to understand his own condition in part because it is highly ambiguous in
nature, resembling various conditions known to him, while not fully fitting the description of
any. He says that he is neither ill nor well (sum nec aegroto nec valeo), suggesting an elusive
condition outside of the typical binary framework of illness and health. Unable to identify his
condition, Serenus cannot diagnose himself and hopes that someone else can successfully
interpret his symptoms and determine exactly what he is experiencing.
Seneca responds to Serenus later in this dialogue, but he too does not provide a name for
Serenus’ condition. Instead, Seneca compares the condition to the experience of people who,
after recovering from a long and serious illness, become overly concerned about a relapse
whenever they experience any minor sign of distress (2.1). In modern parlance, this sounds a
bit like the condition known as hypochondria, but Seneca still does not provide a name. This is
significant, in light of the fact that Senecan prose, like Celsus’ De Medicina, is typically intent on
naming the forms of illness that are described. Celsus is so thorough about this that he
provides names in both Latin and Greek for a great number of conditions, reinforcing the
impression that he is a precise and thorough compiler of medical knowledge. Conversely, the
unsuccessful grasping for a name to give to Serenus’ condition in De Tranquillitate Animi
suggests that not every form of illness can be straightforwardly identified and catalogued, at
least not through the process of philosophical dialogue.
Although Seneca is not able to identify a name for Serenus’ condition, he later goes on to
state that Serenus’ condition is characterized by a lack of euthymia (hanc stabilem animi Graeci
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euthymian vocant… 2.3). The condition known as euthymia, or εὐθυμία, might be contrasted
with δυσθῡμία136, a term which appears in the Hippocratic Corpus and Greek tragedies. It is
often translated as “despondency”, “despair”, and “depression.” Seneca equates the Greek
word εὐθυμία with the Latin tranquillitas (calmness, 2.3), and he characterizes this state as a
stable condition of uninterrupted joy in which the mind exists in a state of moderation, “neither
overly exalting nor overly despairing” (nec attollens se umquam nec deprimens, 2.4). Seneca
does not give a positive identification to Serenus’ condition, but he is clearly suggesting that
Serenus suffers from a lack of tranquillitas.
Despite the fact that Seneca does not actually name Serenus’ condition, some scholars have
suggested Serenus is suffering from “depression”. Lawlor in fact proposes that these sections
of De Tranquillitate Animi provide “the best description of what might most closely correspond
to modern depression in classical literature” (although he does note that “the text itself
observes that there is no name for this condition”).137 Identifying Serenus’ condition as
“depression” is tempting, especially since he is said to lacks εὐθυμία, and thus arguably in a
state of δυσθυμία. However, we must be careful about assuming that εὐθυμία and
δυσθυμία are diametrically opposed states, much like we cannot assume that the adjectives
insanus and sanus are completely opposite in their senses and connotations. When we recall
Serenus’ own comments that he is neither ill nor well (nec aegroto nec valeo), it may make
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more sense to say that his condition is somewhere between εὐθυμία and δυσθυμία, not
firmly situated under either category. This, in turn, might help explain why neither Seneca nor
Serenus give a specific name to his condition.
One might also think that Serenus is suffering from “depression” because Seneca uses the
participle deprimens in this passage (...sed placido statu maneat, nec attollens se umquam nec
deprimens). This English word “depression” is in fact etymologically related this word,
although, as Jackson observes, it was a “relative latecomer to the terminology for dejected
states...” and that it was not used in this sense until the seventeenth century.138 One might also
point to similarities between Serenus’ symptoms and symptoms associated with clinical
depression, particularly his anxiety. Nevertheless, attempting to connect the dots between
modern clinical depression and a condition described in a Latin text poses various problems.
For one, the issue is muddled because the English word “depression” is notoriously imprecise.
Marsella observes that it “lacks clarity”, as it is “used to denote a mood, a symptom, and a
syndrome”139, and in addition, it is associated with a wide array of symptoms. Beyond its
clinical psychiatric uses, “depression” and related verbs and adjectives carry other connotations
that speak to the word’s great semantic fluidity; one finds, for instance, everyday, colloquial
uses such as "why do you look so depressed (i.e. sad) today?" and “what a depressing (i.e.
sorrowful) movie that was!” One cannot expect any Latin term to have this exact semantic
range, and there is every reason to believe that Latin terms like insania, furor, and dementia
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(and the Greek δυσθῡμία) all have a similarly broad semantic range. Another, larger and more
difficult problem has to do with the relationship between words and concepts, and crosscultural studies of depression have shown that there is no single or universal concept of what is
called “depression” in English.140 Furthermore, if we consider “depression” from a crosshistoric perspective, we see that modern theorists in the Western medical tradition often view
depression as a condition with causes which are deeply tied to one’s personality and social
interactions, which in turn may be affected by a biochemical imbalance. In Celsus, and Greek
and Latin texts that describe conditions which might be compared to depression (e.g.
μελαγχολία and δυσθυμία), imbalance is an important part of the explanation, but we never
see it explicitly suggested that these conditions are someone caused by or related to latent
aspects of one’s identity or underlying character traits.141 In other cultures, it appears that no
concept of depression exists at all.142
Nevertheless, Lawlor finds Seneca’s description of Serenus’ condition to be so similar to our
“depression” that he takes the passage as evidence that Latin lacks a term for depression.
Others scholars suggest that the Latin word tristitia and related verbs and adjectives closely
correspond to “depression” in English. Although Harris points out differences in modern
thought and Greek and Roman thought pertaining to the causation of “depression”, he
nevertheless states that the Oxford Latin Dictionary, “not unreasonably gives ‘depressed’ as a
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meaning of tristis and ‘depress’ as a meaning of contristare.”143 In support of Harris’ point, we
can recall that Celsus’ second form of insania—a condition which scholars such as Toohey have
identified as “depression”—is characterized by tristitia (3.18.17.3). But it remains the case that
no Latin term, including tristitia, possesses a semantic range that corresponds perfectly, or, I
would argue even closely, to the semantic range of the English word “depression.” Because the
English words “depression” and “depressed” come with so many connotations inappropriate to
Latin words like tristitia, I avoid using them in my translations throughout this chapter
(generally opting for the more generic “sadness” and “sad” instead). As for Serenus’ condition,
even if there is no better English word to use than “depression”, I will refrain from referring to
his condition as such; instead I will follow Seneca in not applying a label to his condition.
In works such as De Ira and Naturales Quaestiones, Seneca emphasizes that madness is
characterized by disordered mental states and a loss of reason. Conversely, in a later passage
of De Tranquillitate Animi Seneca observes that madness can actually have some beneficial
effects on the mind:
Sed nec saepe faciendum est, ne animus malam consuetudinem ducat, et
aliquando tamen in exsultationem libertatemque extrahendus tristisque
sobrietas removenda paulisper. Nam sive Graeco poetae credimus, “aliquando
et insanire iucundum est”; sive Platoni, “frustra poeticas fores compos sui
pepulit”; sive Aristoteli, “nullum magnum ingenium sine mixtura dementiae
fuit”, non potest grande aliquid et super ceteros loqui nisi mota mens. Cum
vulgaria et solita contempsit instinctuque sacro surrexit excelsior, tunc demum
aliquid cecinit grandius ore mortali.
It should not be done often, lest the mind take on a wicked custom, but
sometimes it should be drawn into jubilation and boldness, and solemn
143
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moderation must be set aside for a while. For, whether we believe with the
Greek poet that “it is sometimes agreeable to be mad,” or with Plato that “one
who is self-possessed knocks in vain on the doors of poetry,” or with Aristotle
that “no great genius was without a mixture of madness”, the mind, unless
roused up, is not able to say anything great and above others. When it has
shown disdain for the common and the customary and risen higher by divine
inspiration, then it has finally sung something greater than any mortal mouth.
(17.9.5-11.3)
The idea that one should embrace madness (even if in a limited way), as well as the idea that
genius cannot exist without madness, represent a radical departure from the way Seneca
approaches madness in many of his other prose works. Here Seneca diverges from ideas he
expresses elsewhere, but in quoting authors like Plato and Aristotle, he takes us down another
traditional path, namely that which sees poetic and artistic inspiration as a type of madness.
These comments lead us closer to usage patterns in Senecan tragedy, as if bridging the gap
between his representation of madness in works of prose and poetry. Indeed, the two modes
of discussing madness are to some extent aligned with the distinction between prose (whether
Seneca's philosophical writings or Celsus' De Medicina) and poetry (Senecan tragedy). Very
generally speaking, the former sees manifestations of madness as a problem to be explained
and, when possible, to be avoided or (in Celsus’ case) cured; the poetic tradition comes with a
heritage of, in some specific and limited ways, placing a more positive value on forms of
madness. In the above passage from De Tranquillitate Animi, however, these distinctions
disappear.
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Indeed, the comments in the above passage represent a rare instance in which Seneca’s
prose deviates from the Stoic emphasis upon maintaining constant mental composure.144
According to this passage, great genius (magnum ingenium) is realized not through mental
composure, but instead through a disturbance of the mind (mota mens), which enables one to
transcend common modes of thought and rise up to great intellectual heights. Seneca also
observes that divine inspiration (instinctuque sacro) is responsible for these realizations of
genius. Commentators have noted Seneca is likely alluding to ἐνθουσιασμός, a concept in
various works of Greek literature which indicates that strokes of genius occur as a result of
divine inspiration.145 This is reflected in the etymology of the word ἐνθουσιασμός (ἐν [in] +
θεός [a god]—literally “the state of having a god within oneself”).146 The divine aspect of this
form of madness sets its apart from all of the other forms of madness which are described in
Seneca’s prose works.
Seneca gives an added sense of authority to the idea that madness can inspire poetic
creativity and other forms of genius by citing the Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle,
paraphrasing them in Latin. Schiesaro has suggested that Seneca’s references to these
philosophers are meant to suggest that the enthusiastic surrendering of mental composure is
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what drives both artistic and philosophical genius.147 Seneca attributes the same basic idea to
both Plato and Aristotle, namely that this specific form of madness can inspire various forms of
creative thought and expression, but Seneca uses various pieces of vocabulary to refer to this
type of madness. First, before mentioning Plato and Aristotle, Seneca makes reference to an
unnamed Greek poet148, stating that it can be agreeable to go mad (insanire). Here, Seneca
uses a word with a very broad semantic range; the related noun insania is, for example,
associated with a wide array of conditions in Senecan prose, including anger, drunkenness, and
fear. As for the reference to Plato, Staley identifies this as an allusion to the Platonic dialogue
Phaedrus, another work that “finds common ground between the poet and the philosopher
through the divine madness they share.”149 In paraphrasing Plato, Seneca suggests that it is not
possible to create poetry in a “self-possessed” (compos) state, and the final sentence of this
passage further suggests that being “self-possessed” is at odds with being under the influence
of divine inspiration (instinctuque sacro). In paraphrasing Plato, however, Seneca does not use
insania/insanire or other words that can be used to convey madness.
The final paraphrase in this passage suggests that genius always comes with the company of
madness (and vice versa)—an idea which strongly resonates with ideas expressed in the
pseudo-Aristotelian Problema 30.1. This work is an essay in the encyclopedic compendium
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known as the Problemata, a series of questions and answers concerning various topics, posed
and answered by a post-Aristotelian author who emulates Aristotle in his ideas and use of
language. Problema 30.1 explores why people of genius and exceptional ability have a
tendency to be melancholic in nature. Stok not only notes a connection between Seneca’s
comments in De Tranquillitate Animi and the the views on genius and μελαγχολία in
Problema 30.1, he also suggests a connection between the condition in De Tranquillitate Animi
and Celsus’ second form of insania because it is caused by bilis atra (black bile).150 While this is
an interesting connection between Celsus and Problema 30.1, it is important to note that
Seneca does not refer to black bile in De Tranquillitate Animi. It should also be noted that
genius is not associated with Celsus’ second form of insania, or any other form of madness he
describes. Seneca’s reference to a mixtura dementiae (a mixture of madness) amidst genius
(ingenium) finds no parallel in Celsus, whose various forms of madness are never connected
with genius or exceptional talent. In addition, in Problema 30.1 μελαγχολία is strongly
associated with “manic” individuals151, including the mythological figure Ajax, whom Celsus
mentions as an example of his third form of insania. But Celsus does not describe Ajax’s
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condition as a divinely inspired form of madness, and this constitutes a very important
difference with the form of madness Seneca describes in De Tranquillitate Animi. Thus, while it
is interesting to compare the three conditions which Stok attempts to link together, ultimately
the differences between them considerably outweigh the similarities. It is also worth noting
that Seneca uses the term dementia in the above passage from De Tranquillitate Animi. Here,
dementia is closely linked with ingenium—so closely that the latter is said to be unable to exist
without the former. In Naturales Quaestiones, however, dementia is described as a condition
brought on by long-lasting fear (6.29.2.4-3.1). The dementia described in De Tranquillitate
Animi is not characterized as either long-lasting or caused by fear, and this is another example
from Senecan prose in which vocabulary of madness is used in a somewhat loose and
unsystematic way.
Language of Madness in Senecan Tragedy
Like his prose works, many of Seneca’s tragedies exhibit a profound interest in the mental
and psychological states of their characters. In some of these plays, including Hercules Furens
and Medea, the “madness” that afflicts certain characters plays an important role in driving the
plot. In this section, I analyze the representation of madness in selected scenes from these two
plays, closely examining language usage and drawing comparisons with Celsus’ De Medicina
and Senecan prose. There has been some scholarship on the language of madness in each of
these corpora, but only very limited comparisons between Celsus and Seneca, and between
Senecan prose and poetry. De Caprariis, for instance, has analyzed psychological and
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psychosomatic manifestations of illness in Seneca’s tragedies152, but this analysis contains only
brief discussion of Senecan prose. Moreover, De Caprariis focuses primarily upon Seneca’s
conceptualization of madness without giving as much attention to the relevant vocabulary and
imagery. Stok, on the other hand, has provided some analysis of vocabulary pertinent to
madness in Senecan prose, and he has even drawn some comparisons with Celsus’ usage of
vocabulary, but his study does not explore Senecan tragedy. 153 My analysis in this section will
take the next step.
Hercules Furens
Hercules Furens begins with the goddess Juno seething in a state of anger and resentment.
She is bitter that so many of the children Jupiter has sired outside of their marriage have
received the honor of being placed into the heavens as constellations. Juno is aware that
Jupiter’s son Hercules is also destined to be immortalized in this way, having has completed the
series of daunting labors that she imposed upon him. With Hercules now making his return to
his home in Thebes, Juno concludes that the only way that she might still overcome Hercules is
to turn him against himself: Quaeris Alcidae parem? / Nemo est nisi ipse; bella iam secum gerat
(Do you seek a match for Hercules? / There is none but himself; now he must war with himself.
84-85). Hercules’ “war with himself” comes in the form of madness set in motion by Juno.
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The process of inciting madness in Hercules begins with Juno summoning the Furies, the
chthonic deities of vengeance. She encourages them to become riled up so that they can inflict
their frenzy upon Hercules:
Incipite, famulae Ditis, ardentem citae
concutite pinum, et agmen horrendum anguibus
Megaera ducat atque luctifera manu
vastam rogo flagrante corripiat trabem.
Hoc agite, poenas petite vitiatae Stygis.
Concutite pectus, acrior mentem excoquat
quam qui caminis ignis Aetnaeis furit;
ut possit animum captus Alcides agi,
magno furore percitus, vobis prius
insaniendum est. Iuno, cur nondum furis?
Me me sorores, mente deiectam mea
versate primam, facere si quicquam apparo
dignum noverca.
Begin, attendants of Dis, having been aroused,
shake the blazing pine torch, and let Megaera lead the line of battle,
frightful with snakes, and let her snatch an immense beam
from a blazing funeral pyre with her grief-bringing hand.
Go to it, seek punishment for the violation of Styx!
Stir up your heart, let it boil your mind more fiercely
than the fire that rages in the furnaces of Aetna;
in order for Hercules to be taken as a captive in mind,
stirred up in a great frenzy,
first you must go mad. Juno, why are you not yet raging?
Me, sisters, first overturn me, driven out of my mind,
if I am prepared to do something
worthy of a step-mother. (100-112)
In Juno’s invocation of the Furies, they are characterized as capable of inflicting madness not
only upon Hercules, but also upon Juno herself. They are portrayed as terrifying and difficult to
control, both characteristics emphasized by the snakes and fire that surround them. The
language of fire is particularly prominent, with mentions of a flaming pine torch
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(ardentem…pinum, 100-101), a blazing funeral pyre (rogo flagrante, 103), and the fire of Mount
Aetna (ignis Aetnaeis, 106). Fitch observes that madness is often connected with fire imagery
in Greek and Latin literature, citing examples from Sophocles’ Electra (887), Virgil’s Aeneid
(1.293-296), and other works of Senecan tragedy, including Medea.154 Juno also evokes fire
imagery in commanding the Furies to “stir up their [their] heart and let it boil [their] mind more
fiercely” (concutite pectus, acrior mentem excoquat, 105).155 The image of the pectus “boiling”
the mens and thus causing it to seethe suggests a physical origin for the Furies’ madness.
Although Celsus’ descriptions of madness do not feature language of fire or boiling, we might
compare the madness in the above passage with Celsus’ phrenesis, both because it starts with
fever, and because it is acute. The Furies are being called upon to enter into a short-term state
of madness so that they can inflict madness upon Hercules, whose madness in turn also lasts
for only a short period of time. Seneca’s description, however, does not feature vocabulary
reminiscent of Celsus’ description of phrenesis.
The Furies’ uncontrollable and destructive nature is also emphasized through the passage’s
fire imagery.156 Indeed, the Furies are depicted not only as capable of driving others into a
state of madness, but also as personifications of madness themselves. Their connotations of
madness are repeatedly conveyed with the language of furor (furit, 106; furore, 108; furis, 109),
154
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which plays a significant role not just here but throughout the tragedy. In this passage, Juno
describes the great power of furor and how it can cause one’s mind to be “taken captive”
(animum captus, 107), a phrase which implies a loss of reason. Seneca does not specifically
refer to the mind being “taken captive” in his prose works, but he does suggest that furor has
the tendency to deprive people of reason. In Epistula 94, Seneca states that furor renders
people incapable of comprehending advice157, and in De Ira he relates how furor completely
overcame the mind of Ajax and eventually led to his death.158 Across these works, furor is
consistently presented as a form of madness that deprives people of the ability to reason.
In addition to using language of furor, Juno also employs language of insania. Juno asserts
that the Furies must first drive themselves mad (vobis prius / insaniendum est, 109-110), and
then, just a line and a half later, asks herself why she, too, has not entered into such a state
(Juno, cur nondum furis? 110). Here, the verbs insanire and furere are used with little semantic
distinction, paralleling the close association that exists between insania and furor in Senecan
prose.159 Then, when Juno asks the Furies to drive her into a state of madness, she
characterizes furor as a state in which one is driven out of one’s mind (mente deiectam mea,
109). This phrase reminds one of the term dementia—literally, “being out of (de) one’s mind
(mens)”, which also appears repeatedly in Senecan prose. Later in Hercules Furens, as we will
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see, Seneca uses a similarly constructed adjective, amens (1021, 1033), which also literally
suggests “being out of one’s mind”. In this way, Seneca characterizes furor as an absence of
mens. At the same time, “being out of one’s mind” is a rather generic formulation of madness,
and there are no other mental or physical symptoms mentioned in the passage. Juno thus
describes a highly generic form of madness, conveyed by various terms which are not strongly
differentiated in sense.
Juno’s invocation of the Furies also raises interesting questions pertaining to the causation of
madness. Although a goddess herself, Juno is apparently incapable of effecting madness either
in others or in herself. She requires the Furies to bring about the sort of madness she wishes to
instigate. In this way, it is suggested that furor / insania requires an external source or cause—
an idea that differs from representations of furor and insania in Senecan prose. Ajax’s furor, for
example, is said to originate from his own ira160, and drunkenness is referred to as insania
voluntaria.161 In both cases, the individual is held responsible for their own furor or insania.
Seneca does describe a divinely-inspired (instinctuque sacro) form of madness in De
Tranquillitate Animi162, but the ingenium assocated with this form of madness is certainly not
an element of the madness brought on by the Furies in Hercules Furens. Thus, it appears that
causation is not very important to how Seneca uses vocabulary of madness. This differs from
what we find in Celsus, who describes causation as an important way to distinguish between
various forms of insania. For instance, his first form of insania Celsus is said to be caused by
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fever, his second form of insania is caused by black bile, and his third form of insania is caused
either by one’s own mind, or by external visions. Additionally, he specifies that delirium,
another type of madness, is caused by fear.
Whereas Juno’s invocation of the Furies strongly suggests that they are needed to bring
about madness in Hercules, the rest of the play deemphasizes the element of divine causation.
There is an element of paradox in the fact that Hercules requires an external force to bring him
into a state of furor, since his own well-established identity is in many ways shaped and defined
by furor. I will explain this point further in the following pages. The cause of Hercules’ madness
has, in fact, been called “the most disputed problem in the scholarship of Hercules Furens”163,
and the paradox just described lies at the heart of this problem. Fitch has persuasively argued
that Hercules’ madness actually has “two levels of motivation: one divine and the other human,
or one mythological and the other psychological.”164 In other words, Hercules’ madness is
caused by two different, but non-mutually exclusive factors, and I would argue that this is
reflected in the structure of the play. The dual causes of Hercules’ madness never interfere
with each other, as the play moves from its initial focus on role that Juno and the Furies play in
instigating his madness to exploring how Hercules’ madness is caused by his own identity. In
contrast, Celsus never suggests that an illness, “mental” or otherwise, can have more than one
cause (although he does suggest that some conditions occur sine causa, as noted in Chapter 2).
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When the play depicts the actual onset of Hercules’ madness, there is certainly more focus
placed upon Hercules’ identity and how it relates to the madness he is beginning to experience.
This state of madness comes about after he has brought the dog Cerberus back from the
underworld to complete his final labor, and then returned to Thebes and killed Lycus, the
usurper of the city’s throne. After this killing, Hercules prepares to make sacrifices to the gods
in the fourth act of the play, but he falls into a state of delusion. It is in this state that he
mistakes his wife and three children for family members of Lycus, and murders them one by
one. Hercules describes the onset of his madness, and his father Amphitryon then reacts:
Hercules:
Sed quid hoc? Medium diem
cinxere tenebrae. Phoebus obscuro meat
sine nube vultu. Quis diem retro fugat
agitque in ortus? Unde nox atrum caput
ignota profert? Unde tot stellae polum
implent diurnae? Primus en noster labor
caeli refulget parte non minima leo
iraque totus fervet et morsus parat.
Iam rapiet aliquod sidus: ingenti minax
stat ore et ignes efflat et rutilat165, iubam
cervice iactans quidquid autumnus gravis
hiemsque gelido frigida spatio refert
uno impetu transiliet et verni petet
frangetque tauri colla.
Amphitryon:
Quod subitum hoc malum est?
Quo, nate, vultus huc et huc acres refers
acieque falsum turbida caelum vides?
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Hercules:
What is this? Shadows enclose
the middle of the day. Phoebus proceeds,
his face darkened without a cloud. Who pursues daylight and drives it back
to where it rose? From where does this unknown night
rear its black head? From where do so many stars fill the heavens
during the day? Behold, my first labor, the lion,
gleams in a not-too-small part of the sky.
He boils all over in anger and prepares to bite.
Soon he will snatch up some star: he stands
threatening with his huge maws as he exhales flames and glows red,
tossing the mane on his neck, and in a single bound he will leap over
whatever harsh autumn or chilly winter carries back
in its icy path, and he will pursue
and break the neck of the bull of spring.
Amphitryon:
What is this sudden misfortune?
Why, son, do you turn your gaze sharply here and there
and, with disturbed vision, see a false heaven? (939-954)
Disturbed vision and the perception of a false reality are the first discernible signs that Hercules
is in the grip of madness166, and this is highlighted by the synchysis in Amphitryon’s remark
(acieque falsum turbida caelum). As we can recall, the perception of imagines is a key symptom
of one of the types of Celsus’ third form of insania (3.18.19.4-6). Celsus states that Ajax and
Orestes, as they have been described by poets, exemplify this type of madness, and now in
Seneca’s play we find another mythological figure whose madness is strongly tied to the
perception of visions. Even though the word imago does not occur here or elsewhere in the
play, the way in which Hercules’ experience is described is highly analogous to Celsus’
descriptions of imagines. We can also recall that Celsus associates imagines with phrenesis, his
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first form of insania. There, he states that the perception of imagines indicate that the mind
has been completely overtaken (3.18.3.3-4). Similarly, in Seneca’s play Hercules’ perception of
“visions” serve as an obvious sign, and in fact the primary sign that he is in a state of madness.
Following the above passage, Hercules continues to describe his visions, and then Amphitryon
immediately describes Hercules’ state of mind as caecus furor (blind rage, 991). He then then
goes on to explain how Hercules strung his bow and unknowingly shot at his own family (992995). Whereas Celsus associates visions with insania, here Amphitryon is suggesting that
Hercules’ visions are an indicator of furor.
Even though his visions are strange and appear quite suddently, Hercules is convinced that
they are real, as reflected in his use of exclusively indicative verbs, and no subjunctives or
expressions like videtur. Yet Hercules’ speech also contains language that suggests an image of
obscurity and confusion (tenebrae, 940; obscuro, 940; ignota, 943), conveying that, even if
Hercules himself is unaware of the fact, his perceptions are shadowy, impaired impressions of
reality. Amphitryon’s response questions the veracity of Hercules’ perceptions by directly
asking him why he perceives as a “false heaven” (falsum…caelum, 954). As noted above,
Amphitryon also characterizes Hercules’ condition as a “blind madness” (caecus…furor, 991),
and the chorus later uses languge of blindness as well, describing Hercules’ acts of murder as a
“blind error” (error caecus, 1096). All of this language of blindness and concealment has an
element of irony, since the passage places so much emphasis on what Hercules says he is
actually seeing. This element of irony draws further attention to the false nature of Hercules’
perceptions, and more generally his lack of self-awareness. Seneca also associates furor with
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blindness in Thyestes (caecus furor, 27); this use similarly suggests that the entire house of
Tantalus is blind and lacks awareness.167 In Oedipus, caecus Furor (590) is one of the
personified forms of illness plaguing the city of Thebes, and this phrase also resonates with
Oedipus’ later, literal act of blinding himself.168 There are numerous references to blindness in
Senecan prose, but they are never connected with furor, insania, or other terms having the
sense of “madness”. Celsus describes several conditions that can lead to blindness if left
untreated169, using vocabulary such as caecus, obcaeco, and excaecatus170, but he never links
blindness with madness. Whereas Seneca’s poetic tragedies repeatedly suggest that furor is a
form of blindness, neither Seneca’s prose works nor Celsus’s De Medicina associate literal
blindness with furor or other forms of madness.

The language of obscurity and confusion

present in Hercules’ speech (tenebrae, 940; obscuro, 940; ignota, 943) highlights not only the
delusional aspect of his perceptions, but also their paradoxical nature. Several of Hercules’
observations describe an inversion or rejection of the natural order: darkness comes about in
the middle of the day (939-940), the face of the sun (Phoebus) is “darkened without a cloud”
(obscuro… / sine nube vultu, 940-941), and the sun reverts course (941-942), causing stars
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See Boyle 2011: 250.
The vocabulary of furor makes multiple appearances in the description of Oedipus’ self-blinding (cf. furit 957,
970).
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These conditions include proptosis (6.6.8g-9c), phthiriasis (6.6.15), mydriasis (6.6.37), and hypochysis, or
cataracts (6.6.35). Quite impressively, Celsus discusses a possible surgical treatment for the latter condition.
(7.7.14) For a discussion of some of these conditions, see Trentin 2013: 96.
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caecus (4.1.8.7; 4.21.1.2); obcaecare/obcaecatus/occaecare/occaecatus (6.6.37b.3; 8.4.1.2; 8.4.7.7); excaecatus
(7.7.15g.5)
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appear during the day (943-944).171 Like Oedipus’ act of self-blinding, Hercules’ own form of
blindness is associated with the toppling and reversal of natural order (cf. Natura in uno vertit
Oedipoda, Oedipus 943).172 The celestial confusion he perceives is a manifestation of his own
mad, confused mind. This is evident Hercules’ references to the Nemean lion, the beast he had
subdued long ago to complete his first labor. Like Hercules, the lion is boiling up in anger
(iraque totus fervet, 956), overstepping its bounds, and becoming wild and uncontrollable. All
of these actions apply to Hercules in this scene173, and in this sense his visions are not entirely
false. The lion is spreading violent disorder in the heavens, and Hercules is about to carry out
mad carnage and introduce disorder into his own home.174 Hercules is confused by the sight of
the lion, since he had subdued this beast long ago; this brings him back to his first labor,
perhaps suggesting to his deluded mind that his labors have been for naught, or even that he
must restart them from the beginning. His perception of the lion and the various
manifestations of cosmic disorder help trigger the furor that is constantly lurking near the
surface of his mind. All this is in stark contrast with the tone at the beginning of this speech,
when Hercules is celebrating the order and safety he has finally brought about for the world
(iussus in lucem extuli / arcana mundi, 596-597). These thoughts turn out to be ironic
misunderstandings of reality, immediately preceding his visual misperceptions.
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This recalls the sun’s reversal of course in Thyestes (802-804; see Chapter 3), which occurs before terrible
violence is carried out in Thyestes’ own home. In both that passage from Thyestes and the passage from Hercules
Furens, the sun’s reversal of course is marked by language of concealment.
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This verse is also discussed in Chapter 2.
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Fitch also notes connections between Hercules’ actions and the perceived actions of the Nemean lion. (Fitch
1987: 364-365)
174
As Fitch states, “the picture of disorder in the heavens reestablishes the interplay between the individual and
the universe…” (Fitch 1987: 29)
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Even after Hercules finishes wreaking his carnage and becomes unconscious, he continues to
be affected by disturbing visions (somnia). The chorus observes that “he turns over cruel
dreams in his wild heart” (saeva feroci corde volutat / somnia, 1083-1084). How the chorus has
knowledge of Hercules’ “cruel dreams” is not entirely clear—this knowledge may be explained
as a dramatic device, or it is possible that the the chorus is inferring that his dreams are cruel
based upon the restless movement he continues to display (1085-1088). Kohn is one scholar
who has noted that the false nature of Hercules’ perceptions in this scene—while he is both
awake and asleep—give rise to many dramaturgical uncertainties. Kohn adds that the sense of
uncertainty associated with these visions contributes to unsettling nature of the entire scene,
which together “reinforce the central theme [that] Hercules is mad and not in control of his
senses.”175 The way in which Hercules falls under the spell of false perceptions recalls the
sensory confusion that Thyestes experiences before he realizes that he has consumed his own
children. In both situations, acts of violence against one’s own children are associated with—
and enabled by—a breakdown of the sensory experience.
In focusing on Hercules’ “visions”, Seneca presents the onset of Hercules’ madness rather
differently than Euripides’ Hercules. Euripides’ play initially devotes attention to describing
Hercules’ physical symptoms176 (especially his revolving, bloodshot eyes and frothing at the
mouth177), but in Seneca’s play Hercules’ physical condition is hardly addressed until his
madness has begun to subside. Fitch points out that visions and hallucinations are frequently
175

Kohn 2013: 109.
Fitch has also noted this difference. (Fitch 1987: 363)
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See Euripides’ Heracles 930-935.
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identified as symptoms of madness by Greek writers on medicine such as Hippocrates and
Aretaeus178, but those symptoms are not emphasized in Euripides’ portrayal of Hercules’
madness. It is also a bit surprising that Fitch only brings up Greek authors here, not mentioning
Celsus or any other Latin writer who discusses imagines.
In both Celsus and Senecan tragedy, then, visual hallucinations are a defining sign of
madness. In his discussion of hallucinations in Greek tragedy, Most observes that tragic
hallucinations are usually visual in nature (as opposed to being auditory, tactile, olfactory, or
gustatory).179 This does not correspond to the “supposed prevalence of auditory rather than
visual hallucinations” noted by modern researchers in the field of psychology. 180 Of course, this
does not mean that visual hallucinations were more common than other kinds of hallucinations
in Greco-Roman antiquity. In any case, Most considers the prevalence of visual hallucinations
in Greek tragedy to be a reflection of the fact that these plays were written with visual
performance in mind. Seneca’s tragedies, on the other hand, may not have ever been intended
for theatrical performance, but they nonetheless assume the form of being staged
performances, and one can find a similarly strong visual emphasis in these plays. At the same
time, Seneca’s plays show an interest in exploring other senses, as well as the mixing of the
senses, as noted in the previous chapter’s discussion of Thyestes (cf. 943-969; 1064). The role

178

Fitch 1987: 364.
Most goes on to state that “it requires only a little reflection to realize that other forms of madness cannot
easily be staged so effectively as visual hallucinations can. For example, how is a dramatic character supposed to
convey voices?” (Most 2013: 404, see also 405)
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Harris 2013: 17. For further discussion of hallucinations in various Greek and Latin texts, see Harris 2013: 285306.
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of the senses and sensory experiences in both Greek and Roman tragedy are topics that would
benefit from further scholarly discussion, and we might be able to gain more insight into these
topics by drawing comparisons with how sensory experiences are understood and described by
authors like Hippocrates and Celsus. This is an area of inquiry that cannot be pursued further
here, but one that I would like to explore more in depth in future studies.
Besides the Nemean lion, Hercules relates several other specific visions to Amphitryon.
These include his perception that he has been summoned to the heavens by all the gods,
except for one unnamed goddess (but presumably Juno), who denies him entry (961-964).
Denied such access, Hercules declares his plan to lead the Titans (whom he also describes as
furentes) in a rebellion against the gods (967-973). He then relates his perception that the
Giants are armed and ready to attack the heavens (976-981) and that he is being threatened by
the Fury Tisiphone (982-986). Finally, he perceives Lycus’ children hiding from him (987-991),
although these are in fact his own children. Taken together, his visions are extremely violent in
nature, and this, I would argue, offers some insight into Hercules’ psyche and Seneca’s
portrayal of the causes of his furor.
There have been various interpretations of Hercules’ visions, and how they relate to his
identity. Fitch takes a psychological perspective, stating that Hercules’ “series of hallucinations
powerfully suggests the fluctuations of a distraught mind” and that “the various hallucinations
result from anxieties and conflicts present whether at a conscious or subconscious level, in his
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sane mind.”181 Fitch does not specify what Hercules’ anxieties might be, but it is evident that,
even though he has completed his labors, he continues to be consumed with concern about
maintaining order in the world and the universe more generally. He directly expresses these
concerns in the prayer he makes immediately before the onset of his visions (cf. 926-939). Even
though he is returning home, Hercules is not yet prepared to rest and cannot set his mind at
ease. Having just returned from the underworld after completing a series of intense labors, his
mind is still bent toward violence and furor. In this sense, Seneca’s portrayal of Hercules’ return
home is a psychologically realistic one. In the mythic narratives about his life, Hercules deals
constantly with dangers and disposes of them with violence. During this past, Hercules’ deeplyrooted furor serves him well, but it now inhibits his ability to understand the present reality.
Hercules is conditioned to identify and react to the slightest danger—and this scene shows that
he is in fact overconditioned, since he perceives dangers that do not actually exist. This speaks
to the thin line between Hercules’ furor and sanitas; as Owen puts it, “his madness is merely an
extension of his sanity.”182 Hercules’ furor is thus constantly threatening to emerge, and this
may be why we do not find the progression from ira to furor that Seneca speaks of in his De Ira
(cf. 2.36.4-5). Hercules skips the step of ira, with furor emerging full-blown.
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Fitch 1987: 28-29. Fitch goes on to observe that Hercules’ hallucinations reflect the play’s broader interest in
exploring “the continuity between the sane and insane mind.” (Fitch 1987: 30)
182
Owen 1968: 305; see also 304.
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These interpretations analyze Hercules madness and perceptions through a psychological
lens, connecting them with his personality and mythic narratives of his life.183 This lens aids in
the understanding of Hercules’ furor and how it shapes and defines his identity. Other lenses of
interpretation offer additional insight into Seneca’s representation of Hercules’ madness.
Scholars such as Pigeaud and Toohey have looked at Hercules’ madness from a more medicallyoriented perspective, attempting to analyze the causes and nature of Hercules’ condition based
upon the physical symptoms that are described. Hercules’ symptoms are related almost
entirely by Amphitryon, who first observes that Hercules terrifies his children with an “inflamed
expression” (igneo vultu, 1022) as he is committing the murders. This recalls the fire imagery
that Juno uses when addressing Furies in the opening scene of the play (cf. ignis Aetnaeis furit,
106), asking them to infect themselves and her with a state of madness. This also recalls the
feverish aspect of Celsus’ phrenesis (3.18.17.1-3), even though Celsus does not make specific
reference to fire. Like phrenesis, Hercules’ bout of madness in the play is short-lasting,
although his enduring identity is very much defined by his furor.
After Hercules carries out the murders, Amphitryon observes other symptoms that he is
exhibiting:
Quid hoc est? Errat acies luminum
visusque maeror hebetat an video Herculis
183

Konstan comments on how this sort of interpretation has been applied to the Herakles of Euripides’ play: “ever
since Wilamowitz, some have seen Heracles’ madness as a consequence of his own nature or actions; most
recently, for example, Robert Emmet Meagher states that ‘Lyssa is merely a prop, an empty mask, as it were. …
[Herakles’] domestic violence is simply an extension of his martial savagery’.” (Konstan 2013: 433-434) Although
Konstan is commenting on Euripides’ play, the same basic idea applies to Seneca’s representation of Hercules (if
we replace his reference to Lyssa with Juno).
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manus trementes? Vultus in somnum cadit
et fessa cervix capite summisso labat;
flexo genu iam totus ad terram ruit,
ut caesa silvis ornus aut portum mari
datura moles. Vivis an leto dedit
idem tuos qui misit ad mortem furor?
Sopor est: reciprocos spiritus motus agit.
Detur quieti tempus, ut somno gravis
vis victa morbi pectus oppressum levet.
Removete, famuli, tela, ne repetat furens.
What is this? Does my vision miss the mark,
and does grief dull my sight, or do I really see
the hands of Hercules trembling? His expression is fading into sleep
and his weary neck falls with his sinking head;
now with bent knee his whole body tumbles onto the ground,
as a wild ash tree cut down in the forest, or as a mass [put into] the sea
in order to create a mole. Are you living, or are you killed
by the same madness that sent your family to death?
It is a deep sleep: his breath brings movement up and down.
Let there be time for rest, so that the strength of the illness,
having been overcome by heavy sleep, may alleviate his spirit.
Remove the weapons, slaves, lest he strike again in madness. (1042-1053)
It is noteworthy that Amphitryon cries out quid hoc est? (1042) when he first starts observing
these symptoms—this is the almost same phrase that Hercules utters when he begins to
perceive his visions (quid hoc? 976). In both contexts the phrase marks a transition to
astonishing visual observations. Though they are based in reality, Amphitryon actually doubts
his own perceptions and the condition of his own senses (errat acies luminum / visusque
maeror hebetat, 1042-1043), expressing a skepticism that underscores his own sanity, which is
in contrast with Hercules’ ready acceptance of his fantastical visions. He finds it difficult to
believe that Hercules’ hands are trembling (manus trementes, 1044); this is a jarring image,
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since Hercules is so known for being dextrous and coordinated, especially with his weapons.
Amphitryon also informs us that Hercules falls into such a deep sleep (vultus in somnum cadit,
1044; sopor, 1050; somno gravis, 1051) that it is at first not clear whether he is alive or dead
(1048-1049). This ambiguity mirrors the unknown state of Hercules prior to his return home, as
own family is uncertain whether he is alive or dead.184 These symptoms thus not only
characterize Hercules’ present condition, but also resonate in a broader sense with his situation
in the context of the play. Amphitryon concludes that Hercules is just sleeping and not actually
dead based upon the slight movement of his chest as he breathes (reciprocos spiritus motus
agit, 1050). Amphitryon is so struck by the sight of Hercules overcome by this death-like sleep
that he likens it to two grandiose images: a felled wild ash tree (caesa silvis ornus, 1047) and a
mass of masonry dropped into the sea for the purpose of constructing a mole (portum mari /
datura moles, 1047-1048). These comparisons, which are modeled upon similes in Virgil’s
Aeneid185, evoke the larger-than-life world of epic, a context which sharply contrasts with the
image of a sick person falling asleep, thus adding to the paradoxical nature of the scene.
Despite all of this, Amphitryon still expresses concern about Hercules’ potential for destruction,
referring to him as furens even as he is unconscious and stricken by debilitating symptoms. The
use of this descriptor at the very end of Amphitryon’s speech (and in fact at the very end of the
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Earlier in the play, Megara wonders: even if [Hercules] were still alive, how he could return from the
underworld? (Demersus ac defossus et toto insuper / oppressus orbe quam viam ad superos habet? 317-318)
185
Fitch has noted that language used in these similes is closely modeled upon similes employed by Virgil: the
former simile is used to describe the fall of Troy (Aeneid 2.636), and the latter is used to describe the collapse of
the giant Bitias (Aeneid 9.71). (Fitch 1987: 389)
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scene, immediately preceding the beginning of the fourth choral ode), punctuates the idea that
furor is ultimately inextricable from Hercules’ identity.
Amphitryon suspects that sleep might alleviate Hercules’ madness (1051), and he turns out
to be right, as Hercules no longer exhibits any active symptoms after awakening. Fitch
compares this to how sleep seemingly helps Orestes return to sanity in Euripides’ Orestes. He
also compares the situation to a passage in Celsus186:
Omnibus vero sic adfectis somnus et difficilis et praecipue necessarius est: sub hoc enim plerique
sanescunt.
But certainly for all affected in such a way sleep is both difficult and especially needed: for
under it many regain their senses. (3.18.12.1-3)
The form of madness that Celsus is discussing in this context is phrenesis, although this is not
noted or commented on by Fitch. Since Celsus considers phrenesis be a short-lasting form of
insania, it is not surprising that he imagines sleep would help it run its course. This suggests
another similarity between Celsus’ description of phrenesis and Seneca’s representation of
Hercules’ madness.
Some of Hercules’ symptoms also correspond to conceptualizations of epilepsy (i.e. morbus
comitialis or comitiale vitium) in Latin literature, as has been noted by Pigeaud.187 We can
recall that the symptoms Celsus associates with morbus comitialis include suddenly losing one’s
wits (exanimat), spasms (nervi distenduntur), suddenly falling down (subito concidit), entering
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Fitch 1987: 390. The translation of the passage is mine.
Pigeaud 1981: 411-413. As Grmek notes, epilepsy was in fact also known as “Heracles’ disease” in antiquity.
(Grmek 1991: 41).
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into a deep sleep (sopor tantum est), and then returning to one’s self (ad se redit). 188 Seneca
does not use the same language as Celsus, but the symptoms identified by Celsus correspond to
Hercules’ experience in Seneca’s play.189 Celsus does mention other symptoms which Seneca
does not attribute to Hercules, such as foaming at the mouth (ex ore spumae moventur) and
revolving eyes (oculi vertuntur), although those symptoms are not present in Euripides’
Herakles. Celsus’ descriptions of morbus comitialis also lack some of the symptoms
demonstrated by Hercules in Seneca’s play. Perhaps most notably, Celsus does not associate
morbus comitialis with the perception of visions, nor does he suggest that one could carry out
coordinated acts of violence (as Hercules does) while under an attack of the condition. To the
contrary, Celsus associates morbus comitialis with movements that are uncoordinated and/or
involuntary.
There are thus some similarities between Celsus’ description of morbus comitialis and
Seneca’s depiction of Hercules’ madness, as well as some significant differences. These
differences remind us of very different aims of each author. Seneca’s tragedy is not, as we see
in Celsus’ text, aiming to produce a diagnosis or prognosis by means of a review of symptoms,
but instead describes illness for its own strategies of characterization and rhetorical effects,
drawing upon, selecting, combining and recombining elements and language from various
sources of poetry and prose. Seneca’s tragedy also departs from Celsus’ approach in
introducing a divine component in the causation of Hercules’ condition. The idea that epilepsy
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Cf. 3.23.1.1-4; 4.27.1a.1-8; 4.27.1b.10-11.
I am interpreting the spasms (nervi distenduntur) mentioned by Celsus to be comparable to the trembling of
Hercules’ hands (manus trementes).
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was caused by the gods was popular in antiquity, and although Celsus does not address this
belief specifically, it is addressed—and strongly criticized—in some earlier works of medical
prose, such as the Hippocratic treatise On the Sacred Disease.
As discussed earlier in this chapter, Seneca also comments on comitiale vitium and its
symptoms in Book 3 of De Ira (3.10.3.1-4.1). Some of the symptoms described there are similar
to symptoms seen with Hercules, such as twitching of the tendons (nervorumque trepidatio)
and the loss of reason (alienat animos). Seneca also refers to memory loss (memoria
sublabitur) in De Ira, a symptom which Hercules exhibits when he awakens and does not know
where he is and has no recollection of the murders he has just carried out (cf. 1138-1159).
Other symptoms that Seneca associates with comitiale vitium, however, do nor correspond to
Hercules’ condition, such as stiffness (rigoremque) and a lack of warmth (calor summa deseruit;
frigus). In De Ira, Seneca also relates that people affected by comitiale vitium are able to detect
attacks of their own condition coming on, but there is no indication that Hercules has any
foresight of his bout of madness. Another symptom that Seneca mentions in De Ira is incertum
lumen (unclear sight), which may suggest blurry vision. This symptom is not explained very
specifically, making it difficult to compare with Hercules’ experience. Hercules’ sight is affected
in that he sees things that those with normal (i.e. clear) vision do not see, but his vision does
not seem blurry; to the contrary, he perceives his false visions (or at least relates what he is
seeing) rather vividly. Based on these comparisons, it does not appear that Seneca’s
representation of Hercules’ condition was strongly influenced by his understanding of comitiale
vitium as described in De Ira. At the same time, it is possible that Seneca’s awareness of the
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symptoms associated with this condition and with other medical conditions may have enabled
him to portray Hercules’ condition and his symptoms in a more medically-focused way.
It is also important to note that Seneca does not use terms such as insania, furor, dementia,
or other terms suggesting madness during his description of comitiale vitium in De Ira. The
closest he comes to connecting comitiale vitium with “madness” when he states that it may
deprive one of reason (alienat animos). When describing Hercules’ “madness”, on the other
hand, Seneca uses various pieces of vocabulary, instead of using just one specific term. In this
way, Hercules’ madness, like Hercules’ himself, is larger-than-life and transcends simple
categorization, having some aspects that resemble the description of comitiale vitium in De Ira,
other aspects that recall various forms of insania described by Celsus, and yet other aspects
that seem totally unique to Hercules himself.
Ultimately it is impossible to find an exact correspondence between Seneca’s
representation of Hercules’ madness and any condition identified by Celsus. But I would argue
that Seneca’s representation bears the closest similarity to Celsus’ third form of insania, a
condition in which able-bodied individuals (robusti corporis, 3.18.19.2-3) may be misled by
visions. As previously noted, Celsus associates these visions with other mythological figures
(Ajax and Orestes), making it all the more tempting to find parallels with Hercules’ condition.
This is, in fact, the only time that Celsus mentions a mythological figure in all of De Medicina.190
Nevertheless, connecting this form of insania with Seneca’s depiction of Hercules is still
190

The word Hercules occurs four times in De Medicina, but in each instance it is used with exclamatory force (on
the use of the word Hercules as an interjection expressing emphasis or strong feeling, see Glare 2012: s.v. hercle,
ercle, hercule). The mythological figure Hercules is not mentioned in De Medicina.
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problematic, especially since Celsus says that it is the most long-lasting form of madness
(tertium genus insaniae ex his longissimum, 3.18.19.1) Hercules, on the other hand, perceives
visions and exhibits symptoms of madness for only a single act of Seneca’s play.
In Greek and Latin literature, the madness in mythological figures is also sometimes
connected with the condition known in Greek as λύσσα and in Latin as rabies. Both the Greek
and Latin terms can refer to a disease passed on by animals (often dogs), as well as “frenzy” or
“madness” (similar in this sense to furor and insania).191 Auvray has suggested that rabies is
form of madness “spécifique au héros”, particulary in Greek and Roman tragedies.192 It is
striking, then, that Seneca does not associate the word rabies, or the related words rabiosus
and rabere, with Hercules or his condition in Hercules Furens.193 As noted earlier, Seneca uses
the adjective rabidus in the opening lines of De Ira when he is describing the “raving” nature of
anger (1.1.4). Seneca and Celsus also use rabidus or rabidosus in reference to diseased dogs,
with the usage of both authors emphasizing the dogs’ uncontrollability and potential to harm
human beings. Given Hercules’ penchant for violence and the brutality that he commits against
his own family—and the fact that it is foreshadowed by animal imagery involving the Nemean
lion— it is a bit surprising that Seneca does not use the vocabulary of rabies to characterize
Hercules’ condition. In this respect his play differs from Euripides’ Heracles, where the goddess
Λύσσα, a personification of madness, appears shortly before Heracles goes mad, making the
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divine cause of Hercules’ madness extremely transparent. In Seneca’s play, there is no
character who personifies madness in such an obvious way (the closest may be Hercules
himself), and this is another reminder of how the tragedy downplays the gods’ role in causing
Hercules’ madness after Juno’s initial speech.
When Hercules is describing his visions, Amphitryon interjects, urging him to come back to
reality:
Infandos procul
averte sensus; pectoris sani parum
magni tamen compesce dementem impetum.
Turn those unspeakable notions
far away; suppress the mad attack
of your scarcely sane mind, even though it is great. (973-975)
Amphitryon’s use of language suggests that the attack which is affecting Hercules is “out of its
mind” (dementem impetum). Similar language is used by Juno when she is asking to be
overcome with madness earlier in the play (mente deiecta mea, 110) so that she can attack
Hercules with madness, and now the attack itself is labeled demens. This similarity in language
serves as a very subtle reminder of the connection between Juno and Hercules’ present attack
of madness. Typically, the words demens and dementia are applied to a person or a condition
suffered by a person, as we have seen in our discussion of their usage in Senecan prose and
Celsus.194 By applying this adjective to the attack itself, Seneca gives Hercules’ madness a sense
of personification, while not actually labeling Hercules himself demens. Amphitryon actually
suggests that Hercules’ mind is still just barely sane (pectoris sani parum), making some
194

e.g. Naturales Quaestiones 6.29.3.1; De Medicina 3.18.2.1.1.
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distinction between the mad force which is attacking Hercules and the mind of Hercules. Later,
the chorus makes a similar distinction, telling Hercules to “drive the maddened waves from
your mind” (pelle insanos fluctus animi, 1092). This again suggests that Hercules’ mind is under
attack by external forces which are mad, without describing Hercules himself as mad.
Just a little later, however, Amphitryon is less equivocal in suggesting that Hercules is out of
his mind, when he directly asks him: Quo tendis amens? (To what end are you striving, being
out of your mind? 1021). The adjective amens, which occurs one other time in the play, is
etymologically related and morphologically similar to the adjective demens. In the other
instance of usage, the chorus, similar to Amphitryon, asks Hercules: Quo pergis amens? (To
what end are you proceeding, being out of your mind? 1033) As these examples suggest, there
is not a clear distinction in sense between amens and demens in this play.
The word impetum (975) can refer to a paroxysm or attack of illness, which is the most
obvious sense of the word here, but in Latin literature it is more frequently used to refer to a
military charge or assault.195 Both senses of impetus are relevant in this context, as Hercules’
attack of illness leads him to make a violent assault upon his family. Celsus uses this word to
refer to an attack of illness multiple times, including during his discussion of phrenesis:
levatoque accessionis impetus protinus mens redit (when the attack of the condition is relieved,
the mind is restored, 3.18.2.6). In this example we also find the familiar language of mens, and
the idea that the mens is incapacitated by an attack of madness.
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Fernandez claims that Seneca uses a limited vocabulary to convey Hercules’ madness196, but
we have seen that the play uses a variety of words, images, and metaphors to represent his
madness. Fernandez is nevertheless correct in singling out furor as a word of special
significance, and its usage in the play has received a good deal of scholarly attention. Scholars
have repeatedly pointed out the word’s decidedly broad semantic range, which is evident in
Seneca’s plays197 and in Latin literature in general.198 The following comments on furor will
build upon observations made by other scholars concerning the word’s semantic nuances and
its significance in the play.
The word furor, and the related verb furere and adjective furens, together are used more
than twenty times throughout Hercules Furens. These words play a particularly prominent role
in the fourth act of the play and in the chorus immediately following that scene. One example
comes when Amphitryon is describing Hercules’ infanticides:
Dextra precantem rapuit et circa furens
bis ter rotatum misit…
He snatched him, though he was pleading, in his right hand, and being mad,
whirled him around two, then three times… (1005-1006)
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“En el Hercules Furens excepto la expression dementem impetum y la palabra insania que aparece una sola vez,
siempre utilize el término furor.” (Fernandez 1973: 307)
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1984; Rosenmeyer 1989.
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One highly influential representation of furor occurs in Virgil’s Aeneid, where it is memorably personified
(1.294-296). The Aeneid also features the recurring theme of Aeneas attempting to resist furor, which culminates
at the very end of the poem.
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Here, Amphitryon uses furens to describe Hercules’ violent and irrational state.199 His irrational
furor prevents him from recognizing that he is brutally murdering his own child, further
reinforcing idea that furor is a form of blindness (cf. 991, 1096). A little later, Amphitryon asks
Hercules whether he is still alive, or whether furor has brought about his demise as well as the
demise of his family (Vivis, an leto dedit / idem tuos qui misit ad mortem furor? 1048-1049). In
asking this, Amphitryon underscores that furor is a destructive and uncontrollable force,
capable of overcoming even the great Hercules. These examples illustrate that furor is not only
a form of blindness, but also an inclination to violence, which is of course a defining feature of
Hercules himself. Hercules’ proclivity toward violence constantly places him on the precipice of
furor, which may be useful for vanquishing beasts and monsters, but poses a danger when
active within the realm of society. Seneca’s play thus explores the relationship between furor
and the heroic psyche200, and the place of each in human society.

While Hercules is

incapacitated, Amphitryon asks the household slaves to remove Hercules’ weapons from him,
in case Hercules should once again become furens (removete, famuli, tela, ne repetat furens,
1053). When Hercules wakes up and begins to regain his senses, he quickly recognizes that his
weapons have been removed (Ubi tela? Ubi arcus? 1153), and he begs Amphitryon to return
them to him, but only if his furor no longer remains:
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Pratt notes that furens is “one of the terms used most heavily by the philosophers to denote irrationality.”
(Pratt 1983: 117)
200
Littlewood similarly asserts that Seneca’s play seeks to show that “the heroic life is a form of madness.”
(Littlewood 1984: 94; see also Picone 1984: 21)
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Sana si mens est mihi,
referte manibus tela; si remanet furor,
pater, recede: mortis inveniam viam.
If my mind is sound,
restore my weapons to my hands; if madness remains,
father, stand back: I shall find a way to death. (1243-1245)
It is very striking that Hercules cannot recognize whether he is still in a state of furor, or
whether he now has a sound mind (sana…mens). Hercules’ use of language suggests a
diametrical opposition, but the play repeatedly presents the relationship of these states in a
much less straightforward way. Here, Hercules cannot tell what state he is in, and asks an
external observer, Amphitryon, to offer a diagnosis. Even in a moment of relative calm and
self-reflection, Seneca portrays Hercules as a character who straddles the lines between furor
and sanitas, and who is not able to tell the difference between the two states. At the same
time, even though Hercules is uncertain about the nature of his present condition, he remains
aware of the violent potential he possesses when under the active influence of furor.
A little later in his conversation with Amphitryon, Hercules reflects on all that he has lost as a
result of his deranged killings. In doing so, he conveys that furor is an integral part of his
identity:
…cuncta iam amisi bona,
mentem arma famam coniugem gnatos manus,
etiam furorem. Nemo polluto queat
animo mederi; morte sanandum est scelus.
…now I have lost all good things—
my mind, weapons, reputation, wife, sons, hands,
even my madness. No one could remedy a corrupted mind;
the crime must be corrected with death. (1259-1262)
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Hercules regretfully groups madness (furorem) with the other “good things” (bona) he has lost,
which include his weapons, his reputation, and his family. As Fitch observes, the inclusion of
furor in this list is paradoxical, since it in a large sense responsible for the loss of the other
bona.201 It is also paradoxical for Hercules to say he has lost his madness, not only because it is
a strange thing to lament losing, but also because the events and language of the play suggest
that he is a character who cannot escape from furor. Indeed, just a few lines earlier, he
expresses uncertainty about whether or not he is still in a state of furor (1243-1245). While the
play presents an episode in which Hercules’ furor is particularly active and apparent (what
might be called an acute “attack” [impetum, 975]), there remains the sense that his furor
lingers on. In this sense, he is like a person who suffers from morbus comitialis in that he
continues to have the condition even when it is not presently attacking him. In fact, the word
furor occurs six times after the attack202, providing a constant reminder of his furor and
suggesting it has not totally subsided. This also further underscores the sense that furor is a
condition that affects and defines Hercules over the long-term, and which ultimately cannot be
disentangled from his identity. Seneca’s portrayal of Hercules’ furor therefore problematizes
the dichotomy between acute and chronic forms of illness so frequently drawn by Celsus and
other writers of medical prose.
While it is hard to accept Hercules’ assertion that he has lost his furor, other possible
interpretations could give his words more credence. Since furor is so tied to Hercules’ identity
201
202

Fitch 1987: 440.
1098; 1134; 1220; 1240; 1244; 1261
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as a hero, he may be implying that he has lost his sense of heroism, and that, more than the
furor per se, is perhaps what he is really lamenting. It is also possible that Hercules is still very
much under the intense influence of furor, and unable to reason clearly, as in earlier scenes of
the play. While the play shows Hercules regaining some self-awareness after his attack, there
remains reason to question his level of self-awareness, as discussed above. In this case, even
though Hercules claims he has lost his furor; he may actually still be furens, and that very fact
would lead him to misunderstand himself and prevent him from seeing the very furor that still
possesses him.
Hercules also feels that his mind is corrupted (polluto animo, 1261-1262) and beyond any
remedy except for death. This makes an apparent distinction between his animus and his mens
(1260), which he says he has lost. Fitch suggests translating mens as “self-possession”,
“composure”, and “mental control”203, but I have chosen to translate mens as mind (as I have
throughout this chapter), because it is in keeping with the paradoxical nature of Hercules
remarks. He seems to be saying that his mind has been lost, which recalls the recurring
language of demens and amens—but at the same time he seems to be saying that his mind is
corrupted. This ambiguity reinforces the idea that Hercules does not totally understand his
own mental condition, and that he is, to some degree, still lacking in self-awareness after
emerging from his attack of madness.
Perhaps most paradoxical of all is Hercules’ statement that death is the only way to correct
or “remedy” for his situation (morte sanandum est scelus). This is, of course, in stark contrast
203

Fitch 1987: 440. Unfortunately, he does not offer a suggestion about how to translate animus in this context.
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with Celsus’ work, which always shows mors as negative outcome of illness, and never a
remedy and never desirable.204 It is important to observe that Hercules is literally stating that
his crime (scelus), rather than he himself, must be cured by death; this makes his use of the
verb sanare all the more striking. This is a verb which often takes a human object, in which case
it often has the sense “to cure” (either the body or the mind), rather than “to correct”, as
translated above.205 But Hercules uses it with the abstract noun scelus, which may suggest,
even more bleakly, that even if his scelus can be corrected/cured, there is still no hope for him.
The verb sanare also immediately brings to mind related words such as sanus and sanitas. Even
though Hercules is claiming that he has lost his furor, he is still implying that he is not sanus,
further adding to the sense of paradox and hopelessness. This also speaks to the complicated
relationship that the play repeatedly presents between furor and sanitas. There is no
diametrical opposition between these states, and the lines between them are often unclear,
unlike what we see with Celsus’ specific, well-defined categories of madness.
As we have now seen, furor plays an extremely significant role in Hercules Furens, unlike in
De Medicina, where the word appears only three times. To review, Seneca presents Hercules’
furor as both an acute attack of madness that affects him in the fourth act of the play, as well as
a chronic, deeply-rooted component of his identity. In both of these aspects, furor is typified by
a strong tendency toward unbridled violence. Hercules repeatedly refers to his own condition
as furor, and in doing so often invokes elements of paradox which speak to the limitations of his
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205

e.g. 2.8.25.11-13; 5.26.19.3-4; 7.23.1.9-12.
Glare 2012: s.v. sanare.
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self-awareness. Other terms are used to describe Hercules’ condition as well, including insanus,
demens, and amens, and the uses of these words sometimes produce a sense of paradox as
well. As a cumulative effect of these repeated instances of paradox, Hercules’ form of madness
takes on the impression of being incomprehensible and impossible to treat, as highlighted by
some of Hercules’ own remarks. Seneca’s play also suggests that Hercules’ form of madness is
beyond comprehension by not giving it a single name or fixed identity. It resembles
descriptions of various forms of insania, morbus comitialis/comitiale vitium, and rabies as
described by Celsus, but ultimately it cannot be pinned down as any of these conditions, not
unlike the plague in Oedipus. Hercules’ condition is thus not any one exact form of madness,
but simultaneously an amalgam of various forms of madness, drawing upon language and
representations of madness from various traditions in poetry and prose, in effect making
Hercules’ condition perplexing to himself, other characters, and the audience of the play.
Medea
Medea opens with the character Medea lamenting how she has been spurned by her
husband Jason in favor of a new wife, and seething with a desire to obtain vengeance upon
him. In the second act of the play, Medea is wracked with uncertainty about how to exact this
vengeance. While contemplating the possibilities, Medea reflects upon on her psychological
state:
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Incerta vecors mente non sana feror
partes in omnes; unde me ulcisci queam?
Uncertain, mad, with a mind not sound I am tossed
in all directions; where can I derive my revenge from? (123-124)
At this point of the play, Medea is fully aware of her own uncertainty, describing herself as
incerta and as being pulled in various directions (feror partes in omnes). The word incertus is
used five times in this tragedy and, as we will see, it plays an important role at certain key
moments. Medea also describes herself as vecors, which can be translated as “mad” or
“senseless”, and which also also suggests an outpouring of woe through its etymological
connection to vae (woe!).206 Vecors, and the etymologically-related vesanus207, do not appear
in Celsus, perhaps because of their emotional connotations. Celsus’ discussions of madness are
from a clinical perspective, keeping an emotionally-detached stance as he proceeds to review
symptoms in order to aid in the processes of diagnosis and treatment. By contrast, the
emotionality of Medea’s speech is evident not only in her choice of words, but also in their
arrangement. For example, the asyndetic pairing of incerta and vecors parallels the disordered
state of Medea’s mind as she struggles to formulate a coherent plan of action.
Medea also states that she is tossed about with a mind that is not sound (mente non sana).
Medea applies the adjectives incerta and vecors to herself, but non sana is applied to her
mind.208 This recalls the subtle distinction Hercules makes between his lost mens and his
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Costa states that vecors and vensanus are “virtually synonymous.” (Costa 1973: 82)
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This distinction is not reflected in Fitch’s translation: “perplexed and frenzied and maddened I turn one way and
another”. (Fitch 2002: 355)
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pollutes animus (1259-1262). The phrase non sana raises other interesting questions, such as
whether the play suggests any significant distinction between a mind that is non sana, and one
that is insana. It is possible that non sana is used instead of insana for metrical reasons, but it is
noteworthy that Medea never refers to herself as insana in this play. At one point in the play
which I later discuss in more depth, Medea’s nurse uses the verb insanit (383) when comparing
Medea to a maenad, but Medea does not use such language to describe her own experience. It
seems plausible that the word insana possesses stronger connotations of madness than the
phrase non sana (at least to Medea), and therefore, even if Medea knows there is something
wrong with her mens, she may not view herself as insana at this early point in the play. This
relates to the issue of self-awareness: in the same way that Hercules fails to recognize his false
visions, it is possible that Medea is in fact insana, but fails to recognize it or refuses to
acknowledge it at this point. Medea is nevertheless at least aware of her own uncertainty at
this point. While her self-awareness is at times problematized, I would argue that she retains
some degree of self-awareness throughout the entire play.
While Medea refers to her mind as not sound (non sana), she does not characterize herself
as “being out of her mind” here or elsewhere in the play. There are, in fact, only two instances
in the play employing the language of “being out of one’s mind” (e.g. demens, amens, ex animo,
ex mente) in the entire play. In one instance, the nurse refers to Medea as demens (174) as she
is informing her of her plans for revenge; in the other instance Medea refers to her demens
furor (senseless madness, 930). With the latter phrase, we again see that Medea does not label
herself as demens, but rather her furor; this suggests, in this instance, that Medea’s furor is
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what is “out of its mind”, and not Medea herself. I will return to this point of usage later in this
chapter.
We can gain insight into how Seneca depicts Medea’s madness by drawing comparisons with
his representation of Hercules’ madness. We find some important differences, especially the
fact that Medea’s madness is in no sense “acute”— that is, she is not overcome by a sudden
“attack”, as we see with Hercules. Because Medea is not consumed by a sudden attack of
madness, and because her identity is not defined by furor in the same way that Hercules’
identity is, she is able to maintain a greater degree of self-awareness. As seen in the passage
above, she is especially aware of her own uncertainty and psychological instability; Hercules, on
the other hand, shows little uncertainty and does not question the strange visions he perceives,
which enables him to take decisive, violent action. In their respective states of madness, both
characters commit shocking acts of violence against their own family members, but Medea’s
violence is well planned and consciously executed.209 Despite these differences in the
experiences of Medea and Hercules, we will see that there are significant similarities in the
language which is used to convey their madness.
In the third act of the play, the nurse observes Medea and notes her uncertainty, suspecting
that she is about to do something rash. Describing Medea’s condition, the nurse likens Medea
to a raving maenad, and in doing so uses an abundance of language suggesting madness:
209

Pigeaud similarly observes, “Medée est un personnage qui sait ce qu’il fait…Cela signifie qu’en effet elle connaît
et reconnaît ses enfants (par opposition à Héraclès)…” Pigeaud goes on to point out that self-awareness is a key
component of Medea’s characterization in various works of Latin literature, quoting a line from Ovid’s
Metamorphoses: video meliora proboque / deteriora sequor (I see and consider better things, but I pursue worse
things, Metamorphoses 7.20-21). (Pigeaud 1981: 397)
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Alumna, celerem quo rapis tectis pedem?
Resiste et iras comprime ac retine impetum.
Incerta qualis entheos gressus tulit
cum iam recepto maenas insanit deo
Pindi nivalis vertice aut Nysae iugis,
talis recursat huc et huc motu effero,
furoris ore signa lymphati gerens.
Flammata facies, spiritum ex alto citat,
proclamat, oculos uberi fletu rigat,
renidet: omnis specimen affectus capit.
Haeret: minatur aestuat queritur gemit.
Quo pondus animi verget? Ubi ponet minas?
Ubi se iste fluctus franget? Exundat furor.
Non facile secum versat aut medium scelus:
se vincet: irae novimus veteris notas.
Magnum aliquid instat, efferum immane impium.
Vultum Furoris cerno. Di fallant metum!
Child, to where do you hurry your swift foot from the house?
Halt, contain your anger and hold back your impulse!
Unsettled, as when a maenad, possessed by the god, goes mad,
she takes divinely inspired steps
on the snowy peak of Pindus or the the ridges of Nysa;
in such a way she runs back and forth here and there in wild movement,
wearing the signs of frenzied madness on her face.
Her expression is enflamed, she draws up breath deeply,
she shouts out, she wets her eyes with plentiful weeping,
she smiles again; every type of emotion comes over her.
She hesitates, makes threats, seethes, laments, groans.
Where will the burden of her mind incline itself? Where will she direct her threats?
Where will that wave break itself? Her madness is overflowing;
she is mulling no simple or moderate crime:
she will outdo herself. I recognize the signs of old anger.
Something large is looming: savage, monstrous, wicked.
I detect the face of madness. May the gods prove my fears wrong! (380-396)
At the beginning of this speech, the nurse addresses Medea directly, urging her to restrain her
irae (angers) and impetus (impulse). As we have seen in Hercules Furens, impetus can refer to
an act of violence or to an attack of illness, and both senses are again relevant in this context.
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The nurse views Medea’s present condition as an “attack”, but in this sense she does not fully
understand the prolonged nature of Medea’s ira, and the extended planning that goes into her
revenge. Nonetheless, Medea’s ira, like Hercules’ furor, is associated with violence. The nurse
is imploring Medea to restrain her ira, and the seriousness of her pleading is evident in her use
of three imperatives (resiste, comprime, retine). She represents ira as a volatile, vengeful force
that must be held in check, and this is very much consistent with how Seneca describes ira in De
Ira.210 There are also many similarities in the symptoms of anger (notas…irae, 394; cf. furoris
signa, 386) identified by the nurse, even if the vocabulary used in the two texts does not exactly
correspond: recursat huc et huc (cf. citatus gradus, De Ira 1.3.3.4); flammata facies (cf. minax
vultus, De Ira 1.3.3-4; torva facies, De Ira 1.3.3.4); spiritum ex alto citat (cf. crebra et
vehementia acta suspiria, De Ira 1.3.3.5; spiritus coactus ac stridens, De Ira 1.3.4.4); proclamat
(parum explanatis vocibus sermo, De Ira 1.3.4.6).211 Hine suggests that these symptoms of ira
underscore Medea’s “indecisiveness”212; I would add that this indecisiveness, which is
particularly evident in 390-392, finds a parallel in Seneca’s identification of “restless hands”
(inquietae manus) as a symptom of ira in De Ira (1.3.3.5). The nurse’s use of language also
suggests that there is something animalistic about Medea’s ira (efferum immane, 395); this
resembles the connection that Seneca makes in De Ira between ira and the behavior of wild
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Various scholars have commented on the similarity between this passage and sections of De Ira. (see Costa
1973: 108; Pigeaud 1981: 398; Pratt 1983: 90; Boyle 2014: 231; Fischer 2014: 754-757)
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One also finds correspondences between language used in this passage of De Ira and language associated with
ira in Seneca’s Oedipus (cf. 919-924; 960-963).
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Hine 2000: 154.
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animals, as well his description of ira as rabidus.213 This connection is borne out further later in
the play, when the chorus compares Medea to a tigress separated from its children (862865).214
Robin offers another perspective on the nurse’s description of Phaedra’s symptoms,
suggesting that Medea’s condition is comparable to descriptions of “hysteria” in Celsus and
Soranus.215 Robin focuses on the idea that works of Greek and Latin literature often represent
the female body as “generative of emotional illness”, and as examples she cites the characters
Phaedra and Clytemnestra from Seneca’s Agamemnon, as well as Seneca’s Medea.216 Robin is
persuasive in pointing out that these characters experience similar physical and psychological
symptoms, but there does not seem to be a close resemblance between Medea’s condition and
Celsus’ description of “hysteria” (4.27.1a.1-8).217 As we will recall, Celsus’ account emphasizes
the tendency of this condition to put women “out of their minds” (sic exanimat), and to make
them prostrate (ut tamque comitiali morbo prosternat) and overcome by a deep sleep (sopor
tantum est). Conversely, Seneca’s play contains hardly any language suggesting that Medea is
“out of her mind” (the verb Celsus uses, exanimare, does not appear in the play, and, as noted
previously, there is only one use of demens and no other similar language). In addition, Medea
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is not prostrate or overcome by sleep; to the contrary, she is characterized as a hyperactive
maenad. Medea’s hesitant and erratic movement reflects her wandering mind, which brings to
mind the “wandering womb”—a feature associated with hysteria by Aretaeus and Greek and
Roman writers on medicine.218 This parallel may seem like a bit of a stretch, but Lefkowitz has
insightfully pointed out that the itinerant nature of the maenads in Euripides’ Bacchae and Io in
Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound mirrors the concept of the wandering womb; as she puts it, “the
womb in its wandering behaves like insane women in myth.” 219 But this is not the point that
Robin is making. She draws a parallel with Celsus, but the condition described by Celsus
mentions neither wandering of the womb (in contrast with Aretaeus’ description of hysteria),
nor does he suggest that individuals with this condition physically wander about. It would
therefore be impossible to diagnose Medea with the condition described by Celsus. All this
underscores the fact that Medea’s ira is characterized by intense, restless movement
At the beginning of the nurse’s speech, it is apparent that she is directly addressing Medea;
this is evident in her use of the vocative alumna and the second person rapis (380), and the
three imperatives (381). The nurse then continues to comment on Medea’s condition in an
aside seemingly unintended for Medea to hear.220 This shift is marked by the nurse’s use of the
word incerta, the first word in the aside, and a word that echoes Medea’s earlier description of
herself (123). The nurse and Medea are in agreement, then, about the fact that uncertainty
218

Cf. Aretaeus’ De Causis et Signis Acutorum Morborum 2.10.
Lefkowitz 1981: 16; see also 17-23.
220
Hine notes that the nurse’s remarks in 382-396 have been “taken as a sign that the plays were not really meant
for stage performance”, but he also recognizes that “it is possible to regard the Nurse’s description….as a long
aside.” (Hine 2000: 155)
219

336

very much defines Medea’s condition. By contrast, Celsus does not use the word incerta in his
comments on madness, nor does he otherwise identify uncertainty as a symptom or feature of
any form of madness.
The nurse proceeds to highlight Medea’s uncertainty by employing a simile which compares
Medea to a maenad, who is described as being drawn into a state of madness through divine
possession (recepto maenas insanit deo).221 This description of Medea, along with the nurse’s
reference to Medea’s “divinely inspired steps” (entheos gressus), strongly suggest that Medea’s
madness has a divine element, or at least that the nurse perceives a divine element.222 These
ideas recall Seneca’s comments in De Tranquillitate Animi (17.9-11), where madness (dementia;
insanire) is associated with divine inspiration (instinctuque sacro). In that text, divinely inspired
madness is imagined to engender poetic creativity and strokes of genius (ingenium). The
nurse’s comments differ from De Tranquillitate Animi in terms of language usage, and also in
that they do not imply any sense of creativity or “genius”; to the contrary, the nurse is
expressing fear and concern about the destructive potential of Medea’s madness.223 As Ker
observes, the maenad comparison “introduces associations with temporary insanity and
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ingenium becomes even thicker in light of Seneca’s description of ingenium in De Tranquillitate Animi.
337

violence.”224 Moreover, in comparing Medea’s condition with a temporary form of madness,
the nurse once again shows that she is underestimating the long-lasting nature of Medea’s ira
and its seemingly permanent integration with her identity. In this sense, she is like the nurse in
Phaedra, another character who does not understand the full extent of her “patient’s” illness
and remains unable to prevent it from erupting.
Syntactical aspects of the nurse’s speech also contribute to the characterization of Medea,
emphasizing certain aspects of her madness. Medea’s disordered state of mind is reflected in
the convoluted syntax in 382-384, where the subject of the sentence (maenas) is separated
from its antecedent (qualis) by a line and a half, and the action of walking (entheos gressus tulit)
attributed to the maenad is syntactically disconnected from the place where the walking is said
to occur (Pindi nivalis vertice aut Nysae iugis). We see a similar rhetorical effect a little later in
the speech, where five verbs are amassed without any conjunction (Haeret: minatur aestuat
queritur gemit, 390), suggesting many actions being hyperactively performed all at once. This
highlights the uncertain, erratic nature of Medea’s behavior. There is another instance of
asyndeton when the nurse expresses her concern that something “savage, monstrous, wicked”
(efferum immane impium, 395) is looming, further underscoring the volatile, hyperactive nature
of Medea’s condition. In these examples Seneca is painting a picture of Medea’s madness by
toying with syntax.
Following the maenad comparison, the nurse observes that Medea’s face displays
furoris…signa lymphati (signs of frenzied madness, 386). Lymphatus, and the related adjective
224

Ker 2011: 90.
338

lymphaticus, do not frequently occur in Senecan poetry or prose, appearing a combined six
times in the entire corpus. This is the only time either word is used in Medea. Due to the
infrequency of usage, it is difficult to compare the usage of lymphatus with the usage of other
adjectives having the sense of “mad” or “frenzied” (insanus, demens, furens, etc.). It is
noteworthy, however, that Seneca sometimes associates lymphatus, and the related adjective
lymphaticus, with panic and fear225, qualities strongly associated with Medea’s experience. In
fact, the noun metus occurs nine times in the play, and the verb metuere occurs six times; both
words are often connected with Medea.226 Some writers, such as Pliny227, use the word
lymphatus as a way to refer to the condition better known as hydrophobia, which is
characterized by a fear of consuming water, even when a person is thirsty.228 Celsus describes
this condition (5.27.2c.2), using the term hydrophobias, but never lymphatus or related words.
Based upon Seneca’s portrayal, however, there is nothing to suggest that Medea is
experiencing this condition or anything similar to it.
The word furor appears several times in the nurse’s speech (386, 392, 396), and also in the
following speech by Medea. There, Medea states that her furor will never cease to seek
225
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Meillet 1951: s.v. lymphare; Rosen 1968: 90-91).
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revenge, and that it will only continue to grow (numquam meus cessabit in poenas furor /
crescet semper. 406-407), directly acknowledging that her madness is not short-lasting in
nature. Much like in Hercules Furens, the word furor and related verbs and adjectives appear
repeatedly throughout the play.229 One key difference, however, is that Medea’s furor is more
closely linked to ira. This is apparent in the nurse’s speech, where she first speaks of Medea’s
furoris…signa lymphati (signs of frenzied madness), then eight lines later refers to Medea’s
irae…veteris notas (signs of old anger, 394). The parallelelism of these phrases230, along with
the mention of ira earlier in this passage (381), builds a strong association between furor and
ira, unlike what we find in Hercules Furens. This connection accentuates that fact that Medea’s
furor is in large part motivated by her ira toward Jason and her desire for revenge231, whereas
Hercules’ madness is depicted as being motivated by ira or revenge. The distinction between
Medea’s ira and furor is further blurred by the way in which these words are used throughout
the play. Medea uses both words in reference to her own condition, sometimes vacillating in
her usage within a few lines (cf. 909, 916, 927, 930, 938, 943). Medea also makes apostrophes
to both ira (916, 953) and furor (930), underscoring her personal connection to them.232
Migliorini has observed that Seneca creates links between furor and ira in various works,
including Medea and Phaedra.233 She asserts that in such works the words furor and furere are
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Boyle notes that the noun furor occurs eight times in the play, always in connection with Medea. (Boyle 2014:
234)
230
As noted in Chapter 3, both signa and notae be used to refer to “symptoms”.
231
Vogt also notes that Seneca’s writings often make a connection between ira and revenge. (Vogt 2006: 62)
232
Segal notes a similar element of usage in Phaedra, observing that Phaedra’s sometimes speaks of furor as
though it were an “omnipotent force, almost a living being.” (Segal 1986: 45; cf. Phaedra 184--185)
233
Migliorini 1997: 84.
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used “senza sostanziali differenze” in relation to words such as insanire, amens, dementia, and
demens.234 This assertion is problematic, not only because it equates words belonging to
various parts of speech, but also because it overlooks the fact that furor occurs much more
frequently—and is thus given more emphasis—in Medea than the other words in the list.
Indeed, amens and dementia do not occur at all in the play, and, as we have noted, demens
appears only twice (174, 930); in this way, Seneca’s tragedy downplays the idea that Medea or
any other character is “out of their mens”. In addition, the words insanire and insanus appear
only twice (383, 765), while other relevant words that appear, such vecors and vesanus (one
time each), are left off of Migliorini’s list. The fact that furor and ira are given such weight in
comparison to the other word suggests that they have specific connotations and semantic
nuances that are important to Seneca’s representation of Medea’s condition in this play.
When Medea is considering whether or not to kill her children in the fifth act of the play, we
can notice a subtle distinction in the usage of two of the words Migliorini equates. Feeling
deeply conflicted and disturbed by her own plans, Medea exclaims: melius, a, demens furor!
(Let it be better, ah, sensless madness! 930) According to Migliorini’s list, the phrase demens
furor would seem to be redundant or intensifying (like “mad madness” in English), with no
significant semantic distinction between the two words. While these two words certainly do
reinforce and complement each other, I would argue that there is an important semantic
distinction in that the adjective demens draws attention to a particular feature of Medea’s
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Migliorini 1997: 85; see also 56. Hine expresses a similar idea, but in a more nuanced way, stating that some of
these words are “closely related in sense”, and as such he consistently translates them as “mad” or “madness.”
(Hine 2000: 133-134)
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furor, namely the escalating sense that Medea is on the brink of being out of her mens. The use
of demens at this particular moment also highlights the near-complete dissolution of Medea’s
mental faculties which occurs when she perceives seemingly false visions of the Furies later in
this scene (958-971235). This element of usage also recalls language associated with the
perception of visions in Hercules Furens and Celsus. If Seneca were to have used an adjective
such as insanus instead, it would not be as apparent that Medea’s is losing control of her mens.
The nurse’s speech also paints a picture of Medea’s condition through the use of
metaphorical language, much of which recalls the depiction of madness in Hercules Furens. The
nurse notes Medea’s “enflamed expression” (flammata facies, 387), which reminds us of
language of fire and flames that Juno associates with the madness of the Furies (cf. 100-101;
103; 106). Both plays also describe furor with references to the volcano Mount Aetna. Medea
connects her burgeroning furor with boiling up of the volcano, using a word, fervebit (410) that
even sounds like furor; this is similar to how Juno connects Aetna with the raging of the Furies
(acrior mentem excoquat / quam qui caminis ignis Aetnaeis furit, 106). Both comparisons
suggest that furor is building up and on the verge of erupting with an intense and destructive
potential. The nurse applies other natural imagery to Medea’s condition, namely the
turbulence of the sea: ubi se iste fluctus franget? Exundat furor… (where will that wave break
itself? Her madness is overflowing… 392). This metaphor recalls how the chorus of Hercules
Furens describes an assault of maddened waves on Hercules’ mind (insanos fluctus animi,
1092). Later in Medea, the sea is even more explicitly connected with madness when Medea
235

I return to this passage later in the chapter.
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refers to it as insanum (tumuit insanum mare, 765). These examples emphasize the
unpredictability and volatility of the sea, and in turn aspects of each character’s madness.236
As Medea’s furor continues to build, her condition is once again compared with the
experience of a maenad during the chorus which follows the fourth act of the play:
Quonam cruenta maenas
praeceps amore saevo
rapitur? Quod impotenti
facinus parat furore?
Vultus citatus ira
riget, et caput feroci
quatiens superba motu
regi minatur ultro.
By what savage love
is the bloody maenad suddenly
being snatched up? What crime
is she planning in unbridled madness?
Stirred up by anger, her expression
is firm, and, tossing her head
with a fierce motion,
she haughtily threatens the king himself. (849-856)
Whereas the nurse compares Medea to a maenad possessed by divine influence, the chorus
portrays Medea as a maenad who is overcome by amore saevo (cruel love). The chorus also
refers to Medea’s condition as unbridled furor, and states that she is stirred up by ira (anger).
Once again, ira and furor are closely connected, and now these two words are also aligned with
amor. As we will see, the word amor appears repeatedly throughout the play, occurring eight
times in total, and given this, one can see why scholars sometimes describe her condition as

236

According to Hine, Lucretius is the first extant Latin author to use waves as a metaphor for emotion, while
Seneca is the first to use waves is a metaphor for emotions overflowing and becoming out of control.
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“lovesickness”237, or “folle d’amore”238. This is in contrast with Hercules Furens, where amor
occurs only once (588), and not in connection with furor. This once again demonstrates how
Seneca uses furor in a highly diverse way, connecting it with various conditions.239 Medea is not
the only play in which Seneca builds a connection between amor and furor; in Phaedra, there is
also a strong connection between amor and furor (cf. 112-114; 195-917; 645-646), as well as
amor and ira (cf. 354-355).240 Celsus, by contrast, never once uses the word amor, nor does he
describe any condition that could be considered “lovesickness”. This is in contrast with other
writers of medical prose (most famously Galen) who discuss “love” as a cause of illness.241
Later in this choral ode, the chorus draws an even more explicit connection between ira and
amor:
Frenare nescit iras
Medea, non amores;
nunc ira amorque causam
iunxere: quid sequitur?
Medea does not know how to
rein in her anger, nor her love—
now her anger and love are joined
in purpose: what will follow? (866-869)
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Toohey 1992: 281. On the tradition of lovesickness in classical literature, see Cyrino 1995.
Migliorini 1997: 84.
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Migliorini similarly observes that there are different types of furor in Seneca’s plays. (Migliorini 1997: 84)
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Toohey discusses connections between Phaedra’s furor and amor (Toohey 1992: 281-282), but he does not
discuss the role of these words in Medea.
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Galen provides an account in which he notices that an ill woman’s pulse suddenly changes every time the name
“Pylades” is mentioned. From this he eventually concludes that the woman is sick with love for a famous person
named Pylades. (On Prognosis 6.2)
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Here the chorus conflates ira and amor, describing them as a united force which is driving
Medea to seek vengeance against Jason.242 The chorus relates that they are joined as a single
causa243, an ambiguous word which could refer either to Medea’s pursuit of vengeance (i.e. her
present “purpose”), or to the cause of Medea’s present condition.244 In chapter 3, we observed
that Celsus uses the word causa in reference to the cause of an illness; these connotations are
also apparent here in the sense that ira and amor are jointly the cause of Medea’s madness (as
well as being the very form of her madness). This medicalized sense of the word causa
becomes even more apparent when one notes that the following section of the choral ode
describes some of the physical symptoms Medea has been exhibiting (e.g. genae rubentes,
pallor, huc fert pedes et illuc; see 858-862). This sense of causa, and the list of symptoms that
follows, emphasizes that Medea is mired in a state of illness shortly before her violent acts of
revenge are reported by the messenger. The chorus also states that Medea cannot rein in her
ira, using the verb frenare (866), which is often associated with restraining or bridling
animals.245 The use of this verb, along with the chorus’ comparison of Medea to a “tigress
deprived of her children” (tigris orba natis, 863), recall the idea presented in De Ira that ira is
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Costa comments: “her feelings of love drive her to action as irresistibly as her angry thoughts (iras), and now
they act in concert.” (Costa 1973: 149)
243
Boyle also comments on the adjoinment of Medea’s ira and amor here, pointing out that this connection is
highlighted through the elision which “melts ira into amor”. (Boyle 2014: 342)
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See Glare 2012: s.v. causa. Boyle also suggests that causa is used “in its legal sense” here, suggesting
thatMedea is pursuing a warped form of justice. (Boyle 2014: 342) Boyle’s comments do not discuss possibility
that this use of causa may also allude to the cause of Medea’s present condition.
245
Glare 2012: s.v. frenare.
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like a wild animal which must be restrained.246 Medea, however, does not know how to
restrain her ira, perhaps because it is joined with amor, and as a result she is overcome by
madness and lashes out against Jason. This is another way in which this passage recalls De Ira:
both suggest that ira is a desire for revenge.247
In the final scene of the play, immediately before Medea commits her firt act of infanticide,
she relates that the Furies have suddenly appeared and that they are pursuing her (958-971).
She also states that the shade of her brother is approaching with dispersis…membris (scattered
limbs), an obvious allusion to her treatment of his body after she murdered him. She describes
this scene in vivid detail, but it is not clear whether these ghastly figures are objectively real and
observable to others, or whether they are visions that can only be seen by Medea (and thus
imagines).248 In Hercules’ situation, Amphitryon offers confirmation that Hercules is perceiving
a falsum caelum (954), but no other character comments on Medea’s perceptions and their
nature ultimately remains unclear. As Gill observes, Medea “seems to have gone mad, and to
be the victim of hallucinations of the Furies and of her dead, dismembered brother [italics
added].”249 Even Medea appears to acknowledge the uncertainty of her perceptions, as she
refers to the image of her brother as an incerta umbra (964). In acknowledging that the shade
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Romm also notes that ira is a major theme in both De Ira and Medea, and while he acknowledges that the two
works deal with ira in rather different ways, he speculates they are similar enough in this interest that they “might
well have been composed concurrently.” (Romm 2014: 76)
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2000: 204, see also 205)
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Gill 1987: 35-36.
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is incerta, Medea demonstrates some degree of self-awareness, unlike Hercules when he
perceives his visions. The use of the word incerta also invokes the uncertainty which Medea
exhibits throughout the play in her mental state and physical condition, and which now
manifests itself in her sensory perceptions. Thus, Medea’s level of self-awareness is highly
problematized at a crucial moment in the play, when we see her furor/ira/amor in full effect.
Medea’s perception that she is being pursued by the Furies and her dead brother seems to
be influenced by other things that are going on around her in this scene, namely the fact that
she is being pursued by Jason. There is no doubt about the reality of Jason’s pursuit, as he calls
out to others for help with his pursuit: “Here, bring your weapons, here, brave company of
warriors, overturn the house from its foundations”(huc, huc fortis armiferi cohors / conferte
tela, vertite ex imo domum. 980-981). In this way, there is some correspondence between the
two kinds of perceptions Medea is experiencing—one kind which may not be completely
objectively real, and the other kind which is more objectively grounded in objective reality. This
is similar to how Hercules’ visions are depicted: although they are deeply distorted versions of
reality, they still reflect important elements of reality, such as the violence and disorder present
in the scene. It is apparent that the pursuit of the Furies and the pursuit of Jason become
conflated in Medea’s mind when she becomes alarmed by a sudden noise after killing of one
her sons:
Quid repens affert sonus?
Parantur arma meque in exitium petunt.
What sudden noise is coming forth?
They are preparing arms and seeking to kill me. (972-973)
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The subject of petunt is not specified, and this reflects the ambiguity of Medea’s perceptions. It
is unclear whom she is referring to when she states that “they are preparing arms and seeking
to kill me”—“they” could be either the Furies or Jason and his supporters. Jason begins to
speak shortly after this (978), which raises further questions about the source of the sonus
Medea hears. It is possible that she is experiencing an auditory hallucination on top of her
possible visual hallucinations.250 There are very few references to auditory hallucinations in
Greek and Latin literature—they are rare in both poetic tragedies and writings on medicine.251
Celsus, for one, does not discuss any kind of hallucination other than those which are visual in
nature (i.e. imagines). Nor does Celsus discuss the possibility, suggested here and in Hercules
Furens, that the content of a person’s hallucinations might reflect some aspect of reality and/or
have some relationship to a person’s psychological experience. Celsus cites Ajax and Orestes as
examples of individuals known to have experienced imagines, but he does not offer any insight
into the content of their imagines, nor how their imagines might relate to their psychological
experience or identity. These are the kinds of things that Seneca is interested in exploring with
Medea and Hercules. With both characters, he suggests that heightened states of madness
distort the sensory experience and thus blur the lines between reality and illusion, selfawareness and ignorance, and what is and what is not sane.
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Boyle’s commentary only states that Medea is responding to “noises offstage”, which does not offer any
clarification about whether we should understand these sounds as actually audible, or whether they might be
auditory hallucinations because they are not part of drama on stage. (Boyle 2014: 370)
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Harris 2013: 302-306, with 304 n. 89. Harris notes that auditory hallucinations are described by Aretaeus, an
author who wrote on medicine in Greek most likely in the first century CE. Aretaeus described a symptom of
mania involving the experience of “ringings and rumblings In the ears which can even sound like trumpets and
flutes”. (On the Causes and Signs of Chronic Diseases 1.6)
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Chapter Conclusions
This chapter has explored nuances of usage through close reading of specific passages, and
in doing so has uncovered some recurring themes. In Celsus’ De Medicina, the noun insania
refers to the most general category of what I have been calling “madness”, and it is divided into
three specific forms: phrenesis, an acute form of madness associated with fever; a longerlasting form of madness characterized by tristitia which is not given its own name; and an even
longer-lasting, also unnamed form of madness which is divided into two groups—those who
perceive imagines, and those who are said to be deceived by their own minds (animo
desipiunt). Within phrenesis and his third form of insania, Celsus describes further sub-types
based largely upon whether a person is tristis or hilaris. Celsus’ tripartite scheme is probably
not meant to account for each and every instance of this kind of “madness”; this is suggested
by his reference to other conditions that do not neatly fit into the scheme, such as delirium and
lethargus.
While Celsus is interested in cataloguing, in taxonomy, in labels, Seneca's prose is deeply
suspicious of passionate extremes and interested in controlling them. For their part, Seneca’s
prose texts Epistulae 29, 59, 83, and 94, De Ira, Naturales Quaestiones, and De Tranquillitate
Animi describe various kinds of insania, using a range of adjectives (brevis, voluntaria, hilaris,
publica), while also considering ebrietas to be a form of insania. These categories are applied
rather loosely, and do not closely correspond to Celsus’ tripartite schematization. In both his
prose works and his tragedies, Seneca closely associates insania with the terms ira and furor. I
have argued that to describe the three terms as simply synonymous or interchangeable is to be
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insufficiently attentive to nuance, and at the same time to miss valuable interpretive
opportunities. For example: Seneca’s preoccupation with ira as a type of insania or ‘dis-ease’ is
characteristic of his Stoically-colored views of the emotions and passions, while furor has a long
poetic pedigree. Other nuances are apparent with the various other terms recurring in Senecan
prose and poetry, such as the adjectives demens, amens, and vesanus. Attention to these
nuances is important, especially since Naturales Quaestiones and other works of Senecan prose
present a subtle continuum between “sanity” and “madness”, as is reflected in the usage of
terms such as sanitas and insania.
In the final part of this chapter I discuss two Senecan tragedies in which the theme of
“madness” plays a central role: Hercules Furens and Medea. A key term in both plays is furor,
which has a poetic pedigree and appears only three times in De Medicina. The title characters
of both Senecan tragedies are said to be afflicted by furor. Hercules’s furor is portrayed as an
irresistable force that puts him out of his mind, as is conveyed by the usage of words such as
amens and demens), rendering him blind (caecus) to his own actions. This sort of furor is
characterized by the perception of false visions (imagines) and by violence. Hercules’ furor
bears a complex relationship to his own characterization as a mythic hero, and this is reflected
in paradoxical uses of language describing his madness. Medea’s furor is driven by, and
identified with, ira and amor – a destructive combination which fits well with Stoic and other
kinds of philosophical responses to the emotions and passions. Initially, Medea is more selfaware in her furor/ira/amor than Hercules, but this self-awareness becomes more
problematized as the play goes on. At times, the relative madness or sanity of both Medea and
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Hercules is presented in an ambiguous way through the use of furor and other terms,
suggesting that a continuum between the categories of insania and sanitas, as in works of
Senecan prose. At the same time, however, I have suggested that Senecan poetry, in its
evocation of furor and insania, uses some of the language and imagery for disorders, illnesses,
and symptoms that we find in Celsus and elsewhere. In particular, I have observed some
overlaps in descriptions of morbus comitialis or epilepsy across Seneca’s De Ira, Hercules
Furens, and Celsus’ De Medicina, as well as other overlaps between Hercules’ condition in
Hercules Furens and various forms of insania in De Medicina. There is no exact
correspondence, however, between the description of Hercules’ condition in Hercules Furens
and any condition described by Celsus. Nor does Celsus’ presentation of madness feature
the paradoxical uses of language and imagery that we repeatedly see in Seneca’s tragedies, and
this is in keeping with Celsus’ attempt to establish a clear taxonomy of insania. In Celsus’
general categories of madness, there is little concern with individual cases and particular
experiences, whereas Seneca’s plays deeply explore the relationship between characters’
illnesses and their personal psychological experiences.
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Chapter V
Conclusions
Illness, in its various forms and manifestations, is an important but underexplored theme in
Senecan tragedy. It is found both in connection with individual characters who experience
illness, such as Thyestes, Phaedra, Hercules, and Medea, and in situations in which illness
affects society en masse and even the natural environment, as in Oedipus. Reading Seneca’s
tragedies in tandem with Celsus’ De Medicina—something which has not previously been done
in any systematic way—makes the plays’ themes, imagery, and language of illness leap out and
come into focus in a way not previously observed. Although Celsus is a major source for
medical thought in the Roman Empire, he is an author who has not been given enough
attention, especially in English-language scholarship. While Celsus is more interested than
Seneca in exploring medical history, theory, diagnosis, treatment, and practice, the two authors
employ a shared language of illness, often using vocabulary in comparable ways and in similar
contexts. By comparing differences in perspective and vocabulary usage, we can also arrive at a
better understanding of each author’s goals, strategies, and various rhetorical uses (and, in the
case of Seneca, poetic uses) of the language of illness. These texts can therefore be
productively read alongside one another and analyzed in a manner similar to how the Greek
tragedies and Hippocratic treatises have been compared in previous studies by scholars such as
Holmes and Kosak. As Kosak has noted, “Greek tragedy and Greek medical literature both treat
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forms of human suffering”1; my study has demonstrated that such a connection also exists
between Seneca’s Roman tragedies and Celsus’ contemporaneous medical prose.
In each of the three thematic chapters that comprise the body of this study, we find
fascinating connections and divergences between the writings of Seneca and Celsus. In Chapter
2, we see that both authors use various words in reference to the phenomenon of “illness”,
including terms often specifically connected with illness (e.g. pestis, pestilentia, morbus, aeger),
words with a more generic semantic core (e.g. lues, macies, tabes, virus), and finally words
broad enough to carry moral connotations (e.g. malum, vitium). Although each of these words
can be used in the sense of “illness”, they are certainly not “interchangeable”, as some scholars
have suggested. With each word, we find subtle semantic differences, and the significance of
these subtleties becomes increasingly evident through close reading, attention to context, and
textual comparison. These differences remind us that Latin, like English, possesses no
“synonyms” in the absolute sense, making it all the more important to pay attention to nuances
of usage, especially when dealing with closely-related vocabulary items such as these.
Seneca meaningfully exploits these subtleties in Oedipus, a play in which various words are
used to characterize both the illness of the character Oedipus and the ill condition of the city of
Thebes. The different words that are used call attention to specific aspects of Oedipus’
condition, specific aspects of the Theban plague, and the complex and frequently metaphorical
interplay between the two. Through Seneca’s use of vocabulary, Oedipus is portrayed as a
personification of illness, while the very society and environment of Thebes are shown to be
suffering in a medicalized state of illness. Nevertheless, no specific illness can be diagnosed for
1

Kosak 2004: 1.
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either Oedipus or Thebes, and this is suggested by the variety of words used in reference to
their conditions. Stricken by a pestis, lues, macies, tabes, vitium, and malum all at once,
Oedipus and Thebes both suffer from conditions that defy categorization and comprehension,
which frustrate attempts at treatment. Seneca’s complex and multifaceted portrayal of these
conditions becomes all the more apparent when we look at vocabulary usage in Celsus. These
comparisons supply a better understanding of the semantic range and possible connotations
for each piece of vocabulary. In her investigations of the Hippocratic Corpus, Kosak has
observed that “the idea that one must be able to classify disease and distinguish it from other
diseases in order to treat it is an important aspect of fifth century medicine.”2 This idea carries
over into the work of Celsus, while in Senecan tragedies such as Oedipus illness becomes a
perplexing and intractable problem in the absence of clear-cut definitions and identifications of
illness.
In Chapter 3, I examined the language and imagery of concealment and revelation in
connection with illness. Both Seneca and Celsus explore the role that symptoms play in
concealing or revealing illness and its causes, sometimes using highly similar language; these
connections have parallels in the corresponding genres of Greek literature: as Kosak has
observed, “Greek tragedy and Greek medical literature...[both] consider causes, seen and
unseen, diagnoses, and cures.”3 In Celsus’ medical encyclopedia, when symptoms are said to
be clearly observable, it generally indicates that there is a high potential for understanding
causes of illness, making a correct diagnosis, and administering treatment. Seneca’s tragedies,
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Kosak 2004: 56, with n. 28.
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on the other hand, are less optimistic about illness, presenting situations in which a cure or
healing still seems impossible even when causes are known and correct diagnoses are made.
Both authors also explore situations in which symptoms are unclear, hidden, or difficult to
interpret, and in such situations both authors suggest that the illness at hand is particularly
dangerous, sometimes because it is thought to occur without a cause.
In the Proemium to Book 1, Celsus provides an invaluable history of medicine in which he
discusses the empiricist and rationalist schools, explaining how each school understood
symptoms, causes of illness, the human body, and the interrelationship of these factors. He
discusses each school’s views on human dissection and human vivisection, and in doing so he
points out some important differences between these two practices, which were controversial
and rarely performed in antiquity. In Seneca’s tragic play Thyestes, we are offered a scene in
which these practices are depicted and the lines between them are blurred, particularly
through the complex characterization of Atreus, who assumes the role of medical doctor,
sacrificial priest, and vengeful brother all at once. Thyestes also complicates the relationship
between causes of illness, symptoms, and sensation—all process which are described more
straightforwardly in Celsus. Atreus is paradoxically able to describe symptoms of Thyestes’
illness before they even occur, while Thyestes is left to puzzle over why he is becoming ill
seemingly sine causa.
The situation is in many ways reversed in Phaedra, where Phaedra is painfully aware of the
passion she has for her step-son Hippolytus, and suffers in anguish as she struggles to keep her
feelings hidden. These efforts are betrayed by various obvious symptoms, but she is initially
able to conceal the nature of her condition from Hippolytus. Phaedra’s nurse, on the other
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hand, recognizes that Phaedra is quite ill, but she remains unable to offer any therapy or relief,
even after Phaedra reveals the nature of her illness. In this respect, the nurse’s experience is
comparable to the situation of Thyestes: each character begins to understand causes of illness
only through information confessed by another person, and not through readily observable
symptoms; moreover, in both cases, the understanding comes all too late. Even after Phaedra
makes her revelation to Hippolytus, the language and imagery of concealment continues,
suggesting that her condition ultimately remains incompletely understood. Rather than
facilitating diagnosis and treatment, as we would expect from Celsus’ discussion of evidentes
causae, Phaedra’s revelation results in both her own death and the death of Hippolytus. Both
Thyestes and Phaedra, then, portray the workings of illness both openly and in concealment,
the fruitless exploration of inexplicable causes, and the paradoxical potential of such
exploration to exacerbate, rather than relieve suffering.
In Chapter 4, we examine the Latin vocabulary of “madness”, which includes a broad range
of words associated with “mental” disorder, but often without excluding physical components.
Celsus uses various words in this semantic sphere, including the rather general insania. Celsus’
usage of this term in Book 3 serves as a very prominent example of his interest in categorizing
forms of illness, as he identifies three forms of insania, which are distinguished on the basis of
duration and other key differences. Another such example is Celsus’ interest in differentiating
between types of causae, as seen in Chapter 3. Celsus gives a specific name to only his first
category of insania (phrenesis), while also identifying various sub-types of the first and third
categories. In other sections of De Medicina, Celsus describes conditions which do not fit
within this tripartite scheme, but which can also be considered forms of madness (e.g. delirium,
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lethargus, “hysteria”). Despite his interest in categorizing, Celsus is not always clear or
consistent in his use of terminology. To a certain extent, these inconsistencies of usage and
sometimes vague descriptions detract from Celsus’ attempts to establish structured
classifications of insania. In part, these ambiguities speak to the complexities and difficulties
inherent to understanding and describing madness/mental illness. These complexities are no
less vexing even today, as mental illness remains a relatively poorly understood phenomenon,
with constantly changing terminology and little consensus concerning matters of usage among
psychologists, physicians, and theorists (to say nothing of popular usage).
Seneca’s letters and philosophical essays also show a significant interest in madness. In
passages of these prose works, Seneca uses vocabulary that appears in Celsus, most notably
insania, but he also uses words that Celsus rarely (e.g furor, ira) or never (e.g ira) uses in the
sense of “madness”. Unlike Celsus, Seneca is not much interested in categorizing forms of
madness, and he does not prioritize consistency of usage; this is seen not only when looking
across texts, but sometimes even within a single specific text. In certain texts, such as De Ira
and some of his Epistulae, Seneca uses the words such as furor and insania without a strong
differentiation in sense.
In his tragedies, Seneca uses vocabulary of madness in an even more open-ended way,
reflecting an interest in exploring the complexities and ambiguities of characters’ experiences,
rather than offering specific diagnoses or pigeonholing their experiences into specific
conditions. One word that Seneca uses in a particularly open-ended fashion is ira, which is
closely linked with insania and furor in Seneca’s tragedies as well as his philosophical prose,
making the lines between these conditions often quite blurry. Seneca’s tragedies, and to a
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lesser extent some of his prose works, also suggest that these conditions are not absolute
states, but rather points on a continuum which does not always have clear and distinct lines
between sanity and madness.
These ambiguities are particularly apparent in Hercules Furens, where Seneca’s vocabulary
usage highlights the often ill-defined boundaries between madness and sanity in the heroic
psyche. Although I identify some similarities between Seneca’s characterization of Hercules
and descriptions of morbus comitialis in both Senecan prose and in Celsus, as well as similarities
with Celsus’ description of phrenesis, none of these descriptions are similar enough to be used
to “diagnose” Hercules with those conditions. Nor does Hercules’ experience closely
correspond to any other condition identified by Celsus. One interesting similarity, however,
relates to Hercules’ perception of “visions”—an important component of his madness, and the
sort of experience that Celsus terms imagines and associates with two different forms of
insania. Despite this resonance, Seneca’s portrayal of Hercules’ condition ultimately consists of
an assemblage of various symptoms, all of which are mentioned by Celsus, but are not filed
under any single condition. This observation about Celsus’ usage allows us see that even
though Seneca’s representation of Hercules draws upon traditional depictions of heroic
furor/insania, Seneca also depicts Hercules’ madness as an elusive, unclassifiable form of
madness.
In Medea, the eponymous protagonist experiences a form of madness which initially seems
to be a manifestation of traditional love-sickness (amor). The word amor appears frequently
throughout the play, and it is repeatedly used in conjunction with ira, not unlike in Senecan
prose works such as De Ira. As the play moves forward, the complexity of Medea’s mental state
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becomes more and more apparent, especially with respect to her vacillating and sometimes
ambiguous state of self-awareness. For example, even while acknowledging her own furor,
Medea shows signs that she is losing control of her mental faculties. Ultimately, Medea’s
madness, like that of Hercules, cannot be classified or encapsulated by any single term, much
less identified with a single condition described by Celsus.
In each of these thematic chapters, we find that Seneca’s tragedies use language and
imagery which repeatedly present illness in a paradoxical and ironic light, while also calling
attention to matters of self-awareness. In these respects, a focus on illness reveals some of the
fundamental characteristics of these plays (and also, in fact, of much Senecan prose). In
Oedipus, for instance, the pestis that ravages the Theban people and environment seems to
spare Oedipus even though he himself is closely identified with the pestis. In Phaedra, the
titular character attempts to conceal her unspeakable passion, but she must contend with the
symptoms so vehemently erupting from her. In Hercules Furens, Hercules returns home after
completing a series of grueling labors meant to pacify the world, only to enter into a state of
blind furor and unknowingly wreak carnage upon his own family. The paradoxicality of these
situations is further underscored by paradoxical uses of language and imagery, producing the
impression that illness is larger-than-life, a source of unexpected and confounding experiences,
and beyond the realm of medical treatment and understanding. These elements of paradox
and surprise are in keeping with techniques and effects of Senecan poetics more generally.
In refusing to pin illness down semantically and conceptually, and in highlighting the complex
nature of the human experience of illness, Seneca’s plays differ from Celsus’ encyclopedic prose
in important ways. Unlike Seneca, Celsus generally seeks to delimit and close off semantic and
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conceptual possibilities, striving to present clear and straightforward ideas about how to
identify, classify, and treat various forms of illness. These key differences mirror some of the
differences that Kosak and Holmes have identified in their comparisons of Greek tragedy and
Greek prose texts on medicine. Much as I have observed with Seneca’s tragedies, Kosak
observes that the “stylized metaphorical language of [Greek] tragedy avoids mentioning the
mundane diseases from which members of its audience surely suffered.”4 Similarly, Holmes
remarks that Greek tragedy, more than any other genre she explores—including Hippocratic
treatises on medicine—explores the symptom as a locus of psychological and existential
significance, moving far beyond its capacity simply to reveal “facts” about the body.5 Whereas
Holmes focuses primarily on the symptom as a generator of meaning in Greek tragedy, my
study takes into account how meaning and ambiguity is generated in Roman tragedy not only
through the phenomenon of the symptom, but also through characters’ experiences of
suffering and their attempts at diagnosis and treatment. Not least of all, my study has also
explored how meaning is generated in Senecan tragedy through the use of language itself6—
particularly instances in which medicalized language is used in paradoxical, ironic, and
polysemic ways. Another difference is that Holmes’ study concentrates upon the symptom as a
way of exploring the emergence of concepts of the physical body and concepts of the self in
ancient Greece7, looking to a large variety of literary sources while attempting to situate these

4

Kosak 2004: 1.
see Holmes 2010: 229; 230-231.
6
This is, of course, not to say that Holmes completely eschews close analysis of language usage. She is also
interested in the uses of certain words (e.g. σῶμα [body]).
7
see Holmes 2010: 5.
5
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ideas about the body in a broader “history of ideas and practices”.8 My project, on the other
hand, has sought to illuminate the approaches, goals, and rhetorical strategies employed by
two contemporary authors, and this specific focus has allowed me to perform close readings of
extended passages that engage with matters of illness. In doing so, I have at times delved into
the “history of ideas and practices”, for example in Chapter 4, where I discuss the history of
dissection and vivisection as these practices relate to the depiction of Atreus’ mutilation of the
bodies of the children in Thyestes, and in Chapter 5, where I draw attention to perceptions of
mental health and mental illness across cultures and through history.
Despite their difference in approach, Seneca and Celsus demonstrate a shared interest in a
striking number of significant topics, including causes of illness, symptoms,
dissection/vivisection, plague/mass illness, and madness. Also striking are the similar ways in
which Seneca and Celsus use certain pieces of vocabulary, despite their differences in genre
and perspective. To be sure, we do find some significant differences in vocabulary usage, and
these differences sometimes speak to significant differences in rhetorical strategies and
approach, but this does not diminish the similarities and resonances uncovered in this study.
Seneca’s works provide many reminders that tragedies, works of philosophical prose, and
indeed writings in any other genre of Latin literature can be rich sources for language and
thought germane to the world of medicine. This may not be too surprising, given the
universality of illness in the human experience. But in view of the widespread nature of the
phenomenon of illness, and in view of this study’s observations about vocabulary usage in

8

See Holmes 2010: 8.

361

different genres of Latin literature, we should continue to question the distinctions which are
still often drawn between “literary” texts and “medical”/”technical” forms of writing.
Although this study has identified numerous resonances between Seneca and Celsus in both
subject matter and language usage, it bears repeating that it has not been this study’s mission
to show that there was any personal relationship or correspondence between the two authors.
This seems rather unlikely, but remains impossible to refute or confirm on the basis of our
current knowledge. Nor has this study endeavored to ascertain whether, as Stok and others
have speculated, Seneca may have read the works of Celsus9, or whether the opposite might be
true. Despite the approximate contemporaneity of their works, our ability to trace any
influence between the two authors seems beyond the limits of the available evidence.
Nevertheless, we can certainly say that an interest in illness and the usage of relevant
vocabulary deeply informs the writings of both Seneca and Celsus. In these respects, we have
found fertile grounds for comparison, similar to the inviting comparisons Kosak, Holmes, and
other have found in looking at Greek tragedy and the Hippocratic Corpus. The scholarship
comparing those corpora of Greek literature has generally focused on comparing language,
imagery, and ideas, rather than suggesting a direction of influence between authors or bodies
of literature, and my own study has taken a similar approach. Indeed, Kosak has observed a
“cross-fertilization in the terminology of illness between the two very different genres [of Greek
tragedy and the Hippocratic writings on medicine].”10 My study, which focuses even more
closely on language usage than Kosak’s (whose comparisons are focalized more through “the

9

Stok 1985: 418; Lana 1955: 73; Migliorini 1988: 52.
Kosak 2004: 10; cf. Guardasole 2000: 76-86.
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lens of ancient medical theory”11), has identified a similar intermingling of terminology in the
corresponding genres of Latin literature. And, although this study has not traversed far into the
realm Greek tragedy, I would even go a step further and state there are some respects in which
Celsus’ medical prose and Seneca’s tragedies bear an even stronger affinity than their Greek
counterparts. Most strikingly, both Celsus’ De Medicina and Seneca’s tragedies show a deep
interest in insania and other forms of madness. While madness is a prominent theme in the
Greek tragedies, it is not explored to a great extent in extant Hippocratic writings, as has been
noted by scholars such as Jouanna and Kosak.12
Future Research Directions
This dissertation opens the door both for a continuation of this study, expanded in scope,
and for further research in a variety of related areas. I hope to produce a larger and broader
version of this study not only by including other Senecan tragedies but also by connecting my
discussion of Seneca and Celsus with the work that has been done on the Hippocratic Corpus
and Greek tragedy, asking, for example, how doing so might inform our understanding of the
literary reception of Greek tragedies in imperial Rome. In Chapter 2, I make some brief
comparisons between Sophoclean and Senecan versions of Oedipus, and further comparisons
between these specific plays could make for an accessible article to acquaint a wider audience
with my interests. Inquiry into the literary reception of the language and imagery of illness
could also incorporate the fragmentary tragedies of the 3rd to early 1st centuries BCE Latin
authors Naevius, Ennius, Pacuvius, and Accius.
11
12

Kosak 2004: 11.
Jouanna 1987: 121-122; Kosak 2004: 8.
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In the realm of Senecan tragedy, there remains room for further inquiry into the
representation of Hercules’ illness in Hercules Oetaeus. Because Seneca’s authorship of this
play has often been called into question, it would be interesting to investigate more closely
how this play’s language and imagery of illness fits with representations in other Senecan
tragedies. Another Senecan tragedy that could be examined in more depth is Agamemnon,
particularly concerning the language and imagery associated with the characterization of
Cassandra in her maddened, prophetic state.13 Although Cassandra’s prophecies turn out to be
entirely accurate, other characters view her as “mad” and it would be interesting to examine
how this gap between the perception of Cassandra and the reality of her foresight is reflected
in language use. Such analysis could further round out the discussion of madness seen in
Chapter 4 of this study, while also providing an opportunity to examine how gender might
figure into representations of madness—another issue which deserves further attention.14
Although Celsus’ comments on madness rarely inspire questions about gender issues, Seneca’s
tragedies depict madness in both male and female characters and would thus lend themselves
to such analysis. As a yet broader and more ambitious goal, future studies could also look at
representations of madness in other works by Seneca which are not discussed in Chapter 4
(both poetry and prose) in order to obtain an even more comprehensive understanding of
madness in the Senecan oeuvre. This in turn could invite comparisons with representations of
madness in other texts, whether in Latin or Greek, thus deepening our understanding of

13

See esp. Agamemnon 710-807.
Mitchell-Boyask and Padel have performed some analysis of the relationship language associated with madness
and gender in Greek literature (Mitchell-Boyask 2012: 323-328; Padel 1995: 20; see also Padel 1992: 116-31, 15761), but little attention has been given to the matter in Latin literature.
14
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madness in the classical tradition more generally. Although madness and mental disorders
have been subjects of growing scholarly interest in recent years, these remain areas where
there is much room for new contributions.
This dissertation has delved into representations the human body: its interior, exterior, and
the sometimes nebulous boundaries in between. In this area, the work of scholars such as
Holmes and Kosak has provided some valuable cues, but there remains room for further
discussion, particularly in the realm of Latin literature. Indeed, the present study has not even
exhausted this subject with respect to Senecan tragedy (let alone his massive body of prose
works) or with respect to Celsus. Along these lines, I am interested in further examining the
various surgical procedures described in Books 7 and 8 of De Medicina. The present study
discusses some examples of vocabulary usage from those sections, but there is room for further
analysis, and I am especially interested in comparing Celsus’ descriptions of surgery and his
comments on dissection and vivisection in the Proemium from a linguistic, rhetorical,
conceptual, and ideological standpoint. More generally, I hope to further the discussion started
with Lloyd’s seminal article about dissection and vivisection in Greek and Latin literature (1975)
and von Staden’s article about the cultural context of dissection in ancient Greece (1992) by
performing close readings of poetic texts that represent comparable procedures and/or
mutilations of the body, human and otherwise. In this regard, one passage from Senecan
tragedy that offers rich potential for further analysis is the extispicium scene in Seneca’s
Oedipus (303-383), where Tiresias and Manto attempt to interpret the disordered organs of a
heifer. I briefly touch upon this scene in the present study, but I would like to explore in further
depth comparisons of the language and imagery in the extispicium scene and language and
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imagery in the scene from Thyestes where Atreus “investigates” the bodies of Thyestes’
children, since the latter scene invokes elements of both dissection/vivisection and extispicium.
I am also interested in studying representations of the human body in various other authors,
including some who influenced Seneca, such as Virgil and Ovid, and some whom Seneca
influenced, such as Lucan. The present study has briefly touched upon these authors,
comparing instances of language usage with language used by Seneca, but there remains room
for further discussion and for new contributions concerning the representation of the human
body in each author. It would be especially interesting to consider representations of nonhuman bodies, such as those of animals, satyrs and other hybrid creatures, gods, etc.—a
subject which has not been given a great deal of attention in either Greek or Latin literature.
For this topic, Ovid’s Metamorphoses would be particularly relevant, not only because it is a
work with many parallels to language usage in Senecan tragedy, but also because it portrays
the bodies of many different kinds of beings in various states of transformation. In addition, it
would be fascinating to explore the ways in which authors such as Ovid attribute vocabulary of
madness to animals and other non-human beings; this, I believe, offers much potential to
deepen our understanding of the usage of Latin vocabulary of madness in general, and more
specifically how such vocabulary is applied to human beings.
This dissertation has the advantage of comparing Seneca’s works with a contemporary work
on medicine, but future studies could branch out by looking at later Latin prose works that deal
with medical topics, such as Pliny the Elder’s Naturalis Historia, Theodorus Priscianus’ Rerum
Medicarum Libri Quatuor, and Caelius Aurelianus’ De Morbis Acutis et Chronicis. I am also
interested in exploring earlier works that deal with medical topics, such as Cicero’s De Natura
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Deorum and De Senectute, and Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura. Comparing terminology used by
these authors with terminology in the works of Seneca and Celsus would provide a broader
understanding of how the terminology is used across various periods of Latin literature. One
specific piece of terminology that has been largely left out of this study, mainly because of its
semantic breadth, is dolor (one could no doubt write a book on this word alone). Because it is a
word with both mental and physical senses and connotations, dolor and other words in the
semantic sphere of “pain” would be particularly interesting to examine. Scholars such as Rey
and Allen have surveyed the usage of dolor and representations of pain in Greek and Latin
literature, but there remains room for more in-depth discussion of these topics in Seneca and
Celsus.
Reflections on the Medical Humanities
It is my hope that this study makes a contribution not only to our understanding of Seneca,
Celsus, ancient medicine, and Latin literature more generally, but also to the developing field of
the medical humanities. This interdisciplinary field embraces the study of medicine through the
lenses of literature, history, philosophy, the social sciences, and the arts as a means to new
insights and perspectives on illness, health, medical practice, and the like. Studying medical
issues through these lenses can also foster cultural awareness and sensitivity to various aspects
of contemporary medical practice and ethics. The present study comes at a time when the field
of the medical humanities is both inspiring and drawing increased inspiration from various
humanistic fields, including Greek and Roman Studies. The spirit of the medical humanities is
very much alive in the present study’s close readings and analyses of Seneca and Celsus, and I
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hope my study will in turn encourage readers to reflect upon the practices, perceptions,
preconceptions, and ideologies that are entrenched in modern medicine. Throughout this
dissertation, I have tried to be aware of cultural differences, and I have tried not to impose
modern views, frameworks, and sensibilities upon the ancient texts. I hope that this can help
motivate readers to reexamine aspects of modern medicine that are often taken for granted or
too readily accepted. In view of the ideas and ancient texts I have examined, we might reexamine certain aspects of modern medicine, such as the dichotomy between “mental” and
“physical” illness; the idea that illness and health are diametrically opposed states; the nature
and dynamics of the doctor-patient relationship; perceptions of dissection and vivisection; and
other ideas and practices that deserve continued dialogue, critique, and assessment from the
medical community and the general public alike. By reflecting upon how ancient authors such
as Seneca and Celsus describe, frame, and ruminate upon matters such as these, we can
become more equipped to think critically about present-day medical practices, traditions,
ideologies, and institutions.
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